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P R E C I S
In the eight chapters which follow I have 
attempted to explore and to analyse philosophically 
the concept of criminal intention in the common law.
My central thesis has been that the concept owes its 
origins in the common law to the Christian tradition 
in philosophy and religious thinking. I selected 
passages wherein the concept is used, showing its 
usage in Greek thought, early Christian theological 
and penitential writings, and then its flowering in 
the Middle Ages, through to the time of the last 
mediaeval legal mind of English law, who was Sir 
Matthew Hale. I then take the reader from the period 
of Sir Matthew Hale to our own time when the concept 
of mens rea takes on a vigourous intellectual life 
through the efforts of law commissions and modern 
legal scholars in their attempts to define the con­
cept clearly, and then to show how it works as a 
concept in nodern criminal cases.
I have argued that criminal intention has 
its roots back in the Christian tradition of the 
Will in its relation to the Intellect. I have used 
pertinent passages from case law and from legal authors 
to demonstrate that the concept carries with itself 
its Christian origins by echoing older and more tra­
ditional understandings of Will and Intellect. I have 
held that many of the modern problems as to formulating 
criminal intention in a proper way spring from our not 
understanding the early roots of the common law concept.
By returning to the roots of the concept and by coming 
to understand the language whereby the concept developed 
through the Middle Ages, one may develop a greater facility 
to understand and to appreciate some of the modern problems 
which the concept of mens rea now presents. A general ap­
preciation of its philosophical past may relieve some of 
the confusion surrounding the concept presently.
J.M.B .Crawford, A.B., M.A., J.D 
Attorney and Counsellour at Law
Whitsunday Term, 1985.
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I N T R O D U C T I O N
When I set forth to write this dissertation 
I had in mind to explain the workings of what I believed 
to be a simple concept, that of criminal intention. As 
my research progressed, I found that the concept was neither 
simple ( in any legal sense ), nor was it to be simply lo­
cated ( in any jurisprudential sense ). Criminal intention 
in the common law was a broad concept, whose origins lay 
deeply and obscurely submerged. It was revealed through 
philosophical, moral and legal usage, and that usage itself 
had rich religious overtones which emanated from Christian 
thought. My first draft of my work was overly compendious.
When I revised what I had written I decided to concentrate 
upon a portion of the whole, and to give my reader an archi­
tectonic view of the early roots of criminal intention. But 
by doing so, one still proceeds with modesty and caution. The 
exploration of the concept did not bring one into a territory 
with clear markings and boundaries. One had a number of sources, 
and from those sources one proceeded to argue what they may en­
tail, how they functioned conceptually, and what, in the end, 
they did mean. Any literary critic or historian, amongst other 
thinkers, knows that there is no single way to interpret a text 
or its worth, and also that there is, generally, no single text 
to which one can anchor an idea and its growth.
1 1
These eight chapters will show the reader that my 
own technicque of presentation arose from a blend of law 
and linguistic philosophy. As a young man, I was smitten 
by the dazzling technique of the late J.L.Austin when he 
analysed philosophical problems, and his style infected me.
I also had a great appreciation for mediaeval philosophers 
with their sustained ability to analyse closely and well.
But my sources as a writer and thinker did not end there.
I am also a lawyer. The method of the common law, with its 
forms and styles of argument, are familiar to me because they 
are part of my professional life. In law I had two mentors.
One was Professor Glanville Williams, emeritus of Jesus College, 
Cambridge, whose impetus, direction and writings moved me to 
consider legal philosophy and lawyering. My second mentor, 
from a distance, was Lord Denning, M.R., from whose decisions 
at law I learned how to analyse and use case law, and also to 
have a sense of the ages of law. It was to him that I was in­
debted for the insight that case law incorporates and recapitulates 
its past. He was also kind enough to write a preface to a small 
book another and I wrote some years ago.
I had been struck by how little of substance there had 
been written about common law legal philosophy. I do not mean to 
assertthis rashly, nor do I make such a comment apodeictically, 
but the jurisprudence of the common law is sparse. In our own 
times, the names of Hart, Williams, Goodhart and Denning have 
given new life to a subject thought to be passe1 . As for
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the criminal law, little of theory had been written of 
it. A fine theorist of the common law of crimes has 
been Glanville Williams, and even there his books have 
been written with the Cambridge law student in mind who 
will sit, in time, his barristers' or solicitors’ exami-' 
nations for practice. The ’’grand" theorists of law and
moral theory Hobbes, Locke, Kant, Adam Smith----are not
common law theorists by any shape of the mind.
A peculiarity about the common law is that it has 
been a method devised by use. Where other forms of law, 
most notably the Civilian law of the Continent, and the 
adaption of that style of law by Scotland, have general 
first principles to which one may appeal, the common law 
was a method which developed in a culture and milieu and 
which used as principles- whatever that culture and milieu , 
presented. One writer has gone so far as to say that legal 
philosophy is parasitic * * and does not have a genuine form 
of its own. I would assert, however, that the common law does 
have a form of its own, and its form can be gleaned from the 
nature and purposes of the law itself.
This last statement may need clarification.
X, Said by Ronald Dworkin in the Preface to Readings in the Phi­
losophy of Law (Oxford).
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What may be the purpose of a law can be understood 
as a twofold statement. The law may embody legislative in­
tent, and this is the first and immediate answer to the 
question, What does this law mean ? The meaning of the law 
is answered in what purpose that law was to achieve. There 
is a momentary problem which may be academic only: namely, 
what if the law, as constructed by the law-making power, is 
a law which is not sententially well-defined ? The simple 
case is of the general proscription that No Vehicles May Pro­
ceed On The Lawn Of This Park. The law-making power may leave 
the matter to the discretion of the Gourts to interpret and to 
fashion what it means for a vehicle not to proceed in the park, 
and then, at the same time, for the Court to fashion exceptions 
to what appears to be a general, blanket statement of pro­
hibition. The ’’twofold" element is that the Courts function 
as neutral arbiters whose aim it is to make sense out of legal 
propositions. What may seem to be a logical howler an unwork­
able law may be sent back to the legislature to be amended be­
cause the Courts can make no sense of the law. However, key 
concepts cannot be sent back to the legislature. They are used 
by the legislature, and are derived from common linguistic usage. 
Say what one will, the power of the legislature to form a per­
fect legal language is limited. The legislature may be able to 
define how a certain term may be used in a statute, such as when
V’malice’ is.used in an arson statute to mean ’wilful’. ’
But legislatures, as law-making powers, do not construct 
abstract legal systems in pure language. Law-making bodies 
use a language of the community, which language may be re­
fined for some purposes.
It is at this point that the legal philosopher faces 
difficulties in the common law. My own objecti.ve when under­
taking this research was not that of one who wished to de­
vise and compose a logical and legal language in which the 
term ’intention’ would operate, as one might do who was con­
cerned with creating artificial logical language systems. By 
the same token I was not concerned with the project of writing 
a history of the common law, thereupon to write chiefly about 
intention. My concern was to blend the methods of both legal 
and philosophical analysis for the purpose of understanding how 
the concept of criminal intention functioned, and what may have 
been its roots and sources.
To undertake this doing necessitated that I work with 
texts of the common law: cases, statutes, all kinds of legal
2. Washington Criminal Code: RCW 9A.48.020 Arson in the first 
degree. (1) A person is guilty of arson in the first degree
if he knowingly and maliciously:
(a) Causes a fire or explosion which is manifestly dan­
gerous to any human life including firemen....”
treatises and hornbooks, and then an even wider range of 
philosophical and theological literature which, in my es­
timation, may have had bearing upon the development and rami­
fications of a general legal concept in the criminal law.
A central question may be: what is philosophical enterprise ?
I did not feel constrained to pre-define what I was 
attempting to do, to ask myself: Is it philosophy ? The 
habit of mind which developed between the two great wars as 
to what philosophical enterprise was greatly freed me, I be­
lieved, from the older approach to philosophy which required 
that one "prove" that one was doing philosophy. One can re­
call the older scholastic textbooks or handbooks which would 
set out in the beginning two objectives: to show that this 
book was ad. mentem Sanctae Thomae, and then to show that this 
was philosophy, done by defining the formal and material ob­
ject of philosophical discourse. This rigourous form is little 
longer practised today. Philosophical enterprise today is great 
ly varied. One assumes that such enterprise can accommodate 
Brand Blandshard, Ludwig Wittgenstein, Jacques Maritain, Gilbert 
Ryle, Alfred North Whitehead, however dissimilar each may be to 
the other. (One can recall the review by one distinguished 
scholar of law of the work of another distinguished scholar of 
law in which the one labelled the seminal philosophical work
of the other as "...Monopoly writ large.") „
What became evident for me during the course 
of my research was to observe the nature of case law, 
especially case law used in criminal cases. When cases 
were cited by the Court in a leading decision, one saw 
that the case recapitulated its past, and that one was 
led back and back into time, like a set of Russian dolls 
which had other dolls inside of them. A case as cited 
was never an objective fact, a something. It was more 
of an indication, over and through time, about how a central 
idea might have developed and was used, and even how it 
changed ( as when later case law would over-rule earlier 
case law ). A case contained a past, but that past was 
often muted, with but a suggestion of any origins of a major 
idea or legal concept. The cases were more like the rings 
within the trunk of a tree, the other rings incorporating 
a past which the inner rings of the tree contained. One 
was not working with simple logical propositions to which 
one might assign simple values. Much to the contrary; one 
was working with complicated sentences within a complicated 
literary form, that of the written case, and one had to learn
3 .
3, Cf., John T. Noonan, Jr., and his review of The Concept of Law 
by H.L.A. Hart: Natural Law Forum, 1962, volume 7 ( Notre Dame 
Law School ), pp 169-177, Noonan plainly rejected Hart’s 
analysis of law, stating that Hart’s model of rules was imperfect. 
"The static and abstract model of rules whose end is to perpetuate 
themselves does not exist in any social situation....It is not 
an analysis of law in a live society.” I cite this only to sug­
gest that great minds can differ greatly as to what constitutes 
an endeavour done properly.
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how to tease the meaning and the sense of the case from 
its written form. Any who have studied law, especially 
law as taught by the Socratic method in an American law
school, will realise how difficult this exercise can be
(and even how some never attain to an expertise in it).
If the form of a poem can be difficult ( one thinks of 
a metaphysical sonnet, for instance ), the form of legal 
language can be equally difficult.
To me ,the "clue" for my progress was given 
in the law itself as it had been set down over the ages.
I would try to concentrate only on a short period of time, 
but however diligent and well-resolved I was in my efforts,
I was constantly pushed back into legal time. The twentieth 
century would lead me to the former century, and so on.
Judges were in time, certainly; but judges seemed also to be 
outside of time, with a sense of the transtemporal and of the 
transcultural. Lord Denning, M.R., for instance, time and time
again would refer to the whole gamut of English case law when
he would decide a major case. At the same time, however, there 
was no clear pathway into the past. Legal texts from the past 
were difficult to obtain, or might be held only in a few li­
braries; hence, my method included citing the text when I wrote 
of it, for convenience to my reader. But also my reason for 
citing a text was to let a reader see the language of the case,
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and to permit the reader to determine for himself, by an 
appeal to the case, if my analysis had been correct. In 
this way I followed the discipline of the law which was to 
make evidence public. I also followed the discipline of the 
law which embodies the assumption that no single interpretation 
will be the final interpretation, or the ultimate interpretation 
of what a legal text may mean. One offers an interpretation 
of a case, and one then hopes that one’s evidence will sup­
port one’s particular understanding of that text. But one’s 
particular understanding of a text does not entail that one 
is uniquely correct in one’s interpretation.
No doubt there will be portions of my research with
which one will disagree, just as a judicial tribunal may have
the opinion of the majority, the opinion of the minority, and
middle opinion between the two, as is seen in some cases from
the United States Supreme Court in which a deciding opinion can­
*
not be determined because the Court decided 4-1-4. I had fol­
lowed the habit of the law to make all of my judgements public, 
and to have put down that evidence which directed me in forming 
my judgements.
When I came to deal with foreign languages chiefly
Latin 1 have provided the Latin text itself, and then have
attempted to render the sense of the text into English. I have 
attempted to make the English readable, and hence have eschewed
* For instance, as with the decision in
University of California Regents v. Bakke,
438 U.S. 265, 98 S.Ct. 2733, 57 L.Ed.2d 750 (1978).
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literalness. Some may be offended by this approach toJf
translating, and for that reason they will have before 
them the original text which will protect them against 
my latitude as a translator. As to the actual making sense 
of (say) a mediaeval passage, I have had to rely upon what 
seemed to me to be the sense of the text, and that was to 
have made a personal choice. When I used older texts in 
which a curious textual shorthand was printed, I tried to 
reproduce that shorthand in my selection as far as possible.
What may seem like a deliberate misprint is, more than not, 
how the text appeared in the edition I had, and I chose not 
to "sic" every line of the text. The date given in the citation 
to the text may indicate to the reader the antiquity of any 
textual citation.
In the last twenty years or so there has been a re­
birth of Latin translating; but that rebirth has also brought 
about a variety of tastes and styles as to what constitutes a 
fine translation. I have fallen into the tradition which chose 
readability over preciseness, and there I may say that I am in­
clined to follow the late John Rickaby, S.J., and Msgr. Ronald 
Knox, who was a biblical translator. Father Rickaby was an 
Edwardian Jesuit whose elegance in rendering Latin into English, 
for those who could not comprehend Aquinian Latin, was prize form 
however, he irritated strict constructionists. I am neither a 
Rickaby nor a Knox, but I do admire what they did.
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As to the status of my research, I very much doubt 
if it has exhausted the halls of scholarship. What I did was 
to work with what I could find, and that very often was to find 
a sole edition of some treatise which interested me and which 
I thought had bearing upon my major concern. The problem always 
was: where is the text ? The text or texts very often were not 
to be found for the simple reason that the books had been lost, 
either because their influence waned and one was left unaware 
that a certain author may have influenced someone or other, or 
the text itself was unavailable. It is just in recent years, 
for instance, that we are gaining a bibliography of legal writings 
of the previous centuries. The adjacent problem also always with 
me was that few philosophers were concerned with the common law.
One did not have a vast body of philosophical literature about 
the common law to consult. One had a few living names whom, 
chances were, one knew personally.
There was a last and single problem which, I hope, I 
have overcome. Too often the attitude of lawyers towards any 
speculative questions about fundamental legal problems is to 
say that law is for the lawyers, and only so. I have rejected 
this position. When I began my research, I began as a philoso­
pher who was greatly interested in the law, and I had not intended 
to write a law book for lawyers about law. I had intended to in­
vestigate and, hopefully, understand with some competence a compli­
cated concept. I had also intended that a non-lawyer might read
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what I had written and thereby gain some appreciation about 
how the law works in one general area: that of assigning cri­
minal responsibility for one’s actions. That I had also be­
come a practising lawyer was one of those accidental but re­
warding outcomes of my research, and I hope that I have com­
bined for the reader the best of both interesting worlds which 
law and philosophy equally present. But my fundamental pre­
mise was to introduce one to a legal idea and the philosophical 
assumptions which lay behind it. It has only been because of 
the necessity of compression that I have confined myself to a 
lesser area which deals with early foundations for the concept 
of criminal intention.
There should be that kernal to the law which every man 
can appreciate. The common law directs all of us under its juris­
diction to follow the law, and it is thought to be the genius of 
the common law that it has roots in the community, which members 
of the community can appreciate and even understand. I had found, 
and hope I have presented it clearly, that the common law began 
with an already rich tradition which spoke of the will of man and 
of the mind of man, and that from that rich conceptual past our 
fundamental conceptions of intention sprang. But from that rich 
linguistic past there also sprang not a single conception of what 
mind or will meant when predicated of human behaviour, but there 
sprang many different formulations of what those key terms indicated
xiii
Two areas of law did not specifically concern me.
I did not write at length about insanity as a separate topic, 
nor did I pursue juvenile law. Of the former, I believe that 
one now needs to be properly educated in medicine and the litera­
ture of psychiatry, which I am not, to make a thorough contri­
bution to the topic. Less than that, and one is writing about
the history of the plea of insanity, which is outside my in­
terest as a philosopher. Of the latter, juvenile law, my be­
lief now is that this has become, as of late, a topic well unto 
itself, and deserves a separate monograph. When I took my de­
gree in law I did special study in the subject, but that study 
involved me more in the practice of juvenile law than in framing 
any theories about it as a legal subject and as a subject de­
serving of philosophical investigation. A major problem about 
juvenile law-----and this is said as an aside and not as an argu­
ment of merit----- is that it stumbles because it mixes certain con­
cepts which might better be left unmixed. I will detail two 
such problems.
4Traditionally, * until the time of modern juvenile acts, 
juvenile law followed canon law for the most part. There was 
assumed to be that period of a youth’s life in which the commission 
of a crime could not be attributed to him, and the age of such 
legal innocence was put at seven. It was then assumed that from
4. Cf., The History of the Criminal Liability of Children, by 
A.W.G. Kean, Vol. LIII, No. 211, July,1937, THE LAW QUARTERLY 
REVIEW, pp 364-371. One may also wish to read: The Infancy De- 
f ense in the New Juvenile Court, 31 U . C . L . A . L .Rev . 5TT3 (1"9'84"5 
by A .M.Walkover.
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seven to fourteen, a youth was presumed not capable of com­
mitting a crime, but that such a presumption was rebuttable 
by the Crown or the prosecutor upon a showing of proper evidence. 
What that evidence might entail was a mixed bag, and that it
5was evidence at all has been sorely criticised by some scholars. *
Modern courts, however, especially now that many of them must 
administer criminal law under new juvenile codes, find a problem 
with making sense of criminal responsibility in a youth. A youth 
does some act which is particularly harmful, but rather than to 
admit that it was a "youthful" act, which may be all the explana­
tion one can give for the acts of a minor, the court presses 
to devise some method whereby the presumption of innocence be­
cause of youth is removed, and this procedure often involves a 
criminal court in fanciful operations. It is, to reflect on the 
older parlance of moral philosophy, to ask for an exactness which 
a subject cannot give. The court may be fanciful and determine 
that it, as a court, must by use of a legal fiction import the 
requisite mens rea to the act in order to find culpability, but 
afterwards mitigate the punishment because of the youthfulness of
5. Cf., For a criticism of capacity tests because they do not 
embody clear standards to determine whether a child has the 
capacity or not to form mens rea, cf., "Children and Young 
Persons", Chapter 21, inrCRIMINAL LAW, The General Part, pp 
804-852, by Glanville Williams (Stevens, 1961).
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the offender or the court may invent a test in which it
holds that the court must determine if the youth has the ca-
7 'pacity to form mens rea *, whereupon one standard of evidence 
will be applied to test for capacity, and another standard of
g
evidence will be applied for mens rea♦ *
Juvenile law especially illustrates the inventiveness 
of the law-making process ( the laws which a legislature make 
and which a Court must uphold and interpret ) in its quest 
for social perfection. If the aim of the law through the cri­
minal sanction is to promote a peaceful society in which the 
rights, duties, obligations of each member are protected and 
respected, then the duty of the legislature is create that 
(ideal) set of legal propositions which, when enforced, will 
bring about those practical ends of a pacific society. The rub, 
however, is that such ends are practical. The practical, as a 
concept, defies simple formulation ( and I very much doubt if 
one need track out all of the commentary upon that notion from 
the time of the Nicomachean Ethics, VI, 1140a, ff.)
6. Cf., In Re Davis, 299 A.2d. 856 (1973).
7. Cf., State v . Q .D ., 102 Wn.2d 19 (1984) at 24: "Capacity must 
be found to exist separate from the specific mental element of 
the crime charged."
8. Ibid., Part II, [3], pp 25-26. Also cf., State v. Allen, 70 
W n .2d 698, 424 P.2d 1021 (1967): ..
Il,rhe true test of the competency of a young child as a witness con­
sists of...*,: (1) an understanding of the obligation to speak the truth on the 
witness stand; (2) the mental capacity at the time of the occurrence concerning 
which he is to testify, to receive an accurate impression of it;(3) a memory suf­
ficient to retain an independent recollection of the occurrence;(4) the capacity 
to express in words his memory of the occurrence; and (5) the capacity to under­
stand simple questions about it."
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Juvenile law begins with the premise that a child 
cannot, generally, be a moral agent in the eyes of the law; 
however, as the child matures ( a concept which the juvenile 
law does not define j proof may be offered in a prosecution 
for a criminal offense that the child understood the nature 
and quality of its acts, and that such acts may fall within 
the circle of acts having been done responsibly, and thus are 
acts which, in the face of the criminal law, may be punished.
But how is one to frame exact definitions and form exact para­
meters so that a developing child may, somehow, be liable for 
adult punishment which flows from adult responsibility for its 
acts ? It solves nothing to assert that a ’’definitional stop” 
must occur; that may only be a way of disguising arbitrariness.
The tension whi'ch occurs in juvenile law is between the extent 
of the legal notions and propositions which the legislature 
makes, against how any Court interprets and then applies what 
it seems to think is the. meaning of those propositions about 
juvenile offenses. The tension is between the primary law-making 
powers C the legislature ) and the secondary law-making powers 
( the Courts ), and I would argue that such tension reveals it­
self in how the language of one power is at odds with the language 
of another power.
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A further concern of the juvenile law was to avoid
the harshness of criminal penalties which, in the past, were
gvisited upon those of tender years. * The criminal sanction
as it is administered by the juvenile courts seems to stumble 
upon the obvious perception of common sense: namely, that there 
may be something about youth which ought to permit immaturity to 
be a defense, in and of itself, to crimes under an adult code.
How often have I seen a psychiatrist or psychologist throw 
his hands up in despair when he is asked to determine if a 
youth has the "capacity" to commit a crime, when, in fact, the 
question which should be addressed is that a youth does not yet 
have the maturation to appreciate what he knows. At the very 
most a youth may have, technically, performed the actus reus 
of a nominate offence. I would argue that the addressee of 
a criminal ordinance or law is, generally, an adult and not a 
youth. When a youth is addressed, one concentrates upon the harm 
done ( as though one were speaking about tort or delict models of 
behaviour ) and less upon refined criminal liability. Jeremy 
Bentham’s observation about intention may be appealed to in order 
to express an insight into human behaviour:
"Whether a man commits an offence knowingly and 
willingly or unwillingly and undesignedly, the immediate 
evil is exactly the same. But the alarm which results is 
very different. We regard him who has done an evil with 
knowledge and design, as a bad and dangerous man. He who 
has done an evil without designing and without knowing it, 
is looked upon as a man to be feared only by reason of his 
inadvertence or his ignorance."
9. Cf., 1 HPC 25, in which Hale, CJ., cites the case of the boy 
hanged for arson whose age was eight years.
10. The Theory of Legislation, by Jeremy Bentham (London, 1950), 
page 24 9, chpt vi, "The Influence of Intention on Alarm."
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j
When I first wrote this study I had in mind j
j
to follow the centuries and major legal figures to show j
]
how the concept of mens rea unfolded. That produced an" ~ j
interesting but unwieldly manuscript. Upon reflexion 
one can appreciate that it violated a simple observation
1
which Aristotle made in the Poetics, 51al [7], that beauty
I
depends upon size and order. A second writing and revision
j
permitted me to concentrate directly upon the Christian ■
I
influence on intention. Since I saw that the energy which 
intention gained was to be found in the mediaeval period
generally, and from the thought of that period the early j
i
common law drew, I found that the natural close for the i
iexploration was with the last writer of common law who him­ ?
self was both deeply influenced by its method and style, and !
who himself embodied its insights in his own legal life  ']
Chief Justice of the King’s Bench, Matthew Hale. He was
the last scholastic mind in English law, and his death was j
in 1676, Christmas Day.
After Hale, one finds that the common law began to de-
\■ivelop on its own, beginning to discard its mediaeval impedimenta,
41
and this would be the topic for another volume. I moved from i
1
the period of Hale up to the our own century to show what, phi- ;
.
losophical problems are common to intention, and how one might 
appreciate such problems after having seen the philosophical past
which gave birth to mens rea. .
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With regard to texts and footnotes, I have placed my 
sources at the bottom of each page for convenience to the 
reader. Where possible, when a text is rare, I have given 
a Wing Number so that a reader, if he wishes, may locate the 
text or source. My main approach to writing, as I have in­
dicated, was to follow the model of the law itself and to 
let my evidence be public. As far as possible I have tried to 
avoid appeals to philosophical intuitions, save for the initial 
intuition I had about the roots of intention in the common law 
and its indebtedness to Christian thought.
J,M.B .Crawford

CHAPTER ONE
: In this chapter by the sparing use of historical
sources I wish to show how the concept of criminal respon- : •
sibility has developed in the common law.,■ The logical form 
of intention was never given to the law pure and simple.
Legal systems have all wrestledwith the problem of how to 
assign guilt for actions and deeds, some systems are harsh, ; 
some systems are lenient. Intention will emerge as a candidate 
for assigning guilt for crimes. We may distinguish between 
the logical form, ie how the language is constructed to •
express that one is responsible for an act or criminal 
omission, and what is assigned, ie that one may have be­
witched a cow and thus should be burned at the stake, having 
first been tortured to establish requisite guilt. The 
crimes will vary, but they are distinct from the requirements 
for establishing guilt in a criminal act. By appealing to the 
development of a concept through the centuries one may be able 
to discover for oneself that the components of intention may 
look to be simple enough, but upon examination of those components 
one may find that when each element within the concept is examined 
no simple logical operator emerges; instead, an unclosed and 
developing concept emerges. It would be a simple hope that one •/
might entertain, wishing for a simple isolation which a formula : .
could give: namely, that the logical form of intention is to assign 
guilt, whilst those actual crimes themselves which are committed \ ••.'
serve to act as variable's within the formula. One- may:'.beguided=■_" 
by such a hope, but it has hot yet been realised in a final form.**
I have no doubt that one may isolate - intentional * elements ini ’ : i,
a statement, as when we say that one must have an intention in order to : ’
be deemed responsible for one’s act, and/or the consequences of his 
act— or even once removed, when we: come to the law of Agency wherein ; ; v j;
the acts of an agent are taken to express the mind of the principal, and > ;i V: s;
thus actions which the principal himself would do, ratify or approve. If , f
One philosophical difficulty may be how to determine that any sentential : ; • 
arrangement actually does express an intentional quality. In a graphic 
way, one might ask how a sentence pictures an intention ? A large part 
of the common law concerns itself with refining intentional language, of ; 
separating obiter dictum from Black Letter pronouncements of what the law v 
is and what is the right and proper construal of a legislative Sentence, <4  ^;
statute, act j ordinance, or what is the proper reading of a case holding. ; 
Determining the what of intention, and the range of intention, is not a %y
simple act of locating something; it is, I prefer, a conplicated act of :
understanding of what something may be, and the range over which it dominates.
1 , I am against attempting too facile a comparison between the common law ^ 
and mediaeval canon law systems, in which a claim is advanced that one sys- 
tern emerged from another, as might a butterfly from a chrysalis. Some who 
have had great knowledge and acquaintance with the common law, such as the 
late Richard OVSullivan, Q.C., K.S.G., of Middle Temple, have argued that ' 
the common law grew out of the rich soil of mediaeval moral theory, indicating 
that Thomas Aquinas was of powerful influence upon early common lawyers. Cf., 
The Philosophy of the Common Law, to be found in: CURRENT LEGAL PROBLEMS 
(Stevens § Sons, Ltd., 1949), pp 116-138; also, Natural Law and Common Law, / 
to be found in: TRANSACTIONS OF TOE GROTIUS SOCIETY (vol.31, 1946), pp 117-138. 
However, I wish to stress one other side of the equation: that is, one must 7.^ . 
also attend to the workings of the common law as they are found, and from their
use then determine what they mean and contain.  ^ >
The earlier sources for the common law notions about V 
responsibility derive in great part from the:theological systems 
of the early Middle Ages. On this, I believe this note can be 
' made. -.••_ /. ’ ••J.. f V % •: : - .7 - • .7 *'!; v /:7;\.. *7/7- ’ >
777.7 " It does not muddle my discussion if this claim is ad- 7:7  
vanced: that the two systems of law, theological and civil, have 
the same aims in mind, although theii: specific problems be dif- ^
ferent. Each system places a requirement upon an agent to 
determine if he is or is not responsible for his meritorious 7. i 
acts. The term ’meritorious’ should not bother us. One is ,-77;777 
’meritorious* when he obeys a speed limit, or does not in­
tentionally kill another person. A theological system, such :
as was advanced in Judeo-Christian religions, is a legal model . 
(in part). An agent is related to God by His meritorious acts.
It is assumed that an agent can act meritoriously. If we argue • V
that one cannot act meritoriously, then there is little need to 
pursue the analogy., One does not fault a robot for its mistakes 
because the mistake is part of the robot; it is not in addition 
to the robot. The robot turns left rather than right not because: : 
it is a mischievous robot but because its mechanical and electrical 
.components cause it to turn right. In awkward English one would 
say that the robot has 1 leftness’ as an essential part of its ’ 
'robotness’, just as one's television set is not to be described 7 
as being malicious because it will not transmit B.B.C.2. It will 
not transmit on that frequency because it cannot receive that fre- /
■. .Vj "• y •
quency. . -;y \ ■ '\ /> . '■■ ?•• • . * • *
If we take both systems, civil law and theological law, 
as models of some society or other (one is the earthly society, 
and the other is the heavenly society), we may compare the! common ; 
elements in each system. I use the word 1 system* in a very loose 
sense to mean that the requirements for meritoriousness in one 
set of beliefs may, at the same time, correspond in great part " ■
to the requirements for meritoriousness or rectitude in the other 
system. The requirements for a moral act, in a religious system 
like Christianity, may have many elements in common with a fullr ; } ii" 
blooded intentional act under the civil law ( its criminal branch ).
We may be asking of the requirements of each questions which could r 
be common to both systems. . \ \  ' ■■
I labour this point because I think one can be put off 
unnecessarily both by two questions. One may attempt to ascertain 
that the common law is little more than a subset of mediaeval : 
canon law; or, one may argue that the common law is so different: .
in aim that it .is to create a confusion if one asks whether the ;: Vi
common law has theological roots. : In the first instance one often 
tries to champion a case. - In the second case one tries to stress V ' :v. rX 
differences to such a point that no comparison can lie. I think. A 
both positions are extreme, and I do hot think either helps one ; ^ ^  
that much, It would be better* like a medical analyst who is analysing 
blood types* to admit that the blood types have common traces than; 
first to begin by stating that if one is from a chimpanzee and the
other is from a man, nothing of merit can ensue because of their 
differences. Much of benefit can ensue by pursuing the analysis.
A theological system may embody modes of excusing which a
common law legal system does not.embody. I cite one instance.
Christian theology makes a claim about one’s ability to act by 
stressing the fallen nature of man. It is advanced that a man / 
cannot be the author of good acts in a supernatural sense. At 
this point the problem:becomes doubly complicated. If a man • iv 
cannot author good acts, what does he author ? He moves his arm, 
he can walk, he can talk, he can compose a sentence, or listen 
to what others have said, how out of all of these specific • : 7 
actions does one arrive at the notion that one cannot author 
a certain kind of act, namely, a theologically good act ? 7
Must there be some other conceptual element superadded to the 
concept of a human act which experience itself will not give ?
If one cites a list of actions attributable to a man, how does ; 
one know that the list is incomplete ? or, if not incomplete, •/ 
how does one arrive at a class of actions, the requirements ' 7
for them; which transcend an empirical list ? v \ , ;
If it is a requirement for the doing of a good act that 
one receive ’grace * in order to do a good act, has not one claimed 
that in order to understand the empirical order of events (the 
class of actions and events which are or can be contingently the . 
case) one must step outside of that empirical order and come to
see that order by means of some prior model, the model itself not 
contained in the order of events ? At this point one system ( a re­
ligious system which is based upon certain tenets ) departs from a ‘
legal system which would not require a trier of fact and of law to 
possess such a religious belief, or uphold a prior set of assumptions, 
in order to be able to try facts and law. One system, apparently, is : 
assumed to be value-free. The common law requires only that a man ; * 
know the nature and quality of his acts, and to be able to perform his 
duties in a reasonable manner. But what a man is, is not defined. One 
would not be met with a theological definition that in order to be a man 
under this legal system, one must be a man who had a fallen nature, and 
only that class of individuals are included in the legal system. The 
common law would not accept as an excuse qua excuse that the reason A 
killed was the fact that A was a fallen son of Adam who could do no : .
better. The law Would, through its official machinery, inquire if A were
sane* it would inquire it he understood the nature and quality of his act 
(which was the killing of B), but it would not inquire into his theological 
beliefs in which it was stated that man, because possessed of a fallen ,
nature, could naught but sin, unless aided by supernatural grace.
Such would be a difference between the two systems. What is central; 
to both systems is man. A question central to each system may be: c a n  a 7 7- 
man be responsible for his actions, whether at civil law, or religious law?
* I do not doubt that a civil law system could incorporate religious be- 7 
liefs, and then embody those excusing conditions which are prevalent in 7777  
the religious law the civil law incorporated. But common law, as it has 
refined itself of its religious presuppositions and inheritances, tends 7 
towards religious neutrality. I wish only to maintain here that the common 
law advances one standard of excusability, whilst religious law of the judeo- 
christian tradition might advance a different standard of excusability.
. :  ^ - if each system embodies common questions about kinds of
human behaviour and action then it stands to reason that we will 
find borrowings from one system to the other. Mediaeval canon V 
law developed out of refinements from Roman law, but Roman law ' 
had little connexion with English common law. While the canonists 
moved to codification, the common lawyers stressed the piece-by> 
piece nature of litigation. The aims of the canon lawyer will /
be to make clear how, within a theological system which holds /'■/'
a man responsible for his religious acts, a man can be said to 
be responsible or how a man can be excused. For the legal! ;;
philosopher the elements which constitute the concept of re- v 
sponsibility under both systems may be;of interest, since the 
common element to both systems is man. The world of the common.: 
lawyers and judges may, at first, have; been an unreflective ac­
ceptance of the moral and religous axioms of the time, but that 
is no m o r e . ••.• -. ■ y  y - ■ V
2. Roe v. Wade, (1973) 410 U.S. 113, and Doe v. Bolton, (1973) 410 o
U.S. 113, illustrate how the legal definitions from one legal system 
do not necessarily fit the legal definitions of another legal system;
It was as if a foetus was a 'person1 under the meaning of the term v
as embodied in the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Con- ;* l:
•; ■. stitution. The theological definition of a person did not map 5; 
on to the constitutional definition of the word person, yet the 
- word was used in each legal system, ie it is used in canon law, U
and ii is used in constitutional law. • *' " ,
Evans v. Ewe Is [1972] 2 All ER 22 shows (in a simpler vein) how 
the range of the word *person’ under section 4-a of the Vagrancy Act 
1824 was made more precise by being limited to meaning only a sexual 
part of one's body, and not the body in general. :
Each instance shows that a concept is precised * Of interest to a 
legal philosopher is how a concept is precised in different legal V 
systems. ■ . ‘
* 'precised*, v.i., meaning: to make precise or definite. - : >
!'• What would an adherent do to fulfil the requirements of each 
system ? System One may specify a set of simple rules, which, when 
known, an adherent is expected to follow ( as one might follow the v
rules of a private club ). System Two may have a set of rules the v
contrary of System One ( one might imagine an Anarchists * Club in "/:■* v 7 
which the sole rule was not to 'be bound by any rule which any other 
private dub might embody ). Or System TVo, in a lesser radical form, 
may be a set of rules which are somewhat different from System One, but 
which obligate one to follow those rules, much as System One obligates 
one to follow its rules. If one viewed believers in this, way as if , 
each were a member of a private, club in which each club had its own set 
of rules, one might argue that the common ground between different 
believers would not lie in what, of set of rules each followed or believed; 
but in how each member assigned responsibility for human acts. If fe- , 
sponsibility were no more than what a rule dictated, then any system which 
was absent that rule which assigned responsibility for that act would pre­
clude any comparison between the systems. No rule would entail no re­
sponsibility ( as when a legislature decriminalises an act ). But if a 
comparison is between not rules, but in what manner responsibility is to 
be found and predicated of an actor, then it may be possible to compare 
System One with System Two, however different in content may be the rules 
of the two differing systems. V  < :
. If is at this point that I think it may be worthwhile to see the de­
velopment of early common law from within the world of mediaeval moral and 
religious theory, and to ask how mediaeval notions of human behaviour may 
have influenced notions of criminal responsibility at common law.
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: 7 We may, to put another side to the case, test any:legal
system by presenting questions to the fundamental assumptions 
of the system. If our sense of a defence to a charge is to 7 V 
challenge the workings of the system itself, then, as I stated 
earlier in this chapter, it may be important to consider 
if being a fallen man does influence or affect our status as 
defendants.^ ‘ If a system holds us to be responsible for our 
actions, but at the same time holds that responsibility, as 7 
the word is normally Understood, is a chimera or is a logical 
impossibility within the axioms of the system, then, plainly, 
one is not responsible for his actions because the system by ,! 
its logical stop excludes responsibility as a viable notion. 
Were one to espouse seriously the doctrine of predestination, 
and took the doctrine in the strong sense to mean not only that 
God knew what would be the case, but caused the case to be the 
case, then it would be odd for a theologian to introduce the
3. One may consult Predestination, Grace and Free Will by Dorn 7 
M. John Farrelly, 0.S.B., (London: Burns § Oates, 1964) wherein 
its author attempts to defend the thesis that Divine foreknowledge 
does not casually predestine. Cf. Chapter 5, "Grace and Free ’ 
Will" pp 152-216, and Chapter 6, ’’God's Sovereignty and Man’s 
Freedom" pp 217.-307. '
One may also read, for instance, how St. Prosper of Aquitaine, . 
The Call of All Nations,( London: Longmans, Green and Co.,1952) 
can puzzle over why some are saved by grace, and others not.
This is discussed in Book One, beginning with the nature of 
and distinction between, animal will and human will, progressing 7 
to grace as a cause of supernatural actions in man. In the trans­
lation of P. De Letter, S.J., Chapters One through Twenty-five, 
pp 26-88 cover the material. Final human responsibility for one’s: 
acts and actions seems not to be possible unless grace is given ,7
freely to all, a paradox which bothers predestination theories.
notion of human responsibility for human acts. What would a human 
be, save for an act predicated upon the movement of a creature. The 
creature would always be described in passive terms, ie, an act was 
done of it. Responsibility is an active notion, unless one wants 
to present an existential metaphor that man, no matter what he does, 
is damned ! 7 - r «y.»’•*; *7.’:} s 'gniii's
By like reasoning if one advances for serious consideration 
that no man is responsible for a criminal act because every man is 
predetermined by prior conditions to his act, and those prior con- ^
ditions are beyond his self or personal control, then one has at- 7 7
tacked a fundamental assumption of the criminal iaw: namely, one 
has said that responsibility does not follow:upon a voluntary act 
because a voluntary act is a self-contradiction. If every criminal 
act is a determined act, then such a statement vitiates that an act.4 
could be an intentional act. The concept of intention embodies in 
its elements that one could choose, that the exercise of choice 
was voluntary, and that one was not forced, coerced, or under duress 
to act, and that one could have refrained fromiwhat he did. One may 
wish to argue that the barest meaning of fto choose’ need only mean 
that a range of possibilities be evident, as the possibilities within 
a predetermined mathematical series, to an agent. But have we avoided 
a conceptual snarl by excluding free will in the strong sense ? I 
think not. If we mean by ’to choose’ that one chooses from amongst
a predetermined range, what of the act of choosing itself ? That 7
act must be unforced. If it is not, then the act itself of' 7 *1 v
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choosing must entail that it is an action brought about by some -y ;;.: 
other power than the actor choosing, and if this is the case then " ; 
one is not talking about an actor, but one is talking about an \ 
agent through whom an action is exercised. We are not trying to 
locate an empirical finding about human behaviour, ie does the 'vj-^ - 
motor mechanism of choice rest in this or that part of the brain. ,
We are analysing a concept, that of 'to choose1, and are inquiring 
about what logical states are excluded by the concept. I am arguing 
that 'to choose' excludes, in the strongest sense, 1 it was de- r: v 
termined for. 1 : ;• ’V?’
/ If an actor is one in whom action originatesand the 
Origination of his action is not predicated of some other, then \-V 
the locus of choice will be the actor. If , on the other hand,> the 
locus of action is in some other than in the actor himself, then 
the actor is transformed into an agent, and his actions are those*, 
in the strongest sense, of another.. . . . . . ,
\ I am not trying to unravel, for instance, what might be 
contained in the concept, prohairesis,^ * as is used by Aristotle 
in his moral theory* Not only may one have much difficulty in
4. One may consult W.F.R.Hardie's Aristotle's Ethical Theory, ; -
(Oxford, At The Clarendon Press, 1968), especially chapters ! T o;
viii, "The Distinction between the Voluntary and the Involuntary",
• ppl52-159, and ix, "Choice and the Origination of Action", pp ^
160-181. One may also consult Sir Alexander Grant' s note on ;
/; the matter of the voluntary and involuntary in his edition of :
. the Ethics, The Ethics of Aristotle (London: Longmans, Green, ;
and Co., 1874), vol. 2, page 25, of E.N., Bk.lll, Chap.lv-v.
. The concept of 'free choice' in the E.N. does not entail that : : /
an actor possesses a quality of free will; he may only be .free
from restraint, and thus may chccse. . -> V.-'V-
' ■ .. iiA
in, con junction with what he means by voluntary and; involuntary,
- ' ' . but there seems to be no easy mapping from the Greek on to 7  ^ 7
7  the common law notion of ’wil 1 . * The common law notion of will
derives from a Christian context wherein the concept of * wil11 
. is foreshadowed by the concept of non-recurrence. For the traditional
7 :  Christian each and every act of an actor was unique and non-repeatable.
Christianity knows nothing of the doctrine of recurring forms, WhichV- ■:
, > 7 ‘ in theory at least, would maintain that what distinguides A from
; r ‘ ; A 1 would be a point in time. Christian thought would not advance
V 7 • 7"7 , , a doctrine of similarity and return because its notion of final 7  .
judgement precluded that the same agent could be twice held in 7  \ ;
jeopardy for his actions. It would be theoretically possible 
:•. • 77 tha,t if A failed ( let ’A* be some person at time ftv .) and were ; ;7;
* 7 7 - i) 4.,’ cont., . * .. '
; ‘ V ; V > Thon»s Marshall’s, Aristotle’s Theory of Conduct ( London: V 77(7;:
T.Fisher Unwin, MCMV1 ) at Chapter 111, "The Conditions of Moral , ;
Conduct: Freedom, Choice, and Responsibility" pp 142 - 183 offers 7
,y7 ,7 777, 7 a good analysis of Book .ill, Chapters 1-5 (1109,b27--1115, a 3) ,
■ of E.N. Marshall suggests that prohairesis does not; correspond ^ 77777
y to the English word ’Will’."Aristotle has no word to express ;
; 7 the state of consciousness of a person acting under such cir- > 7 7 7 ;
' cumstances [a free agent doing something not contemplated by 77 7
■ 7 : 7 him at the time of action], who would, nevertheless, certainly ‘ 7
7 be said to "will."....With the question of the freedom of the 7 ?>7;
‘0  i will, as a practical question, Aristotle does not concern himself . ^
, He assumes (with the rest of the; world) man to be the uncontrolled^ v 7,7 
7; * 7 cause of his own actions, bodily and mental.!’ p 173. One may 7'77; 7 •.:••'
V also consult The Ethics of Aristotle as edited and commented upon / 7.-.7:.:
by John Burnet (Methuen § Co., London, 1900), Book 111, "The -77
7 Will.— Coufage, Temperance" ppl08-162, his introduction to the 7 '
7 7 - 7  Greek text, as well as his footnotes and gloss to the text. -;7 i
. . : 7L.H.G.Greenwood* s Aristotle: Nicomachean Ethics, Book Six 7 7
7 (Arno Press, New York, 1973, a reprint of 1909 Cambridge U.P 7 77'7y
7 ; : ; : edition) gives a helpful gloss on prohairesis at pages 40, 49, 7 7777;
7T-' “ 7 ' •' 55, 175 and page 178. v7'7 ; .. . -•• ,• 7,.. 7; : :'-r77;77
. iS:Ji.
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judged to have been sinful, it could, nevertheless, be argued that 
his guilt and sinfulness was not the final state of his being. It 
; could be advanced that A, at time t^ , could at some future timebe 
A*, at time tn, and A>  A*. For the Christian theologian this 
amounted to a contradiction in tents. The theory of eternal re­
turn precluded a final judgement about the status of A. The; ir 
Christian doctrine of will was linear, and it precluded recurrence j 
(even in theory) of human actions. An individuating feature of an 
act of will for Christian theology was not only the time at which 
an act occurred, but that the act occurred in addition to the time 4 
of its occurrence. The future was open, non-recurrent, end unique 
V without th. possibility of recurrence. Forms did not originate 
within a cyclic universe; or within cyclic movement; forms originated 
in the mind of God, were insubstantiated in matter, and, together, 
were an expression both of God’s freedom (to create from nothing) ( 
and intelligence (to direct to a final end, which was Himself). 7/
; Although Christian notions of the voluntary have in their history 7. 
an Aristotelian notion of to do within the power of oneself, they 
provided a different model of the universe in which the volitional 
occurred, and a different model for volitional action: grace aiding
nature to attain a supernatural end.
4k, cont., ■; ,"7 "• 7*7-7' 7 :7‘7 -7 «■ •'*. 'v ;
Ackrill in his edition, Aristotle’s Ethics (Faber 4 Faber,1973, 
London) renders ’voluntary’ in this way:"Since that which is 7 > 
done under compulsion or by reason of ignorance is involuntary, j  
the voluntary would seem to be that of which the moving principle 
is in the agent himself, he being aware of the particular cir- 7 
cumstances of the action." (1111a, 21-23, page 78: Nicomachean 
Ethics, Book 111.1), J.E.C.Welldon, The Nicomachcan~Ethics >"77 
(London: MacMillan and Co., 1897) renders the seme passage in 
this way: "When we speak then of an action as voluntary or in- . 
voluntary, we must have regard to the time at which a person 7 t 
performs it. The person whose actions we are considering acts . 
voluntarily; for in actions like his the original power which > 
sets the inst-rumentality of his limbs in motion lies in himself, 
and when the origin of a thing lies in a person himself, it is -■ ; 
in his power either to do it or not to do it."(page 59) . f 7 ■
. : . The common law can accommodate both concepts of will at ■ /! 
the practical level. I dwell upon the distinction at"length be­
cause, from my reading of the sources of the common law, I believe 
that it is not the Greek model of will which is being advanced 
when accounting for humaui responsibility for an action. Each ; 
account of will requires that an actor give his reasons for his 
action, if at all possible; and each account of will does permit 
extenuating circumstances to be advanced to excuse or exonerate 
an accused. One theory of will does not stress the notion of 
'free1, while the other theory does sttess such a notion,
4., cont., •;/ ' ‘ V . V',: ' j f y y  ■' :'y ■'. :
F.H.Peters, The Nicomachean Ethics (London: Kegan,Paul,
French 8 Co., 1886) renders the passage as follows:
" In applying the terms voluntary and involuntary, therefore, 
we must consider the state of the agent's mind at the time. :
( Now, he wills the act at the time; for the cause which sets 
the limbs going lies in the agent in such cases, and where 
the cause lies in the agent, it rests with him to do or not 
to do." (page 59). Sir David Ross in his The Nicomachean • % 
Ethics renders the passage in this way: "Both the terms,then, 
'voluntary' and 'involuntary', must be used with reference 
to the moment of action. Now the man acts voluntarily; 
for the principle that moves the instrumental parts of the 
body iii such actions Is in him, and the things of which thb ; 
moving principle is in a man himself are in his power to do 
. or not to do." (page 49) [London: Oxford University Press, 
1969], a more expanded version of the passage is provided 
in The Nicomachean Ethics, Robert Williams (London: Longmans, 
Green, and Co., 1869): "And, moreover, the terms voluntary , , 
and involuntary are predicable of our acts not in the abstract 
but only at the moment of action. And in cases such as these 
a man at the moment of action does act voluntarily; for his 
limbs are the instruments by which the act is done, and the ' 
efficient cause of their motion is his own volition. And, 
where the efficient cause lies in ourselves, it is in our , . :
, power to do the act, or not to do it." (page 60). :
The translation of St. George Stock, The Nicomachean Ethics 
(Oxford: B.H.Blackwell, 1897: Second edition, revised) follows 
rather much the rendering given by Williams, and appears on v 
' pages 43 aiid 44 of Stock's text. His summary of Book 111 Is ; ; 
most helpful, pp 40-43, especially his diagram illustrating 
- the conditions under which an 'act' occurs. •
\ ; :--Vfey • ' . i s  y; :>;  §. v
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4a. W. E. G. Floyd, in his Clement of Alexandria’s treatment of 
the problem of evil, (Oxford University Press, 1971) makes a 
helpful statement about prohairesis (choice) and aute2hoursion 
(in one’s own power, free) when he says this of Clement:
"Throughout Clement1 s w r i t i n g s ’ choice*) and 
(’in one’s own power,free’) are, for all intents and purposes, 
synonymous. Yet, to the educated Alexandrian ear, they were 
loaded terms with very different philosophical overtones.
The first was an Aristotlian term which is defined as follows: 
’Choice’may be called either thought related to desire or de­
sire related to to thought; and man, as an originator of action,
7 is a union of desire and intellect.’[Eth.Nic.vi.2,1139.5*7]
describess moral purpose or will in the fullest sense 
: and involves both an element of desire for an ultimate end and -7
an element of deliberation in a choice of the means-— means 7  ^
which lie with our power . The second term ( “» *>ie ) was
unknown (italics mine) to Aristotle and emerged into common 
Greek usage with the Stoics, specifically Chrysippus (c.208- 7 y
281 B.C.), to suggest a similar moral responsibility.” page 29. 7
The difficulties inherent in framing the Christian doctrine of 7 ' 7  
Will for Clement of Alexandria are dealt with in Chapter 11 of 
Floyd, ’’The Gnostic Polemic ll: Determinism”, pp 24-40. 7
* ‘ C 1 >• '
I would like to turn now to an examination of texts 
from which the concept of intentional action matures. Most of 
the texts concern killing of another, in some form or other.
The general categories will contrast; killing which is
permitted and is deemed to be licit, and killing which is wrong 
and is condemned. The dominant notion will be a twinned one: > 
it will combine Vto excuse'and 'to be responsible for.* There 
will be no single doctrinal constant; in place of a doctrinal 
constant there will be various notions about the nature of in­
tellect, will, and human nature.' There will emerge, also, a 
pattern about what it means to excuse one so that what one did, 
even if wrong in itself, would not be held to be a deliberate 
wrong pursued by an actor. No single or uniform doctrine of 
excusing existed in these early texts, even though some later 
writers like Plowden or Covarruvias write as if St. Thomas .
Aquinas developed a uniform doctrine of excusing. He did ;
not , and I have listed in the appendix a range of citations 
from his writings to show where he treated the topic of t<y .7 
excuse, but did not develop a uniform doctrine of excuses. 
Little analytic writing about what the concept Jto excuse' 
entailed exists in early common law writing. It is a topic .
which has become of interest only for later legal writers, and
; /  7 7 • ' - : . •- 7 ^ 7 ' 7 7  , •• ■ • *S.; v .even there little formal writing exists on the subject. *
•5. The late J.L.Austin's essay, lfA Plea for Excuses" from 
Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society,1956-57, was a 
seminal essay, but little has gone on since then in the 
law. Legal excuses remain, for the most part, uncharted.>
cuse under that law ? A law, for instance, may require £  not only to : 
know that !xf was wrong, but also require that £  wilfully do jx*. If 
the Crown or a prosecutor fails to demonstrate both elements of the of­
fense , then JD may be acquitted. But how is one to know this ,
6 . In Lim Chin Aik v. R., [1963] 1 All ER 223, the conviction of I) was 
quashed because, although he had wilfully acted, he did not knowingly
• violate Singapore 1 aw. \ . v “• f  \ ■ ■
The simple legal case is as follows. There exists a rule, and 
J) is alleged to have transgressed that rule. The simple relation­
ship which exists is between a law and the following of it. But 
the simple statement of the case also embodies philosophical ques­
tions one may wish to consider. What are the bare conditions for ; 
the proper observing of the rule or law ? /.Is that rule obvious in 
its address, or is the follower of the rule assumed to know more 
than what the rule itself states ? Must J) also know the habits and  ^
customs of the community in which the rule exits, if he is to follow ■ 
the rule correctly ? Does a simple reading of the rule, or hearing 
of the rule, address itself in such a way that the content of the 
rule is self-evident so that no possible contingent case may void the > 
rule ? Will the ordinary man understand* upon reading or hearing the 
rule, that it applies to him; and that it applies to him not only in 
this present situation, but that it applies to him in all possible 
situations ? Further, will the rule embody those conditions which 
serve to excuse under the rule ? For instance, although all vehicles ■ 
are forbidden in the public park after sundown, one doubts if patrolling 
vehicles are forbidden in the park after sundown. How then is any actor 
to know, after having been apprized of the law, what conditions may ex-
: S , .. . . '  • i '. i
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■ The historical development of degrees of criminal.cul-
pability will show how competing models develop, and how the con­
cept of culpability was both enlarged and made more precise by the 
advance of those models. 8* I will make only this one observation 7 
about my sources. Most of them have not been commented upon, and 
those few which have ( Bracton, Glanvill, Coke and Hale ) have 7 7/V7 
received little, if any, analytic dissection, It may be to the 7 
tribute of the common law that, after all is said and done,; it is 
a practical discipline not in need of great theoretical dissection.
I very much doubt if any legal or moral philosopher would be per­
suaded by the latent wisdom of such an assertion ! , . 7 : : 7.
; : The earlier theological decrees regarding homicide served 7
to complete a double task. AiV peison who caused a death did so 
on a double plane. He caused the death of a person in the civil 7
realm; he also removed the deceased from the sphere of religious .7
good works, and this was a serious removal since it presented a 
deceased to judgement of God, not something lightly to be brought 
about. The difficulty which we have removed from our present ;7 >
approach to criminal responsibility is that we do not add to a
8. It is not my intention to repeat the literature on the subject, 
nor to exhaust adjacent fields on the subject, such as criminal 
responsibility in canon law. On the latter one may consult 
’ IGNORANCE IN RELATION TO THE IMPUTABILITY OF DELICTS by Innocent 
Robert SWoboda, O.F.M., J.C.L., (The Catholic University of 
America Press, Washington, D.C., 1941) for an adequate survey of 
canonical law. The two-part article by Albert Levitt; ’’The 
’• / Origin of the Doctrine of Mens Rea" ( 17 ILLINOIS LAW REVIEW, 7 7 
, pp 117-137, and pp 578-595 ) is adequate for early Old Testament 
law on the subject, as well as early Christian notions on the 7  
subject, and need not be restated here. It should be read in con­
junction with ’’Phases in the Development of Criminal Mens Rea", 
a two-part article by H.D.J .Bodenstein ( The South African Law 7 
Journal, Pt.l. Vol. 36, 1919, pp 323-349, Pt.11, Vol. 37, 1920, 
pp. 18-34) Which presents fuller historical documentation, ';■/7 /
criminal act that the accused must be forgiven. He must purely and 
simply be disposed of by means of the criminal process, and we do 
not require that he be contrite. During a plea in mitigation, if y' 
the accused has been found guilty of his crime, it does pay counsel 
to; demonstrate to the court that the accused regreted what he did, 
and is properly disposed to reform himself; but this is not a necessary 
ingredient in our criminal process for it to work effectively. ,
The earlier pronouncements of the Councils had to meet the double 7 ’ 77 
task, both of condemning wrongful temporal actions, and, at the 
same, extending conditions whereby the criminal, who was also a 
sinner by the force of his serious crime, might be shrived. Conditions 
for mitigating the guilt of the penitent were more severe, and the 
penitent, as well as his confessor ( or bishop, if the crime were 'so;7 v7  
theologically serious for his sole consideration to dispense a 
penance or not), had to meet bilateral conditions. The confessor' 
had to assure himself that the penitent demonstrated a sorrow for J 
his sin, and the penitent had to know for himself that he had, in 
fact, transgressed religious law. It had to be determined that he 
had, as a penitent, serious matter to confess; that he knew that;the 
matter was serious and grave; and that he accused himself of having 
freely sinned and violated religious law. The relationship between 
the peniteht and his confessor (in the best sense of the word) was ; ; 
that of an accused who, voluntarily, moved himself to confess, and . 
the confessor, as a judge, voluntarily granted or withheld absolution, 
Both the confessor and penitent pledged themselves to act honestly,
God being their witness. * - • ’♦ 77 7V’yy •.
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JBa; Although it is a later citation than those With which I ; : ^
. am concerned, one may cite this passage from the Council s; 
of Trent to show the juridical nature of confession. : .
“ "If anyone says that the sacramental absolution of ...the' -; / ’y.
 ^ priest is not a judicial act, but is the mere ministry
of pronouncing and declaring that the sins of the person ; •
confessing are remitted,?provided only that he believes 
himself absolved even if the priest gives gives absolution Cft 
: in jest and without a serious intention; or if anyone says
that the confession of the penitent is not required so 
that the priest can absolve him, let him be anathema." ? •; '
The citation is from the session of the Council, November •
; 25th, 1551, and is cited in an English translation in
The Church Teaches (B.Herder Book Co., St. Louis, Missouri ' ;: 
and London: 1955), which was a translation of various 
.Council pronouncements as prepared by the Jesuit Fathers of 
of St. Mary's College, St. Mary's, Kansas. The Latin ?e- /
ferences in the work are to Denzinger: Enchiridion Symbolorum.
Page 307 of the translation; paragraph 808 of the Council;
page .9.19 of Denzinger, : ... <■.;Ty
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;y/" '• ’ -The early models for homicide come to us through the ' y  y
Councils of the Church, and appear as Council pronouncements. The 
• ; form of these pronouncements is not one of extended, analytical : y;
; ; argument; to the contrary, the form is that of a rule, or a directive,
•. : y announced. I am not concerned with their historical force, and I y y y
draw upon these early models mainly to show how from the simple ,
: . r statements about homicide there developed a complicated and re­
fined concept which the courts used to assign guilt to an accused, • ;
and which the accused used to defend himself against criminal guilt.10* y
. : 9. I have used the following edition to cite Council and Papal
.' '• . texts: CONCILIORVM OMNIVM, Generalivm et Provincialivm, Col- ■:■■ yy :
/ ^ lectio Regia ( Parisiis, MDCXLli.ll ) in 37 volumes. I shall ; :
,>. -cite the volume, page, and Council of this edition throughout. y • y
; • ; ? -  I have also consulted DECRETORVM CANONICORVM COLLECTANEA,
(Parisiis, Apud Iacobum Puteanum sub insigni Samaritan® , ; 7y'y
y ' y M.D.LXX.), and shall cite this text by page, listing it as: ■ •’yy’y y ’;
y y . DECRETORVM, page . I mention this to my reader because ;
y y each edition of these early documents is, generally, a unique : y
. edition, and the making of locations of the citations is often ;
y. ; y yy..'; difficult when one tries to match one edition to another. (The .y y vyy
y  ^ same is true of law reports in different editions, as Law, , ’ y
y y ; LAWYERS and LEGAL CITATIONS by C.J>Rees, Esq., Librarian,
: Supreme Court Library, Royal Courts of Justice, in the NEW y y
LAW JOURNAL, August 5, 1976, at page 799, aptly demonstrates.) -1 ' . ;
 ^ ’ y"''. • 10. Swoboda observed ( op. cit. ) that the ". . .Church. . .always ; y
: ?*• : taught that knowledge and the will to transgress the law form y •
 ^ the necessary internal or moral elements; of all sin. Against y  ; y y y y
the legalistic views of the Jews and Gnostics the early Fathers  ^ y y !
: . y . y y y ;" and ecclesiastical writers expressly taught that the mere objective
y y ■ violation of law did not constitute moral guilt without the de- y
>t: y y / y liberate consent of free will." page 14. He cited Matt.XV,19;
Matt. XXI11,27; Matt. V>28; Matt.Xll,34; also, St. Augustine, 
v D£ Vera Religione (Migne, vol. 34, page 133) "Usque adeo peccatuin ;
y voluntarium est malum, ut nullo modo sit peccatum, si non sit :y y y
y y : ' y voluntarium.", and Tertullian , De Poenitentia (Migne, vol. I, ^age ^ y y  ■
• y  : 1232), cap. 111. I cite this to suggest that there was a developed y ;
; . - notion about intellect and will which could be taken over by the :-y--yy/y
■ ' y. y common lawyers, and shall cite evidence in support of my assumption y 
y . . when I have reason to quote from PlOwden in Reniger v. Fogossa
y. v; •" -(4 Edw. 6, Easter Term). '■;/ . ■ ! y.. . • . y y y y y
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For the believing Christian the centre to his doctrine was to 
locate responsibility for sin and for faults. Attempting this 
location was to attempt a delicate balance. If one totally con­
demned the world and the flesh, then one fell into heresy for it 
had to be maintained that God created a good, although fallen, 
world. If one claimed that the intellect of man was totally 
corrupted,;one fell into heresy again because Christian doctrine 
claimed to illumine the intellect against all falsehood. If the 
intellect were fully corrupted, how then could it be expected to 
distinguish truth from falsehood ? If one located the cause of 
sin and fault totally in man's corrupted will, then one faced a v
heresy again: How could a good act, which the will impelled a man 7
to accomplish, issue forth from a totally corrupted will ? 11'Within 
the limits of a belief proposition, the heresies can be seen :
as excesses, or paradoxes, within fideism. The common law would
11. Richard Hooker in his Of The LaweS of Ecclesiastical Politie • ? 7
(The Works, London, 1676) saw the dilemma which the denial of 
, reason presented at the cost of the elevation of will. Truth
both had to be known and good works to be done. If truth could 
>. not be known, how then would one judge that what he did was, in
truth, the truth ? Cf. The Third Book of Ecclesiastical Polity, 
pp 138-39, op. cit. ' ' ' • ' T;7 7- -:T'. 7' •. Y ' ' ''7'; > -7' /. 77" ■/:
' % \
-V:; ' , , deal with puzzles of this soft, but ,in,sOcular form. ^;What may^
; have been stopped by an appeal that such a holding (in a theological:-.iv
: debate) might be heretical would, in the common law, become a fashion \ ;; .
• which the courts adopted as part of the conventional wisdom. The
£}, v ' reasonable man would become the ordinary man who rode the Clapham ; j
omnibus. Common law would assume that a man has both volitional  ^ ^
and intellectual faculties. The oft quoted example is of a will: V : . '
one need not make one, but if one does, one must prove that the will •. ■
r " ; : 12, Each legal situation involves one in
; ; • / ; facts of the case. The ’facts’ are not neutral datum, however ;
■- V f much the term suggests. The courts then take a position / that
; once the facts of a case have been established it follows that \ ■
; ! the duty of the court is to enunciate the law which applies to -
\ those facts ( or apply Such law as those facts permit ). . But ■
 ^L ; r ♦intellect1 and ’will* are not ’ facts1. They are sophisticated :
i concepts, historically, inherited, and used in a court. How
. ■ V i •/ - One views those concepts will determine how one sees ’factsV ; V v ^
; ; , ^ ^  in a case dictated by one’s precedent view. In one such case,
. ; . important even though a State Supreme Court case from the
United States, is State v. White[60 Wn.(2d) 551, September 1962].
".v . The defendant appealed his conviction for murder. Part of the
7 • • : : assignment of error which he alleged in his brief for the appeal
, v ' V was that the court, in first instance, had not understood the v:
force of his defence of irresistible impulse, and that it had \
r ; . • constrained his defence by a rigid use of the M*Naghton, rule on
: , V ; r  : insanity, a defence permitted in the State of Washington. The "
/ ; . Supreme Court of the State saw what the defendant had advanced,
' V  Mid stated the; issue in these terms, "It is contended that if a ^
i man does not have control over his own behavior, he has no free
.. . will and cannot be blamed for his mis behavior i", (page 589). St* :
Augustine could have phrased the question ! But the court would : i;
• ; not accept irresistible impulse as a defence. It claimed the
. defence was unclear as a viable legal concept; and that if it
; * /; admitted the defence crime might not be deterred. It found that \
f ' i ; /;,•••' M ’Naghton as a rule ".. .better serves the basic purpose of the'
v  : ■" . • criminal law-— to minimize crime in society." (page 592). That :
■ White could not control himself, which later evidence and a retrial ^
/ V . . " showed, the court remained unconcerned. Its/statement of the ‘V : -v'.
problem, however, could have been taken from an early Church . : '
. -; -* Council. At law, without fear of theological heresy, it might 5 ;
p; .■< ' " f ( well' have been an admissible finding of fact that D could not
: ' - . control himself, and did act out of impulse. But the law would not
; , ‘ • permit such a finding (page 593). It could not see such *facts!> 'V. ,1 :
j
yy
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7 7'; 7 Was made of one’s own volition without any coercion; one also ' 7 7
> . t 7  must observe the rules for the making of a will, for instance, 7 7 7 y
yy ’V" ' : 7 if one makes a bequest to A, one must be sure that A has not y 7 ;7 7 ^ y . 7 ;!
< 7 : signed as a witness to the will. If he has, the bequest is void ' •>’. -7 7 y ^-.y: y
: \ /  r’y'- . at law. ‘. y • -7. ... 7 ' ' ; ;7 7 ; 7y-.y- ' ■ "■ vy 7,7' '77 .;7^7v£7V7;7y
; 77 Theological models of early Council pronouncements 7 - 7. 7 77:7
-.7,777 may serve as examples of argument forms for later common law 7 7 7^^^7
7 7 developments. Both were illustrative within a legal framework v 7
y 7 7 of acceptable and non-acceptable cases. In the; common law one y;7<:l \
; .7 7  7 7 turned to past decisions to find guidance for present decisions; 7 7 y yy
7 : the theory there being that;legal judgements must be universalisable 7 ;77
. 7 in theory if such judgements are to be guides for legal behaviour. - ’ ; 7  7
That a; judgement might be universalisab le stemmed from the assumption 
7 that ’all men1 were thought to be equal under the law, and that what 7 7 ;;y;yy
y7 7 might be derived from particular cases concerning this or that man; yyy v ^ yy
7 7 y would affect the class of ’all men. ’ Embodied in common law reasoning y 7 7 :
'»■{ y ; y. 13. , I do not intend to convey the impression that early common law 7yy
7 decisions were guided in great part by turning to reported cases.
7 y 7 Reported cases were in their infancy, as the fine w o r k  b y  L.W. 7 7 •
yyy 7 ; Abbott shows: LAW REPORTING IN ENGLAND 1485-1585 (University
7 of London Legal Series : University of ifie
7y 7 1973). It is not until one reaches the late 18th Century that , 7,
;-7-, - law reporting became dependable and skilled. Furthermore, the
y Iplentitude of texts on the criminal law do not come to us until . 7 7  
7 7 the beginning of the 19th Century, with A Treatise on Crimes
and Misdemeanors by William Oldnall Russell (1819), raining into 
: '.7. ;. ; many editions, and then the more detailed and somewhat analytical
7 7 7 y writing of James Fitsjames Stephen, as in his General View of ;
7 ; ' the Criminal Law (London: 1863). A review of the Bibliotheca
7 ’ Legum Angliae, compiled by John Worrall (London: 1788), shows7 7  .7 . less than two pages (84-85) of ’Criminal and Crown Law’, listing 77
. 7  them together, the only text of the period being the somewhat rare
7 three volume work of Henry Dagge, Considerations on Criminal Law,
(London: 1774).One had Blackstone, Serjeant Stephen’s Commentaries,
7 ; y and Wooddesson * s Lectures . as well as Deacon ’ s Criminal Law, 7 : 7 7. 7{7
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was a belief that the universal was virtually contained in the
particular. This man, Jones, was bound by the force of this law ■ ;
or statute or custom which was a general expression of what should 
or should not be observed. The restriction put upon a plaintiff in 
an action might arise from the form of the action itself. If the 
plaintiff in a civil action did not issue the correct writ with 
its correct language, he might therefore lose his power of legal -yyv’ 
redressy*; but all this serves to show is that a universal right 
of redress had to be circumscribed by a general manner or form of ? 
action so that a universal notion ---an injury or claim --might be 
channelled into some general form, and thence expressed to the court 
as a certain wrong or harm which, because it was now possessed o f ' %
a correct legal form, could be adjudicated. I doubt if the courts ; :
entertained this procedure in order to resolve any conflict between 
the linguistic triad of what relation obtained in a universal-general- 
particular classification. The general form of a complaint or plea 
or writ seryed to give flesh and bones to a universal right of re­
dress in whatever was the present problem for judgement before the 
dourt . It was not an exercise in logical analysis whatever logical .. - 
assumptions were assumed. y • y i
y From the assumption that 'all men' was a class to which •
the law applied, the model for the early lawyers was the common case.
14. One may consult Forms of Action at Common Law by F.W.Maitland
(Cambridge, 1909); or, A History of Legal Institutions by A.T. y
Carter (London: Butterworth § Co., 1902), especially chapters 
XXII and XX111, pp 199-221, "Criminal Trials and Criminal Jury", I 
■ i and "Civil Process and Civil Jury"; also, The English Legal Tradition 
by Henri Levy-Ullmann (London: Macmillan' § Co. ,1935) . ; :
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The concept of the common case is not without its logical flaws.
Be it remembered that any common case at law is a case which has 
been constructed out of language. It is a little linguistic 
engine or device, and not an object like a stone or the sea. The* 
common case is a constructed case, not a given case. Any who try 
to marshall cases for persuasive purposes in a legal brief find ' 
that the difficulty is to show how case One bears an example to ' 
case Two, when the facts of One are dissimilar to the facts of 
Two. * * What must be jettisoned from one case to make it conn ; 
parable to another case for legal fOrde 7 How broad may the re^ : ■ 
semblances be which nevertheless will permit one to claim a family 
resemblance exists or obtains between this case and that case ?
15. "Clearly then to argue by example is neither like reasoning 
from part to whole, nor like reasoning from whole to part, but rather 
reasoning from part to part, when both particulars are subordinate to 
the same term and one of them is known. It differs from induction, be­
cause induction starting from all the particular cases proves...that 
the major term belongs to the middle, and does not apply the syllo- V 
gistic conclusion to the minor term, whereas argument by example does : J 
make this application and does not draw its proof from all the par­
ticular cases; " Analytica Priora 69a ( MeKeon translation ), as cited 
at page one, Introduction to Legal Reasoning, Edward Levi (Chicago).
16. One may recall Judge Simeon Baldwin’s early criticism of the . 
case-book method of teaching law, when, in 14 Harvard Law Review 258, 
he said of a case-book: "It is in substance a series o£ fragmentary 
discussion of particular topics, interspersed with fragmentary portions 
of opinions from reported cases....No science can be learned purely from 
particulars. The universals must be studied to discover what the par­
ticulars mean and whence they sprang.",: ; ■ . ^
28
Any person may come into a court of law and plead for 
his defence his own individuality and the individuality of the 
case itself, concluding that only he himself has the right to 
judge himself. If law were a comparison of particulars qua 
particulars, such a defence would be a sound defence by the very 
notion of what it is to be a particular which is, by definition, 
unique. Such a defence rejects the concept of a common case.
The rejoinder which the common law has given to this defence is 
that an offence under the law may arise precisely because human 
action (omission or commission ) may be viewed as a series of 
moves under a legal network, and the reasons one offers when in 
a court of law for his move, or lack of move, will serve to 
fit one into the legal network, as guilty, or exclude one from 
the legal network, as innocent. \ yi. . Vy
r  ' A  1
16i "As he stood before Judge Gesell, Ehrlichman continued to pro­
claim his innocence. He told the court, "I believe I am the y yyy.Vj
r- Only one who really knows whether I am guilty and, your honor,ty yWy;
I am innocent of each and every charge.'" from the report by 7y •
; ' Robert Siner, International Herald Tribune (Paris edition), ; ;
; August 1st, 1974, page one. Siner gave an account of the sentencing
y yof Mr. John Ehrlichman, former Chief Domestic Adviser to former
United States President, Richard M. Nixon, to a 20 month to five y
year sentence pronounced by U.S. District Court Judge Gerhard y:;
Gesell, of Washington, D.C. y!y V * -'3 V': V- yVy y'yy
*,: v/ y.?;
'V/
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The ground for comparisons in a 1 common case1 concept rests 
in this double way. Common law accepted the force of genus-speeies ^  
reasoning. It also accepted that reasons could be given for an action ,v>- 
or omission, and that from an evaluation of those reasons Offered by : ; ,
a defendant in a criminal action, the judge and jury would make an ; 7
assignment of guilt or innocence.; In the main, the juries were triers  ^ - 
of fact and the judges determiners as to what the law was which would 
apply to those jural facts determined by the jury. If a reason could not 
be offered for an action, then a paradox is created: namely, an agent 
does an act, or refrains from doing an act, but at the same time cannot 
explain to himself why he acted or failed to act ? This, for the common;
law, Was another way to describe a man as mad; or that he was an idiot,
or closer to our own times, that a man Was functioning as an automaton, -
or was frenzied, or, simply put, Was not fully in control of his actions. ?
Ought one then to say that human actions as such are ultimately so solitary ; 
and unique in quality that no legal system can arise to embrace those actions 
under canons of prescribed control ? The epistemological assumptions of 
1 common case1 reasoning at law are that no action is so hidden or unique 
that it cannot be viewed by the law. The underlying assumption to this 
belief may be that if an action can be known to its agent, then the agent 
can describe aspects of his actions by stating his reasons for his actions, 
v In no way do i think that a legal monist, or aharachist, has been
17. I do not Wish to moot this. No doubt an imaginary world populated by 
such creatures of the imagination could, possibly, devise a legal system 
of strict liability. It would be odd, however,-— perplexing, even— -to - 
claim that one knew that such a legal system did (in theory) exist, but - 
at the same time to maintain that one could not know the reasons for his /v 
actions.- ■■■ \ \
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has been easily routed. He makes a strong objection against the 
unanalysed legal assumption that solitary events may be compared.
To know, in an ultimate sense, why this man killed his wife may te-  ^
quire that one be this man who killed his wife. But the law has never 
admitted to being that precise, and it has admitted that common moral 
qualities can be discussed. That one may discuss reasons for what • ;  ^
he did, or entertain proposals, follows logically from the assumption 
inherent in the common law that the law, if known, must, on the part  ^
of the agent, be given reasons for why it was not followed. The " ; 
giving of those reasons constitutes the art of legal argument out ; ,: ' > 
of which legal guilt or innocence ensues. v 1 i ^
The logic of the common case embodies an assumption that '
particulars can be talked about; they can be freed from their very 
particularity by reason and speech. For instance, one Can talk about 
’this chair’ and the force of onefs locution can be understood, and 
acted upon, as in "Will you sit in this chair ? " Even if we were 6; 
to admit that the force of language is not related to objects, the 
common law would not be troubled. One may perceive, and one may . . .
speak about what one perceives, necessitating no conjunction of V\'.V 
speech to perception, and proposing a type of two-track theory of ,.
human behaviour. Yet if one did understand a sentence, "Will you 
sit in this chair ?", and did in fact sit upon this chair, the 
mysterious world of the legal monist would; dissolve by the simple
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fact that an instruction had been brought about in a([n] assumed ) 
world of solitary and mysterious particulars. This particular chair 
becomes, by force of the question, this-particular-chair-to-be-sat- 
upon, or this-particular-chair-not-to-be-sat-upon. Were it a solitary 
and mysterious particular no person could direct mine, or his own, y 
or any other's attention to it by use of an illocutionary proposal, • 
such as, MWill you sit in this chair ?** ,
If simpl;e directions can be expressed by the use of such y
simple locutions, then, it is argued, reasons can be given for actions. 
The common case is no more a mysterious concept than that of a chairv 
This object can have attention directed to it by means of an unlimited 
number of sentential modes; likewise, out of the singularity and yty 
particularity and uniqueness of human actions one can, for legal . 
purposes, devise common classes of actions and cases which may v
be looked upon and understood. As I might qualify my question,
"Do you wish to sit on the blue chair to your right, or the red / 
chair to my left ?", so one might talk about the killing of a person 
as accidental, or by design, or by natural causes; all of these in turn 
are subject to further possible refinement, as my question about 
which chair to. sit upon may be refined:and made more precise.
By what physical or mental process one’s sentence arises, or by 
what physical or mental process and what scientific conditions must v 
obtain in order for there to a world in which chairs can be talked 
about may present endless perplexities for a thinker; but the law 
was not concerned about metaphysics. Why this world ? For the' , • .
common law it would have been: That there is a world. - ■ v- -;.: f
- - *.The Council of Ahcyrani, 314 A.Dv, under Pope Silvester 1 , ■; v
concerned itself with homicide in the following way. Question ,'
twenty-two of the Council, "ex interpretatione Isidori Mercatoris", 4
v was: De his qui volentes homicidium fecerunt. -^ * The reply given ■ .■ •
: . at the Council was, to the effect, that if the killing Were a '
voluntary killing then it was absolutely the case that a penalty {
; ‘ : . should be assigned against the act; but if the killing were an in- ; - }
voluntary killing, then one should be deemed to be not guilty of
7 . culpable homicide, but should; nevertheless, perform some kind of * > •
^ \ v penance that a human life had perished.19* if a penitent in the •  ^ i 1
\ course of his confession admitted ; to causing the death of a person, ^
; but claimed, in good conscience, that the death resulted involuntarily :
; on his part, then his confessor could absolve the penitent, the 
. : action confessed would not have been matter which was considered V ; 7-;'^>“77; •
to be grievous or mortally sinful. 1 If, on the contrary, the penitent '
 ^ : had admitted to killing another, and admitted that his own act was
V a voluntary act, a requirement in the chain of seriousness for the -
elements of a sin, then one had a different matter. In both cases 
. . V. the same result was evident: some other had been ki 1 led.- '.The dis- p  k-7:; ; 7:7
v . tinction rested not upon the ’matter’ of the act, as, for instance, . . ^
" 18. CONCILIORVM, Tomus Secundus, M.DC.XLIV, page 59.
19. Ibid., "XXII: Qui voluntarie homicidium fecerint, ad ppenitentiam; 7 
quidem iugiter se submittant. Circa exitum autem vitae, co^^ - 
 ^ munione digni habeantur;. Eos vero qui non voluntate, Sed casu ;; j 
p  ; homiciditmi fecerint, prior quidem regula post septem anno^ : - ' - jf:. 
vP rum poenitentiam communioni sociauit secundum gradus con- 'P:>v-7’ Tf pp
; 7 7 stitutos* Haec vero humanior definitio, quinquenni tempuS , P77 ':C ;
V'- * 7 tribuit." page 66. ' . * p
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■ ■' ' ; 20- * -v .-v : • / / ' »-I : '■ •- 1: • h-z%;Lady Wootton ’ has suggested should be the sole coresm of the court
(thus ridding the court of the problem of determining if an accused
had formed a criminal intention), but upon the 1 form1 of the act: did
the penitent freely elect to sin ? The model is not; necessarily, /
of a penitent coolly sitting down to deliberate whether or not to
kill some other; the model is that a penitent, within the framework
of a penitential system, could distinguish for himself between what
he did, and thus for what he may be held responsible for bringing
about, from what happened to him, and for which he may, or may not
be held responsible. Whether an act was voluntary or involuntary ;r;
served as the test to distinguish between culpable and non-cupable.
A penance was recommended by the Council of Ancyrani in the instance .r
of involuntary homicide because a penance might cause the penitent
to strive to be more careful; such a penance also might serve to' r *
assuage any lingering guilt or remorse a penitent had for having
been involved, even though involuntarily so..in the death of another
human being,"*V; v* ■ > / f t , '': . V ;.
I have introduced the terms ’matter’ and ’form’ of an 
act to help with explication. As explanatory terms they were not 
employed until later in the development of moral theory by canonists;
20. One may consult her Crime and the Criminal Law (London: Stevens f ' f f r ' ’-'- 
§ Sons, 1963), the fifteenth Hamlyn Lecture, especially chapter 
Two, "The Function of the Courts: Penal or Preventive ?*’,pp 32-57 
which suggests that intention, as a question in a criminal defence, 
ought to be minimised, if not abandoned in English criminal procedure. 
One should incline towards the facts, and away from subjective 
qualities and their ascertainment. Her criticism of diminished 
responsibility as a viable and logically sound procedure was ex- ;
. pressed in; "Diminished Responsibility: A Layman’s View", The
Law Quarterly Review (Vo1.76,April I960), pp 224-239*T; f
■ r.,,
Vv?-34
'• Leeming suggests V  that Stephen Langton was the first to have . . :
- employed the concept in sacramental theology, but mentions that \
V } William of Auxerte used the term during the same period, the 1
} thirteeiith century. Langton’s death is given as 1228 A.D. ; 1
; ;• , . In language not scholastic, Leeming suggested that the early , * ’ \
v: ; •* J Church theologians, such as Tertullian Cyprian, Cyri 1 of Jeru- / !: j ^ ^  ? |
{ '*s .vSalemi. Gregory of Nyssa, and St. Ambrose of Milan, laid the •' ^
; . foundation for such a distinction between matter and form, but > : { :
" without developing pre-existing Aristotelian categories. He
~; . said, and I quote, ”...nevertheless it is clear in their minds
. that there are in a sacrament the two things, the material element
and the verbal. ’1 - * *Z’ The terms themselves find their way into .
the common law, its criminal tradition, when the law employed
’ ? the distinction between the objective matter of a crime, its v . s ^
• / reus^from its subjective element, ~ the mens rea of the crime. ' ; .
21. Cf., Principles of Sacramental Theology by Bernard Leeming,S.J., '
(Longmans Green and Co., 1955: London,New York,Toronto) at ;*.•
■ v ' pp 403-407, "The Matter and the Form in the Sacraments.”
■ : Also, A. Michel, art.” Matiere et Forme”, in Dictionnaire
de theologie catholique Ced. Vacant, Mangenot, Amann: Paris, ,
; v ■•;= 1903-52), vol . X, (1928), col. 346-9. Also, Chapter 11, ; • K; : C
’ , V ’’Matter and Form of the Sacraments” in vol. three of
Moral and Pastoral Theology by H. Davis, S.J., ( Sheed ", ;
and Ward, 1945: London, in four volumes ), pp 9-13. Davis 
. c i t e s  the decree of Pope Eugenius XV [1431-1447] to the ’
''Armenians, [given 22 November 1439] which stated that all ;
s' ’’Sacraments are constituted of three elements: by things which 
s are the matter, by words which are the form, and by the
 ^ person of the minister.” page 9. This would bring the usage Vv‘.,:'
of the terms late on into the early renaissance. <■; ••■f!
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One can admit that a general comparison can be made between the 
*matter' of a sacrament, and the reus of a crime, and. the 'form'.. ; 
of a sacrament, and the intentional element in a crime. \
The force of the Council of Ancyrani continues to serve as 
a criminal model in penitential reasoning when one reads that it 
was referred to as a guide by Pope Zacharias, 741-747 A.D., in his 
seventh letter, or Epistola VII, the title of which was, "Zacharias
papas ad Pippinum maiorem domus regiae , itemque ad episcopos, ab-
v"’". I-* .• •••••• "• "24- ' *‘" V  ;-V'-bates et proceres Francorum." * Two of the questions set for
guidance concerned homicide: XXIII, "D£ his qui homicidium sponte
perpetrantand XXIV, "De his qui homicidium non sponte perpetrant."25.
23. In his discussion of duress in Lynch v. P.P.P. [1975] 1 All ER 
913, R.A.G,O'Brien in "Compelled to Abet Murder" observes,
"The concept of actus reus and mens rea was developed in our 
[English] criminal law from the conditions laid down by the 
moralists for the commission of mortal sin. Grave matter is :
the actus reus and full knowledge and full consent are the ; 
elements of mens rea.... In Canon Law it [duress] will be found 
under the heading of "metus". In the Code, it is stated that 
"metus" diminishes the imputability of a delict where the act
is intrinsically wrong; in other cases it takes away guilt 
altogether: Canon 2205 paras 2 and 3." (LAW § JUSTICE, No. 48/49, 
Trinity/Michelmas Terms, 1975) page 87.
24. CONCILIORVM, Tomus Decimus septimus, M.DC. XLIV, page 374.
25i ibid.,- page' 374. ‘V/:-• • v.-.'.J.A ■ ‘ W-.
The direction of Ancyrani was followed, and no distinctions were 
introduced in the papal response ^ o either of the questions. f:
In the Carolingian edicts of 789> during the reign of Pope Adrian { ;
the First, 787-794 A*D.* we read under the "Capitvlare Aqvis- \
granese" a general condemnation of homicide in the "Titvli V; V.:
Capitvlorvm" at LXVII, MPe homicidiis." A man1 s life may J ' \
only be taken by command of the law, "...nisi lege iubente." . ,
The distinction between culpable and non-culpable homicide is i
protected'; by the . force of the law, aiid • it is;..assumed.; that the v • ' i • 
law may command acts and make those acts, even they are the V?:'*
26. ibid,, at page 384, ,
"XXIII: De his qui homicidium sponte perpetrauerurtt in XXI [I] , ; ^
• capitulo Ancyrani Concilii cbntinetur: Qui voluntarie homicidium
fecerunt, poenitentiae iugiter se submitt ant, perfectionem vero 
?*V '-.circa vitae exiturn consequantur. •*’
"XXIV: De his qui homicidium non sponte perpetrauerunt, in eodem 
Canone XXII. capitulo continetur: De homicidiis non sponte 
commissis, proior quidem definitio post septem annorum poeni- 
’*> tentiam perfectionem consequi praetepit, secunda vero quiiw 
Vf’f* quennii tempus explere." -V'/v/.'-."r-.'
27. CONCILIORVM, Tomus Vigesimus, M.DC. XLIV, page 4, and the re- ;
: ; sponse at page 34 > ■ -X'''- y; : v’^.
: S "LXVII: Item vt homicidia infra patriam, sicut in lege Domini . < ‘
. interdictum est, nec cause vltionis, nec auaritiae, nec latro- •
; cinandi, non fiant; § vbicumque inuenta fuerint, a iudicibus
; . bostris secundum legem ex nostro mandatovindicentur; 8 non
bccidatur homo, nisi lege, iubentei" One nay note that the 
principle is enunciated here that death brought about by the 
; command of the law and in accord with the law is non-felonious ; y j
j - homicide. One may intend to execute a prisoner, but, acting • =
with legal accord, the intention is not a criminal intention. ■
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killing of another, legitimate when done under the cloak Of the 
law. : -;v'v’• vv'-v'■■ - ' '•.V/.5:’’-'-'
. . .The Council of Moguntinum, the first session, held under ;
the papal reign of Leo IV, 847-855 A.D., and itself held in 847 A.D. ! 
sets out a more detailed reply ;tq two questions, XXII,"De homicidiis" 
and XXIII, "De homicidiis non sponte commissis." ’ The general 
statement of the Council of Ancyrano was followed, with reference : *
made to guidance from other Councils> IIlicit ki1lings were to be 
punished by excommunication, "...sine conscientia iudiciis occiderit."
28. CONCILIORVM, Tomus Vigesimus Primus (Ab anno DCCCXVII. ad annum
DCCCLV), M . DC.XLIV at page 578, "Tituli Capitulorum".
29. ibid., pp 589-560, :
/ '.V "XXII: In Concilio Ancyrano, cap 21;[the listing should be
'• • ;V.. ’'cap 22] de homicidis ita scriptum est: Qui voluntarie ; ;;:v *'■
• : homicidium fecerint, poenitentiae quidem iugiter se sub-
• I mittant, perfectionem vero circa vitae ixitum cpnsequantur.
’ v ;; In Concilio vero Agathensi,cap. 37. de homicidis § falsis
 ^ . testibus ita legitur: Itaque censuimus homicidas 8 falsos :
; testes a communione ecclesiastics submouendos, nisi poe nitentiae 
satisfactione crimina admissa diluerint. Item in Concilio “
; Agathensi, cap. 62. scriptum est de his qui feruos extra { ^
' iudicem necant: Si quis seruum proprium sine conscientia
iudicis occiderit, excommunicatione vel pee nitentia biennii 
_ r. reatum sanguinis emundabit. Item in Concilio Eliberitano,
cap.5. scriptum est, de doraina quae per zelum ancillam suam ;
{ ; occiderit: Si qua femina furore zeli accensa flagellis ver-
• berauerit ancillam suam, ita ut intra certium diem animam : '
I'-^Vcum cruciatu effundat, eo quod incertim sit voluntate an 
1 casu occiderit: si voluntate, post septimum annum: si casu,
: • per quinquennii tempora acta legitima poenitentia, ad com-''
; , munionem placuit admitti . Quod si vero intra tempora v V;. •:
constituta fuerit infirmata, accipiat communionem."
v V • ;^ Tlie;:distiacti:9h is maintained between voluntary and involuntary :
; ; ’ killings. Force is given to the concept of crime and penalty, -  ^y ;-yy.:y
when the language of the response tells us that one may not re- 
• turn to the civil community until a penance is completed. We are  ^. , : ;--'y,."
'*r- • .yv:; also informed that illicit killing merits an excommunication
■ a severe penance. y.**’.V, ;\sy'-s'V;-• £•* ,y\ 0 ; ■ ■ y;'V-y;/-y:
The interesting distinction; which obtains at this Council J !
: is between what now would be murder and manslaughter, or in- *
4 • f tentional and unintentional death. It is suggested, as an example,
. v V , that a master could kill his servant girl by an excess of zeal 1
yy ; yy (”... de domina quae per zelum ancillam suam occiderit...) but that , y ; . 
s y . ; . V . he might not have intended to kill her when he was punishing her y
: y s ; y ;; so. It would appear from this example that a distinction is being £ j
^ * . y^ ; forced, or developed, either between what the agent himself in­
- y tended, or between what was thought to be done or achieved (as .
: when one says he wishes only to punish a person) and something
y other than what was desired is achieved ( the one punished dies V r
:• v ; . as a result of the punishment )V : It would be to extend this \ •: - (; '
30. One finds an interesting and later parallel on this very point y y
' y . : i ; when one reads the Acts of Assembly as passed in the Colony of y s •
Virginia in 1662.
; ,f At a Grand Assembly holden at James-City by Prorogation, from
V y ; ; the 17th of September, 1668, to the 20th of October, 1669, in r.
 ^ : the 21st Year of the Reign of our Sovereign Lord King Charles 11. .
; : : : : V ” No. 1, An Act about the Casual Killing Of Slaves: , .
’V  ■ . Whereas the only Law in Force for Punishment of refractory y .
’ •' - y , Servants resisting their Masters, Mistresses, or Overseer, cannot '
y.y;;yy-,y:,..yv be inflicted on Negroes, nor the Obstinacy of many of them, by /!J].
y : ; • other than violent Means suppressed: Be it Enacted and Declared
: y .. ; by this Grand Assembly, and the Authority thereof, That if any
early distinction too far if one were to attempt to apply it to the 
complicated situations of fact in modern criminal law. **32, The 
response of the Council initiates the distinction between an end 
which an agent may by design achieve, and an event which might 
come about as an accident . If the latter, then a mild penalty is „ x f 
attached to such a happening, a penalty of. 50 days. What was 
brought about; involuntarily would, if one were attached, suffer 
a mild penalty. We preserve such a distinction to this day. When 
one causes a death of a driver or pedestrian in an automobile crash ■ 
it can be argued that one could have foreseen that such might have
30. cont., • /..• V ./ ^ •; VI • » ->:• v-:
"Slave resist his Master, or others by his Masterfs OTder, 
correcting him, and by the Extremity of the Correction should, .
chance to die, such Death shall not be accounted Felony, but 
the Master, or that other Person by his Master appointed to 
punish him, be acquit from Molestation, since it cannot be 
sumed, that prepensed Malice which alone makes Mirder Felony, 
should induce any Man to destroy his own Estate." (Printed at• 
London, Printed by Order of the Lords Commissioners of Trade :
r and Plantations, by John Baskett...MDCCXXVlll) at page 91.  ^ >
I have cited the copy which is held by the Library at Lincoln’s 
; * Inn. ; F ' • ; * ■ .  " . •, ■' :t ' ■ ;; \
31. One could, however, see its application in modern criminal
cases. In State v. Frazier 339 Mo. 982, 98 S.W.2d 707 (1936) -
£ struck the deceased on the jaw, and did not know that the 
deceased was a hemophiliac. The charge could be reduced from 
murder to manslaughter, arguing that the fight arose from an 
’excess of zeal’ and that the defendant had not intended to :
kill his victim. The assault in this case could be taken as
•. ■ ; wilful and premeditated and felonious, as it was held by the
court; the unintended outcome could be argued in mitigation. ,
The appellant in this appeal case was convicted of mans;laughter.
32. "2416. (2239) Manslaughter.— -351. Whoever unlawfully kills any A  
human being without malice, express or implied, either voluntarily, 
Upon a sudden heat or involuntarily, but in the commission of some
w unlawful act, is guilty of manslaughter.. .’’ (Bums Ann. Indiana 
Stat. (1926)). may show the force of the mitigation from the side 
of the agent. He did not intend to kill, etc., and one looks to 
his state of mind or being ( *zeal ’ or ’ frenzy ’ or ’excitement * ) " 
to mitigate his act, as in the servant girl example. -
:; 3 9 yy/.
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happened, but the courts generally assess the consequences of the
act by meins of a fine and do not involve themseIves with the question : •
of whether or not the defendant intended to cause a victim's death.
That latter finding is open to the court, but it is seldom used^. v ;
‘ The general force of the distinction between degrees of ’ .
seriousness which the Council enunciated serves to impress upon ; .if; u 
one that a standard of care ought to be evident to a person, and that from 
such an appreciation one can distinguish between an act which was f 
fully willed producing consequences which a reasonable man would ex- f
pect, from an act which was brought involuntarily or by accident, even 
if harmful consequences flowed from it. In both instances a certain ^
harm ensued, and for each such classification of harms a penalty would 
attach,, stressing that some reasonable standard of behaviour ought 
to be observed in the community, or a reasonable standard of care 
ought to be attempted in the community. The harms which result-are f
not to be .thought of as neutral if the harms concerned the loss of <f -V. 
life ( or matter equally serious ). When one could conjoin a harm, >
the death of that man/ with the voluntary Conduct of the defendant
33. The dangerous driver is a problem to the law. Generally the ' V  -:
notion of 'dangerousness’ is denied by a driver when he faces '’if 'f-
*y\ a charge. He claims that he was acting reasonably, and, in the.-,• • 5;
last analysis (unless one is dealing with a drunken driving ; :
. charge, which present a different issue than what I wish to
show here), the public policy of the law is to assume that 
- people drive, and do not drive and want to murder others. Lord ; f
Hailsham, in an obiter dictum in Hyam v. P.P.P. [1974] 2 All ER if J;,;; 
39 at 55-c remarked, "The reckless motorist who is guilty of 
- manslaughter, but not murder, is not at least ordinarily aiming v :
his actions at anyone in the sense explained in Director of ; J
Public Prosecutions v Smith. If he were, it is quite possible . ]
that, els in Director of Public Prosecutions v. Smith, he might 
; be convicted of murder." ,
which brough about that harm, then a heavy penalty attached because 
a defendant had brought about a serious effect which need not have ;; 
happened. In ari accident, which the Council termed an action brought 
about involuntarily, it can always be questioned whether or not the 
accident should have happened. One is left with two alternatives: 
that what happened did happen without any design or control on the 
part of the defendant, and was truly not only an involuntary pro­
duction on his part, but was a production which in no way could he 
have avoided. The scholastics of the thirteenth century would ana­
lyse such an event as that brought about by ignorance on the part ; 
of the defendant, and the ignorance was that for which he was in no 
way culpable; it was not an ignorance brought about,deliberately • .,: 
by himself, as one might speak of an act or an attitude springing 
from bad faith, yyt The other side of the alternative would be that 
what was caused involuntarily could, in some way, have been avoided 
if the agent had been cautious, or had taken precautions to prevent.
34. In Q.vi, Art. 8 of the Summa Theologias , ]a2ae, Aquinas speaks
of such ignorance as ’affected ignorance’ and offers this example. 
"Ignorance is consequent to the will to the extent that the ig­
norance itself is voluntary. This happens in two ways*..The first 
y way occurs when the act of the will is brought to bear on the ig-y 
norance, as when one wills not to know in order to have an excuse 
for sin, or so as not to be turned away from sin..." (from the 
translation of John A. Oesterle, Treatise on Happiness [Prentice- 
Hall, Inc., Englewood Cliffs, N.J.,1964, third edition] at page 
79.) It may also be found in Volume 17 of St. Thomas Aquinas,
SUMMA THEOLOGIAE, translated by Thomas Gilby,0.P., and entitled 
"Psychology of Human Acts" (Blackfriars 6 Eyre 6 Spottiswoode, 
London and New York, 1970) at page 33 in S.T.la2ae.6,8, "Does 
ignorance render an act involuntary ?" I cite this as but one of 
numerous examples one can find in the better-known mediaeval 
authors. Albert Magnus in his Compendium Theologiae Veritatis, 
(Strassburg, [Johann Pruss], 1489) is concerned with the will and 
sin and ignorance; Stephen Langton. as cited in Powicke’s book 
' on him (Oxford, 1928), which used the Cambridge manuscript from
The type of ignorance Which attached to the notion that one could 
. ^ • ’• . have taken precautions to prevent can be shown by an example from
^ -modem tort law. In, most medical malpractice suits, unless gross 5; ; ■
negligence obtains from the onset of the case,, it will be an adequate j
y 'C \ • defence for a physician to argue that what he did was within the •
medical standards of the community. I do pot mean to mix the ;
: V field* of tort law aid criminal law * But in this instance it may ^
v bei easier for one to see how culpable and non-culpable ignorance / > •
are viable legal categories for a medical defendant, in much the-;,-,
- ' same way that for the mediaeval theologian such importance was
• . ; attached to various kinds of ignorance if such ignorance was to^ ^^ ^^ !
y   ^ ; serve as an adequate defence to the charge that one had sinned, ^
v  ; and would be held responsible, or not, for his sinning. The modem
defendant in a malpractice suit faces terrestial seriousness,,in the / ■ ;
V ; 34., cont. v-■ ' *■'* ' • Kr:■ ’i ' t
x ,' ; ; St. John?s College, Cambridge, is shown to deal directly with : -j
/ the matter of affected ignorance in F. 173V. 2 1. ”de ignorantia '
, . V /• . affecta.”, as well as other discussions of ignorance as the ,:
, ; ; cause of sin, etc. Alexander of Hales discussed the matter at . ;
• . v length in his Summa% volume 3, De Malo (1930, Qaracchi edition)v *
; . / In an easier obtainable edition of Albert Magnus, one may con­
' , suit his Compendium Theologicae ( LVGDVNI, Sumptibus IOANNIS $*>'-
:^ . CHAMPION, in foro Cambij ., M.DC.XLIX ), referring to Book 111,
v : MDe Malo in genere” pp 193-264. : ;
. v,’! ’ : ikms Scotus asked "Utrum,peccatum primi hominis fuerit ex ^
'/?*» ! ignorantia” ( Libri 11, Distinct. XXll,Quaestio Secunda at vol 2, ;
i;v pp 353-54 ) in his Questiones Quolibetales (ex quatuor volu- 
: v ; minibus) scripti Oxoniensis Super Sententias [Venetiis: Typis ■'V
v I Abbundij Menasolij, 1680], proceeding to distinguish three ,} ;
types; of ignorance, ie, ignorance prior to an'.-act, ignorance-, ■" . ' -ViVV
■ ..  ^concomitant with the act, and ignorance following after an act* : :i •
- V . The value of this area for the legal scholar is that it presents 
.  ^ . ;/ him with very detailed modes of excusing, and a legal defence, at ;V :
 ^ V the least* is a mode of excusing (as is ignorance). vVV .•'
form of a massive monetary award against him for damaees should 
he lose. 3S’ : '/v"
^i"‘1pwentyr^^ of the Council of Moguntinum
preserved what the Council of Ancyrani had announced. Voluntary 
homicide* which is a. killing arising from a deliberate or voluntary 
intention, is condemned. During Tudor times one will see that 
the common law made a distinction between unintentional killing 
and killing which one brought about by chance-medley ( or chaud- : :
medley ). The killing under chance-medley, deriving from 24.
Hen. 8.C.5. (and then repealed by 9 G. 4. c.31), appears to be 
intentional, but arising from an affray or sudden act of self- ' <
defence negatives the intentional aspect of the act. Much like *’ /'•*
the notioii of 1doub1e-effect’, the intention of the agent is to |
defend himself, primarily, and that another is killed is secondary. I have
35. One may notice how the concept of J ignorance1 is used in modern
tort law. I shall: cite two cases. One will illustrate that what 
happened (the harm) could not have been reasonably avoided, al- 
■ though it could have been extraordinarily avoided: namely, there 
-had been some arcane research conducted on the matter which one,; :
possibly, could have known about. The second case illustrates i. :
that the 'standard of care’ need only be reasonable, and that 
; if it embodies risks, even though criticised by the medical
•; • . community, those risks may be taken if they seem to be reasonab 1 e-
• risks.. The first case is Roe v. Ministry of Health [19541 - ; ;
;■ 2 All ER 131. A glass ampoule which contained nupercaine, which 
; was administered for a spinal anaesthetic, was contaminated be-  ^ 4 
cause it had been immersed in a phenol solution, and, unknown 
> to all in the surgical theatre, it was not realised that, a i
phenol solution could penetrate the molecular flaws of the glass 
.ampoule, thus Causing a contamination of the nupercaine which, 
in turn, when injected in a lumbar puncture could cause spastic •
paraplegia in the patient. Since none of the medical community
; was apprized of such a possibility occurring the Court of Appeal 
was unanimous in holding that the Ministry was not negligent.
The second case is Moore v. Lumley and the Governors of St. 
Bartholomew's Hospital: 19 July 1975, unreported, before Mr. ,■/ ,
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Justice Thompson. There is,however, an adequate report of the \ ■
case in the British Medical Journal for the 20th of December 1975, !
as well as a partially adequate report of the case in the Annual 
Report, 1976, of The Medical Defence Union ( 3, Devonshire Place, 
London, W.l* ) at pp 23-25. Their report is flawed because they ^ : 
do not give the name of the litigants properly, although they do 
give an adequate summary of the case. :>
The facts of the case are: The plaintiff suffered from varicose ; ( 
veins since the age of 18, and Was now 57. He was treated by .
the Fegan technique, which was the technique of compression 
sclerotherapy. The technique was not without its hazards, but 
in spite of hazards the technique was thought to be an excellent 1 : 
one for treating varicosities. The alternative to this technique , 
of injections was surgery, and this the plaintiff did not desire. r. 
The plaintiff suffered complications after his third treatment of A  ./A 
injections* and brought suit against the doctor(the operator' 
the injections) and hospital.
Judgement was against the plaintiff, on the grounds that the technique, 
althought possessing some risk, was not .hazardous. The opinion of-1? 
Mr, Justice Thompson was, to the effect, that no doctor” .i .is 
negligent merely because there is a body of opinion taking a • con- A 
trary view [against the treatment he prescribes]. Nor is it every i'Vj 
mistake which imports, negligence. In the words of Lord Justice A ; :>A 
Scott [Mahon v . Osborne: (1938) 2 KB at page 14], " the standard • • 
of care the law requires is not insurance against accidental slips.™ 
at column two, page 715, of the B.M.J. statement of the case, ;A A>-. 
MEDICOLEGAL, "Hazards of compression sclerotherapy" pp 714-715. ./
Cf., also, Whitehouse v Jordan and Another L .R. (Times) 5 December V J-A 
197£ (C.A.), page 13; also, Chatterton v Gerson and Another, L.R.
(Times) 6 February 1980, (QBD). ■: - A.'• \?7~ , V v * > ’> Sa- \)
cited the Latin text in a footnote at the bottom of the page.^  *
It is, also, outside of the scope of my aim to discuss how one 
would have proved, in early canon law, how facts in a killing 
might lead to the distinguishing of the voluntary from the in­
voluntary. It is enough for my purposes here to note that those 
conceptual distinctions were a part of the moral literature.
• . ' Pope Hadrian 11, 867-871 A.D., through the Council of ; ; 
Worms (Wormatiense) in 868 A.D., developed the following dis- ,
tinctions with regard to homicide, as well as preserving earlier 
pronouncments. - The Council sets down a serious penalty for any 
person who kills a priest ( "Qui sacerdotem morti voluntate >
tradiderit.. .V) ’ . The next rule > XXVI barkens back
to the Old Testament, and recapitulates Deuteronomy 20, to the 
effect that in a time of war, uiiless one acts from intentional ; 
Hatred (’...odii meditatione...') or gTeed (*...vel propter :v- '
auartiam paganum occiderit..."), killing does not merit a penance.
36. ibid., page- 5 9 0 . : ' ' ' . ; / ': 'J -j;.-7!I i {S
; "XXIII: In Concilio Ancyrano cap. 22 scriptum ast ,?a& V
homicidiis non sponte commissis, prior quidem definitio ; \;S?i 
; post septennem poenitentiam perfectionem consequi prae- V ;
; cepit; secunda vero qUinquennii tempus explore." :
37. CONCILIORVM, Tomus Vigesimus Tertius (Ab anno DCCCLXVII at .
annum DCCCLXXI), Concilium Wormatiense, page 101:
: -"XXVI: Qui sacerdotem morti voluntate tradiderit (the con- ;- .:
struction of r...voluntate tradiderit. . . \ stresses the . .
voluntariness of the act), camem non comedat, nec vinum -r—i
bibere praesumat: ieiunet autem usque ad vesperam, exceptis 
testis diebus atque dominicis. Arma non sumat, § ubi- . 
cumque ire voluerit, nullor vehiculo deducatur, sed propriis * 0
pedibus proficiscatur." The rest of the text sets out - :•
;./-A. penalities, penances, and fasts to be observed. v\.;'
38. ibid., page 101, "XXVII: Qui odii meditatione, vel propter ; 
auaritiam paganum occiderit, quia non leuivitio committitur, ‘
vt homicidam conuenit poenitere: quando quidem nec exteris  ^
gentibus, nisi oblatam pacern respuerint, bellum est populo antiquo 
. penitus inf err e praeceptum." v. ;
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Both canons, twenty-six and twenty-seven of this Council, stress ; \ 
the notion of the voluntary in a deed. When one encounters a 
construction such as "voluntate tradiderit" and "odii raeditatione" 
the force of them is to italicise the agent in the act, and to 
remind one that what flowed in a consequence freely originated from 
the agent. The use of 'meditatione’ carries with it a cognitive 
geography: that what was entertained or known or excercised was 
done so with thought, or by design, or because of an intention. A 
Canon XXVIII introduces * insanity and unsoundness of mind , 
as a condition which ought to mitigate the imposing of a penance. ’ 
The condition is interesting because it calls attention to the a  
state of the agent as one who may do a harmful act, and, to 
all appearances seem to be voluntary, but the voluntariness is 
is prohibited by his being 'insaniens’ or ’irrationabile*. Such 
reasoning will find its way into the common law in Bracton. *
39. Ibid., pp 101-102, , ; ; A  ^ :/A; A
■; "XXVIII: Si quis insaniens aliquem occiderit, si ad sanam
mentem peruenerit, leuior ei poenitentia imponenda est, quam 
ei, qui sana raente tale quid commiserit. Cui quamuis poeni- 
tentia sit imponenda, quia ipsa infirmitas causa peccati, A
licet fortassis occulta, contigisse creditur, tantum tamen 
. leuior, quam ei qui sanus aliquem occiderit, quantum inter
insanum § sanum, irrationabile § rationabile, constat esse A  / 
V’. A  discriminis." A  A, A A  v.A* • -Oi'ffeS
40. One may consult Bracton's ON THE LAWS AND CUSTOMS OF ENGLAND, A  
translated by Samuel E. Thome ( The Selden Society and • •.' a 
The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press; Cambridge, v a a a '
; A Massachusetts, 1968 ) in volume two, "Of Pleas of :the Crown”; J 
: in the calender entry for: Of homicide through misadventure and 
A  : and accident, at page 384, Urom which I quote: "...a crime is >
. not committed unless the intention to injure exists,.. .as may be
said of a child or a madman, since the absence of intention pro­
tects the one and unkindness of fate excuses the other."
' . Canon XXIX attempts to develop the category of an event. ;
The stress of the canon is upon the order of necessary happenings; 
over which one might have had no control ("...dum ille operi ne- 
cessario fortassis incumberet.,,M) and which does not arise from any 
intention, or from negligence, on the part of the agent ( as when ; — "
one fells a tree, and some other is killed by the falling tree). In
modern law, such a death would be a death by misadventure; or it may ;
be viewed as a non-culpable homicide ( as in a motorway accident ) .
What the carion attempts to relieve of an agent are the following pre­
dications. The death of a third party was not related to the state 
of the will of the actor, thus there is no agency because of will 
The casual conditions which brought about the death of the third party '- -i v
were not intended by the actor, thus there is no intentional agency. v.-r
In general language one would say that the defendant did not prepare 
a trap into which the unwary human victim had entered. ■ ;
; The illustration of a man killed by a falling tree abounded in .
mediaeval philosophy and moral theory* it seemed to have been that kind r 
of example which was thought to present clearly the notion of a non-negligent 
act. An agent did not cause the event; to the contrary, the event happened. >
If an agent had caused the event,■ (in the strong sense of 1 cause’), it would
have had to have been the case that the agent willed what he did-as with ' ;v
an intentional murder , or; barring that it was an intentional act, the ;
agent would have had to have been reckless or negligent in some fashion— —  
preventing what might have happened by having had some notion or expectancy "
that what actually did happen would have been likely to have happened.
39. ibid., page 102: MXXIX: Saepe contingit, ut dum quis operi necessario . ,
ihsistents arborem incidit, aliquis subtus ipsam veniens deprimatur; 8 i d - ; 
circo [very often the case] si voluntate vel negligentia incidentis arborem r ’ 
factum est, ut homicida poenitentiae debet omnino submitti. Quod si non voto, 
non incuria illius, non denique scientia contigit, sed dum ille operi ne- 
cessario fortassis incumberet, iste insperatus occurrens, sub arborem improuisus
deuenit 8 syb ipsa, nemine valente penitus adiuuare, suppressus est, incisor. 
arboris homicidae procul dubio non est conparandus
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A A  ,. ;'The Council of Triburiense, 895 A.D., is concerned with 
a number of criminal matters, and I shall have to refer to them 
in passing rather than to treat of the Council detail. I reduce 
a great part of the text to footnotes in Latin quotation only 
to show that there is a continuity of thought without the addition
of much new matter or criminal distinctions. ; ' 'n
. •' * '■ ■' -a  • .'A • 40..' A  A  A  A  '
The thirty-sixth canon of the Council preserves the tree
example, but elaborates a bit more on distinctions ( and the case
now concerns two brothers J.  ^The qualifying clause attempts tp
spell out that one did not want in any way or manner the death of
the other: "Quia non voluntate, non incuria illius* non denique ;:
consensu, nec ullo suo mortem incurrit reatu..." The tree simply
falls -and' the .other. is killed. : A v :A  a ■'A  ‘- V , 7 A a A .■ / : A : > >• •!: A
40. CONCILIORVM, Tomus Vigesimus Quartus, (Ab anno DCCCLXXII ad
‘ annum DCCCCIX), Concilium Triburiense (under Pope Formosus, A A  A;'
' 891-895 A.D.) at page; 662:
"XXXVI: Si contingat duos fratfes simul arborem succidere, . A  
’ , siue.in silua, siue [?u* * *yf throughout] quocumque loco, 6
cadente arbore, alter alteri, Fuge vel caue dixerit, 6 ipse ..
A stans, siue fugiens, subtus ipsam arborem deuenerit, § mortuus a
fuerit, superstes frater, innocens de morte defuncti diiudicetur. 
Quia non voluntate, non incuria illius [» neither reckless or a  
%, ;; careless], non denique consensu, nec vllo sup mortem incurrit ■ ;
v. A reati: sed dum ambo insisterent operi necessario, incautus 8 A
A' insperatus casu arboris depressus est, [the tree simply and un­
expectedly falls], nemine penitus adiuuare valente. Hanc eamdem •:
statuimus diffinitionem de ceteris similibus, siue cognatis, a  
siue nulla proximitate coniunctis[and this should hold over to v 
other examples where one has no intention to bring about a wrong 
and is in no way connected to what is brought about, ie, one is A  
_ v not a cause of a criminal event]. - Istarn diffinitionem tenuere
patres nostri apostolici vire: ideo eorum exempla sequentes, per 
futura tempora inuiolabilem earn custodimus, 8 posteris nostris A  
sequendam transmittimus: quia graue peccatum est, 6 nostro minis- 
terio contratium, innocentem opprimere, § securum crimine, 
scienter criminosum habere." One can notice that * scienter V 
carries over from this Council to the common law ("...scienter 
•; ' Criminosum. habere.").’ ", .A A : -a!:-;. . ' -A-\  ■ A A' A'"':.a;a
;-c\ ;• y- v ■ v-\
'•.; '■'■ ‘ The canon closes with a sensible observation or exhortation, j
that little of joy comes from crime either for the just man or for 
the evil man, 11 Quidam de sapientibus ait: Premit insontes debita 
sceleri noxia poena iustusque tulit crimen iniqui." and then pro­
ceeds, in the thirty-seventh canon to discuss accidental death of 
an infant, which can happen often (*’... ut saepe contingit. . . .  The 
example shows one that infanticide is not being talked about; what 
is being described is another event which happened, although some :
negligence might have arisen on the part of the mother. A mild f ^ ■
penance can be given to the mother, but the father ("...homo q u i ’ ; 
caldarium pependit...M) is not involved in the act, as £uch, and  ^
may rest with a peaceful mind.4 ‘ V > V :
I ' The force of the example is that we are given a distinction
41. ibid., page 663, "XXXVII: Si quae mulier, ut saepe contingit,
infantem proprium prope ignem collocauerit, 6 alius, qui cal- ; 
darium super ipsum ignem pependerit, 6 aquam infuderit, atque 
aqua ipsa per ignem seruens egreditur, 8 infanti superfunditur,
8 propterea mortuus agitur: mater infantis, propter negligentiam, 
iudicio sacerdotum poeniteat, 8 homo qui caldarium pependit, 
securus permaneat. Simili modo de ceteris similibus, quae 
saepe diuerse solent euenire* 8 iudicamus, 8 esse volumus." ;W'
V
-■ V‘
between death which may be caused deliberately and a death which 
may result from some event, and the reason for the event being a 
possible case owes to one’s negligence and lack of care. An ap-V..>’ 
preciation for the force of events is shown, but a distinction is :
made between events which purely happen, as the tree falling, and 
a child dying. We have seen that homicide can result from one 
willing to kill another; we have seen that homicide can come about v 
because one has expressed an excess of ’zeal* in the disciplining 
of a slave or servant; we have seen a death come about because of 
an event in nature; now we see :that death can come about, and, / • • 
for the most part, it appears to be an event within the course of v / ;
nature, but the ’nature * here has been a set of conditions set up
in a household, and those sets of conditions may have been other .
than they were. That they could have been other than they were - v , ; 
permits the canon to ascribe negligence to the mother• In mediaeval 
moral theory this category will be transformed into * ignorance
which is concomitant with an act1, and it will be assumed that v!:-
by care and diligence one could obviate this category in -one’s -• X
behaviour, and therefore obviate the harms which would ensue Z
from such behaviour. - Xv,’ f\.‘
It is a trying category because it appears to predicate . I. : V 
responsibility on what one, at the moment, did not know or cause,;
but upon a failure for not acting properly. A risk must be" ' r e a - X  ’,X
sonable’, and it is assumed that reasonable risks are within the X V
capacity of agents to bring about. It is not that one permitted
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0 to happen; it is not that one willed 0 to happen; it is, not 
that one intended a counter-condition to be the case. The 
force of the objection is that one should not have let such a ; p '*■ 
condition happen because, from the enlightenment of practical 
and human experience, one should have been aware that such 
may have happened, whether in fact it would or not. The closest 
analogy one has is to insurance underwriting, when an under­
writer anticipates in the preparation of an assured's policy 
what may be the scope of the foreseeable risks the company 
should underwrite and which the assured should reasonably expect 
to be insured against. One cannot insure against every risk; 
but one must not underinsure.-^V V
Had the example been altered slightly to a mother letting > 
her child be tended for by an inexperienced baby sitter, all other 
parts of the example holding, and one might have a mother faced with
42. I do not want to dwell upon the nature and extent of occupiers’ r 
liability (already extensively treated by P.M.North in his 
book, Occupiers’ Liability [Butterworths, 1971]) but one can 
draw upon that area of the law for comparisons here. Chief is / i 
\ to determine what is entailed by the concept of liability. It -j;
rests upon the notion that risks can be anticipated, and thence V f
prevented, as was expressed in the recent case from the House of 
. Lofds in British Railways Board v. Herrington [1972] 1 All ER 749,. 
holding that, the Board had not acted, with reckless disregard '
towards a six year old child who had trespassed upon its land
(a  railway ) and who suffered an injury; nevertheless, the 
Board had failed to act with due regard to humane considerations, • 
and were under the circumstances culpable. As the mother in ;V;; ,v^ 7 
tie citation from the thirty-seventh canon, reasoning similar to 
it was applied in Herrington. The House of Lords assumed that the 
Board would assume that small children might play near to their 
electrified line, and would have taken precautions against the 
trespass of children. In other jurisdictions the tort notion of 
maintaining an ’attractive nuisance' might indict a defendant in 
: 5 a similar case, ie he should have known 'x' condition would attract 
• 7/' harm* 7 vv ' v! ; • :
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criminal negligence. One may not employ as a defence that one *
assigned away one's natural rights and obligations. A defence :
through agency, ie that the servant was at fault and not the 
masteri must be a reasonable defence. * Although a baby sitter A ' ■
might be absolved of her negligence ( or even found to be negligent ) 
the parent(s) could be found guilty of haying taken a reckless 
disregard for life, and what might have been simple negligence 
for them would be transformed into criminal negligence.44* A  A 
v ; By its fifty-second canon the pronouncement of Ancyrani , ;,a A- 
was followed, and I have Cited the Latin of this canon in a A  •
footnote to show the similarity of expression and feeling to • A / A  - :AA 
the earlier pronouncement. No models of important novelty are AAAy
added in the present expression. 44* Stress is put upon voluntari­
ness throughout the pronouncements of. this Council, from the A  A  
fifty-second through to the fifty-fifth pronouncement. What A?-A:
penance is given depends uoon the presence or absence of voluntari A'A 
ness, given expression to in the fifty-second canon. It is left 
to practical religious wisdom to determine the volitional state of 
a penitent at the time of the commission of his sin. Such a de- .
43. Cf., Tesco Supermarkets, Ltd., v . Nattrass, H.L.[1971]' 2 All
A A-/..A; ER 127. • • A  • " . < . > A  . / A, : A- "
44. In R. v. Charlotte Smith, (1865) 34 L.J.M.C.153; LA § C. 607,
Blackburn, J., in a case concerning homicide by neglect* ob­
served, "To render a person who has the charge of another 
criminally responsible for neglect, such as is alleged in this 
case, there must be, on the part of such person, a duty arising 
, from the helpless character of the person who is under control. 
Such a duty, for instance, arises in the case of those who have A
charge of infants, invalids, or lunatics.” I have extended his
observation to suggest that if one appoints a defective agent, ; 
knowingly ,the defects of the agent will not be a defence for 
A  the principal in a charge of criminal negligence. ; A AA A •
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termination does not necessarily reveal a lack of preciseness on 
the part of the Council. The question often is how to orovide a
scale of practical wisdom, and it is a practice in modem criminal
law * to leave the practical nature of a finding open to a iurv
and not to a rule or scale, ie, was one two-tenths voluntary and 
eight-tenths involuntary ? is a formulation it would be hard to 
follow. We do not possess a mathematical scale for human actions. 
We may be able to measure soeed or distance or mass, but we are not 
able to measure voluntariness or involuntariness.
45. ibid.. page 671, "LII: Placuit nobis de homicidiis non sponte 
commissis, his inferere, quod in Ancyrano sancto Concilio, 
capite vigesimosecundo legitur, ubi dicitur: De homicidiis \ 
non sponte commissis, prior quidem diffinitio post septennem 
v poenitentiam perfectionem consequi praecepit: Secunda vero, 
quinquennii tempus explere. Modus autem huius poenitentiae 
in episcoporum sit arbitrio, ut secundum conuersationem 
poenitentium, possint 6 extendere tardantibus, 6 minuere 
studiose festinantibus."
46. Under the Criminal Justice Act 1967, proof of criminal in­
tent is no longer given in the form that a jury must assume 
that £  intented the natural consequences of his acts. The 
language of the Act is now as follows:
Section 8, provides that,"A court or jury in determining 
whether a person has committed an offence,
(a) shall not be bound in law to infer that he intended 
or foresaw a result of his actions by reason only of 
its being a natural and probably consequence of those 
actions; but ‘:A* V •; . " ■  •• ’: -4 ;
(b) shall decide whether he did intend or foresee that re-
suit by reference to all the evidence drawing such in-;
: ferences from the evidence as appear proper in the cir-
'V'M -**;: cumstances. 11 ; J■ '. • .V;: v- j
David Napley, in his commentary upon the Act stated that, "The 
section, however, does nothing to clarify whether, and to what 
extent in particular crimes, intent or foresight is required to 
be proved." at page 29 of A guide to Law Practice under the 
Criminal Justice Act 1967,(London: Sweet 6 Maxwell: 1967), an 
observation which later decisions (from 1967) would puzzle over, 
and upon which I shall comment in the section on modem case law.
aj
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In passing, I wish to say that because we do not possess a : 
mathematical scale by and with which to measure accurately the,: y7-7 7 ; 
voluntary or the involuntary ( as one might measure blood pressure ) , 
does not mean that we are plunged into an abyss of imprecision or of 
darkness. It may be fundamental to moral and legal language that it 
cannot achieve that kind of precision, either, because that kind of ; v 
precision cannot be attained, or that such precision is not what ,;y7v77y.7 
we would need after all. It may be that there must be a distance 7 y :7;..;:X 
between what we describe and the vehicle by and through which it is 
described, as if to say that language itself is a limit upon the act 7
of knowing. .7. f / S r .7, -7 7.77^  ^7_;yy77\7,”y 7y; y>,‘ ■'.•■7;- 7y.,;
We must remember, also, that we do live in a culture which has . 77
embraced technology. We believe that language is precise and can be 
made more precise, as measured by our advances in science. We believe 
that we not only can make exact locations in the world, but also that 
we can exactly create worlds as a result of the clarity of scientific 7 : 
language. Language is both power and exactness for us. What then of 
human actions ? Why Can we not make these exact kind of locations there;?
Human actions seem to fall outside of a technological network* To 
some, like the reductionist, this is not so. A human being is just a more 
compleat robot, and time will reveal how that compleat robot ultimately 
operates. "Why is this so ?" is reduced to, "How this is so." But in­
tentional explanations of human action, with their stress upon the volun­
tary and upon the intellective, arid their awareness of human character and 
its past, do not lean to the reductionist’s camp. Like all essentialism, 
a single flaw is perceived in its formulation. The essentialist states
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that any formula about the real world is as real as the real world.
But if wishes be as horses, then all beggars would ride like kings.
That an object may exist, and that an object does actually, exist,
are convertible metaphysical notions one makes at his peril. ’ ; --iy:
■ . : Essentialism and reductionism look to formulas to displace
the real. Carried to a logical extreme, both seem to believe that \
there can be presented some formula which will displace the real. - ;
When that habit of mind comes into the law, it turns to codes to
understand human conduct and not to human conduct to understand /
human conduct. A good law, or a sound law, becomes a law which the
la w -m a k in g  pow ers have a r t f u l l y  c o n s t ru c te d ,  and in t o  th o s e  le g a l
c a te g o r ie s  human a c t io n s  somehow f i t .  One w i l l  o f te n  o b se rve  ( a n d
I  do n o t  say t h i s  n e c e s s a r i ly  t h a t  i t  m ust be a fe a tu r e  o f  c r im in a l  ;•
Codes ) that the intentional elements of the criminal act are either ^
over-broad, or they are diminished excessively. A crime is defined in ; •
very general fashion. * An underlying criticism of such statutory 
constructions is that they do not reflect human nature or public ex­
pectations, but rather are harsh crimes and may even be petty in their 
scope and effectiveness. Mens rea is extraordinary diminished, or may 
take on the meaning of 1know’ in a tort sense,; and actus reus will be 7 \ v;7\\
accentuated so that a mere doing becomes the essence of a crime. -
47. There are hosts of examples: Washington Criminal Code 9A.44 ff wherein 
intent is seldom a defence to the charges of any kind of sexual contact. One 
may read the COMMENTARY ON TOE IMMORALITY ACT (Act No.23 of 1957) by Hardie .
and Hartford (Juta § Co.,Ltd., I960, Cape Town) to observe how offences of ;vf>'l\
the strictest liability are cast, diminishing mens rea almost totally. .^£'77 > 
The classic case, of course, is: R v . Larsonneur (1933) 97 J.P. 206 (C.C.A.), ’
the police, having arrested D., caused her to be found in the United Kingdom,
her presence thereby being an immigration offence. Paradigm cases for offences 
of this kind may be older counterfeiting or uttering cases in which the offence 
is complete when D "knows" the coin to be false, no matter how innocently he 
acquired the coin or note. Elizabethan recusant statutes functioned much the-
same; one offended if one "knew" that a priest were about the land. i Y
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In the course of legal experience, however, we find that 
one proposes reasons for his actions. A simple causal explanation ; 
will not account for a motive,, for a goal, for an intention, for a \ A 
hope, for a desire, or for a change (as in, VI decided to wear brown 
this season and not pinstripes.”) , ii we wish to utter a trivial : . 
metaphysical statement of the form that change (of whatever kind) 
involves a transition from what may be the case to what is the case y 
we have done so by excluding that 'what may be the case' can only K 
be a case at all because one designs that it be the case rather than v 
some other end be a possible case for consideration. To exclude A  Ay 
that one considers is to exclude a world of locutions which are A A 
part of our common language*- If we hold that such a host of locutions 
are accidental and are nominative only (they are only names which we 
use in discourse but the names relate to no internal condition or A. 
situation) then how odd it is to explain any state of affairs A  ArA A) 
One's explanation of some state of affairs could always be rejected 
by an appeal to the theory that language, is only used and does not ;
convey what is the case outside of itself.7 One uses a sentence, and ’ 
the world does what it does. Any explanation (even of itself) would A 
be little more than an accidental conjunction of a sound or sign with 
an event. Even when one believed that he might have explained, one •. ^  A  
would be haunted, at least in theory, by the persistent/doubt if he 
could know that he had explained some event or other, even if the event';;' 
were so simple an eveit as knowing whether or not one had used a sentence 
correctly. 1 A • • • ' “■; ' V - Ay a'Aa >,:AAA..A
V'A rJ' v. y
If we admit that some aim or other can be a possible case then 
we are assuming that action for which a human being is to be held re­
sponsible is ah act for which a reason can be given by him for its 
doing or production. A theory of 'potency’ and 'act* at the level 
of human discourse is a theory which suggests that what now is the 
case, for example some dispute in court, is a production which need 
not have been the case. If one were forced to do this, and only this, 
then the defence of necessity or duress might obtain, and, by the 
force of such a defence, it might be argued that because an agent 
were only a causal feature is a set of features ( Bloggs was just ,
a cog in the wheel of events ) he was absolved of human responsibility.
The first aspect of an intentional description is that one can 
offer a reason for what action he proposed to himself. : How one 
causes himself to act may not admit of a simple description. One may 
appeal to simple human experiences to show this condition. When one 
writes a letter he may have intended to say one thing, but, when finished, 
have noticed that he omitted to say what he had intended to say, or 
said it poorly and unciearly, or said it clearly. How one physically 
directs himself, or how one sententially produces sentences upon the 
page in the form in which they appear, may admit of no final and ex­
haustive situation ( ie, moving from some general explanation of the
* I do not want to suggest that a little man inside of a person ’pro­
poses' projects to be done or aims to be reached. What we do with 
the language of intention is to understand why an agent acted, and 
our assumption is that one can, if only to himself, ascertain why 
he did this rather than that. The standard way we propose a con­
sideration to ourselves is in question and answer form. But the 
question and answer fo% ( an arbitrary feature of a non-necessary
language form ) is not the action itself. It mirrors our understanding 
of an action.
■ form, "all *x ’ s do such and such, and this ’ x’ did such and such in this 
! instance.”). If what one did at this moment did follow from some general
explanation, then one’s human actions would be a function of that - general;/
/ explanation. One could argue that responsibility then would not be a / //
; feature of what some ’x’ did; rather, it would be a feature of the general ^
: explanation ( as with the example of the defective medicine ). The faiJu^e;V/;\/4;/;
of the prescribed tablet resulted from a failure to follow the formula cor- \
; fectly when preparing the tablet. Liability would be attributed to the -
wrong formula having been followed. / ' ' >
A second aspect of an intentional description is that one may be able 
to account for his actions by means other than an appeal causal presentations.
If an appeal is made totally to a casual explanation of what one did, -it/is 
arguable if any reason at all has been provided for what one did. It is a / ;v V  
variant of the defective tablet case. One did this
because one is so constructed, and things accordingly constructed act in this 
, way and not in that way.- •//; " V * ' • /. K‘.r-.
' The twofold approach of an intentional explanation Suggests that one m ay j ^
V  propose an end, and then one; may accomplish that end (; if there are no in/
/ ternal contradictions to prevent an accomplishment ). Crimes of aiding and"
abetting preserve this distinction. * One aspect of the crime is to aid,
; whilst a further aspect is to take steps to abet. What had O in mind, and what >
; ' •. 48. Cf., Free Action, by A.I. Melden ( London, 1961.), chapter Nine, ’’Motive 
and Explanation”, wherein the author argues that causal explanations and ex­
planations by an appeal to motive are not logically interchangeable, pp 83-104.
48a. R. V. Clarkson and others,[1971] 5 All ER 344. Citing R.v.Coney (1882)
V 8 QBD at 557 ”..'.to constitute an aider and abettor some active steps must be ; -"v*
taken by word,br action, with ihe intent to instigate the principal, or principals.f 
this court held that presence was not enough to convict a person of aiding and ;
•; abetting, but (at 347 ), ” It must be proved that the accused intended to give ;
. encouragement; that he wilfully encouraged.” • '
A : steps, he took in execution? This locution is somewhat awkward. -'What.AAA^AAAA/A
the court inquires after is what the accused had in mind, and then what Ay A 
overt acts the accused did to bring about effecting the plan or design. - A
Unless the Crown clearly shows that the accused had in mind and in fact A
A; A did bring himself to perform elements of the forbidden act, then there
A is not a case for the accused to answer, and the defense may move for a A  ; A A  A
A*;’.-: A dismissal of the charges. .-* AaV' A A' -AAA;; y : ' A-' '.yiA,
’ , A recent example may serve to illustrate the two tier nature of ,
V criminal intention. Although this case which I cite was to be controlled A A A
by Smith [1961] A.C. 290, but now would be controlled by Section 8 of the A .  .
Criminal Justice Act 1967, the example is appropriate here:, A A : : A
■ ; ; "The law of murder and manslaughter is set out in sections 198, A ’ A ,
A ; ; 199 and 202 of the Penal Code of Kenya. A person who b y an un- ; A A A:
lawful act or omission causes death is guitly at .least. of mail- A: .A,.•.A A
y slaughter; and if the act is done with malice aforethought, he A
is guilty of murder. Malice aforethought is established where, A \
A ; A  A A inter alia, there is "knowledge that the act or omission caus- A A
ing death will probably cause the death or or grievous harm to" A
another person; and in section 5 of the Code "grievous harm” A !
A A is defined as including anything likely seriously or; permanently r:
to injure health or any organ. The Crown.. .submits.. .that A A Aa A ^
; A !lknowledge". . .does not mean actual knowledge, but means.. .the y.Avh .A.A-; AyA--
A A A knowledge that a reasonable man wOuld have of the probable con- r A
: sequences of his acts and omissions," 49. AA A
. Returning now to matter from the Council of Triburiense, one will A A' A 
note how the fifty-third canon appears to leave room for the category ;
of accidental death; but it also adds, by way of a cautionary , rA A
- - 49. R . V. Sharmpal Singh [1962] A.C. - Privy Council - 188 at page 196.,
• The defendant was accused of homicide, it being claimed by the Crown -
AAA:- A; ; that he had caused the death of his wife by acts of violence on his Aye A;A AA
A part during sexual concourse with her. , A  f
* In no way do I mean to suggest that an accused is required to give , A A A
' evidence and thus prove his innocence. It is for the Crown or the A A
prosecution to prove the elements of a criminal charge, and, if those A
elements are not proven, the charge falls. If, however, the accused A A A
does take the stand in his own defence, then his testimony, serves to A AA
y rebut the charges of the Crown or prosecution through suggesting that A
some other reasonable explanation can be given of the acts of the accused,
A :A" A according to the evidential canons in criminal law that one need succeed A A
yA A in his case by meeting the burden of reasonable doubt. A A 7 AA; AAa AaP
. ': vv/; ; v 6(> :-
a gloss on the text (which appears as a note in the text), it
states that if the death is other than accidental (”...; sed ' 
casu contingente occiderit...”) a legal penalty would then fit • -
(M.. .ut sequent i subinfertur capitiilo.. •,f) * Of interest for the
common law is that such a distinction does appear, and is sub­
mitted for penitential consideration. I have reproduced the ; 
text in a footnote, but shall comment no further on it. The 
fifty-fourth canon of the Council follows Ancyrani, and I have 
reduced it to a footnote only for the sake of consistency in this 
text. Its matter was stated in that portion of my text on the . 
Council'of;Ancyrani. *; ,;.v ? V'‘\v.y;W
50. ibid.,page 671, ”LIII: Si quis filium suum (quod absit) non 1 •
sponte, sed casu contingente occiderit,[*iuxta homicidia non 
sponte]; secundum homicidia sponte commissa poeniteat, ut 
sequenti subinfertur capitulo.” By contrast, Roman military : 
law could be severe, ”De milite, qui commilitonem suum vul- 
nerauit. 22 Miles, qui commilitonem suum gladio vulnerat, 
caput amittit.” l?A soldier who wounds a comrade. 22 A soldier 7 
who wounds his comrade with a sword shall be beheaded.” , : ,
: taken from the Military Law from Ruffus, the text and trans­
lation appearing at pages 154 and 155 in Roman Military Law 
by C. E. Brand (University of Texas Press, 1968: Austin 6 / 7
London). That one wounded a fellow soldier, and not with what /
intention one may have wounded, comprised the offence; thus 
the actus reus directed the penalty---the wounding itself--- > 
and it would not matter if the wounding had been by accident, 
by negligence, or by intention. ' , :
51. ibid., page 671, ”LIV: De his qui voluntarie homicidium fecerint, 
Ancyrano sancto Concilio, capite vigesimoprimo legitur: Vt 
poenitentiae quidem iugiter se submittant: perfectionem vero,
id ist, communionis Christi gratiam circa vitae exitum con- 
sequantur. etc.” The fifty-fifth canon simply sets out penalties 
for intentional homicide (”Si quis sponte homicidium fecerit...”), 
and there is no need for me to reproduce the text here since :
: ; nothing of major change is added to a voluntary act.; ,
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v When we come to view the Council of Namnetense, A.D.895,. 
following upon the Council of Triburiense, we find little legal 
theory, but we do find what may be called a judicial statement 
about punishment for crimes. The seventeenth and eighteenth 
canons state respectively, "De poenitentia homicidii voluntario" 
and "De poenitentia eius quo non volens fecerit homicidium." It 
is not within the scope of my study to relate crimes to punishments. 
Such has little formally to do with the concept of intention. The
bearing upon the common law is that both canons reveal an attitude
of mind which assumes that to have a law one must, of necessity, 
have a concomittant punishment. It is an attitude which follows 
us to recent times. * In the practical order of the governmental 
life of a commonwealth it may be the case that crimes must have 
assigned to them subsequent punishments or fines; but in the logical 
order, considering law qua law, there may be no need to make this 
conjunction. One may have a law of conscience, the punishment for 
having broken or transgressed a law a simple knowledge that one had 
done so, and a related consequence that one was displeased by one’s 
own sense of failure. The ’punishment’ would simply be that one 
knew that one had violated the law; there would be no need to add
a punishment on to the fact of the transgression. I cite this as an
instance only to dispute the claim that a law necessarily entails a 
subsequent punishment. It does not, but it may.
52. One need only consult Edward Poste’s introduction to Gaius 
(' Gaii: Institutionum Iuris Civilis Commentarii Quattor, or 
Elements of Roman Law By Gaius [ translation and commentary 
by Edward Poste; Oxford, At The Clarendon Press, M.DCCC.LXXV])
v " ; One has to search behind; the pronouncements of the canons: ■ •';//-
: to discover if any legal theory be present in their expressions. - •
r / One is not presented with reasons why a certain act is forbidden,^* \ <
. and one may observe that if an authority deems itself above question ;..u '
. or examination, it may then issue pronouncements which offer .few-,;.' v / / ­
— v reasons for its proposals. The tradition follows us to the present : i
v? . period with the political fallacy that Parliament, a maker of the i
. law, is itself above the law and bounded to no rule other than it- .
, self. What fallacious thinking of this kind does to the law is to 
muddle it much* and of it one can only say that it is a curious i ^ V;
v ; ' ; , feature of an accented social Order. The philosophical emptiness ;
of such an assertion that an entity which derives its power from
- *r . ■» *, ■,: ■ 32'.. ,. cont., ■ ^ * ,* - * ■ v*~- v*" -* *** f*' .* * ■: * ■<*.* * i ~  ^^ .
i;/ -lv at page 5 whereon he states: ’••Vsi.’*/,*./ J'%/*•
> _ /'•;:/ ///"The essence of ;every; Law is the injunction or prohibition \
/ / : . of some given act and the menace of an evil in the case o f /  - /;//;///
. non-compliance • Every law, that is to say, is at once Im- . ’ ..
'• perative and Punitory; it is only Imperative by being Punitory.%K& s //;
: - • : , Poste would then have assumed, no doubt, on this notion of .
. : * imperative * that the expression ”2+2=4” would not be imperative, ///
/ '/ since no penalty attaches to the expression. I prefer to use /  • '•■’/'SC
V ' / :v: the model that from an understanding of the law, one follows jT// >///:
•;//■ ; the law; Poste, and other voluntarists, assume that the force . . ‘
■/'/■.'/-./’;. ■’ . of law is that one is moved by a force (ie the penalty) other ; •
•/v-v . . than the legal proposition itself. I am not an Austinian, and///-./' / /
// / / / /  •./ /-v do not embrace a command theory of law. The logical priority //' '• //
//. ' which a criminal law should possess is that it is first a law, / /  - A / /
V : //./ /  and then that it commands. The relationship is not *p and q*; ://////
: / /  , / ^ rather,the logical relationship is 'If p, and p, then q'. : :
;'•/// ; Such a relationship permits one, in theory, to argue that the / / / / ;  //
/, / - .  justification for law as law rests in its reasonableness. The ,
//' ; justification for a punishment, following upon a transgression /  ,/ / / /
v . of the law, may be its effectiveness within a just standard. *.
; One must separate the conceptual elements. If one does not
A then a claim is advanced that any description of a law;must,,///// / / /
/ /  / . f  / / -  • at -the same instance, be a description of a punishment con­
- ; : ; comitant vith the law . This, I suggest , is a logical fallacy.
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living persons in turn exceeds the power it derives steins rather 
much from a strict adherence to a volitional theory of law, and, 
at the same time, reveals the weakness inherent in such a theory. 
One may, as is revealed in the Ninth Amendment of The Constitution 
of The United States , state that rights may be given to a polity 
while at the same time stating that people still are the source of 
rights, 'and retain .them. ' '• M * / : - ■ ' . "-V- :
* AMENDMENT IX: The enumeration in the Constitution, of certain
. rights, shall not be construed to deny Or dis^ : v /
parage others retained by the people.
53. I reproduce the Latin canons from the Council of Namnetense from 
CONCILIORVM, Tomus Vigesimus Quartus, page 685, for the sake of 
consistency: " ' - .  • . [J.r: *7.* . •'  ^; ' .
"XVII.:; Si quis voluntarie § per insidias hominem interfecerit,
: . iugi se poenitentiae submlttat. Et si hoc pub lice actum con­
. stat, si laicus est, a communione orationum quinquennio re- 
moueatur: post quinquennium, tantum in orationum communionem 
recipiatur, non autem offerat, non Corpus Domini contingat. In 
quo perdurans quatuordecim annis, tunc at plenam communionem 
cum oblationibus recipiatur. Si_ quis de industria ^  per insidias 
occiderit hominem, ab altari meo euelles eum, vt moriatur,dicit 
Dominus." One will observe that no reason is given ^or the 
penitential assignments; they are simply given. \
• -VXyill: Si quis casu (as ah accident) non volens homicidium per- . ‘ 
■: petrauit, quadraginta diebus in pane § acqua poeniteat . Quibus
peractis, biennio ab oratione fidelium segregetus: non com- :
; municet, nec offerat. Post biennium in communione orationis
offerat, non tamen communicet: post quinquennium ad plenam ^ 
communionem recipiatur. Abstinentia ciborum in arbitrio sacerdotus 
: maneat." This policy finds itself in judicial sentencing under
common law procedures when a sentence is left to the discretion of
,, - the trial judge. It is also reflected in magistrates'practice V .
v .. - when reasons for decisions need not be given. The ’reason* rests
in the office of the judge ( or in the sacerdocy ); namely, be­
cause one holds a dignified office it is therefore assumed that -7 
he knows how to judge properly whether or not he gives reasons
: .,^^.his judgement. Its lack of logical force is self-evident.
T h e  C o u n c i l  o f  T r o s l e i a n u m ,  A .  D . 9 0 9 ,  n e e d  n o t  c o n -
7 d e r n  u s  g r e a t l y . I t s  s t a t e m e n t s  c o n c e r n i n g  b o t h  l y i n g  ’ 7-. 7.7 7 7 '' "•••'
7777 . / a n d  h o m i c i d e ,  a n d  i t s  e x t e n d e d  m e t a p h o r  t h a t  l y i n g k i l l s 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 ^ 7 7 ^ 4  
-7 7 ;; t h e  s p i r i t  , . . .O s  q u o d ;  m e n t i t u r  , o c c i d a t  a n i m a n . .  .
a r e  o b v i o u s  i n  t h e i r  f o r c e .  One may  s e e  h e r e  a m o d e l  f o r  i 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 /  
o a t h s  i n  a c o u r t  o f  l a w ,  b u t ;  I  w o u l d  n o t  s u g g e s  t  t h a t  . t h i s  7 7 .;\7  7; 7 
C o u n c i l  i s  a common l a w  s o u r c e  f o r  o a t h s  . I t  i s  t o  b e  r e -  ; _
7 m e m b e r e d  t h a t  C h r i s t i a n s  w e r e  e n j o i n e d  a g a i n s t  t a k i n g  o a t h s .
7 / O n *a theological scale, deliberately to lie, or deliberately 7
; : to murder, were both morally grievous in the eyes of God,
7 7 e a c h ,  a s  i t  w e r e ,  k i l l i n g  o n e ) s s p i r i t  b e c a u s e  e a c h  w e r e  
7 j m o r t a l l y  s i n f u l  a c t s  a g a i n s t  G o d ’ s m o r a l  l a w .  ,
; i T h e  l o n g  t h i r t e e n t h  q u e s t i o n  f r o m  t h i s  C o u n c i l  ( r u n n i n g  ; v  7 7  7 -  
7 ^  n in e  f u l l  e l e p h a n t i n e  p a g e s ; )  ‘ i l l u s t r a t e s  t h e  P a u l i n e  m o d e l  7 :7 7 7  777/7 
7 • f o r  r e s p o n s i b i l i t y  . We a u t h o r  o u r  a c t i o n s  ( a s  w h e n  we t e l l  7 7 / 7 7 / 7 7  
7 7; t h e  t r u t h  ) , a n d  we c a n ,  t h e r e f o r e ,  b e  h e l d  r e s p o n s i b l e  f o r  w h a t  ;
7 we say, and equally can be condemned for lying. One’s m i n d , ; ,  /
V> j u s t  a s  o n e ’ s p u b l i c  a c t i o n s ,  s h o u l d  b e  i n  a c c o r d  w i t h -  t h e  l a w .  7 ; 7 7  
N e i t h e r  s h o u l d  o n e  l i e  n o r  s h o u l d  o n e  d e l i b e r a t e l y  k i l l  . T h e  7 V  7 7 7* 
7 7 7  u n d e r l y i n g  t h r e a d  t h r o u g h o u t  t h e  Q u e s t i o n  i s  t h a t  o u r  p u b  l i e  -  
7 .7 , a c t i o n s  (  J  move  my h a n d  ) a r e  b r o u g h t  a b o u t  b y  o u r  p r i v a t e  ; 7 - 7 77'' 7 7 / /  
p o w e r s  ( i t  i s  t h e  p e r s o n  who  m o v e s  h i s  o w n  h a n d  ) .  T h e  e x t e n d e d  7  7 
m e t a p h o r  t h e n  i s  t h a t / l y i n g  ; ( w h ic h 7  o r i g i n a t e s  p r i v a t e l y  i n  my -
: m in d )  i s /  a k i n  t o  k i l l i n g  ( w h i c h  i s  a p u b l i c  a c t  ) . ,  a n d  t h u s
77 b o t h  a r e  g r i e v o u s  a c t s  b e c a u s e  b o t h  h a v e  t h e i r  . s o u r c e  i n  t h e  ‘777 7 7 7 .7 7  
; p e r s o n  who w i s h e s  t o  t r a n s g r e s s  t h e  m o r a l  l a w .  ‘
*; Ibid., page 774 . Question XIII, ” Dc Homicidis 5 mendacibusV,77 : ; e x t e n d s  f r o m  p p  767-775. " , , ,r
In passing I would observe that what one can extract from 
the Council of Trosleianum is a strong rationalistic flavour for 
human actions. If God is the author of man, and God is held to be
rational, then man, in his image, must be rational and must be able
-•? v :Vv-; .-.vv’ '54 •' . ,v, ‘‘ ^7; '• ' 7 ‘to control his own actions. * The unanalysed assumption of the
common law is that a man is thought first to be held responsible 
for what he does, and only afterwards thought to be excused from 
what he did. . 7 . ■■ 7 ':v-\V-. ;• 'vV
There is little need for more citations from the Councils.
I have used them here for the purpose of showing how they con­
tained models for legal behaviour, even though the legal be-
54. ibid., XIII, "Qua sententia cum sub interminatione prohibeatur 
(ie Gen.9.) homicidium, tamen ne quis insipientium putet animan 
hominis in sanguine constitutam, quae immortalis est, § quae ;
ideo sic appellatur, quasi anaema, it est a sanguine longe 
discreta, nouerit sanguinem animarum typice intelligendum ipsum P 
vitale, quo vegetantur, 8 sustentantur, § viuunt homines in came 
per animam. Non enim sanguis hominis ad substantiam animae 
creditur pertinere: quamuis alibi legislator dicere videatur: 
iM SiL camis in sanguine est. (Leuit. 17) quod non ideo
dictum est, ut hoc sit anima, quae est proprie spiritalis sub­
stantia: sed quod per sanguinem anima, ut diximus, typice sig- 
nificetxar, per rem scilicet visibilem res inuisibilis, sicut § 
illud: Petra autem erat Christus,(I.Cor.IO) non quia hoc erat, 
sed quia hoc significabat. Quo sensu § illus intelligendum est, 
quod sequitur: Quicumque effuderit humanum sanguinem, fundetur 
 ^sanguis illius....Ergo cum ille qui occidit sanguinem non 
; effuderit, quomodo eius sanguinem Dominus effusurus est ?M f
I would add that the argument is novel in one regard. It sug­
gests that by the fact of existing one is a human being. Theories of 
brain-death would reject this kind of thinking, substituting in its 
place an activity or arrangement theory of human behaviour, ie,
; to be human one must have a brain, and, having a* brain , it must 
perform in a specified way and at a specified level if its owner 
is to be deemed human. Would there, however, then be a valid 
difference between a man who decided to sleep all of his life, 
and Karen Quinlan, who was rendered permanently unconscious as 
as result of drug poisoning (Matter of Quinlan, Superior Court of 
New Jersey, Chancery Division, November 10, 1975, Muir., 348 A 2d, 
801, and overturned March 31st,1976, by the Supreme Court of New
J e rs e y , H u g h e s ,C .J .) ? v l ; - C c - :: '.V : ■ V ;  " ;  -VH  0 1
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; haviour was within a religious system. I-have attempted to argue
 ^ x  that it does not matter what system holds models or exemplars of ,
, : ; legal behaviour; it is the models themselves which are of value • •' ’*  ^':vv ;;
; • : for philosophical analysis . We are not examining if a certain > ■
'• system is true. One may play an absurd game, and at the same time : f
/>.' ?.;• , . see that the rules of the absurd game are not themselves absurd. •
- The common law, in its earliest formal expression through Bracton,
; v took over models for legal behavior from what was present. Hie
. models were, in great part, to be found both in canonical writings . *
/ : and m  canonical pronouncements. * If is for the historian to • ; v ' f
.C J  } demonstrate the possibly direct influence of one set of writings ■ -
; : from one period upon writers of a later period. I have assumed :
that there is a philosophical relationship between earlier legal ^
• models and later legal models, and I believe that there is enough ; ;
; : 55. The aim of my dissertation is not to present an analysis of
\ - .Latin models, but for some of the early sources of Common law ^
:! <: ; one, out of necessity, must turn to the legal Latin of the period.
In his edition of Bracton: Select Passages from the works of 
BRACTON AND AZO, edited for the Selden Society by Frederic ..; 0;/
;  ^ . William Maitland (London: Bernard Quaritch, 1895), Maitland , ; 3
• ; v has cited in his second appendix, pp. 225-235, the texts both f;
■V ; J %. of Bracton and Bernard of Pavia on the subject of homicide.; V
: : > It is Maitland's claim, with which I see little to disagreef
from having viewed the texts, that the language of Bracton on ’ ;
> ; the subject is taken mostly in styleand content from what >0;
Bernard of Pavia Wrote in his own De homicidio voluntario vel , ; ;
casuali. One may refer to Maitland's text which appears in •-
- ' an interleaved printing, one line of Bernard with the same line
.‘V beneath it of Bracton. The similarity of Latin is hardly co- y;.
incidental. Such the case one can safdy assert that the early . '1
■ . scholastic texts did influence early writers of the common law; . v
’ ^ what one cannot demonstrate, without greater textual analysis .
> ) V ' . : ; and without more historicdlyaccurate texts (since so much is ^
 ^ yet in manuscript) , is to what extent was the influence * We. do i) ; vv v
: . . . have enough early case law to show that scholastic writers were : ;
. . . cited in legal decisions, and that early scholastic categories
> v V such as degrees of ignorance •«— were accepted in the common law. ^
good case law extant to show that the mediaevals were accepted 
as guides, in some aspects of legal theory, in our early decisions. *
> ; . The early Councils appear to have stress the term Voluntary'
for the test of a responsible act. If we turn to Roman military
vv law one notices there, unless it is a penalty of the strictest
liability (wounding whether with intent to wound or not), that 
voluntary was the test for a violation. The Councils seemed to 
v :  ^ have preserved such a legal operator, and it seems possible that v
one could argue that a linguistic model for voluntary action,
 ^f within a well-defined legal context, is set forth for us in , -
military law. The comparison is not to be made between the ,
: similarities of military to civil or canon law. The similarities >
56. One may turn to so dissimilar a source for legal theory as 
the Council of Basil,[CONCILIORVM, Tomus Trigesimus Primus,
(A.D.1433), edition of M.DC.XLIV, Parisiis] at page 147. 
where, during its discussion under what species the Holy 
Eucharist may be received, we encounter a strict liability 
model about the nature of ignorance and the law, which 
model will appear in Plowden*s report of Reniger v. Fogossa,
' pp. 19-20, volume one of The^Commentaries or Reports of
Edmund Plowden (London, 1816). The language of the Council, 
from page 14^, states this on ignorance:
' ,fNec potest dicere quod ignorantia excusaret ecclesiam a . ;
sacrilegio, 8 contemptu, 8 per consequens a damnatione, quia 
ut alias dictum est, ignorantia iuris, in his quae sunt neces- 
saria ad salutem, cuiusmodi sunt praecepta diuina 8 Christi, 
non excusat. " This in turn is traced back to Aquinas. He 
seems to have been a voluminous source both for canonists and 
for legal writers, Plowden citing him in Reniger v. Fogossa.
The common heritage reveals itself in a central notion as ; • V 
was if ignorance excuses, and we tend to find a common reflexion 
of the" common notion in the common lawyers, in the canonists, and 
in the theologians of the period. Sir Paul Vinogradoff, in his 
Roman Law in Medieval Europe (Third Edition, with a preface by 
F. de Zulueta, Oxford, 1929) suggested (at pp 117-18) that the 
only test for the influence of Roman law in England was to find 
it in maxims which had passed into juridical thinking. I think 
the same holds for scholastic legal models which did, in fact, pass 
;': into our legal heritage. Plowden is one example.
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y y r,4-v
r e s t  in  th e  use w h ich  a common te rm  to o k  to  convey r e s p o n s ib i l i t y  "
w i t h in  a le g a l fra m e w o rk . The le g a l fram ew ork may a c t  as a ; -7 . .7 77:7;
g u id e  f o r  a key  te rm , such as was ’ v o lu n ta r y ’ , so t h a t  one can co m e ; ' .; ; 77:: 7 7 ;, 
t o  see w hat such a te rm  ra n ge s  o v e r .  . >
57 . I  make th e  fo l lo w in g  c i t a t i o n s  fro m  Brand (  o p . c i t . , fo o tn o te  ,
; 50) . One w i l l  n o t ic e  how 'v o lu n ta r y '  fu n c t io n s  i n  v a r io u s  > . ,5
■ ■ "7 le g a l-  c o n te x ts .  ; 7-7 ; 7 ' % ■ ' '  *.7- '7 7 -%.
Military Laws from Russus: 7 ■ \ \';7' •. .••^ 7 V
" De m i l i t i b u s  c a s tr a  v e l  urbem p ro d e n t ib u s , a u t  cu s to d ia m  n e g l ig e n t ib u s i 
, 36 S i;  q u is ,  c u i  c u s to d ia  v e l  v r b is  v e l  c a s tro ru m  c r e d i t a  f u e r i t ,  ; ; j f ;
7 / ea p r o d id e r i t ; a u t ,  quum ea de fender©  p o s s e t , p r a e te r  v o lu n ta te m  7 77:77 j
[ i t a l i c s  m in e ] p r a e s id is  s u i ,  v e l  e x t r a  n e c e s s ita te m  ad v i t a e  : !
p e r ic u lu m  tenden tem , in d e  r e c e s s e r i t ;  c a p i t i s  s u p p l ic io  d a m n a b itu r ."  ? 
: : ’’S o ld ie rs  who b e t ra y  a camp o r  c i t y ,  o r  n e g le c t  t h e i r  d e fe n s e .
36 I f  any p e rso n  to  whom th e  c u s to d y  o f  e i t h e r  a c i t y  o r  a campy 7777?
has been e n tru s te d  b e t ra y  such a t r u s t ,  o r  when a b le  to  de fend  them
w ith d ra w  drom them w ith o u t  a u t h o r i t y  o f  h is  commander, o r  w ith o u t  :
. n e c e s s ity  i n  th e  fo rm  o f  c o m p e llin g  danger t o  h is  l i f e ,  he s h a l l
‘ ; be condemned to  th e  p un ishm en t o f  d e a th . ”  p p . 1 60 -6 1 . NOTE: I  . ! 7!
w ou ld  m o d ify  th e  t r a n s la t io n  to  in c lu d e  th e  fo r c e  o f  " p r a e te r  - 77- 
v o lu n ta te m "  w h ich  s ig n i f i e s  t h a t  one, o f  and b y  h is  own w i l l ,  d id  v-7 .7 
a c t  w ith o u t  a u t h o r i t y .
"62  S i q u is  c o n u ic tu s  f u e r i t  sem etipsum  h o s t ib u s  dedere  v o lu is s e , 
[ i t a l i c s  m in e ] u l t im o  s u p p l ic io  s u b i i c i e t u r . . . "  : 77
: "62  I f  any p e rso n  i s  c o n v ic te d  o f  h a v in g  w ished  to  s u r re n d e r  h im - 7
s e l f  to  th e  enemy, he s h a l l  be s u b je c t  to  th e  supreme p u n is h m e n t . . . "  :
A g a in , th e  fo r c e  o f  " v o lu is s e "  i s  t h a t  one has moved h im s e lf  o f
h is  own w i l l *  and th e  ra n ge  o f  "w is h "  i n  th e  t r a n s la t io n  i s  more
'o n e  d e s ire s  t o . . . " .  p p . 168 -69 . 7 77-.. -'7;7 V;:;7*/7:
"6 4  . . . .Q u i  d en iq u e  sp o n te  t r a n s f u g e r i t ,  8 re u e rs u s  f u e r i t ;  ad 77
7 to te m  v i t a e  tempus se ru us  e s t o . "  ; / • ’ .7.7 7" ■■7.■ ■ • ••7.,7._ - . 7. 7
” 6 2 7 . . 7 . I f  he v o lu n t a r i l y  [s p o n te ] d e s e r ts  to  th e  enemy and i s  7^ 7 I 
b ro u g h t b a ck , he s h a l l  be a s la v e  f o r  t h e  r e s t  o f  h is  l i f e ; "  ;77 7^
.7 777 -pp. 168 -69 . 7 77 ; ’ 7 ■  %-v 77 -;. 7~777 -7 j  7 -7 ; ; -'7;. 77;7. 7;7 7 -"7 77
From th e  Corpus J u r is  C i v i l i s , M o d e s tin u s ' P un is fanen ts , Book 4 , 7
one re a d s , ( l l )  " E t  i s /  q u i v o le n s  t ra n s fu g e re  adprehensus e s t ,  ; -7: 7:
p u n i t u r  . "  i s  re n d e re d  as "A ny pe rson  who, in e n d in g  to  d e s e r t  to  77: ;
th e  enemy i s  apprehended, s h a l l  - s u f fe r  d e a t h p p . 7 1 7 4 r 7 5 . 7  7 7 7 77 •
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I wish to close this excursus into the past without dwelling
further upon sources from the various Councils, or discussing ci- >■
tations from Gratian ( in the text of Antonio Contii which I have
employed ) . It is enough for us to appreciate that the Corpus '
Juris Canonici, as well as Councils and Synods, : and the great body . 
of writings of the mediaeval canonists and theologians, formed sets . . 
of models for the growth of early common law. The common law had }
a ready fund of models from which to develop notions of the voluntary, 
or to ask what degree of ignorance may serve to excuse, or to de- .
termine how responsibility may be assigned for human acts and omissions.
Law, however, does not (generally) move rapidly. Most legal development :
is slow over time. If one is to control human society, one must realise p u
that it is through time that the wisdom of laws is perceived. Legislative/: 
Modifiers may disagree (who want rapid change), but the history of the 
criminal law is rather much this: laws rapidly made soon die by long dis- i ; 
use. Law is that curious admixture of the theoretical and the practical, 
which needs; time and wisdom to measure its workability.
57. Cont., Military Affairs, Book 1, of Arrius Menander: , V ‘" /•?"
"(3) Temporanum exilium voluntario militi insulae relegationem adsignat, 
dissimulatio perpetuum exilium. [Any person in temporary exile who voluntarily 
enlists incurs the penalty of relegation to an island; if he conceals his con­
dition, he is liable to perpetual exile.] . .
M(5) Reus capitalis criminis voluntarius miles secundum divi Traiani re-.;i 
scriptum capite poniendus est...,f [A volunteer guilty of a capital crime shall/ 
suffer death, according to a rescript of the divine imperial Trajan...] • p
* Comprised of the Decretum of Gratian (1140 A.D.), the Decretals of Gregory IX 
(1234 A.P.), and The Sext (1298 A.D.). For commentaries on the Canons with / 
regard to intention, one may consult: Kanonistische Schuldehre von Gratian //' 
bis auf die Dekretalen Gregors IX by St. Kuttner (Citt^ del Vaticano, 1935).
/\"Y' V;; V CHAPTER TWO ' V - y y C Y - V ' Y
; ■ A legal philosopher need not be bothered excessively by a ; : f; y
system of law which excludes certain actions from punishment. • Oney y;.‘ ’§.* ;'y
,®ay criticise the system socially, ie, stating that it is obvious " ; y ;
; that one class within the society ire benefitting unjustly by a yy
y/ : • certain privilege, but such a move within a legal system does not y -
y baffle or confuse. It can be listed plainly as an exception or an ' ' •
y- > • exemption, and most games provide us with models of exceptions Or :
y exemptions. Much of early common law Jield exemption or exception
: y moves in its legal rules, as the benefit of clergy did show. .yy: y y rV ,;‘
*.'••• y y r ■; One need not be bothered, either, by the forms which legal ’ "
punishments take, or by what is legally punished. One may confer ; : -y1 y Uy- 
- names as he pleases, and, by an extension of such an attitude, one y yy:. y'yy'
iyiy : may punish what he pleases unless one adheres to a legal belief .
which maintains that punishments are a necessary extension of law, 
and those laws which exist are of a necessary number dictated by a > : •;
y necessary order in the world. It would be a type of rigour ism em- yy :
v/ ; bodied in a severe natural law theory of law that would state that ; y yy y ^ 0 y 
• y the number of laws in existence would be a necessary and not an acr y y; y;: :
y : . cidental number of laws , and the punishments attached to that necessary ' yyy
number of laws would themselves be necessary punishments, lawmaking 
would have to it no contingency; all lawmaking would be viewed as that -. :'y:''Vy'"
•. which must necessarily be ; the case.. *.\V ' y* \ y • yyyy/y .'yy'ifey
Even were one to hold to such an excessive naturalism in legal
theory ( to which natural law theory can lend itself ), a legal philosopher 
might not be bothered by what forms punishment took for laws infracted.
V  He might object to the existence of such punishments, but that is a different
. ; question from what I wish to consider. What ought to concern a legal
• j philosopher, and which does concern me in this chapter, is the manner, 7 ;
and whatever justification were advanced ( either implicitly or explicitly )
; for the manner, by which an accused was brought within the boundary of
legal guilt or innocence. If all within the legal system are not guilty 
(of crime, or of some crime) from the onset, then one can state that the 
: legal system admits that some may be guilty whilst othes may be innocent.
How is such an assignment of legal value made ? One may appeal to another v
legal system in which ail were guilty ( in some form ) and none (save
7 : two persons) were innocent* Christian law held that all were born with
and into sin, save for some theologians who argued, as did, for example,
Duns Scotus, that Mary, the mother of Christ, and Christ Himself, Were 
'77:. born free from sin. Removed from a matter of belief, and transformed, into
; a matter of legal statement, one has a legal system in which all are \ 7
7 7 ;; guilty but in which two legal exceptions to guilt are tolerated. In
the common law system, however, no such wide ranging assignment of guilt >
• ; was made over its members; thus the question of how guilt or innocence 7
was proved is of importance for philosophical consideration, and by a : 7 >; 7  
7 7 selection of leading texts I hope to demonstrate how intention became
7 7 : the central concept in this demonstration. There developed a legal con- 77
cept which could protect or judge an accused; but as with many concepts
i V / it stands in ’’...such disparitie / As is twixt Aire and Angel Is . ^ ;
' ‘ ; : puritie..." • ’ V- > V> : : v V ;’7:! ?:
• . / ; : V ^The use of a term does not assure that it denotes a concept /
marking out clearly what are and what are not the conceptual borders 
of the term. The use of ’intention1 comes early into common law; . .
M  but the marking off of clearly defined limits comes late into the
: ' common law, if at all. One can turn to various chapters of Peter
; v Abelard's Ethics * * to note that 'intention' is that device which de- r /
Y V; : termines if an act possesses an ethical quality and is not singly a /
v neutral act. Just what intention is, or signifies, is not that pre- /
; .cisely stated; It may be a psychological quality; it may mark some , f
, r operation of the human will; it may rest in some aspect of the human
: ; intellect. The term may also be modified, kiggesting that 'it' i s ;y
, not only some ontological quality, but a quality possessing a certain
•. . attribute dr property.' • An intention' may be 'good' or it may .be'. 'bad' v/p;;/ /'•/;' «
/ ^ . . The relationship between the term, 'intention', and what that term p .:
/ . - signified was often assumed to be known; namely, one's intention is ; / \v > ;
'•• -what the term signified. We would remark that such is a circular ; ; ^
' •: ; : argument, but legal reasoners, as wel 1 as early theological moralists, •
seemed little disturbed that they did not specify exactly what was ^ ;-J
; ; an intention. Kenny has suggested that the terms 'consensus' and ,.
; c J: 1. In the edition of Peter Abelard's Ethics, edited and translated by ; : >
; D.E.Luscombe ( Oxford Medieval Texts: Oxford, At The Clarendon Press, ' ;
; 1971 ) Abelard at one ( of many ) instance states, "For God thinks not - .
, .r of what is done but in what mind it may be done, and the merit or • :,
’ glory of the'doer lies in the intention, not in the deed.” and near ■ ,
.• v * . , . to the end of the same paragraph he states, ". . .yet, through the di-
/ . . ; . versity of their intention [per diuersitatem tamen intentionis], the
; same thing is done by diverse men,- by one badly, by the other we 1 1 . " : VX%
'■ &  " pp. 28-29. v.:. : /♦. ' v - '
1intentiof were used as synonyms by Abelard in his Ethics, and that
v the terms denoted a state of mind of an agent and not desire. * if,
7 however, desire were to mean only a blind impetus, I would agree with 7, ^ x ;
him; but if desire connotes an object which is desired, ' t i i e i l f i t ? S K * §9
seem that could ’intend1 what one ’desired’. At one place it is stated 7 ;• !
by Abelard: 7 v7 -,7v V 7 7.<-\ 7 7■7-7: h ' 7 77;:';
7; .; ”God is said to be the power and judge of the ? 77 7 7 7 7
7 . 7 heart and the reins, that is, of all the intentions 7 7 7
[quarumlibet intentionum ex affectione animae uel in- : 7'; *7; 777-77
7 7 firmitate seu delectatione carnis proueiiientium] which 7 . 7 77^7
come from an affection of the soul or from a weakness -7'-. 7 7  7-77;
, or pleasure of the flesh,” ■ \  *
>7-7 Our minor differences may be resolved if one were to assume that when 7 7 7 7 7 7 7
7 ’intention' is used, it is referring to a rational movement of theTsoUl^ 7 7 7 7 7 .
•v*Y7? and is therefore presumed to pertain to One's rational faculties.
77'7-;7:-\It is not my wish, either, to individuate faculties by stating that the :
H ’will' has, one location, and the intellect some other location. Such ihr 7 7 - 77
7 dividuation of concepts seems to create rather dimnish perplexity. .7 It 7' 7 7- 5 7
7: is sufficient for conceptual analysis to distinguish between the use of 7^ ; 77;
, 7 ;terms. 5* 7 7-: • -• . . c -7/ -7.. 7 7 ' '  ■ 7'’7’"; 7- -7 7 '-'7 7 7 -.7 7 ;7-; •■•7’ ^ -.777
2. Cf., The Anatomy of the Soul by A.J.Kenny (Blackwell, 1973)7 pp 136-3?. - 7;/7
• 3. Qp.cit., ’Why works of sin are punished rather than sin itself”, p. 41. 7 7 7;7;7
4. My concern is not to dispute how certain key Latin words are Used by 7v7 777-7777?
.. Abelard, but to make only what appears to be a coimnonsense observation
7.7 v about use here. 7 7 -./ 77 ! 7 v;7 77/7-7 7 :f ‘ 77 7;'7'"'7 '7 :7 'r7 :7 7.77-7-7
5. I admit that mediaeval philosophers were interested in faculty psychology. 7 q 7 : 
7 They were also concerned with locating spatially the functions of the soul.
One may read at length in Edwin Clarke’s, An Illustrated History of Brain 
7 Function, (Sandford Publications, Oxford, 1 9 7 2 )/ especially at Chapter 3, } 7 ;7
”Medieval Period: The Cell Doctrine of Brain Function.”, pp 1 0 -5 1. Dr. 7 7; 77  
Clarke convincingly shows that the mediaevals were concerned with m a k i n g 7 7 : 7 " 
empirical and spatial locations in the brain which expressed rational and 7 7 7  
7 .7 volitional operations of the soulV 7 7 7 7 -; ./• 7'. 7 '7; 7*7*7
‘ >'• y 'u.
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v M e d ia e va l p a r la n c e  p re s e rv e d  a d i s t i n c t i o n  be tw een w i l l i n g  and ^ ’ 
kn o w in g , c a s t in g  th e  d i s t i n c t i o n  i n  th e  language  o f  a f a c u l t y  p s y c h o lo g y  • 
(w h ic h , to  us now, seems b o th e rs o m e ). What was p re s e rv e d  by th e  d is -  ' / - y  
t i n c t i o n  was th e  d i s t i n c t i o n  be tw een  "k n o w in g  t h a t  one c o u ld  do f x U ',  • y  y 
and , "kn o w in g  t h a t  one c o u ld  do ' x * ,  w hereupon one th e n  d id  ' x '  ( o r  y ; y  
th e n  x -e d  ) . "  Know ing t h a t  I  can  * x ' does n o t  com pel me to  ' x - i n g ' .
One may th e n  be re a d y  to  a d m it t h a t  fro m  a d i s t i n c t i o n  i n  how te rm s  y
can be u sed , i t  w o u ld  be f a l la c io u s  to  a tte m p t to  d e r iv e  e m p ir ic a l / t  y 
fu n c t io n s  o r  to  make lo c a t io n s . T h a t I  can  speak a b o u t ' t h e  w i l l  ' / * .  y Y j y  
does n o t  d e m o n s tra te  t h a t  some e n t i t y  e x is t s  w h ich  c o rre s p o n d s  to  my y; 
use o f  th e  te rm , ' w i l l 1 . ; I t  d oe s , h ow eve r, become im p o r ta n t  f o r  th e  law  
to  p re s e rv e  a  d i s t i n c t i o n  be tw een  ' in t e n t io n * a s  a te rm  w h ic h  has a c o g n i t iv e  
usage , fro m  ' i n t e n t i o n '  as a te rm  w h ic h  has a v o l i t i o n a l  u sage , and to  yyy  
a p p r e c ia te  t h a t  one usage does n o t e q u a l th e  o th e r  u sag e . An accused  
may know t h a t  th e  a c t  he  d id  was w rong a t  la w , b u t  i t  may have  been  an a c t  
w h ic h  he d id  n o t v o lu n t a r i l y  d o , and i t  i s  v o lu n ta r in e s s  w h ic h  i s  th e  : y 
c e n t r a l  e le m en t to  be p ro ve d  i f  he i s  to  be fo u n d  g u i l t y .  E q u a lly ,  i t  y  
may be t h a t  th e  accused v o lu n t a r i l y  d id  an a c t ,  b u t  d id  n o t  know t h a t  h is  y  
a c t  was c r im in a l ,  w hereupon th e  c e n t r a l  e le m en t i n  th e  c r im e  w h ich  th e  
Crown m ust p ro v e  i s  t h a t  th e  accused knew t h a t  h is  a c t  was a c r im in a l  y - . f l y  
a c t .  The n a tu re  o f  a c r im in a l  d e fe n ce  may v a ry  g r e a t ly  as to  how in t e n t io n  
i s  v ie w e d . Does i t  mean ' k n o w ' ,  and o n ly  know; o r  does i t  mean ' w i l l 1, and
o n ly --Will ? - y y ?  - y .  y. Y 'V *v Y  V*Y;Y ; % • Y Y C > : > . r ' - .  Y  Y '  - Y  ■ Y Y Y
6. One may c o n fe r  th e  c l a s s i c  case  o f  t re a s o n ,  R. v . S teane  [1947 ] K . B . 997 i 
: ■ y  ' , .V"/ y y ; ; y  ;. , y  (C o n tin u e d  on th e  f o l lo w in g  p a g e . )  ;>yy.
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-.// ; We need not first turn to Bracton to see the use of in­
tention in relation to the assignment of guilt. Quite apart from 
the Councilar sources and the Corpus Juris Canonic!, we do have other 
records of the use of intentional language. Pluckhett ?cites a !
passage from the laws of Aetheired 11 (although the passage he cites : / 
is,; he says, only to be found in one manuscript) , 1008 A.D., in //.
which this relationship is made obvious, and I reproduce a part • . .. ■/•.',: /• 
of it here:
"And if it happens that a man commits a misdeed in- /v’ ;////
; voluntarily; or unintentionally, the case is different ///.
/. ; , from that of one who offends of his own free will, vol- .. ''/’■
untarily and intentionally; and likewise he who is an ; ;
involuntary agent of his misdeeds should always .be en- / ///'/ 
titled to clemency and better terms owing to the fact'/ //:'"/l
6. cont., ■/: ‘ / . / / :- / „ •' ' ' :'v.//^’-.
One may contrast the decision in Steane with the submission, and / 
later the decision,in Hearst/ Steane held that the defendant did . .
not intend to do the acts he was charged with because of duress.
; Glanville Williams has criticised the judgement. In The Mental
Element in Crime (Magnes Press, Jerusalem, 1965) he says, "... .
Steane should have been acquitted by reason of the defence of ;
duress, and not because he lacked intent to assist the enemy." /
at page 23. In United States of America v. Patricia Campbell 
Hearst we read in the trial brief for the United States, at page /;
14v "One who acts under duress, or later performs protagonistic 
acts because he feels menaced, acts as intentionally and knowingly 
as the law requires. (9)footnote: The person who is forced to rob /.
: a bank knows what he is doing and intends to do the acts which rer
suit in the harm proscribed, but the law excuses his acts as a , 
matter of policy, because, just like entrapment, they were not at /
his own instance." IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE 
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA, CRIMINAL NO. 74-364-OJC, February 
3rd, 1976. I would caution that if one holds a strictly cognitive or 
intellectual notion of intention, then Hearst follows; but if one 
holds a voluntarist theory of intention, then Steane follows. I 
have cited these two cases to show that the dispute between the two 
poles has not yet been resolved;/.- . /' ■'///'/ / //:; ’ '///; ,,v/.V/'/;-.:,v:;
7. Edward 1^ and Criminal Law by T.F.T.Plucknett (Cambridge University 
Press, 1960), from page 61, from the translation of Miss A.J.Robertson 
of VI AEthelred 52, Laws of the Kings of England (1925) at page 107. /
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. • '’that he acted as an involuntary agent. ■
; 7 Cv . ' " Careful discrimination .-shall be made in ‘ -vt
; judging every deed, and the judgement shall ' v ; . ;
always be ordered with justice, according to 
/;'■ the nature of the deed, and meted out in pro­
portion, in affairs both religious and secular; - t, ;•
, ; ; and, through the fear of God, mercy and leni- - .<;■ \:V ^
. i ency and some measure of forbearance shall be 
: . shown towards" those who have need of them.- / /,
■ J .7 '; For all of us have need that our Lord grant {i\- ■ .
; , : us his mercy, frequently and often. Amen.” V ---7
; : ; ■ There was to be found, certainly, a tradition in which
the will was spoken of as a free and spontaneous faculty. One may
return to the writings of St. Augustine, amongst other Augustan 
theologians, to appreciate the tradition. When one comes to the • 
early mediaevals one finds that the notion of the will, as a freely 
moving faculty, became highly developed in the literature. For ; ; 
Anselm of Canterbury 9‘the notion of 1will'is expressed as the free 
act of love a creature shows for God, modelled on a concept of deity 
in which God freely creates and freely loves His creation.
8. In The Treatise on the Laws and Customs of England commonly called 
GlanvillT [ Tractatus de legibus et consuetudinibus regni Anglie
qui Glanvilla vocatur ], the edition prepared by G.D.G.Hall, 7'/7
(Nelson's Medieval Texts: Nelson; London and Edinburgh, 1965), V • 
one finds no intentional operator used in the classification of 
crimes. The jurisdiction of the law is divided into civil and ’ t
. ! criminal, and matters pertaining to crimes are stated, and : 
forms of penalty assigned. Under ''Criminal Pleas" (De placitis 
criminalibusj, pp 171 onwards, the form of the action(s) is stated, / 
how an accusation is to be made, what sureties may be demanded , V 
. and how the criminal is to be convicted. Under "Homicide", at •
’ - page 174, : no evidential guidance is given. '.V*/^ V.Vs.-
9. Cf. Chapter 72 j 73, "The Soul which despises the Supreme Being -7
will be eternally wretched" and "Every human soul is immortal", • <
pp. 80-81 in the Monologion, edited and translated by Jasper Hopkins 
and Herbert W. Richardson (SCM Press, 1974, London).
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Hugh o f  S t .  V ic t o r  (d .1 1 4 1 ) ,  o f te n  c a l le d  A l t e r  A u g u s t in u s , p re s e n ts  
us w ith  a h ig h ly  deve loped  language o f  w i l l  , and I  q uo te  a passage 
fro m  De S acram en tis  w h ich  b e a rs  d i r e c t l y  upon a d e f i n i t i o n  o f  w i l l :
"X X IV : What f r e e  w i l l  I s :  ;
7 ,7 F o r spontaneous movement o r  v o lu n ta r y  d e s ire  is .  :
f r e e  w i l l ;  f r e e ,  in d e e d , in  t h i s ,  t h a t  i t  i s  v o lu n ta r y ,  
b u t  w i l l  i n  t h i s ,  t h a t  i t  i s  d e s ir e .  B u t th e  pow er i t ­
s e l f  and th e  a p t i tu d e  o f  th e  w i l l  i s  th e  freedom  w hereby 
: i t  moves in  e i t h e r  d i r e c t io n  * and i t  i s  s a id  t o  be th e  .7/- 7
f r e e  c h o ic e  o f  th e  w i l l .  Now m oving v o lu n t a r i l y  and b e -  
in g  b o rn  b y  spon taneous d e s ir e ,  t h i s  i s  to  choose w ith  
power apd to  ju d g e  w ith  freedom , in  w h ich  f r e e  w i l l  co n - 
;■' : :  s i s t s .  "  • " : 7- 7  77- ' 7 7 '  7  ;• ' • : ! - 7 - 7 7 y 7 :- : 7  .7
We n o te  a f u r t h e r  re f in e m e n t o f  t h i s  c fe f in it io n  when Hugh o f  S t .  V ic to r :  >
moves fro m  th e  sphere  o f  a g e n e ra l model ( th e  m odel j u s t  s ta te d  c o n - 7 ;
c e rn e d  n o t o n ly  w i l l  i n  g e n e ra l,  b u t  w i l l  as i t  p e r ta in e d  to  a n g e lic  7 y
•.crea tures;,')' t o  man' s p e c i f i c a l l y ,  s t a t i n g f  v 7 7  ’ y:77 7:
i-77 -7 ” 17: On f r e e  w i l l : 7 .7  7 y 7 7  ; ~7 : .V :.:7 7 7 y  : 7 7  7 -7  -;y '
y y77." .7 ; "The .movement o f  th e  m ind i s  in  th e  w i l l . . . . '
7 ; : I n  th e  movement o f  th e  m ind  a lo n e  i s  th e re  f r e e  
; . w i l l ;  i n  th e  movement o f  th e  body and o f  s e n s u a l i t y  .
v ; ; a re  th o s e  th in g s  w h ich  f o l lo w  f r e e  w i l l .  F o r th u s  ’ ; 777;7:7
was th e  d is p o s i t io n  o f  n a tu re ,  fo r -  the - v o lu n ta r y  move- 7' 77- 
• . 7  merit o f  th e  m ind was d e s i r e ,  f r e e  in  th e  v o lu n ta r y ,
f j  7 7 7  w i l l  i n  d e s ir e .  The m in d , th e r e fo r e ,  moves b y i t s e i f ,  7  7; ■ 7;
10, From, Hugh o f  S a in t  V ic t o r  On The Sacram ents o f  The C h r is t ia n  F a i t h , 
t r a n s la te d  b y  Roy J .  D e fe r r a r i  (The M ed iaeva l Academy o f  A m e ric a , 7 ;
7  C am bridge, M a s s a c h u s e tts , 19510 a t  page 85, fro m  Book One, P a r t777 7
F iv e ,  ;"On th e  c r e a t io n  o f  th e  A n g e ls , and on f r e e  w i l l . . . "  7 .y 7 -
11. i b i d . ,  De S a c ra m e n tis , Book One, P a r t  S ix ,  Q u e s tio n  I V . ,  page 9 6 . 7 :
■ff y
' / / / I
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v : . "and is the first movement of the will. ' ; X ;. .• .^ :
V;: "Therefore, the movement of the mind is always r / /
justice or injustice... .For in that the mind vx/v \/
moves, it moves by freedom, because it moves y\/
//; voluntarily and moves by itself, and to it be^1';:'/^ :V/;:
; / - longs the fact that it moves, either to merit, / x
; if it moves well, ot to blame, if evilly." . -
Coupled to this notion of the will was a postion holding that ; : /
human activity spring either from knowledge -or from ignorance, . .:
and both such states or privations were conditions for which ;•
one himself was responsible. Ignorance was viewed as a vice, * 
and, at the same time, it was viewed as a cause of action. In 
a defence one alleges, often, that he did not know that such and / 
such was the case or could have been the case. For the mediaeval 
theologian that would not have constituted a defence. The specific 
charge to be answered was to remove any trace of a fault on one's 
part for having been ignorant, and thence for having acted in ac­
cord with such ignorance. •./. ■/./• ■' y? / / / :7 - y ' ;
. I cite Hugh of Sty Victor because he was a, if not the, 
leading sacramentalist of his time who ranked with Abelard. I have 
omitted his chapters on Natural and on Written Law because they do 
not concern me directly. But I wish to make reference, in passing, 
that in De Sacramentis, Book 11,Part XIV, Questions 1 through 9, he 
stresses an intentional aspect to the operation of penance, stressing
12. Cf., ibid.,"How ignorance is a vice" at page 137,onwards, in 
Book One, Part Seven,Question XXXII of De Sacramentis. ^
''»>V
■yj
. f
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that merit is attached to; one’s state of will. The will was viewed by7 
him to be the author and Commander of works; so the category of a good 
but will-less act would have been meaningless. * ;**y;;. ■■' 7y 7  • \ -..-yy 
: It is not my concern to review or develop a mediaeval 777 777
concept of the voluntary. In itself that would require a separate 7; 
book, or books. I wish, howevet, to suggest that the concept of 
the voluntary was not an isolated notion found only in a few writers, 7 
or that it was an isolated legal notion, which it was not. However; 
to discover how ’voluntary1, or ’ intention’ functioned in early legal 7: 
argument at the common law one needs to draw upon some of the sources 
of the period, and then, by assumption, see how thf term reflects the 
similarity of other usages of the period. Of course, a legal sentence^ 
should be self-sufficient, and it should be looked at in its own 
sentential and legal setting. But such legal purity seldom exists, - 7 
if for no other reason3that the law is such a borrower of common ideas, 
and it is to the force of major common ideas that we must often turn .77 
for help.; I have chosen some leading mediaeval texts about the will 
and about the nature of the voluntary and the involuntary. Both of > 
these areas embrace questions about ignorance, its nature and causes, 7
13. Cf., ibid., page 414,"VI. That good will alone suffices, if the 77 
77-7 opportunity for operating is not given.". 7 y ■- 7 .7*77 7'7- 7 7 7 7 V
7  . •> But mediaeval texts in themselves do not possess any magical :
v 7. clarity on how key terms are to be used or as to how precise 7 7;
their meaning is. The mediaeval mind, if that is riot a metaphor 7
; too wide pf the mark, possessed both a logical clarity and a ;;
; penchant for presenting intellectual models as if those models 7  
were empirical facts about human or angelic behaviour. It takes 
only a short look at Aquinian epistemology, to cite but one of 
many possible examples, to see that the relationship between 
the known and how it comes to be known is explained by the use 7  "
of various models of behaviour, beginning with a generalised notion 
7 . . a b o u t  objects, and then a model as to what sense knowledge means^
then on through a series 'extractor* models of mind which show
77 • . ; the intellect moving from the sensible; particular, up through
J a phantasm, through various phases of intellect, and finally a
7 7 , 'something* which is at rest in the mind as the thing known.
7 : ■ 1 This kind of model analysis is both foreign to us, but 7 , ;7>;77
7 7  yet at home with us. One experiences both a tension and a satisfaction
in reading such analysis. We do create models ( of atomic behaviour,
7: of computer programming, of physiological input when speaking about
7 '. ;7 the function of the brain ) but we tend to want to ground them more
:. on 'factarid less on inspiration as to what a fact should be. The
mediaeval presented everything together; we want to analyse everything, , 
but we do not want it all together. Thus I offer this mild 'caution'
7  * about the use of the term 'voluntary' and its related terms. We ,7V
, ‘have to freei the term from its many functions. It was at home in <>-
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theological discourse, as when it was asked if the angels' act of /•. 
disobedience was a voluntary act; it Was at home in moral discourse, ; /'/./ 
which any appeal to Abelard reveals; it was at home in general religious 
discourse about man ( in general ) when questions were asked about man's 
sinfulness and if it were voluntarily caused; it was at home in formal 
mental analysis, as when Aquinas commented upon portions of the Nico- 
machean Ethics and Aristotle's use of the term 'voluntary1; it was at 
home in the wide-ranging discussion of mediaeval writers about the 
nature of ignorance. The concept of the will admitted of no simple 
reduction of term to faculty. It was a complicated concept, and for/- --V 
the major writers (Abelard, Magnus, Aquinas, Scotus, Pullen,Bonaventure, 
Ockham, Lang ton ) no simple view of their use of the term followed. .7 
•/y. When, therefore, the concept of 'voluntary' enters into the
common law it does not enter as a single uniform concept to which a 
lexical clarity can be assigned. It is a multi-layered term, and it 
is a metaphor. Like many multi-layered terms or metaphors a single /, 
term was often made to do too much; and overwork kills the spirit and 
dulls the fineness of mind. When 'intention' begins to be used as a 7 
pivotal term it is asked to do too much, and little philosophical re­
finement attends it use. The law may be able to slight on the fineness 
of analysis, but the philosopher may not; if he does, he courts danger. 
Since there Was no clear tradition about how the term 'voluntary' was 7y 
to be used (because it had many usages), one could not return to the 
bulk of mediaeva.1 writing and claim that it meant only this and not;/:-7 
that, one will witness the force of the law and not its conceptual re­
finement; It first controls; afterwards it may, perhaps, explain. -7
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: • 7- ■ 14 '-7: ■ •7 v •. ;; ■ - 7:r • ■' 7-’. • 7 7.'.:-; - , 7 Plucknett * suggested that between the years 1113 and 1118 7;
there, occurred an outburst of legal writing in England. I wish to turn -
to some of the writing of that period to show how the notion of 'intention!
finds its way into the developing common law. ; It will be the only period
of the common law where theological, philosophical, and legal influences
permeate one another. After the time of Bracton, save for some reflections
by Coke, Hale and Hawkins of a religious nature, the law will not be so 77
close to other conceptual sources. By looking at some of the instances ;
of the use of * intention1 in Leges Henrici Primi one may gather how the  ^:7
concept began to function in pur legal system; * * It is a larger source:';7,;
for the early legal use of the word than was Glanvil17 . 7 !• 7 . ; 7
; 7  An important rule of evidence is given early on in the Leges 7
which suggested that evidence should be given, and after given it should
then be judged. Legal evidence was not a private issue;. thus its con- )'
junction to intention would imply that the accused would present his
reasons for an act ( or serious omission ), and that about his actions
there would be a public nature. The passage reads as follows, and I shall
cite the translation of it only:
7 ’7.7 ”5, 7a: Nothing shall be done in the absence of an accuser; 77 ; 4-
I for God and our Lord Jesus Christ knew Judas was a thief*Tbut 7 -7?
14. Cf., A Concise History of the Common Law by Theodore F.F.Plucknett,
•; (London: Butterworth § Co. (Publishers) Ltd., 1956), Chpt. 14, 7 7
7 ''Professional Literature'', pp. 252-289. ,
15. The edition which I have employed for quotations is that which had 7 7;^ 
-been prepared and translated by L. J. Downer, LEGES HENRICI PRIMI7 ( 7
(Oxford: At The Clarendon Press, 1972), and I shall quote from it -7 ?
7;' 7; throughout.’w  :77.77 7..'! 1 ’>7 >7':' :•' 7  7  7 7 ' 7  '.7 7.
16. ibid., page 87, Leges. 7 7 7 7 7 . 7 7  j‘77 7; ; 7-7 777 7 7 -77•. 77‘7-77
"7 '. 3
7  7 ­
* . j.:
7  . " because he was not accused, he was therefore not ;'.«Yv *'''77
: y ; cast out, and whatever he did among the apostles re- ’
Y ; ’ = mained credited to the dignity of his office." i y Yy
;7:77 Arid we read a little later on in the same chapter,* Y  7 v Y
; y "5, 9a No one should be judged or condemned before ' . -
7 • 77 . he has lawful accusers personally persent and the op- y 7 ;
portunity to offer a defence for the purpose of clear­
. 7y y'- \ 7 -.'7 " y • ing himself of the charges." . y. ' 7 ^ 7 7 7 -'':7 7 7 /7.
7 The growing concept of a legal defence would be that reasons would '7
be given, within the ambit of an accepted legal framework, for the
actions or omissions of an accused. What underlies such a theory is
7V the assumption that what an accused does is thought to be his act, •
and that his act may be seen as what is public, which would be the
, action itself, and what is private, which would be his reasons for
7? his actions. No theory of of irrationalism is espoused in such a
. doctrine of legal evidence. It may be granted that odd reasons might y
7 7 have been advanced for the doing of or refraining from doing of an ;
y act, such as daemonic possession, or witch-spell casting, but that
7 is only to observe that a legal system accepted as a rational or ;
legal explanation for an action other than what we would accept in the
7 present day. We need only cast our mirids back to that period after
the Second World War when many an accused claimed that he had been, 7
■. bewitched by the political doctrine of Communism to explain why he 
was not a ‘good1 citizen at some time in his life. His excuse, or
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reason, often served as an effective plea in mitigation, if not even 
as a complete defence against a charge of political disloyalty. Even so 
barbaric a method of trial as trial by battle was not revoked in England /
until 1819 under the statutes of 59 Geo. Ill, c. 46. .*•• V x - y/X
The aim of the Leges was to foster a judicial attitude that x X;
legal guilt should follow upon one's voluntary responsibility for his y
acts. Guilt ought not to be forced: "A confession extracted by duress ■/. •
or fraud is invalid." The prevailing Christian notion at work in
the shaping of these early laws is, more or less, that to be a man is 7 .
to be composed of both body and soul. The unity of the principles is 
expressed in the existence of a human being, and he is neither to be 
thought of as solely spirit, or as solely corporeality. Just how 
the composition worked was left open to serious disputes, and these 
disputes, in themselves, do not concern me here. I mention, in passing, 
that no unified mediaeval theory about human behaviour issued forth, 
which numerous councillar condemnations and clarifications were to 
show. Some writers thought that the body was an expression of a : ;v
world-soul, while some thought that each man possessed his unique soul.
18. Ashford v. Thorton, 1 Barn § Aid. 405 appears to be the last appeal 
. from murder to invoke this method of trial. 7 xx
19. Leges at page 89, section 5, 16a. It should be recalled that Pope 
Innocent III, on 24 August 1215, condemned the Magna Cartax by issuing 
a papal Bull which decland that King John having been impelled to 
enter the agreement and to sign it because of force and fear/the ;; 7
document was void. One may consult Magna Carta by by G.R.C.Davis, 1 : X
published by The Trustees of the British Museum, 1971, at page 29, : 
or the Selected Letters of Pope Innocent ITT as edited by C.R.Cheney .7 
and W.H.Semple ( Nelson:Edinburgh, 1953). Xy y v %: x 7 7 x 7 v
■.V't
V ~ yYYY . 7: 7.V7, Y • .yv: - 85 ; y ; :y  y ; Y y y 1- •- 7v7yy,y v^Y Y y3
However the different positions with regard to the nature of the soul, and 
its union to the body, were resolved, what appears to develop is a concept 
about human nature which held that each man was unique, and thus uniquely 
responsible for his moral actions or omissions. * There existed, how­
ever, some conditions which would excuse him from fault, but those I Y
shall discuss later on when I discuss ignorance and the law, y 7 7 7y
It is when one turns to 5,28b of the Leges that a clear state- . 7. 
merit about intention occurs, but, at the same time, I would caution against
assuming that its clarity is also conceptually helpful. We meet with a 7,
20. It is interesting to turn to some of the spiritual writers to see
how the responsibility concepts developed. It should be impressed •* 
upon one that a spiritual act, such as meditation, was just as "full" 
a human act as was walking or talking. William of Saint Thierry could 
write, " So is it with the intention in contemplation or in prayer 
[italics mine],7 If the understanding of reason or of love has not y 
received something definite from you that it can quickly put before y 
itself where its affections can rest and its attention find an . 
object*-and where it can pour out the fruits of its devotion, then y V  
contemplation grows faint, prayer waxes cold, attention falters, 7 ; 
understanding becomes weak, and reason can do nothing." pp. 72-73 y 
Vy of Prayer in On Contemplating God by William of Saint Thierry, trans- 
lated by Sister Penelope CSMV, volume 3 in-the Cistercian Fathers 
Series (Irish University Press,71971: Shannon, Ireland]. One may 
7 also refer to his Da Natura Corporis et Anima (Migne: P.L. 180, y 
; y col.707).: It cites a typical twelfth century position of the 7
common mind on the matter: "[T]he philosophers of this world defined 
the soul as a simple substance, distant from the matter of its body, 
the organ of its members, having the power of life. ; The doctors of y 
the church, on the other hand, define it thus -—  a spirituar sub-y \
.; stance particular to each individual, created by God, vivifying, y 
rational, immortal, and able to turn to good and evil." as cited yy, 
at page 12 of, An Introduction to the Cistercian De Anima (Aquin 77 
.‘7 77 Press,. 1961: London) by G. Webb. 7 y 7 : ."Yvy y 7;:yy \: jy
86
simple statutory declarative: " A person is not to be considered 
guilty unless he has a guilty intention," v ;v 7 \ :
’ . Levitt •V  states that Maitland had correctly traced the :,
use of the phrase [Reum non facit nisi mens rea: 5,28b of the Downer 
text] to St. Augustine of Hippo, having found its 'source*.when Sir 
James Fitzjames Stephen did not,"• v* himself an eminent historian and 
practitioner of criminal law in the nineteenth century; Such an V  ,;/V 
omission on his part alone ought to tell one that the historical 77 / 
roots Of the concept of intention are not a matter of simple historical:: 
location, or that its roots possessed a persistently vivifying force 
as might the living force of a ritual. Its roots had simply been 
lost. What one fears is that if its roots were lost then, too, its 
conceptual framework might have been lost. I make this extended caveat 
because Of certain comments I now wish to make about the Augustian roots 
of intention. . :
I prefer to suggest, and argue mildly, that an attempt to 7 
locate * intention’ in one of the sermons given by St. Agustine, and then 
to argue, from its location, that the common law doctrine(s) of 'in­
tention' stem from that historical location is to import into the : • v
21. "The Origin of the Doctrine of Men Rea" at page 117, op cit.
22. Cf,, A History of The Criminal Law of England, volume 11, \
(London: Macmillan and Co., 1883) at page 94, Chapter XVIII, 
"Criminal Responsibility". In his A General View of The;- 
Criminal Law of England (London and Cambridge: Macmillan and 
Co., 1S63) Stephen makes only mention of Bracton as an early
source for the definition of homicide (at page 41) and does
" not trace his sources back further than to him.
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common law more than the evidence will permit. The method should be 
: that one should be willing to admit conceptual links into a growing
\. tradition, but one should view the ' links ' as parts of a living tradition/1■''/
each moment of which in some way recapitulated what preceded it. The 7 7 -7/ 
Augustinian tradition grew out of a rich Roman tradition in which law, ; 
rhetoric and philosophy al 1 had powerful parts to play. I do not in- /* 
tend to show, as in a biography, how St. Ambrose, himself steeped in Y; / 
Roman culture and learning, may have transferred Roman learning to
St. Augustine when, as a young scholar, he was a pupil of St. Ambro se. ;7
So much Of early Christianity was formed by legal minds, thereupon 
converted to Christian beliefs, that one assumes tjiat Roman culture
was transmitted to the early church in that way. The doctrines and i:/
% x edicts; and papal letters of the early councils show how much Rome had
permeated early Christian culture, especially after the time of Origen, x .
iho himself believed that Christian education needed to model itself
7 after pagan education, but in a manner fitting to Christian beliefs.23*
■; }, It is telling that the/early location made for intention rests in a . 7 ;
sermon rather than in a legal work. I think there is a reason for it. 
in such a form; the doctrine took a Roman form, a concept expressed in the 
literary form of the time: a church sermon. The tradition of the Senate '77
had not been surpassed; it had been embellished by a growing political ;
body, as was the early Church. One may turn to Cicero's De Inventione 7/
. to appreciate that legal analysis might occur in other than legal form.
23. Cf., Christopher Dawson, The Crisis of Western Education (Sheed 8 Ward,Ltd,,
1961: London) , Chapter one,; "The Origins of the Western Tradition 7
:’-7‘77.r**V' of Education." pp.-j3-12. 7- //. *V "7/7;: - 7777--X.;y y r7'7 7'7
i 7 7  The phrase, "Ream linguam non facit, nisi mens rea." occurs in < . , .
: Sermon 180 of St. Augustinefs collected sermons, ^ * The body of the 7777;:;77;
7. sermon discusses oaths and lying, and I have appended a free trans- 77777f77&'J
; ; • lation of my own to the Latin text and have placed them in the foot- 7 77 :
notes below. The sermon is both compressed and foreign to us . now . 7 777
7*7 ;7'-What seems to be a simple example, the asking of a questiq;ri whether • ' 77 7 (7 7 7
it rains or not in this place ["Pluit in illo loco ?"], has a com- ,
plicated import due to the compression of the Latin. The compression ; .77
7 7 7 7 ’ is made even more complicated because the example should be seen from '• .
7 within Augustine's own thought. One is not dealing with a simple 7 !7 ,7
grammatical example; rather, one is dealing with an example produced 7  7
7 by a philosopher and theologian and functioning within a system of his 7 1
;: 7 assumptions. The early Christian believers were seriously troubled by - -7/^777
7 oaths; the gospels had counselled against the taking of oaths; but 7 7
there seemed to be occasions either when one should be able to take an J  7 • 7
oath and not violate Christian teachings, or there were occasions when 7
7; > oaths had been taken and were not in violation of Christian belief. ''But7 y 7 :17 7 '7 i 
■7/ 7  to take an oath also meant for one to tell the truth. What conditions . :
bound one so that: an oath would be truthful tr Two questions then pre- J
sented then^elVes: the nature of ah oath, and the conditions when an oath . - 7.v
7 7 7  ’ was truthful; 7777-7-f'7 77777:;: p X 7 . ',V'77 7 7 ; 7 ^ 7
7 24 7  Opera Omnia, volume five, Sancti Aurelii Augustini, Sermon 180 appears 7 7
:. 7  at page 972 ( Paris edition, 1841 From CAPUT II (972-73) of this :
777 7 edition I have taken the Latin text, and set it down here. ' 7 \7- 7,/;’ 7;
7  "CAPUT II. — -2, Juratio licet a Deo usurpata, homini tamen fugienda. '"',-77'7 7 7 7
Perjurium quot modis contingit. Invenimus enirn jurasse sanctos, jurasse • 777-77 
7/77 primitus ipsum Dominum, in quo non est omnino peccatum, Juravit Dominus, 7/;777
et non poenitcbit eum: Tu es sacerdos in aeternum, secundum ordinem Mel- , 7 , 
chisedech (PsaTI cix. 4 ). Aetemitatem sacerdotii Filio cum juratione: . 7
promisit. Habes etiam, Per memetipsum juro, dicit Dominus (Gen. xxii. -16) 7 77 - .7'; 
7: Etillud juratio est, Vivo ego dicit Dominus (Num. xiv. 28 ). Quomodo homo 7 77
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is an oath of special value ? In this sermon the underlying 
belief is that God is perfect and cannot deceive. Christian believers 
are called upon to be like God the Father, both perfect and without : •, 
any taint of deception. The further assumption which this sermon draws 
upon and elucidates, coherent with the general spirit of Augustinian • 
philosophy, is that the human person is directed to be one in all that 
he does. Human character should have to it a unity, and should not be 
at odds with itself ( ”Si discutiat homo quoties juret per totum diem, 
quoties se vulneret, quoties gladis • linguae se feriat et transfigat, 
quis in illo locus invenitur sanus ? ” (italics mine)].By taking :
seriously the command or injunction not to lie or to deceive, one pre-
24. Cont., - . >: •
"per Deum, sic Deus per se ipsum. Non est ergo peccatum jurare ?
Durum est hoc dicere: et quoniam diximus Deum jurasse, quam bias- 
phemum est hoc dicere ? Jurat Deus qui peccatum non habet: non 
ergo est peccatum jurare: sed magis peccatum est pejerare. For- 
tasse quis dicat non esse proponendum de Domino Deo jurationis ex­
. emplum. Deus enim est, et forte illi soli competit jurare, qui
non potest pejerare. Homines enim falsum jurant, vel cum fallunt, ; 
vel cum falluntur. Aut enim putat homo verum esse quod falsum est, 
et temere jurat: aut scit vel putat faisum esse, et tamen pro vero 
jurat, et nihilominus cum seelere jurat. Distant autem ista per- 
juria, quae due commemoravi. Fac ilium jurare, qui verum putat 
esse, pro quo jurat: verum putat esse, et tamen falsum est. Non 
ex animo iste perjurat; fallitur, hoc pro vero habet quod falsum 
est; non pro re falsa sciens jurationem interponit. Da alium qui /
scit falsum esse, et dicit verum esse- et jurat tanquam verum sit, 
quod scit falsum esse. Videtis quam ista detestanda sit bellua, et 
de rebus humanis exterminanda ? Quis enim hoc fieri velit ? Omnes 
homines talia detestantur. Fac alium, putat falsum esse, et jurat 
tanquam verum sit, et forte verum est. Verbi gratia, ut intelligatis, 
Pluit in illo loco ? interrogas hominem; et putat non pluisse et^ad 
negotium ipsius competit, ut dicat, Pluit: sed putat non pluisse; 
dicitur ei, Vere pluit ? Vere, et jurat; et tamen pluit ibi, sed ille 
nescit, et putat non pluisse: perjurus est. Interest quemadmodum
verbum procedit ex animo. REAM LINGUAM NON FACIT, NISI MENS REA.
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serves a wholeness of the body and soul. By being unwilling to take 
oaths, the Christian is reminded that when he gives his word, he gives 
his word in the same fashion as God gives His word, and to do so is 
a serious act. When an oath or affirmation is false, the falseness 1 
does not rest in the words themselves, but in the uttering of them, 
since words are a production of the mind or spui ( "7..verbum procedit 7 
ex animo. .. ''). If the soul is bent upon wickedness ( ". ..nisi mens 
rea...V), then productions which emanate from the soul will, by necessity, 
be false and wrong. To the Christian this is wrong for the reason that 
God, often depicted as logos, and the model of human spiritual perfection, 
is mocked by an imperfect human act. The imperfection occurs when the 7 
human logos produces the false word, revealing a heart set in deception.
24. Cont./ : :*7x7, y 7- 7/77.:. '7-7 "\• -7 7. '■••x- _■
"[italics mine] Quis est autem qui non fallatur, etsi noluit 
k. fallere ? Quis est homo cUi non subrepat fallacia ? Et tamen
’ juratio ab ore non discedit, frequentatur: plura sunt plerumque 7­
. juramenta, quam verba. Si discutiat homo quoties juret per toturn 
' diem, quoties se vulneret, quoties gladis linguae se feriat et 
transfigat, quis in illo locus invenitur sanus ? Quia ergo grave 
peccatum est pejerare, compedium tibi dedit Scriptura, Noli jurare."
THE TRANSLATION: ; 7 77 '' ■'; 7 v 7/ ”7'7v . :';7x. . 7 7x/ 77x7X7
is lawful for one to take an oath if the practise is directed 
by God, notwithstanding the fact that it may be hastened by men.
(I will also speak about ) perjury and how it may take place.
We do find examples of the saints taking oaths, and we also find 
7 that our Lord himself had taken an oath which was in no way sinful 
for him to have taken.7 Our Lord took an oath, and it did not dis­
please him ( to take the oath, when he said ^: You are a priest
forever, according to the order of Melchisedech ( whereupon Psalm 
109 is cited which reads: "Thou art a priest for ever in the line 
x of Melchisedech." ) . With an oath He promised the eternity of the
priesthood to his Son. You also know from Scripture, Our Lord did 
say, I have taken an oath upon my very own self (whereupon Genesis 
xxii. 16 is cited, which reads, "Once more the angel of the Lord 
called to Abraham out of heaven; and he said, This message the Lord 
has for thee: I have taken an oath by my own name to reward thee for 
this act of thine, when thou wast ready to give up thy only son for 
; my sake,!') x 7.7x. y.y /' 7''-7 :7 ; 7'- ..yx , 7. .:77'y '■ . X'x. ' 7 ' .
T x j
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THE TRANSLATION, continued: " ^
And here is another example of the taking of an oath, I am the ? jfeS? 
living God, says the Lord, ( whereupon this passage from Numbers 
xiv. 28 is cited: " Such was the Lord1s message to Moses and Aaron: •
Will this thankless multitude never cease complaining; must I hear ;v
nothing but lament from the sons of Israel ? Tell them this, As 
I am living God, the Lord says, the very words you have used iiv 
my hearing shall come true; your bones shall be left to lie in this - 
desert.") How a man does this is through God, just as God does this 
through himself. But is it hot a sin to take an oath ? This is a
hard question to answer, and for this reason. We have said that ; ; <
\ God himself has taken an oath, and does it not seem as though we ,
have blasphemed by having spoken in this way ? God, who is without 
Sin, has taken an oath: therefore it would follow that it is not a
sin to take an oath: but rather what is greatly sinful is for one :
to commit perjury. Perhaps one may say that an example of oath­
: taking by our Lord before God has not been proposed. For as He is
' G6d, . then perhaps He alone is capable of taking an oath, because 
. he is incapable of committing perjury. Men, however, are capable >
; ; of swearing falsely, by concealing matters, or by letting matters be ;
£'V'- concealed. \ v " ' '\ .■
" Either a man believes that something is true when it is actually - 
false, and rashly swears an oath: or he knows or he believes what 
is false, but yet he nevertheless swears that it is true, and never­
theless with wickedness he affirms an oath. These perjuries are tb •> 
be kept in a separate class, and there are two things I wish to men- / M'f"
tion. Let him take an oath who believes It to be true, for he swears "  . :V- •
by this: what he believes to be true, which is, however, false. Such ; 
falsehood does not proceed from one's soul; it has escaped one's notice, /
• v : that one has uttered as true what was in fact false; but not knowing 7-
that such was false, one takes an oath.
"Here is another example:of one who knows something to be false, yet ; 
he says that it is true: furthermore, he takes an oath ( as It were.;),..• 
that it is true, even though he knows if to be false. Do you appfe- ; 
Ciate that such a monster must be detested, and be removed from human - 
affairs ? And who wants this to be done ? All men who detest such 
, • matters. • :• . ' • ■ . . . ' . ' • . / :  :
" Consider a further example. A person believes something to be false,; ■
but nonetheless by oath affirms it to be true, and there is the chance 
that it may be true. Freely put, so as to be understood, one puts m 
this question to someone , "Does it rain in this place ?" That man 
/ . happens to believe that it has not rained, but, to cause a difficulty,
[et ad negotium] by coincidence, just as he speaks, it does rain: but 
he does not know that it has rained; however if is remarked to him.
"It is really raining now, isn't it ?" Truly it is raining, and he ; r: 
affirms it: however, although it is actually raining, he himself does "
; not truly know that, and he even believes that it has not rained. He 
is a perjurer. What is important to observe is how the word proceeds 
from our soul. One does not produce guilty speech unless one has a guilty 
mind. Who is there however who has not deceived, yet at the same time 
has not wished to deceive ? Who is the man who has not come forward !
with this fallacy ? Nonetheless, swearing an oath ought not to 1: -
X 'y r
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' .' :/The simple example[ of: asking some person if it has rained or 
not gives us two possibilities. One may answer rashly, but without 
deception, or one may answer deliberately ,with an intent to deceive 7  
the listerner. This latter act is, for Augustine, a dreadful act. " 7
it represents the mind out of order with world, but paradoxically 
so. The mind has created a sentence, which is real, but that real *
thing is perverted against itself and is made with the purpose of 7
deceiving. It is made doubly damning when, having fashioned a sentence
by which to deceive the listener, the producer then avers that what 
he has said is true, and he declares it to be so by swearing that the 
sentence is true. The Latin sentence shows Augustine's strong dislike \
for this double act of deception: "Videtis quam ista detestanda sit bellua,
et de rebus humanis exterminanda \ - *-C. • 7' ^
THE TRANSLATION, continued:  ^ 7 7  7 7 7 7 : '
"run Counter to our speech, and this is Commonly understood: 
there are many matters which require an oath, rather than mere 
talk. If a man becomes frustrated how often he swears throughout 
the day, how often he feels vulnerable, how often he is severely • 
critical of himself, what part of him then is sane ? Because it 
is therefore a grave sin to commit perjury, holy Scripture offers 
7  to you this restraint, Be unwilling to take oaths." ; 7 7 *
■7-7 ; 7^-:; y x-'x--- 93; y  .xy,:7;7V .
Why I hesitate to justify a common law theory about intention yyy
based upon this single passage is that to do so would require that
; 7 human nature in general, and this the common law does not.: What
Augustine wished to stress in his 180^ Sermon was how a corrupted 
will could produce in evidence that which caused perjury. We know 
that the respondent answered "yes" to the question which had been put 
to him regarding rain not because he truly knew in fact that it had 
7y  y. rained, but because it served his own secretive purposes to claim on 
oath that he truly knew that it had in fact rained.
It is not my concern to undertake either to present a synopsis 
of Augustine's religious philosophy, nor to attempt to make it coherent 
X or to defend it. To accept, at face valuethat a single phrase from
a body of sermons ( which occupy 1700 folio columns in the standard
- 2 5  X .  ■■ 7 - . .  \ ; ;• . . / / .  '{s'- . y V - _  v - v  ;/edition *), is to make too bold a claim for a central theory of the 
y common law. However, seen in a religious background which was concerned 
; about man's propensity for sinfulness because of his fallen nature, and 
given the stress of early Christian philosophy upon the corrupted will of 
y man, when one reads of mens rea within the context of August ini ah phi­
losophy, it is possible for one to appreciate that this simple notion as 
yy to what relationship occurs between mental acts and public acts is, in y 
fact, a complicated notion serving to account for human responsibility. 
Central to Christian belief was that one was responsible for one's acts, 
and that one knowingly could sin. Paramount in the scale of perfection 
was a will subjected to God by obedience. The guilty mind, the criminal 
mind, was a result of wilfulness, and to be wilful was another way to
create without regard to consequences. A Tie is a wrongful creation.
yxy'y ‘ 25. op.cit. ;y y 'y 7,:-.'/ - vy- 7yys77'.7iy.y‘ry '/-y-x/y/;.7_7'.yy’7 /■7,'?.y:;.y_y;
/ : and that what was obtained was certain and reliable. It was not a
question about doubting the existence of a or the sensible particular \
, ( a  position not even attributable to Cicero in his Academica ^ ‘
. . it was a question whether or not one could gain personal knowledge,
which he would have expressed as knowledge Of 'the truth', and he argued 
. . v that one could in Book Three of Contra Academicos. ’ It was also a
predominate, even if curious feature, of Augustine's thought that he 
held that the will determined all that One did naturally, and that the 
-. / will, when the cause of evil, was not itself another cause within a series.
 ^ ; of other efficient causes. Gilson has presented a cogent synopsis of
: v y r Augustine's voluntarism, and I need not reproduce it here. :* A possible
distinction one could make in the Augustinian use of the concept of will i"
. 26. Cf. The Academics of Cicero, translated by James S. Reid (London:
V  y Macmillan § Co., 1880), pages 7-11 of his introduction. v;"'"
27. Cf., St. Augustine, Against The Academicians, translated by Sister "
Mary Patricia Garvey, Mediaeval Philosophical Texts in Translation, , =;;i
; No.2, (Marquette University Press, 4th edition, 1973: Milwaukee, " -i
5 ; . Wisconsin), Book III, pp 50-83. v '. y:;v
28. The Christian Philosophy of St. Augustine by Etienne Gilson (Victor 
" J :3  V;v' V-; •..;;;'Gollanc2' Ltd.., 1961: London) , at Chapter II, "The Elements. •..of/the-’
; * :  Moral Act.", esp. pp. 127-136. The author states at page 134, and • "
 ^  ^, I quote, "If the will is the; active force which calls forth sensation, ; ""
; ; • y :; it is also the force which causes rational knowledge.. . .But: whatever ^
: " the degree of knowledge we attain, it is always determined by an K- i £
. . . . impulse to investigate which has its origin in the will." Cf., also,"V"::
■y ; Chapter II, "The Nature of the Soul" in Augustine1 s Psychology by :
/v. ; T. J. Parry (published dissertation of the University of Strassburg:
- ; , Boraa nr. Leipzig, 1913). Parry presents a strong picture of Augustinian ; :
f • : : voluntarism, pointing put that one use Of 'intention' is
y:; • } • " peragendi', meaning of the Will in action. He cites Chapter 3 of
C y  * 4  [ if De immortali tate Animae of Augustine for./this usage. : S
i
v ,1 ' -1
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would be to distinguish between the will as a force or cause, and what /• 7 /7/7  
was the product of a force or cause. It may be an acceptable distinction, 7 
but it contains little legal force. : One might wish to argue by a form 7 7 -'.,//; 
of measurement, suggesting that a heihous act reveals a heinous will, /y/
if such a distinction were made viable in law. But such an argument 77
from proportion contains a fallacy which simple case law recognises.., 7 ../y/; / y  
Two acts could be done by two different defendants, and each act judged V 
to be heinous, but one act could be done by a child, not knowing what he / 
did was vicious or wrong, whilst the other act could have been caused by y  
the hardened criminal. Each act, as an act, did great harm; but to argue ;
from the harm done to the state of mind of its perpetrator is to indulge 
in a leap of faith and not of logical necessity. / 7;i;; 7
I do not wish to give the impression that 'intention' then was . 7
a vacuous notion. It was not.' I wish only to argue that what Augustine
may have meant by its use does not restrict;its use totally. He was
• •- '2977''-’ : /'-/ /. ■ : *: / / ’/ '’■•/ -77/: 77.ya student * of Cicero's/thought, and we may turn to one of his writings /
to gain, more or less, a neutral guidance about intending and .human acts.///:.;7
In De Inventione Cicero makes some sensible statements about and an ///./7
analysis Of various forms of legal pleas. I accept the truism that 1itt1 ie • : {
of Roman criminal law influenced our common law origins, as Levitt and .7777''-.a -
others have suggested.^* My purpose in turning to Cicero is to look for ,;./
29. Cf. Rhetoric at Rome, by M .L.Clarke (Cohen § West,1966,London) chpt. 14.
30. De Inventione translated by H. M. Hubbell ( Loeb Classical Library, ::
volume No. 386; Harvard University Press § William Heinemann Ltd., • 7"
. London, 1968 ). '
31.' Levitt, dp. cit. , / y v7 * //• ■ /. ' ;;'7 v;:\ y  . '
■, .‘>'7
'•■'7;Yy V-;7 y/\that/ those common usages passed into Christian theological writing, 7 x 7
{; V through Tertullian, Ambrose, Augustine, and then were: transmuted into . 7
. '-■X'.:7y. ■ y; vehicles for Christian religious concepts. y. ■. y -. X y  77.'y' ■-/'• .77 777y
x ; We will recall, from the previous chapter, that the concept 7 7y
■7: y of the voluntary, as expressed in various Councillar canons, did not v 77:
specify that one 1 intended*. The grounds of responsibility rested •; ^
\yX x\ upon voluntariness, and then upon what practical judgements a con- '771y77y
• . fessor might make about the guilt or innocence of his penitent. The 7 • 7
: ; , grounds, I suggest, for determining the guilt or innocence of a penitent y
y y y  7 . *. would rest upon what reasons he offered for what he did. . In the De •'••y ••: 7;X'x/,
y - , Inventione we read of a legal analysis of possible reasons for actions,,;1 - /  >.
7 /x y and these I wish to consider before I return to conclude my analysis 7
>7.7y 7 . of the Leges. /7y -7 y.77; y ..y' ; -/x/x ; . ////xy; /7yy ::7y . \;v77y.y 77/:777Jy;
: . The problem which one faces if he remains with an;Augustinian. /
7 7 , 7 analysis of error, or of falsity, is that the analysis for an inordinate 7 7 ;xy
7 act, such as perjury, returns ofte to a complicated.theory about the ! y
will. Unless one accepts the Augustinian analysis of will, and how £
i y. 7 it causes all human acts, one will never ascertain the reason.for’M : y r;v;77y
/•/•;.•/ .. action. If God is the source of all truth, and if the human will.' is a ; yXy/Xv
, corrupted and fallen power, then to account for criminal acts one must 7 7 /'7-y 7
present all criminal law within the nontext of Christian theology .andxyy7y y y ; 
: 7 ; its assumptions about human nature. The common law has not such a rigOurous
. precision, however admixed it is and was with: Christian assumptions aboutx y7yy
7/ 7/\y/' y human behaviour, yy:; yy. -.7y yy.'!. /./7 /// /x- - '7/7./..;. y7- y'/y. ^ :777;7-yyy7y 7:x y
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Augustine's voluntarism, holding that the will ( and whatever 
is entailed by his concept of it ) is responsible for all human action, 
presents the legal philosopher with two distinct problems. One is the 
problem of meaning. Is there a consistent Augustinian position about 
the will ? And then the further problem, admitted that there may be 
the Augustinian position, what conceptual clarity does it give to a /, 
legal concept and operator such as is intention ? One's feeling is 
that we are encumbered with two notions which, in the end, do not help 
us to 'explain' an human action in a legal context. The common law may 
have had vestiges of Augustinian voluntarism, but these vestiges are not 
recrudescences very much alive in the common law. I am willing to admit; 
that intention may have been borrowed by the early legal writers and 
statute draughtsmen, and it may have been used without much historical
appreciation. Its occurrence in the Leges indicates this. Even if one
'‘v.yV-*-:'.: ; r%V: . ■ 77 7,7 32 '■/•.■ ; ' ■'' ' 7turns to a closer source for the usage, adverting to Ivo j perhaps the
immediate source for the usage of intention in the Leges, one needs to 7
enlarge upon the occurrence of the term by making an appeal to accepted
legal usages for the voluntary. One such source we have traversed by 7
reading from the Councils. 7/77 /7 . •«/<7 7 . • • ' // / / ; • y .•
/7  y \  ■ 7 % 7.7 V ' 77 . . “ 33 'I wish now to turn my attention to Cicero's De Inventione. *
32. I shall refer to Migne edition of Sancti Ivonis, Opera Omnia 
(Parisiis: 1889), and shall cite from his Decreti Pars Decima
7 (which encompasses columns 689-746, and is titled De Homicidiis) 
and De Homicidio, Book VIII of Panormia (which encompasses columns 
7  1303-1322 in Migne). ..
33. I shall make all of my citations from the edition prepared by H.M. 
Hubbell: De Inventione,(Loeb Classical Library: London, William 
Heinemann Ltd., and Harvard University Press, 1968). I shall simply 
cite the page of Hubbell's text when making citations hereafter.
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" , _ Although Augustine may have invented a new explanation to 
account for the nature of voluntary action, he did not invent the/' 
accepted usages of the term 'voluntary1. It possessed a rich usage 
in the Latin language, and had been part of Roman law. When Cicero . 
in De Inventione discourses about the nature of legal pleas, hie has /"- v/; 
given us, perhaps, an hitherto unappreciated legal and rhetorical 
lexicon by use of which one may disentangle what is meant by 'the 
voluntary1 in its various forms. His method is not to present us with 
a secret entity or power which is called 'the will' -i - 4  1 ; )%
For legal philosophy central legal notions may be understood 
in one of two ways. They may be understood as concepts, pure and simple, 
and then tested for their clarity and consistency. What will be the '
agreed upon test will depend upon what one accepts to be the aims of f
a legal system. A legal system need not pass a strict logical test 
to determine whether Or not it functions as a serviceablelegal system" 
and for this reason I do not specify what kind of test(s) one might use 
to judge a legal system. The aims of a consequentialist, or some 
variety of utilitarian, will not be the aims of a natural lawyer. Each 
system of legal theory may, most likely, be content to function with
 ^ . ' , • * y , *4- . • , • ’ J. • /.* \-» . . ’V.'"*' ** *4 * ' s ' i * * •- . » .« V ■ i' r .
* Grant argues that Cicero appears to have possessed no profound
understanding of Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics. Even if one ad- i.V
. " mits the point one may yet conjecture with some reasonable force-'
I that the edition of the Nicomachean Ethics which was prepared by
Andronicus of Rhodes, and known to Tyrannion, a learned friend of;": 
Cicero, could be facilitated to the Latin tongue. The concept of 
the voluntary would not have been a strange notion to Cicero, and 
he could easily have gained an understanding of it, for legal use,
/ from his reading of the Nicomachean Ethics. One may consult:, Andronici
Rhodii, Ethicorum Nicomacheorum, Paraphrasis (Oxonii: MDCCCIX), pp.
: 92-141 concerning 'sponte1 and 1de voluntater. This is a reprint of
the edition by Daniel Heinsius, MDCVII (Lugduni Batavorum). ;
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certain sets of unanalysed primitives within the system. Present day 
common law is able to function with its magistrates courts in which a ; ; \
magistrate reaches his decision without need to offer reasons for his 
judicial decision. The common law rules of procedure protect the , /: /
litigant by permitting him to file for a new trial in a higher court 
should he wish, but if he does not file for a new trial, even though : 
the magistrate did not offer reasons for his judicial finding, the . / , *
litigant is then bound by the finding of the magistrate's court. One
might find such to be illogical; but it is perfectly functional*,and 
largely acceptable to manylitigants. Trying to fit a meta-legal y'
grid or matrix upon a legal system in order to establish if the system 
is a 'good' or 'proper' system is to forget that legal systems, in;paft,y 
dwell in the practical order; and there are many avenues to the practical. 
But one may look at the central concepts of a legal system and try to 
see if they are understandable; or ask if so many exceptions are made /
to a single understanding of the central concepts that, in fact, no
true understanding is possible of the central concepts because, it is 
discovered, no central concepts exist within the system as a whole;
On the other hand one may eschew a purely logical approach toy);, 
legal analysis for the sake of turning to a linguistic analysis of the 
law and its central notions. For the moment, by use of passages from;
De Inventione, I wish to attempt the second approach. I wish, too, to 
show that 'intention', in whatever linguistic presentation it is clothed,/
l o o  ■ 7:  - v V r - ' 7 , ;7 - V -
whether it has been used to signify ’will’ or 'motive' or ’intent’ or ..
’wish1 or ’aim’ or ’purpose’ or ’cause’ or ’design’ or ’foresight’, is J ; /
made the more evident when it is seen functioning in some accepted legal 
context, as is presented by Cicero« The early legal linguistic usage 
demonstrates that one is not searching for a hidden entity, an *ih-^ ^ v ; 
tention’, as might be suggested by the appearance of the word in a 
bare statutory pronouncement such as the Leges. The linguistic history 
I wish to draw upon may free us from a search for hidden entities. f
- De Inventione was divided into two distinct books, both of which 
concern the practical art of legal rhetoric. The work has been referred 1 : : 
to as a pleaders book. It is, for our purposes, a study in practical ' !
argument forms which one would employ in a court of law. For a modem\ 
student coming to the Bar such a work would appear to be a blend of 
evidence and practical exercises. For the legal philosopher the book 
contains a vast quantity of samples of ’how to make oneself clear*, in a
vein reminiscent of Pierce’s popular essay, ”How To Make Our Ideas 7/; \7.7--
7: 35V ■ •- -7 7  ' . ' . 7 / 7  7 ; ; ,7  7 "  ’7 : 7 - " 7  7 7 '  7. * ■■Clear.’’ '■'•7-7';.,/ 7: •{* 7, ; - ■ 77. 7, •7;:?.;7 7y7:;: 7
35. One may read William James’s gloss on the piece in his own 7 ,
Pragmatism, Chapter Two> ’’What Pragmatism Means” pp 46-47 (Longmans,1908).
* I am aware that there is a sacramental use for the term intention.
For example, the Cambridge Manuscript of the QUESTIONES of Stephen 
Langton ( The New Scholasticism: Volume IV, 1930, at page 224, the 7
article by Alys L. Gregory ) records this usage of intention:
Cd. 191: Vtrum intentio baptizantis vel baptizati sit necessaria 7  :
in baptismOi One may read Chapters 14 and 15, ’’The Doctrine of In- '
tention” and ’’Presumption of Intention” in Principles of Sacramental 7
Theology by Bernard Leeming,S.J.,(Longmans, Green and Co.,1956:London) 
to appreciate that this was a (somewhat) standard use of the term to . ■ :*
, 7 mean ’ comply with * . The modern business equivalent is revealed in the 
doctrine of agency, as, 7Did the insurance agent comply with the aims 
of his Principal when preparing the insurance policy for the assured ?’
: : Aquinas speaks about ”De Intentione” in S.T.:la2ae, 12, 1, and there 
: the term has wider than sacramental use only. , . v V ,7 7 77 7 ;
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The following examples and usages occur in De Inventione 
which are of interest about intentional use of terras, and I cite 
them.--’'-':.- 7-'. • •/•• .• •' ‘/’t*7>- 7 • '• 7*7’7 -• 7 .. -V 7 . 7 7  ///Z./-5
.77/7; When reference is made to an interior sense, we encounter / /
language of this style: "Memory is the firm mental gTasp of matter / / 7 7
and words." ( [mjemoria est firma animi rerum ac yerborum perceptio■.7 / 7/'7 . 
D.I;(I) vii. 9, pp 20-21.) When he draws a distinction between 'act1
and .•fact* we read the following: "Every subject which contains in it­
self a controversy to be resolved by speech and debate involves a :
question about a fact, or about a defirition, or about the nature of 
an act, or about legal processes." ("...aut facti aut nominis aut - 7/,. •7;/ 
generis aut actionis continet quaestionem." D. I. (I) viii.10, pp 20-21.) 7/ 
Asking further questions about an ’act' we read, "There is a contro- r"//Cl 
versy about the nature or character of an act when there is both agree-. 7  
ment as to what has been done and certainty as to how the act should be / 
defined, but there is a question .. .:. about how important it is... 7
("Generis est controversia, cum et quid factum sit convenit, et quo id 
factum nomine appellari oporteat constat.. . D.I. (I) ix, 12, pp 24-25.)// 
About legal deeds we read, "It is purgatio when the deed is acknowledged 
but intent is denied; it has three parts, ignorance, accident, necessity." 
("Pugatio est cum factum conceditur, culpa rempvetur, Haec partes habet 
tres, imprudentiam, casum, necessitatem." D;I. (I) xi, 15, pp 30-31.) v 7/
* I shall cite from the work as follows:D.I.,/either part r or part II, 7
and give the paragraph and page number. A citation will then appear
’ at: D.I. (l),para%36, pg 72. ■ : /z/"//-- 7.7;• ■' -"7 * //'////
- ’7 / ';■ 7 u ixH  . 7 --//•:• . 7 ■•■;7'• 7  7-'77v7/
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The same passage continues, "Deprecatio is used when the defendant 
acknowledges that he has given offence and has done so intentionally, 
and still asks to be forgiven; this can rarely occur." ("Deprecatio V 
est cum et peccasse et consulto peccasse reus se confitetur et tamen 
ut ignoscatur postulat: quod genus perraro potest accidere.") One 
attempts to shift the criminal charge by "...transferring to another 
either the act or the intent or the power to perform the act...[e]ither 
the cause or the act itself is attributed to another." ("Remotio 
criminis est cum id crimen quod infertur ah se et ab sua culpa et 
potestate in alim reus removere conatur...[s]i aut causa aut factum 
in alium transferetur.") ' . /
Cicero shows other cases where ’intent1 may need to be con­
strued, and to written documents he turns to discuss this matter.
; -"In one case it seems that there is a variance "etWeen
the true words and the intent of the author..." ("Nam " ;
turn verba ipsa videntur cum sententia scriptoris dis- 
y"- dissidere.. D.I. (I) xiii, 17,pp.34-35) . ; • ,
-"the first class [of case] is said to be concerned with 
\ the letter and the intent..." ("Quare primum genus de
: " ; scripto et sententia.. ." loc cit). ;;
/ -"What more certain proof of his intent could the author .
of the law have left than the statement which he wrote him—
. ’ ; self with great care and pains? Therefore, if there were no 
written documents we should be in sad need of them to learn 
■' ■ ’ from them the intent of .the law giver;. v
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(”Quod enim certius legis scriptor testimonium voluntatis 
suae relinquere potuit quam quod ipse raagna cum cura atque. ,
diligentia scripsit ? Quodsi litterae non exstarent, magno 77- 
opere eas requireremus, ut ex eis scriptoris voluntas cog- 7777-7-; 
nosceretur;...” D.I.(I), xxxix, 70, pp. 114-15) . ; ^ ^ 7 7 :
-'•A controversy over the letter and the intent occurs when y " 7
one party follows the exact words that are written, and the 7 7 7 7 
other directs his whole pleading to what he says the writer 7 
meant. The one who. bases his defence on the intent will 
sometimes show that the intent of the writer always had ,
the same end in view and desired the same result, at other v- 
times he will show that the writer’s purpose has to be modi­
fied to:fit the occasion as a result of some act or event." ;
(”Ex scripto et sententia controversia consistit, cum alter 
verbis ipsis quae scripta sunt utitur> alter ad id quod 
scriptorem sensisse dicet omnem adiungit dictionem. Scriptoris 
autem sententia ab eo qui sententia se defendet turn -semper 7 7 '777.\.; 
ad idem spectare et idem veile demonstrabitur; turn ex facto ; 7 :7'7
aut ex eventu aliquo ad tempus id quod instituit accommo- 7 .
dabitur.” D.I.(11), xlii, 122, pp. 290-91.) ^7
- loc cit at 123, ”But there is another kind of argument . 
brought forward by advocates of the intent in which the wislv77fy77 
of the writer is shown not to be absolute, i.e.;having the 77 ; ;■ 
same weight for every occasion and for every action, but it 
is argued that his wishes ought to be interpreted to fit the7; / 
occasion in the light of some act or some event . ” y 7 ./ : / :7 7 !7 7
."r; ,(”Aliud autem genus est eorum, qui sententiam inducunt, £ $ 5 V *
. ;  ^ ■ in quo non simplex voluntas scriptoris ostenditur, quae j
'■>* in omne tempus et in omne factum idem valeat; /sed5 'ex-quor'.' -
\ . dam facto aut eventu ad tempus interpretanda dicitur.")
. In.one very long passage, the body of which i wish to cite, Cicero  ^^ i
: . shows the other side of the argument when one wishes to adhere 'to = - A
; the letter of the law. The argument proceeds in this fashion, and
f I shall cite the passage in single space: *
/. ;■.V*? *'11 is not right for us to argue about. the intent of
: of one who left us a clear indication of his intent v; /.*?;•.»
> ’ in order that we might not be able to dispute it; that ■ - iv:
. much inconvenience would result if it should be estab- \
 ^ \ lished as a principle that we may depart from the written V-^.ys
A \ , word. For those who draw up a written document will .not
; y ; ; feel that what they have written will be fixed and un-
. • alterable, and judges will have no sure guide to follow , ; ;  ^>
< ; ; i;f once they become accustomed to depart from the written
wordy Therefore if the object is to carry out the wish ^
; of the writer, counsel will urge that it is he rather •r ^
• than the opponents who adhere to the writer's wishes; ^
; for one gets much closer to a writer's intent if one j
[ " . interprets it from the writer*s own words than one who '/'
y/ - does not: learn the writer's intention from his own written
. document which he has left as a picture, one might say, of :
■’ his own desires, but makes one's own inferences.” :\7 /: “ 'V i, ..77
I; ! . - (,fSi aliud sensisse scriptor, aliud scripsisse dicetur, • : : ;A "
:*V»> is qui scrip to utetur haec dicet: non oportere de eius :
■ c: voluntate now argumentari, qui, ne id facere possemus, • >7*:.
;; : indicium nobis relinquerit suae voluntatis; multa in- .
,.v : , V" commoda consequi, si instituatur ut ab scripto recedatur. ; ‘ ^
v  ^ ; • Nam et eos qui aliquid scribant non
; y : ! / ; . y scripserint ratum futurxim; et eos quo indicent certum quod V"
; . ; . • sequantur nihil habituros si semel ab scripto
; . . : sueverint. Quod si voluntas scriptoris conservanda sit, Se; y
r , . non adversarios, a voluntate eius stare, i Nam multo propius
i accedere ad scriptoris voluntatem eum qui ex ipsius earn litteris
• ihterpretetur quam ilium qui sententiam scriptoris non V.,V-?
. -- < • . ipsius Scripto spectet, quod ille suae voluntatis quasi imaginem;
:: ; reliquerit, sed domesticis suspicionibus perscrutetur.” :  ^ -
■ t ' -• p.I. (II) ,xliv, 128* pp. 296-97) . . : .. w.
lustrate his thoughts about human actions. To this point one can see . > !
that a document is said to embody an intent of its author by asking . 
us to look to its purpose, or its time Of construction, or to the .
z 7 simple construction of the sentences themselves, arguing here that . ;
; , : z an author is able to express his feelings and intentions and (fesires  ^ ;
x , by use of sentences. The word 'intentio' never appears. What word //77/7";'77
z does appear is either a form of 'volunta' or ' sententia' or a • . /• | .• z-7
j 7/ construction from legal phraseology itself, when he said 'culpa / :
7  7 removetur' to mean that criminal intent has been denied (at D.I.(I) : 7 Z:77;z•
/ 7 7 y / / 7 7  Jti* 15, page 30). The rare occurrence of a form of intention does ,
z y  7/-'-/7 appear in this way;, 7 ^/zV-^ 17/7. -zZ 7 7 /;./-7z.,.//z/ ’7 Z,z7 /7 :'7;yZ '7 Z7 /7zz7 7 y /;7  
7 z - i7 , "...after that one may use the most effective argument, i £
7■ ;. 7, v Z--7 7" 7 a comparison of the act and purpose [italics mine] of the ; 7 Z/Zf/z/J/
zz 7 Z 7 ; „ opponents with the letter of the law, showing what was written, , '1
777 7 z * 7 - what was done, what thb judge has sworn to do." 7
., '! 7 7 . 7z . .postea, quod vehementissimum est, facti aut intentionis
7/ 7  : 7 [italics mine] adversariorum cum ipso scripto contentione, v Z • /*
’ 7 Z Z : 7 quid scriptum sit, quid factum* quid iuratus iudex." D. I. (II), , 7 r / 7:
:7:z7;7tvz/-;yz z. ///;■7.; xliii, pp. 292-295) . 7, 7 ; % ^ ' *3^
7 7 7 This is the form of intention which one will read in some mediaeval z z; z7z5
; /Z 7 uses of the word at the time of Bracton. But ' intentio ' seldom occurs, z zzzzz-
7 ; 7 7 7 Z Z and its few occurrences never appear to signify a 7 criminal mind' . When 7 ;//77./'': 
z. 7 Cicero, in those rare occasions, does employ 'intentio' (in some form) 7/ Z : 7>/ 
-v -;Z it appears to mean design or purpose. One might argue that it has some >
* Cap.l3,"De differentia inter voluntatem § finem 6 intention; Cap. 16, "Vtrum • 7 • • 
•;v7i z/7.-omnis actio ex intentione 6 fine pensetur." Sententiarum Pars II of PETRI • /
’• 7• z PICTAUIENSIS, Roberti Pulli, (Paris:M.DC.LV, ed. of Hvgonis Mathou'd). 7 z7/' 7/=
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association with a blend of formal and final causes, but he never develops
such a notion. If one is considered to be free of guilt, the phrase we 7 7
read, or a form thereof, is "quod absit a culpa”, which is rendered simply' .
as "because he is free of guilt." 1 .
’ ' . Cicero makes a general statement about the nature of argument,
telling one how arguments are formed and from what they are drawn. • I need
not cite the Latin. He tells his reader that "All propCsitlons are" sbpi7y; y
ported in argument by attribute of persons or of actions." (D.I. page 70)
He holds that ’purpose’ (’consilia’) is an attribute of a person, (loc cit)
His definition of purpose is:"Purpose is a deliberate plan for doing or y y
not doing something.” ("Consilium est aliquid faciendi aut non faciendi
excogitata ratio.";D.I.(I),xxv,36, page 7 4 0 • He says, (loc cit.) that
"The attributes of actions are partly coherent with the action itself,
partly considered in connexion with the performance of it, partly adjunct 7
to it and partly consequent upon its performance.” He joins the class of: V
person and action when he speaks about the cateogry of Manner, and I .
cite him directly:
’ J ;. ;"Manner...is the category under which one inquires how and
in what state of mind the act was performed. Its parts arer y ' > K  
; intention and lack of intention, Now we seek to calculate y /y y 1
one1s intention from the acts which one performed secretly * :
*• Were this an important notion in De Inventione One would have assumed ;7 
y that ’intentio’ in this form would have made regular appearances through­
out the work, and it is plain that it does not. ;7/.7 :.-’y.v ;
from page 268, D.I.(II),xxxiii, 101.
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or openly *, by the use of force or by persuasion. V-v •
• Lack of intention, on the other hand, is related y7 .
. to justification, the sub-heads of which are ignorance, 7
accident and necessity, and to emotions, such as : 77
annoyance, anger, love, and the others belonging to 7:.
' ' f / ' r .* V  the same class.” v y 7 " vy/ >777:‘ 7>>77y77y
.7 ("Modus autem est in quo, quemadmodum et quo animo 7  , }:
77. yy. V~ factum sit, quaeritur. Eius partes surit prudentia ■' ■ .v- y. .-777
7 et imprudentia [italics mine] ; Prudentiae autem 777 yy.: '/ y  v >
ratio quaeritur ex eis, quae clam, palam, viy per- y7.'.:y’7y7y 
.;7 suasione fecerit. Imprudentia autem in purgationem
confertur, cuius partes sunt inscientia, casus, -  7. 7
. necessitas, in affectionem animi, hoc est, molestiam, 7
y 7 ’ iracundiam, amorem et cetera quae in siinili genere y ;
7 yy 7 versantur.” D. I . (I) , xxvii, 41, pp. 78-81.) . y 7
It is to be noted, and I have placed the terms in itaiics, that the
state of mind Cicero reports is spoken of by use of
’prudentia', and that in its positive sense the term connotes:
foreseeing (a rare use), good sense, sagaciousness, practical judge*
ment, discretion, acquaintance with a thing, knowledge of how to do,
and even a meaning of ’statesmanship’. We are not given a doctrine 7
about a hidden something, an intention. When intention is referred
to in this context, it is the notion of intention which is calculated
from an act, a sense which did come into common law use early On.
One does not have the presence or absence of a bare intention. One
looks to assign reasons for actions. y  7.-7 :;77y 77 ; 7 ! 77yy  7
* The translator states that "acts performed openly as characterized 
by violence, passion and daring, secret acts by deceit, fraud, etc.”
He says (loc cit, page 81) "Result is the outcome of any action; in
this connexion it is customary to inquire what happened after each
thing, what is happening, and what will happen." ("Eventus est exitus 
alicuius negoti, in quo quaeri solet quid ex quaque re evenerit,
. . eveniat, eventurum sit.") ’/vr y 7 . y :• s
7. '■ “ Z !
All of these observations on the part of Cicero tend to develop a central ?
point about legal argument: that "an argument seems to be a device of some 7
sort to demonstrate with probability or prove irrefutably." (D.1 .(I) p.83.)7'
When he comes to speak about the cause of human acts he uses i / 1
language of this kind:.'7 / /7;v 'yZ/7;:: '/"• / 7: ' V ' • •• 7 7
, "The cause of an act falls under the heads Of impulse and
7 Z premeditation. An impulse is what urges a person to do 7 :
. something without thinking about it, because of some feeling ;
or emotional state: examples are love, anger, grief, in­
toxication, and in fact every state in which the mind seems 
to have been so affected that it could not examine the 7  
7 7: act with care and deliberation* but did what it did from ; 7
Z: a certain mental urge rather than from reflection7*7 7;’7Z7'Z’ .;•/.//
("Causa tribuitur in impulsionem et in ratiocinationem.
; 7 Impulsio est quae sine cogitatione per quandam affectionem 7///7 7 / 7
7 animi facere aliquid hortatur, ut amor, iracundia, ae- : . ;
; ; gritudo, vinolentia et omnino omnia in quibus animus ita 7 77/ 7 ;
. videtur affectus fuisse ut rem perspicere cum consilio : ;r//77;ZZ
7 et cura non potuerit et id quod fecit impetu quodam animi - 7 7
, 7 potius quam cogitatione fecerit." D.I;(II) v, 17, pp.180-81.).
The same passage continues, ’ - - / y  y-/////;/ •,- 7 7 //:///v z y y Z / y / y z Z ; - / -  77-;77 / 7  7
// "Premeditation on the other hand is careful and thoughtful ./Z/yyy//
.7.77;  reasoning about doing or not doing something. It is said /
7 to have been present when the mind seems to have avoided ;
• : 7 :. or sought something to do or not to do for a definite cause; /./-• 777
. 7! if an act is said to have been performed because of friend-
7 . '7 7: /ship, etc." 77 7Z;7: 7- '7' ; 7; ; " // -'7 //• 7; 7  ' 7; ,7 7 7 7 / 7
./:("Ratiocinatio est autem diligens, et considerate faciendi *;; y 77 
. ; aliquid aut non faciendi excOgitatio. Ea dicitur inter- v y j / y Z  7  .
fuisse turn, cum aliquid faciendi aut non faciendi certa 7 - Z/Z 7;
y / de causa vitasse aut secutus esse animus videbi tur; si ; 77 7
amicitiae quid causa factum dicetur, etc." loc cit.). 7 y -7 77
The portion is remarkable for its definiteness. He continues his
instructions to the prosecuting Counsel and tells what must be done ; 7
to make reasons evident. The next paragraph begins in this way, and
with it I shall close my citations on the matter of premeditation: . 7
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: "For no one can be convinced that a deed has been done 35
unless some reason is given why it was done [italics mine].: *.4 
: Therefore the prosecutor when he says that something was 
: ■;; • done on impulse, will be under the necessity of dilating < T;
upon that passion and, as it were, agitation and state of 4 • 
mind, with the full powers of his thought and expression,
• ; and of showing how great is the force of love, what power­
ful mental agitation arises from anger or from any of the 4 y 
causes by which he claims that the defendant was urged to 
v: t commit this crime. Here pains must be taken that it may :
„ . not seem strange that a mind disquieted by such passion < ‘4
' should undertake some crime." 4
("Nam nihil factum esse cuiquam probatur, nisi aliquid 
’ quare factum sit ostenditur. Ergo accusator, cum im- •*" ;: )
/ : pulsione aliquid factum esse dicet, ilium impetum et 4
quandam commotionem animi affectionemque verbis et .' •"•"4444v 
: ? sententiis amplificare debebit et ostendere quanta vis ;’'44"4y ; 
sit amoris, quanta animi perturbatio ex iracundia fiat " .
aut ex aliqua causa earum, qua impulsum aliquem id fecisse 
} }  . dicet.” D,I. (II) ,v,19, pp. 182-183.) \:
A few lines down,; at the close of the instruction,: Cicero states that : 4 ;
the prosecutor should be able to explain mental disturbance, and to 4 44:
offer parallels illustrating that crimes can be committed from impulse.
The language he uses is ,. "This can be done by Citing examples of those
Who have done something under a similar im- •
: 4 -4- 4- pulse and by collecting parallels and by ex­
; . ': 4 4 4  Plaining the nature of mental disturbance.” i )4 44 . : ("Hie et exemplorum commemoratibne, qui ;
v . . . simili impulsu aliquid commiserint, et
. . . similitudinum collatione et ipsius atiimi
. 4 4 affectionis explicatione curandum est ut4 : 4 . • non minim videatur si quod ad facinus tali
4" .; perturbatione commotus animus accesserit." :/4‘4
. 4-“ >:4 ‘^.’4 : * loc cit.) . , •« .•4 ';..-
Linking his instruction that reasons must be given for actions, he;makes 
a .sensitive distinction by stating that a deed and the reason for a deed-
36. One may read such a position recently argued in moral philosophy V 
by the late Arthur E. Murphy in his The Theory of Practical Reason 
4  (Open Court Publishing Company, La Salle, Illinois, U.S.A., 1965,
edited by A.I.Melden) at chapter two, ’’Practical Reasons As Grounds 
; ; for Action." pp. 24-56. >-*v. \ . > 4 ; ' : '• ..'4-4 ; 4  :4 '4  ’ • •- '-4 4 4 4 4 ;
:..j u
'Y',
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are conceptual I/.-, distinct: v /-w ^ -.v V;',\ V' •/ •.'; ;■
■. ■“ ' ■ - */■ ;I-*" s ■■ . v'’' s "**•*; V%jr ’v’’The result is deceptive when the matter turns out *
differently from what the defendants 'are said to 
have expected; for example, if one be said to have : 
killed a person other than he wished to kill be­
cause he was misled by resemblance, or suspicion,
; ' ■' or false description; or to have killed a man under
; ; , whose will he did not inherit, because he thought
;, ; that he would be an heir under that will; for (the ;
prosecutor will say) we should not judge his intent ;. 
v ' [italics mine] by the result, but consider with what 
. intent and hope his mind set out on a career of crime;
:;: ; . the pertinent fact is the purpose with which anyone 
performs an act, not what success he attains.”
i : (’’Eventus autem turn fall it, cum aliter accidit atque
, ei qui arguuntur arbitrati esse dicuntur: ut, si qui
, dicatur alium occidisse ac voluerit, quod aut simili-
. •• . tudine aut suspicione aut demonstratione false de- '
. ceptus sit; aut eum necasse, cuius testamento non sit
''* heres, quod eo testamento se heredem arbitratus sit♦
Non enim ex eventu cogitationem spectari oportere, sed 
, qua cogitatione animus et spe ad maleficium profectus
/ / sit considerari; quo animo quid quisque faciat, non - 
quo casu utatur, ad rem pertinere." D.I.(II),vii,23, 
V-V; pp. k84-l85.). - \ ■' k : a* ■ >• ' ' :X\
37. One may refer to the English case R. v, Latimer (1886), ,•
17 Q.B.D. 359 to observe how two different legal systems, 
as are Roman law and common law, may yet share a similarity 
in legal reasoning. In Latimer the defendant, D, had been 
involved in a pub brawl. During the course of the brawl he 
took aim at A, hoping to hit him with his belt, and hit : ,
B, the barmaid, whom he did not intend to hit. He injured 
B gravely. In a reserved judgement, Lord Coleridge,C.J. : ^ 
, stated, ”It is common knowledge that a man who has an un- ' 
lawful and malicious intent against another, and, in at- 
v tempting to carry it out, injures a third person, is guilty
i of what the law deems malice against the person injured, be- .
: cause the offender is doing an xml awful act, and has that .;; >.
- which the judges call general malice,” He distinguished the
case from P. v. Pembliton (1874) L.R.2 C.C.R.119,showing that 
intent in Pembliton -differed and did not guide in Latimer. 
The language of the Malicious Damage Act,1861,s.51 controlled 
Pembliton, but did not control Latimer, in the determining of ;
v of the requisite intent for the crime. - ; : v - -;
. ■*
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.. One may appreciate, t suggest, that the notion of transferred ’ 
malice, at times denominated as oblique intention, is not a novel notion. 
There is a great similarity between the conceptual content of the pas­
sage just cited and its modem counterpart, revealed in Latimer, as 
distinguished from Pembliton. I pause here, however, to warn against 
too facile a comparison. The broad conceptual notes of the concept 
bear similarity, but not identity. The modem doctrine, it needs to y 
be urged, is to be accepted with Some reserve, and some writers have- y
" • '■ ■ ,/ 30 ‘ '‘‘-'Z : - 3 9 '..’ 7 .7 7 J y 'stated this warning. * Edwards * believes that Lord Coleridge was ,> 
less than clear when he attempted to distinguish Latimer from Pembliton. 
The language of section 20 of Offences Against the Person Act,(24 § 25 7 
Victoriae , Cap,100) reads as follows, and may provide the reason for 
the presumed distinction between the two cases. It will be remembered 
that the defendant in Latimer, with his belt buckle, took aim at A but 
hit/B, the barmaid, by mistake, yet wounded her seriously. It all oc­
curred in the midst of a tavern brawl. In section 20 we read: ;7
38. In CRIMINAL LAW by Smith and Hogan (London: Butterworths, 1969) 
one reads this caveat: "It is important to notice the limitations
of this [namely, the doctrine of transferred malice in the criminal 7 ;
law of common law jurisdictions] doctrine; It operates only when /
' the actus reus and the mens rea of the same crime coincide. If D,
.with the mens rea of one crime, does an act which causes the actus 
reus of a different crime,he Cannot, as a general rule, be convicted 
of either offence." at page 45. (Even this caveat, I would advance*
;7y/' needs further refinement.) -. . :7. / 7  . 7 7 -y "77;v :y/7 .. ■../ -7;7/7 i / .
39. In MENS REA in Statutory- Offences by J.L1.J. Edwards (London: Mac- z/z
:. Mi Han § Co. Ltd., 1955), the author, at pages 12 - 16, criticises 77
the legal clarity of the supposed principles underlying the decision j
■7/ '/of ; the court in Pembliton. 77 V /.y •// 7 ; 7 . - 7 / ’. 7 / 7
: They term 'general malice’ was first used in R. v. Hunt (1825) 1 Mooii' 937
Use later favoured 1 transferred malice’ to denote the same legal concept
- y-yvj
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’ - "20. Whosoever shall unlawfully and maliciously y : ;*
V 4, 4  ■ V-V-;- , wound or inflict any grievous bodily Harm , 4-4- 4 4
. .; 4- 4 4  ;/ upon any other Person, either with or with- - 4 4 4 ;4
.  ^ : out any Weapon or Instrument, shall be guilty 444-y
•4yy -4;>'4.' -44 of a Misdemeanor.v.?f 4 /4 4 4 4'4yyy 4444;' ''4„ '4:4' - '
One was under no mental obligation to oneself , in order to violate 4 / 4 4  
the provisions of this statute, to specify against whom one had yy 4 V "y 
intended to direct his violence; it was enough, simply, to direct 4 y 
violence against any person whatsoever. If the violence arose within . 
a context deemed to have been unlawful ( as would be a pub brawl ), 
then the actus reus of the crime was satisfied if some person were y 
' subjected to grievous bodily harm 4  4 - y’. V y ^ y y ; f. lk4.44 4*/4 4 ;y •
y Pembli ton, having been decided twelve years earlier in 1874,y44
concerned a fight, during which the defendant hurled a stone at A but y y  
hit, not By but a window and broke it. He was charged in the indictment 
under the Malicious Damage Act (24 § 25 Victbri® , c. 97, s. 51). The 
concept of general or transferred malice, upon -reserve* was held not to y 
apply to the facts of the case, the jury having found that the defendant 
threw the stone intending to hit some person and not intending to break 
or strike a window. Since the jury found as a fact that the defendant 
did not wilfully intend to strike or break a window, the court then ac­
cepted that finding of fact and adjudged that the law in question, which 
required an accused under the statute to have wilfully intended to damge 
property, had not been abridged. Blackburn,J., offers one a clearer : 
reading of the problem in the case than does Lord Coleridge, C.J., and.. 
I shall close by citing a short excerpt from Blackburn, J / y y 4 y  y 4;
*•* Pembli ton was decided in the Court for Crown Cases Reserved. 4 -,• -y
■ Vv,
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k "Can this man be considered, on the case sub- ; - ■ : -V / ;
k ; r' .V rmitted to us, as having wilfully brpken a pane " k ■ - k :
, - > of glass ? The jury might perhaps have found - ‘V  ‘ :
. ; / on this evidence that the act was malicious, >  ■ ' ■
k * • ; ‘ because they might have found that the prisoner • IV* '«**«
v.. .:knew that the natural consequences of his act , k v:'kkTi
: k ; would be to break the glass, and although that  ^ k ^
, was not his wish, yet that he was reckless
. / whether he did it or not; but the jury have not'; X’; /.'/ "/’• kVk
. so found, and I think it is impossible to say , . ;/'• • •;
in this case that the prisoner has maliciously ^
/ done an act which he did not intend to do.” ; * k k.-M-
\ : There are numerous passages from De Inventione which may , \
be cited to show that Cicero intended guilt to be found for a criminal
act only after reasons for acts or omissions had been given by or had \
been elicited from the accused. The giving of reasons could occur when 
the prosecutor had advanced an argument which could not be defended, 
or when counsel for the defence offered an excuse which could not be 
met by the prosecutor. I do not think it furthers my comparison here to 
advance his©very Latin usage which might revolve around the concept of 
an intent. I have excluded one usage of ’intentio' which is: The 
charge is, This rendering occurs at De inventione, II, xxvi, 79, of 
page 244, and appears in this way: ’’Accusatur (He is brought to trial). 
Intentio est: Iniuria sororem occidisti. (The charge is: ’’You killed 
your-sister without warrant.”). It is obvious that intentio is not 
being used in that way either in Augustine or in the L e g e s :
40. Present commentary, with intent upon recommendations for statutory
revisions of the Act, may be read in Working Paper on Offences against .
• the Person (London: H.M.S.O., August, 1976) as prepared by the CRIMINAL 
LAW REVISION COMMITTEE, at pp. 40-45, paragraphs 100-117, "Wounding, Z 
Grievous Bodily Harm and Actual Bodily Harm." \ Edwards ( op. cit.),
at page 15, cites from the case comment (1886) of 2.L.Q.R.536 on Latimer: 
"Questions of this kind have given abundant exercise to Continental 
; writers on the theory of criminal responsibility. The comparatively
• v rough methods of our own criminal jurisprudence are perhaps sufficient ,
for the common purpose of justice." . : \ v:'.‘ k
■L
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yz7 y/Z If the argument is advanced that De Inventione represents 
a rather young Cicero and, perhaps, an unreflective usage of key legal 
terms (which I think is an ill-founded argument with regard to legal 
usage, nevertheless), one may fortify the worth of the comparison by . 
turning to the late and mature Cicero which appears in his Topica 
(composed, it is assumed, in 44 B.C., a short while before his death). 
In section XV of Topica he proceeds to discuss ..efficient forces 
which are called causes." *y Having made various distinctions which 
may pertain to various concepts of cause, there appears at section 
XVII a long statement about cause in relation to an intended act, and 
I reproduce it here in full because of the force it has!upon the roots
of criminal intention: 7/z ; 77y y. /.; 7/ 7 z ;
"XVII. But of the causes which are notTmifoTm in bperatipn,
: V. some are evident and bthers are concealed. Those are eyi- 7:7
dent which affect our impulses or judgement; those that are
. • controlled by fortune are concealed. For since nothing hap­
pens without cause, this is exactly what Fortune is, an event 
/which is the result of an obscure and unseen cause. Again 
these results which are produced are partly unintentional,
7 [italics mine] and partly due to our own volition. The
unintentional are the product of necessity; those in our 
v •/" own volition are accomplished by design. To illustrate,
throwing a weapon is an act of the will, but hitting some 
one unintentionally is the act of Fortune. This distinction 
; supplies the beam which you use to prop up a weak Case in
your pleadings: ’Perchance he did not throw the weapon, but 
z; it slipped from his hand.’ Mental agitation belongs with y:77
acts performed in ignorance or lack of foresight. For though 
such a state of mind is voluntary —  for these conditions 
yield to reproof and admonition ---still they produce such 
' 7 z. violence of emotion that acts which are voluntary seem some­
times to be necessary and certainly unintentional." : yz y
41. I shall cite from the edition of H.M.Hubbell throughout, which
also contained the De Inventione. The passage in this instance is
• ' • .'from Topica, XV, 58, at page 425. * yyy/" • / : ■' • yyy
• ( MX Y I I .  Sed tamen earum causaxum quae non s u n t • ^
c o n s ta n te s  a l ia e  s u n t p e rs p ic u a e , a l ia e  l a t e n t . : 7 7; !
{ > P e rsp icu a e  s u n t quae a p p e tit io n e m  a n im i i u d i c i -  v V
v. , 7 7 : uinque ta n g u n t;  la t e n t  'quae s u b ie c ta e  s u n t fo r tu n a e .  ; .
.77\.,'.7-7 /.7 7 ;7 : V:--7 Cum enim  n i h i l  s in e  causa f i a t ,  hoc ipsum  e s t  f o r -  . :
/  ^ ; i V  a tu n a , q u i e ven tus  o b scu ra  causa e t  la t e n t e r  e f -  ! \  i
; ;j :’ •• J f i c i t u r .  E tia m  ea quae f i u n t  p a r t im  s u n t ig n o ra ta  '
;r ;  : : p a r t im  v o lu n ta r ia ;  ig n o r a ta ,  quae n e c e s s ita te  e f -  i'i.'h.
v fe c ta  s u n t;  s o lu n ta r ia ,  quae c o n s i l io .  [NOTE: - • 777:
Hubbard s ta te s ,  and I  in c lu d e ,  t h i s  fo o tn o te  to  
’ ^  . ;t h i s  passage : ’ ’A f t e r  c o n S i l io  th e  MSS. have Quae
’ ■ 7 7 autem fo r tu n a ,  v e l  ig n o ra ta  v e l  v o lu n ta r ia  (What
7 7 i s  accom p lishe d  by F o rtu n e  i s  e i t h e r  u n in te n t io n a l  . _
; o r  v o lu n t a r y ) : b ra c k e te d  b y  S chuetz (1804 e d i t i o n ) ]
; ?  7 ; , Nam ia c e re  te lu m  v o lu n t a t i s  e s t ,  f e r i r e  quern n o - -’,7 7^7/7-
7: /  :7' 7;.'7777 •' 7 lu e r is  fo r tu n a e .  Ex quo a r ie s  s u b ic i t u r  i l l e  i n  : 7} ; ;
7 7 77 7; v e s t r is  a c t io n ib u s : s i  te lu m  manu f u g i t  m agis quam : .
7 . ; ,iecitv ;Cadunt etiam in ignorationem atque im- v 7
7 7  ;; : prudentiam perturbationes animi; quae quamquam :
7* 7 ; ;7 7 . s u n t v o lu n ta r ia e  - o b iu rg a t io n e  enim e t  a d m o n itio n e  , 7 7 •
; . d e ic iu n tu r  —  tamen h a b e n t ta n to s  m otus, u t  ea •
7V quae v o lu n ta r ia  s u n t a u t  h e c e s s a r ia  in te rd u m  a u t : .
7 .. c e r te  ig n o ra ta  v i d e a n t u r T o p ic a , X V II,63 -?65 , J
777-7 777' -7 7 - p p . 4 3 0 -3 1 .) .  *  : 7 - 7 -'7 . ' .  : :9: 7: 7v;7;,7
* The passage i t s e l f  has re fe re n c e  to  a fra gm en t o f  The Tw elve T a b les  
(Loeb e d i t io n  by E .H .W arm ing ton : Heinemann, 1 967 ), fra g m e n t i4 a t  page 
. . 4 9 3 :  ’ ’ I f  m is s i le  has sped fro m  hand, and h o ld e r  has n o t  aimed i t . . . ”
■ v , ; [7 S i te lu m  manu f u g i t  m a (g is  quam i e c i t ) > One may a ls o  re a d  in
7 : 7 S t.  A u g u s t in e 's  De L ib e ro  A r b i t r i o  V o lu n t a t is , Book One, C hap te r IV ,
th e  fo l lo w in g  p a r a l l e l :  "E . I f :  to  m urder means to  k i l l  a man, m urder 
-7 : can o c c u r sometimes w ith o u t  s in .  F o r when th e  s o ld ie r  k i l l s  an enemy
, . 7 ,  7 o r  th e  ju d g e  o f  o f f i c i a l  p u ts  a c r im in a l  to  d e a th , o r  when, [ i t a l i c s
m ine ] by  chance, a man u n w i l l in g ly  o r  u n w is e ly  le t s  a weapon escape 
from  h is  hand, I  do n o t th in k  th a t  th e se  men s in  when th e y  s la y  a man. 
A u g u s tin e : I  a g re e ."  (E n g lis h  e d i t io n  by A .S .B en ja m in  and L .H .H ack - 
7 . s t a f f  [B o b b s -M e r r i l l  Company, I n c . ,  New Y o r k ,1964] a t  page 9 . ) .  : ,
E v o d iu s .a  few  l in e s  down a t  s e c t io n  27, uses t h i s  la n g u a g e :’’The law  
7 is n o t a t  a l l  wrong to  p u n is h  th e  man who w i l l f u l l y  and k n o w in g ly  m urders
• •• 7 h is  m a s te r .*1, an7 exam ple o f  language  n o t unknown to  A u g u s tin e , and
7 d e r iv e d ,  i t  a p p e a rs , fro m  h is  s tu d y  o f  C ic e ro . One may a ls o  r e f e r  to
The I n s t i t u t e s  o f  J u s t in ia n , L ib ,  i v , :  T i t ,  x v i i i ,  D. 5 .3 4 . a t  pages .7 7 
505-6  f o r  p a s s in g  re fe re n c e  to  th e  same passage from  th e  T ab les  in  7. 
u 7 th e  e d i t io n ,  L a t in - E n g l is h ,  p re p a re d  by  T .C .S andars  (London: Longmans,
7 . G reen, and C o .,1883 [7 th  e d i t i o n ] ) .  7 •. . 7 .
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The legal grammar of Cicero is not replete with intentional 
operators, If responsibility is to be assigned to an agent for what 
he did, then one looks for verbs which show a conative or a volitive f 
disposition. The transition from an affective source or disposition 
to an esoteric quality, in part, reveals itself in Augustine when he 
centres human responsibility in the Will (as any number of his major 
writings reveal). But I think it would be a mistaken judgement to • / ,
argue that Augustine invented an ’intentional1 operator by which to .
account for or with which to assign guilt to human failing. He remained 
within the volitive tradition however much he hypostasized the Will as 
a faculty. [>'• '.V,‘ fk tu.
• k'V One may cite two works of St. Augustine in which, if ond
were to argue for intention as a central concept to his ethical theory,
intention plays a relatively small part in the language of the works. •/,
Reviewing De Mendacio and Contra Mendacium Ad Consentium * will re­
veal how little the word ’intentio' is used throughout the two treatises, 
yet it could be argued how appropriate would be that term, were it a 
developed ethical concept which functioned as the pivotal term of a 
system, to function as a central metaphor or vehicle when discussing 
so deliberate an act as ’lying* . :• - >,:
42. I have used the Latin texts which are.printed in J. P. Migne’s
Patrologia Latina ( Paris, 1865 ). 40.487-548; the editions run :
; consecutively, D.M. then C.M.A.C. The English translation of 
each text I have consulted appears in volume.16 of THE FATHERS '
•/ OF THE CHURCH ( Edited by Roy J. Deferrari: Fathers of The ■
Church, Inc., New York, 1952 ), "St. Augustine: Treatises on 
Various Subjects.” Lying ( De Mendacio ) is translated by 
\ Sister M.S.Muldowney,S.S.J., Ph.D. , and: appears on pp. 47-110 :V;
' of that volume; Against Lying ( Contra Mendacium Ad Consent ium )
■ ; was translated by Harold B, Jaffee, Ph.D. ,and is printed on pp.:. ;
: 113-179. Both translators used the text as prepared by J.Zycha,
Corpus Scriptorum Ecclesiasticorum Latinorum 41(Vienna, 1900 ), 
but this edition was not available to me. However, both trans- 
•V lators .consulted' Migne. /• ; ' '. J- .i; k kV-k/v, ;''k
•v VI
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it is clear that for Augustine the example of lying, as well 
as blaspheming, provided a strong model for that kind of human activity 
in which one course of action contradicted another course of action.
The extra-mental and public, that statement which one might assert (al­
though Augustine did not confine lying to utterances; one could
lie by silence), could be in conflict with the intra-mental and the 
private. The danger latent in this model, I would suggest, is to at­
tempt to equate the concept of intention with that of the act of lying. 
As a concept, ’intention* in part grows out of the Christian heritage 
which condemned lying. But that is not the whole of the concept. One 
can observe, as I hope the examples from Cicero indicated, that Roman 
law contained many rhetorical models of what reasons for an action or 
legal omission might be presented to exculpate or legally to blame.
any oath, by heaven, 
word be Yes for Yes, 
it.1* When one turns
43. It will be recalled that in Sermon 180 the passage from Scripture 
upon which St. Augustine was commenting was James, 5:12, wherein 
we read, 11 But above all, my brethren , do not bind yourselves by
by earth, or by any oath at all. Let your 
and No for No; if not you will be judged for 
to the Contra Mendacium, which was written 
by Augustine late in his life and was a treatise against the 
Priscillianists, who, amongst other matters, felt that lying was 
itself justified at times to aid the spread of religious doctrine, 
in Chapter 16 (from the English edition, op. cit., of Jaffe at 
page 167) we read, "Let your speech be, "Yes, yes"; 'No, no.’" 
which citation, in this instance, is taken from St. Matthew at 5:33­
38 , wherein one reads, "Again, you have heard that it was said to 
the men of old, Thou shalt not perjure thyself; thou shalt perform 
what thou hast sworn in the sight of the Lord. But I tell you that 
you should not bind yourselves by any oath at all: not by earth... 
nor by Jerusalem...And thou shalt not swear by thy own head... Let 
your word be Yes for Yes, and No for No." One reading is that 
Christ has condemned Pharisaical evasions which appeared to permit 
one to perjure oneself as long as an oath was not taken directly in 
the name of Yaweh. St. Matthew 23: 16-22 indicates how serious it 
was, for the believing Christian, to make and take an oath, "And the 
man who swears by heaven swears not only by God’s throne, but by him 
who sits upon it." "■ •* v ■ - • -
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To lie might be one of a member of a legal set of acceptable candidates
V  . By undertaking textual examination — - permitting one in S'•i
examine St, Augustine's theory of mental operations --- it should ■■•be
noted that the sentence which immediately precedes "Ream linguam non
facit, nisi mens rea," is:'.." Interest quemadmodum verbum procedit ex v y. 5
animo." The 'verbum* is a production 'ex animo.' The falsity of a V:' ;
lie rests in the ability of the soul to produce what is not the case. r ’■ ■ ■
The production is not the centre of the lie. Were it, then one would H
have a reader-card theory of truth, wherein the proposition or utterance P;: ;
would be - akin to a reader-card, and the state of affairs (in the world) : Hi
would, or would not, correspond to the sentence 'on' the. reader-card. V- V\ 
In part this is so, since what is produced may not be a correct print-out 
of what actually is the case. Yet we should recall that Augustine has ’ 
turned the example around once again; he has stated that what is 'actually 
said does, actually, correspond to what is the case; however^one has V, C lv ’ -s 
nevertheless told a lie. . , ■ ’ , ■
, His is not a rhetorical trick. It has its foundation in the
early theology of Christian belief wherein 'God' was believed to be true ■; .
and one throughout his triune processions. The Son was believed to be t. i
the Word which progressed from the Father. If the 'Word* did not represent , r
the 'mind' of the Father, then the procession could not be .-'true' owing ... 1
to the difficulty that what found its origin in the Father would not,
however, represent the mind of the Father. I am not attempting to argue .
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for the logical coherence of the doctrine of the Trinity, and I .trust that 
my statement of it (in part) is not obscure. For the Christian it would 
appear that he wanted to mode1 himse1f after. Christ (in all ways) , who 
Himself was an expression of the Will of the Father. It is for this rea­
son, I suggest, that Augustine wanted to model the inherent structure of 
a lie not in what was produced but in how it was produced. His expression 
reflects the mind of early Christian speculationTo cite but one early 
source we may turn to Lactantius ( 250-325 A.D.) who himself gave ex­
pression to such early theorizing when, in chapter 49 of the Epitome Of 
the Divine Institutes ;*.**, we may read:i;i t : , I
. ' : "He that knows not Christ; is for ever alienated"".--; fe-:- ■
. ; from truth and from God.. .He who acknowledges not
k,-.;\- .. - k • the Son cannot acknowledge the Father. This .is . -'"V-1 VX.
wisdom, this-the'mystery of. God. It is through • V  'k:/kk. 
•  ^ ^he Son that God has willed it that He should be . \k;"‘
. ; acknowledged and worshipped...Yet it must not be j
; fe imagined that there are two Gods : ' Father and Son -V;/' kkkkkk/k:
V'.’..-.' •  -k yy- are one. For since the Father loves the Son, and - .k'-'kkk 
' assigns all things to him, and since the Son loyally - y t
W  . obeys the Father, and wills only what He wills, so ; '/ 
great a fellowship cannot be disrupted, so that they 
v can be spoken of -as two, in whom substance and will
;fe and faith are one --- the Son through the Father,
; ; k the Father through the Son. One honour must be paid .
/ to both, as to one God; and it must be so divided 
• ! through two worships that they very division may be k
; ;/ fe; overcome by a bond that cannot be broken. Nothing . -
•y y will be left to him who divides the Father from the y ; • k
;s*. Son, or the Son from''the F a t h e r . - ::k hfe
44. The text was edited and translated by E.H.Blakeney for the S.P.C.K. 
Press (London: 1950) and the English appeared on page 97. . The Latin 
text appears on page 34, and I cite it accordingly: / ,k y'kr k'[kk-;\\k 
: ".. .quem qui ignorat a veritate ac Deo semper alienus vk k V
; ; est... .Qui Filium non agnovit, nec Patrem potuit ad-\ -V. -
.: . noscere. Haec est sapientia, et hoc mysterium summi
. Dei. Per ilium se Deus et agnosci et coli voluit;.. ,.k..kk
/ Nec tamen sic habendum est, tanquam duo sintDii.
; Pater enim ac Filius unum sunt; quum enim Pater Filium ' f k ‘ v;"-
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; V From a reading of St. Augustine's two treatises it is: ; 7 7
apparent that he treats,of lying by considering what is logically "
prior and what.is logically posterior in a lie. It is not what is 
produced which is the artifact of a lie, as might be a proposition 
or an utterance or a label; the essence of a lie consists of the willing- 7 
ness of an agent to produce a lie. Augustine offered an intentional 7v77. 
analysis of a lie. The modern counterpart in the criminal law is the 
law which governs various types of criminal attempts. ; 7 ; . ;7
Were he to have concentrated only upon a material fact,.: the ’\.V 
that which was produced, his definition would not have possessed a ■•'7;'il­
logical completeness. A material happening may be explained as an 
instance of a miscalculation, as an accident, as a simple mistake, as : 
that which was done through non-culpable ignorance, as that which was 7 
done outside of the control of an agent, or as an act done by inadvertence, 
amongst the list of possible reasons (or explanations ) for the occur­
rence of 0. But willing to lie will not admit of these exempting moves; 
one has to admit that a lie was intended, and afterwards decide (be- ‘ 
cause of duress, or necessity, or human frailty) whether 0-ing will be 7 7 7
excused.' • " 7 ■ 7 . • 7 - ' ' 77 .'*''7**7 '".-7 -• • .7 /- . - 7^j
45.
44., cont., 7 •, 7 " • ' 77 ;V . ,y: - 7.'; • /:> 7 ;7:;7 7-77: 7. 7 -7:7-;7.> 7. 7-7 •
•7"' 7'- 7 diligat, omniaque ei tribuat, et Filius Patri 7
fideliter obsequatur, nec vel it quidquam nisi 7;
.: 7 * ; quod Pater, non potest utique necessitudo tanta v 7
7 7 7 7 ! divelli, ut duo esse dicantur, in quibus et 7 ;
7 substantia, et voluntas; et fides una est. Ergo 7
. * 7 et Filius per Patrem, et Pater per Filium. Unus 77,
7 - 7  est honos utrique tribuendus tanquam uni Deo, et "
7. 7. 7 7 ita dividendus est per duos cu 1 tus, ut divis io, •: 7
> ipsa compage inseparabi1i vinciatur. Neutrum 7; *
sibi relinquet, qui aut Patrem a Filio, aut ;,777-7-7:7 7 
• ' 777'7‘ 7 Filium a Patre s e c e r n i t . "  ;:7 7 '"'7 777~.yV 7 7 ; 77--77'
45. Note Austin's analysis of R. v. Finney (op.cit),in section 6 of 
7  . ; MA Plea for Excuses.": 77- '--'7 .% 7;7 7.7, 7. 7?: 777a 7- 7-"-777,
; !  I may be accused of haying begged the question by stating ^
. that the analysis of lying which Augustine made was itself an in- : ; , ^ ; : 3
; tentional analysis of lying, but I can see little other room for - ■
some other analysis of his account of lying. One may disclaim the 
beliefs which Augustine propagandised; one may fault him for failing 
\ to distinguish, with appropriate seriousness, the degrees of cul- •/ .
: pability to be attached to lying, but such would be to miss what he
; ; . did say.. If one produces, it is assumed that one intends to produce. :y
That statement, I am aware, needs to be offered in a restrictive sense. :V 
I . : V A poet, or an artist, or a writer, or a scientist, may claim that he •> : i
j. ; ; did not intend to produce this particular 'x1 (whatever it be: a fact, ,
a sentence, a composition, an experiment), and what he did produce he 
; ' may argue, as in the Ion, happened and he knows hot how. That we 'are':'---:
 ^ able to make any human production at all may, in itself, be an onto­
; ” : logical mystery, just as the fact of any universe whatsoever may be an ^
V. ontological mystery: we have no fact, nor any theory, which Will bring , y.
us outside of the given. That there is a given molecular arrangement 
- y in the universe, at any moment, no fact in the universe, or the history
\ I U of it we imagine, will yield* An infinite series will not yield a:'why1 : : ' : ; ?
\ y V  y V ' outside of the series (in a final sense); the creationist closes fact , -?:-
: : in mystery. Why this fact ? Because of a fiat; Why a fiat ? One ends:/'
;> with the unanswerable. s
v ~ .C The;- catch- in such a puzzle is that one may offer: some reason J; '/ >y:. y 
'■ to himself on why he did this dr that. One may say little; more t h a n , I  ?;  ^ ^ i
'intend not to answer M and; one has, by such a locution, given anintent iohaiy^yy
./ account/for what one has refused to do. I am aware that some ex­
tremely difficult cases can arise from a wide use of the concept of 
intentionally to produce, but, for the moment, I wish to argue from 
the restrictive application of the notion. Augustine's assumption —  
;•/ r : and it is open to logical question -—  is that 'to produce' entails
'to intend to produce'. At law it is sound law. The bank robber 
can be charged not only with the actual robbing of the bank, but he 
may be charged as well with intending to rob the bank: conspiracy.
^ ; / •* * : The model which comes to mind, arid Ion may be the impetus for •
such a model, is the problem which present-day analysis may pro- ■/ ' ^ •;
• \ vide. One can call such an example the problem of the residue of / ;
 ^ an act. Let me offer this example, in no wise unusual (as a clinical :
V ; example, but highly Unusual in commonplace life), of the liar. As- // / ;%'
/ -1 / sume that A has told a deliberate falsehood, and, when caught in it, ; ; / /
admits that he lied. Assume further --- as if it were a clinical 
/ ; experiment— - that A. is asked if he did lie, arid if he knew that
he did lie. He answers 'Yes'. If he shows remorse for what he had -/y K  
done, as might be argued from the Nicomachean Ethics (Book III), / . & 
one could conclude that his action was both voluntary and involuntary. '{//■; 
. / It was, it would seem, voluntary in that he produced it; it was in- 4 ZV;- ;
voluntary in that he showed regret for what he had done, and would 
not have shown regret, or the like, for what he had done if what he 
. ; had done had been fully within his control. But this is still not
/ an exhaustive account of a compulsory or involuntary act. ‘
It may be that we have to use the model of hypnosis. An analyst . 
might argue that at some time in the life of the patient the patient <
suffered some harm in a room of this type, and that when in a room of 
this type, rather than to recall to mind the harm he suffered and 
subject himself to emotional anguish, the patient simply refuses to f-.;
 ^ face reality in any simple way; the act of lying provides for the •
. patient the escape he needs from reality. /• •/- '• • V*‘ /*'-•' ' ;V?
1 What has been produced by the analyst is an explanation of an action, / /
the explanation itself a residue not to be perceived in the ordinary 
, .. . intentional explanation when A simply stated that he lied, and knew
that he had lied. What the residue model provides is an account of an 
. V action which the agent does not, and, possibly, cannot give. The hard
philosophical question arises when one wonders if from a single case of 
; :.v / this kind then can it be extrapolated to fit any intentional action ? ; /
, The fundamental problem it touches is: How complete must an explanation !
" ’ ;• : . be to be considered to be a complete explanation ?
:k 123 \ ; ■ -V V
k - > ! > V  Augustine was, as I have indicated, able to solve for him- £ , y 
V':rr;' • ;..,7 • . self how an intentional action could, at the same time, be an action • . /'
; / that an agent might not wish for, and he did this by claiming that the 3’7 ,37
i will was corrupted by lust. As a concept, 1lust' embraced more than ; ?.  ^•
simple venery. He spoke about the 'chastity’ of the mind with regard :
7 to lying. I need not pursue the implications of the notion here since \
• - v it is not germane to any argument about intention. : V ? 7377373. k
h V When one reads the two treatises On lying one notices that' • 7v 3' 37;7
73733' ; 3, •••*' cont.; V,  V ; ./ ■. 7 3 •. J . 73'33-7 3777
} ; the difficulty is further compounded when one sees that two 3 X?
" V questions are being considered in the one problem. One is first ; i 3^ ;
7'-7.v 7. - inquiring if such a concept as the 'residue of an act';is a valid
, •> ; : concept, or whether it is purely a depiction of the imagination. 7333
V /. 7 . Philosophical error may be brought about when one moves from the ■ 777.
; 3 ' 3 ’ .3 s hypothetical "let us suppose x. to be the case" to "and it is a  ^ ; 77/3.37
• . >;•!*. 7 case one must answer." If one admits that the hypothetical case
; ; is of value (without analysing the test for 'value') , then one :
• faces an empirical difficulty of locating the concept, ; ie, are ; 7.7 J-
, there accounts of actions in the real or extra-mental world which v 3
•.. •;: lend;themselves to the features of a concept which speaks about
•' .. the residue of an act ? The famous case is that of Dr. Mprton  ^ ;:v!;
Prince who treated Miss Beauchamp and her five separate personali- 333333
3 ; i ties, a case which the law would presently classify under a form : ;V ; 7V;
77 of automatism. What happens in rare cases such as these is that ■3377';:777
; the burden of deciding what to do with them in any classificatory
; sense is thrown upon the jury for them to accept the testimony 7\;< -v ' !
777733 of the defendant, or his assigns, as 'fact'. [One may refer tq; : 7:7;
to Chapter 10, "Automatism and Drunkenness" pp. 165-182 in Nigel 3
; 7 . 3 Walker's book, Crime and Insanity in England ( The University Press, 7  7 :
; . Edinburgh, 1968, volume one ) to read how unsatisfactory such is 3;
; treated by the common law at present.] The criminal law will, at the 7:
very least, permit a defence to certain charges either by means of ;
: v. ' an appeal to diminished responsibility on the part of the defendant, .7: ;7:
7 7 or an appeal to automatism. One has not solved the conceptual problem; 7 7
7 773^77*7737 one has only, at law, permitted a utilitarian solution which the jury;; ;
• 7-7 " 7; • ; or judge alone (in certain cases), may render a verdict of Not Guilty; 7 • ; 7-
7;7v’.7 ’."; . :• 7; by reason of diminished responsibility or automatism. The philosophical f  7
; : f7 problem remains as to what constitutes a full and final explanation of777 7 33
7 7 r 7 7  an intentional action. I shall discuss the problem in my final chapter. 77,;
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that the first, and earlier, treatise does not employ ’intentio' other 
than once which occurs in the phrase, " addita etiam intentione vel 
salutis tuende...” V The operative verbs in De Mendacio are verbs 
which concern speaking, enunciating, producing, thinking, willing, 
or verbs which directly state that one has lied, as in "os autem quod 
mentitur, non corpus, sed animam occidit.” [col.494 of Migne] * None 
of the verb constructions which Augustine employs are directly in­
tentional; one must read an intentional reference into the verbs, and 
such an interpretation of his text means that one must seek other; than 
a primary meaning for his employment of verbs in standard grammatical 
constructions. This would be clearly to distort the obvious. ;;
46. In Migne, at column 313, CAPUT XX, the context in which ’intentione * 
occurs is the following: "Fides enim appellata est in 1atina lingua
ex eo quia fit quod dicitur: quam manifesturn est non exhibere menti- 
entum. Quae eise minus vilator, cum ita quisque mentiturj ut ei nul- 
lo incommodo nullaque peraicie credatur, addita etiam intentione vel 
; salutis tuende, [italics mine] vel pudicitiae corporalis: violatur 
tamen, et res violatur in animi castitate atque sanctitate servanda.” 
It is rendered in this way by Sister Muldowney: "For, faith has re­
; ceived its Latin form from the fact that what is said is done. Hence, 
it is evident that a person who is lying does not show faith. Even 
though this faith be violated in a smaller degree, when a person lies* 
under such circumstances that, without bringing inconvenience or 
' damage to another, he is believed and that he even has the intention?- 
of protecting the health or bodily chastity of another, nevertheless, 
faith is violated, and this is likewise done even in preserving the v 
chastity and holiness of the soul.” at page 106, op. crt. : r
* ’Mentior, itus’ occurs throughout-the first text. It is a verb ' : v ."kV 
which directly means to lie, or to cheat, to deceive. It is not - 
an intentional compound in which the intentional aspect of the verb 
must be conjoined to the primary sense of the verb, as in "One 
intends...’+’...to lie” * ’Mentior'. One would use some form Of 
. ■ 1intendo, di, turn and sum' if one wished to call attention to a
; distinct act of the mind, as in "Intendere animum, to direct one's 
. thoughts or attention to any thing.’ ^
Contra Mendacium followed on some twenty-five years after ~ : 
his first treatise on Lying. Although he considered Der Mendacio to r ; ? 
: : be complicated and somewhat unclear --- as we are, told in his Re-
;l v tractationes (1, PL 32.630) — - he permitted it to remain. The latter
. ; v work, Contra Mendacium, for which there is no need here to summarise, ZZ -
; represented a mature Augustine, and appeared near to the time of his
Sermons. What is of concern in the work is that it reveals a use of Z .Z
v ^ the term 'intentione' which was absent from the earlier work. It also r ;
, provides us with a link from one period of use to the period of the —  -
'■ : Leges. ;•* 'K* •, V  V*
^ ; The value of reviewing the Latin text of Contra Mendacium is
that it reveals the addition of newer grammatical apparatus. Not only ;
/' are the standard verbs present, such as willing, desiring, plannings ’ '
V lying, obtaining,knowing, thinking, causing, and the like, but we read / / v
how the concept of an intention is stressed and pointed out independently ;
 ^ \ of the other forms used in verbal discourse. Augustine develops the *1/
- metaphor of speaking the truth from one's heart, " Qui loquitur veritatem : - o
in corde suo [PL 40.526]" It is a metaphor drawn from Scripture, and it V  
implies that the very act of telling the truth is an act whose 'truthful­
ness' lies hidden from the world but' is known to God, since God knows the , 'i 
full content of a man’s soul. The echo of such a concept may have been 
; ^ the warning given by Christ that adultery may be committed in a man' s kh¥j:«
heart only should a man fully entertain the desire to transgress the moral
V.. v  : : 125 !*■/:
law, circumstances only, in the main, preventing him from acting fully in ,> 
accord with his desires. The devoutly consummated wish ranks in seriousness :
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with the full-blooded act. ^ . * rf .v-y
He then proceeds to close the portion C Chapter 6 at section %\ 
14 : PL 40,527 ) in which the metaphor of the heatt is developed by 
quoting from Psalm xiv, 3: 2H* non egit dolum in lingua sua. The effect 
is, from the prior clause, that if one speaks the truth from his heart 
then ..he has no need to deceive With:his tongue." The force of the / 
Latin, by use of 'egit* and 'dolum',is to tell the reader that if one 
has taken care to listen to his own conscience or voice of his heart, 
then he need not labour to construct With care and deceitfulness a lie f 
to be spoken. The phrase is compressed, but it carries in its language 
the force, of to do with careful but deceitful deliberation; deliberation
being that activity of the soul which is private and known only to one's
47.' • . v . ' V - W ; v-yprivate self.
47. I do not want to engage in biblical commentary on the matter Of
: the Psalms, nor Augustine's understanding of the text herewith > y
under question. When we come to review the various English trans­
lations of this passage (Psalm 14, or 15, depending upon hoW it 
is catalogued; I read it as Psalm 14), we have a wide range of - ^
v English terms to:chose from for the act of lying, or the act of
harming one's friend or neighbor. The Authorised Version speaks t  ^; 
! of-'backbiting' but that is not a term We use now with the force
it may have had centuries ago. The Knox translation renders the 
y passage in this way,"...one whose heart is all honest purpose, who : ■
utters no treacherous word, never defrauds a friend, or slanders a 
neighbor..." (rendered as Psalm 14, at page 48.3 of The Holy Bible, 
published by Bums § Oates, London, [5th edtion] 1965.) " /;
The Latin which may have been used by Augustine I take from Col_- 
: lectaneo Biblica Latina, Vol. 1, "Liber Psalmorum: Iuxta Antiquis-
: simam Latinam Versionem Nunc Primum Ex Casinensi Cod. 557" as edited y'
by D. Ambrosio M. Amelli, O.S.B. (Fridericus Pustet: Romae, Ratisbonae, 
et Neo-Eboraci:MCMXII). The text, however, reads, "Ambulans immaculatus 
? et operans iustitiam. Et loquens veritatem in corde suo. Non fraudauit;
in lingua eius neque fecit proximo suo malum et iraproperium non accepit : 
super proximos suos." The compression which Augustine's citation gives;' 
is,: in this Latin text, expanded. But the force of the Psalm remains 
■ in spite of change of text. • •,; "v, V':
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; V Beginning at GAPUT VII [PL 40:527] one may observe
occurrences of intention. I shall cite the sentences seriatim: ;
• ,'CAPUT VII. —  Mendacium nulla velut bona intentione •
[italics mine] admittendum." JZ ■ Xf.:yf
• "Aut enim licebit utrumque pariratione defendere, ut
ideo haec non esse dicantur injusta, quia ea facta sunt :
. intentione [italics mine! qua deprehenderentur injusti, ySl'Y&z
/aut si sana doctrina nec propter inveniendos haereticos 
; • vult nos cum feminis impudicis saltern corpore, non mente, ; ;
misceri, profecto nec propter inveniendos. haereticos vult •: ; ~;
- a nobis saltern voce, non mente, aut immundam haeresim prae- ; .
: dicari, aut castarn catholicam blasphemari." [PL 40:528]
"18v Interest quidem plurimum, qua causa, quo fine, qua 
: intentione fitalics mine] Quid fiat: sed ea quae constat \ >
esse peccata, nullo bonae causae obtentu, nullo quasi bono . >/•" ‘ /
fine, nulla velut bona intentione (italics mine] facienda sunt." v
[PL 40:528 at 18.] J . . //
47. cont., . ; V / ij / : ' ;7 \ "; C
• In the citation, from Migne, Augustine uses 'dolum', a term which
' . is replete with legal and moral meaning. It has the force of: ; ■
evil intent; wrongdoing with a view to the consequences ( as op­
posed to simple negligence ); it may mean fraud, or deceit, or 
guile. A recent and discursive treatment of Dolus, culpa and casus ; 
may be found in Part Three, entitled "Philosophical Aspects" of 
Professor David Daube's Roman Law (Edinburgh: At The University 
Press, 1969). That portion covers pp.129-175, and it will show ■
how various degrees of negligence functioned in Roman law. Daube : 
reads 'dolus' as meaning ’evil intent'. He makes the observation . 7': .7
that 'evil intent' in Roman law differed from 'evil intent' in 7-v ;7/'7"
: Greek law. For the Greeks it functioned in the criminal law, and /7777|;
entailed that one was of a slothful, immoral disposition (for whom 
: ignorance could not be an excuse because one's own slothfulness
was the cause of the ignorance), while for the Romans 'dolus' was
’ a function of the civil law, and concern was not for retribution but;. ' .7/f
.v for compensation and payment of damages, as in Delicts or Contracts. . -7 7
Dolus was a term of wide meaning. One may refer to Roman Law and 
Common Law by Buckland § McNair (Cambridge: At The University Press, >7 
1936) in Chapter X, "Delict and Tort" at pp.300-307, section 4: DOLUSv 7';;- 
to appreciate how rich and unsimple the concept was in Roman law.
One simply assumes that such rich nuances would have been appreciated 
V by St. Augustine, who modelled so much of his writing after Cicero. »
The translation from the Hebrew by Mitchell Dahood, Vol. 16, The Anchor > 
Bible, PSALMS 1-50 (Doubleday, 1966: New York) gives a different ren-777. 
dering, and hence changes the: force of 'doliis'. Dahood's reads: ,
. .He who walks with integrity and practices justice, // and speaks 
r the truth from his heart, // He who does not trip Over his tongue, // -, 
Who does no wrong to his fellowman, // and casts no slur on his neighbor.
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. ’ "CAPUT VIII. --- 19. Peccatum esse ex intentione Z:
aliud alio levius; non tamen faciendum levius, quod 
saepe alterius generis peccato gravius est. "
ZZ;v:; /• Z /' [PL 40: 529] rZ / z  Z z / ' Z Z y - O z — 'v? \z;> Z'Vkz—
There is a use of 'intendens' from the New Testament which is cited
by St. Augustine (Galatians, vi. 1) in which 'delicto' appears:
Vz 'Z-Z'^ Z'^ -^ 'Z’^IWtXeS', et si praeoccupatus fuerit homo in ali- 
quo delicto, vos qui spirituales estis, instruite / 
hujusmodi in spiritu mansuetudinis, intendens te 
. / . [italics mine] ipsum, ne et tu tenteris." [PL 40: 537]
Z , "Multura autem fatendum est propinquare justitiae,
- Z Z Z ©t quamvis re ipsa nondum, jam tamen spe atque , ;
Z Z / indole animum esse laudandum, qui nunquam nisi  ^:V:r -yY
; Z hac intentione [italics mine] mentitur, qua vult v,
:Z«•* v —  prodesse alicui, nocere autem nemini." [PL 40:541 Z ■ >
Z at CAPUT XVI.]
. "Sed multum est ut iste in tantum perseveret af- - . y
fectus, ne intentione [italics mine] desit effectus." 
y' : : [PL 40: 543 at CAPUT XVIII.]
The path of the arguments is plain enough for one to see. Z
The intention of an act determines the quality of the act when one 
speaks of human actions and qualities. The definition of a good act 
is that a good intention is present. ' [I]ntention' functions here as
47. cont.,
He translate!the Psalm as number 15. The portion rendered "...trip 
over his tongue —  " Dahood argues is in account with the Hebrew habit 
to form denominative verbs from parts of the body; also, that the 
text ["ragal 'al 1 sono"] is both problematical and does match a 
later Psalm XXXIX ("'*•.-.1 will heed my steps lest I stumble over my 
tongue...") for its consistency of imagery. Dahood's text is at pp. 
83-85: vZ.' • Z:;..Z*" : •; Y— ,y . —  Y , y. .y w. ■
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that aspect of a human production which the agent controls.
not concerned with non-subjective qualities, as in 'kindness which kills'.:
The aunt may do a good deed by leaving an inheritance to her. grandson, and : 
the inheritance may be the cause of his self-destruction. The effects of ; 
a good act do not concern Augustine; in fact, he takes a very hard at- r 
titude towards those who would argue from conceived effects to a change ;
in a cause, as when oie might argue that unless such and Such were done ;
(unless one lied to an enemy but for the achievement of a possibly good 
end j harm might ensue. In both treatises on lying he will not permit |
a lie to be told so that good may result. The moral quality which an 
human act possesses flows first from what the agent intended, or what 
Augustine at times refers to as what one conceived in one's heart. There 
is a mild doctrine of 'effects' when effect means what effect the agent 
himself desired. The force of a good act rests in what the agent wills 
himself to do; if his willing is good Or virtuous, meaning that the cause 
of the aim or the intention arose from a good will, then should the re^yy.y7y
suits of the act fail to match the hopes or expectations which launched / ?
•*? . i'L " • - ’ y._ 48 ' A * y- /‘yyy-’VA * ' lyythe act, the agent is not at fault. - -% v .
48. One fruitful illustration of this notion about moral acts and their
. effects can be taken from the novel of L.P.Hartley, entitled, They?yV•yV
- Shrimp and the Anemone (1944 Putnam § Co. Ltd; 1975,Faber § Faber Ltd.).
In the first chapter the two children, Eustace and Hilda, observe that 
a shrimp was clutched by a sea anemone. The dialogue is telling, • ;>
"It was a shrimp, Eustace decided, and the anemone was eating it, sucking 
it in. A tumult arose in Eustace•s breast. His heart bled for they :
? shrimp, he longed to rescue it- but, on the other hand; how could he ^
bear to rob the anemone of its dinner ? The anemone was more beautiful 
y than the shrimp, more interesting and much rarer. It was a 'plumrose1 / !
anemone...If he took the shrimp away, the anemone might never catch y\
- another, and die of hunger. But while he debated the unswallowed part >
of the shrimp grew perceptibly smaller;...He made up his mind to release •;
v it. But how ?....But Hilda cut him short...'I've got it,' said Hilda...
'y.. The shrimp lay in the palm of Hilda's hand, a sad disappointing sight. •
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7  ' The te rm , 1 in t e n t io n  ’ , when i t  makes i t s  appearance in  o u r 
le g a l l i t e r a t u r e  th ro u g h  th e  Leges and in  B ra c to n  comes to  us w ith  a /  
r i c h  p a s t .  I t  i s  a c lu s te r - c o n c e p t  w h ich  o n ly  c a re  w i l l  s e p a ra te  o u t  
i t s  v a r io u s  and d i f f e r e n t  s tra n d s ;  i t  i s  a ls o  a m e tapho r, used b y  
A u g u s tin e , when d ra w in g  upon b i b l i c a l  t r a d i t i o n ,  f o r  th e  s e c re tn e s s  
o f  th e  h e a r t  and f o r  th e  s e c re tn e s s  o f  why men a c t .  The n o t io n  s tan d s  
v a r io u s ly  f o r  a im s, p u rp o s e s ,g o a ls ,  ends, fo re s e e in g s ,  w is h e s , o r  f o r  
t h a t  f i n a l  hope t h a t  one m ig h t e n te r ta in  as a re a son  f o r  d o in g  w hat he
d id .  There  is  n o th in g  p re c is e  a bo u t th e  te rm ; i t  i s  n o t  an 1^0 te rm , y
n o r i s  i t  a p re c is e  te rm  a s , f o r  exam ple, i n  Greek t r a d i t i o n  one m ig h t 
be a b le  to  d is t in g u is h  a w is h  Q o u le s is )  fro m  a d e s ire  ( o r e x is ) . Nor 
does th e  te rm , in  i t s  e a r ly  appearance in  A u g u s tin e , o f f e r  any c le a r  
r u le  on how one m ig h t d is t in g u is h ,  c o n c e p tu a l and g ra m m a tic a lly ,
•w hat one one wanted to  do* fro m  ’ one sh o u ld  have r e a l is e d  th e  f o l lo w in g  
consequences w ou ld  have fo l lo w e d  fro m  what one d i d . ’ There  is  no f o r e ­
s ig h t  t e s t  c o n ta in e d  in  th e  e lem en ts  o f  ’ i n t e n t io * .  One may. e q u a lly  be
48. c o n t . . 77 : • 7 v V ?  ; '7 '7 v :  7 \  • y,7.7' -7. '7 7 7 7  :-7 -7 7 /7 7 \7 ‘7  7 '7  7 7 "
I t s  re p r ie v e  had come to o  l a t e ; i t s  head was m angled and th e re  was 
no I- v ib r a t io n  i n  i t s  t a i l .  The h o r r ib le  appearance fa s c in a te d  Eus­
ta c e  f o r  a moment, th e n  u p s e t h im  so much t h a t  he tu rn e d  away w ith  7
. '• t r e m b lin g  l i p s .  B u t th e re  was worse to  come. As a r e s u l t  o f  H i ld a ' s
f o r c ib le  in te r fe r e n c e  w ith  i t s  meal th e  anemone had been p a r t i a l l y  , 
d ise m b o w e lle d ; i t  c o u ld  n o t  g iv e  up i t s  p re y  w ith o u t  l e t t i n g  i t s  
7  d ig e s t iv e  a p p a ra tu s  go t o o , P a r t  o f  i t s  base had come u n s tu c k  and 7 : 
was se e k in g  fe e b ly  to  a t ta c h  i t s e l f  to  th e  ro c k  a g a in . ”  . . . . " I  '
w is h  we’ d l e t  them  a lo n e , ' sobbed E us ta ce . "W hat w ou ld  have been 
7 th e  good o f  t h a t  ?* demanded H i l d a , . . ."We had to  do s o m e th in g , '
H i ld a  c o n t in u e d , 'We c o u ld n 't  l e t  them go on l i k e  t h a t .  '" W h y  7 * 7
c o u ld n 't  we ? ' asked E u s ta c e ."  fro m  pages 9-11 o f  C h a p te r One. ; -
:4 W-
'.4
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referring'to the subjective aspect of an human act or to the objective fi
aspect of an human act. Augustine places the logical priority on the :
intention of the doer, asking him to inquire of himself; his true rea­
son for doing this act. One may assume that this was a minor flaw of 
early moral and legal writing not to have qualified the term rigourously. 
One may have need to make the logically unconvincing reply that in mat­
ters of moral, and legal reasoning one seldom sees so clearly. y Z
. Z / In the next chapter I shall show how these early rich roots 
of responsibility began to work in the common law. : One sees, if one Z ;
is willing to look, how the wisdom within the various traditions grew
into the criminal law, no rigid rule of selection evident at any one 
time. The law drew upon philosophical sources when it adopted the. 
language and arguments of the scholastics, who, in turn, had drawn upoii 
Plato, Aristotle, the early Fathers, and the pronouncements of the Church. 
I shall begin by inquiring where Bracton brought the criminal law with 
his early notions of intention. : - / — ;.rZw ;Z Z'-.::ZZ Y v.ZTZ
* Please refer to the Addendum,;this chapter, for references to Ivo 
of Chartres. . 'ZZ . :':Z<'v
•Z
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ADDENDUM: Ivo of Chartes. y ^ y y  y
A metaphor which might be used to describe the growth 
of early common law notions of criminal responsibility might be - : 
the metaphor of the coral reef. Within the freshly growing com- : 
mon law a central body of notions begin to impress themselves on y-yy 
its growth and development. One is not speaking about the relation 
of parts within an organic whole, which concept suggests that what 
is growing is developing out Of a preordained design in which what yy 
is expressed as a final cause properly reveals what was contained 
within the formal cause. The example is more of the relation of 
elements to one another, as the parts and shadings of the sky make y: 
up the sky. There is a blend both of the accidental and of the 
substantial. How the patterns form themselves is accidental; but 
that they are parts of the sky in its cloud formation, and not parts 
of the earth, or of the water, reveals a substantial nature which 
changes. One need not inquire further to ask if one is inquiring 
after a hidden substratum which is the ultimate composition of the 
sky; that is a theory, from amongst possible theories. "• ‘ r; . >. y 
“ the process of judging, of determining if this man be guilty 
or innocent, sprang up in the common law from borrowings from canon 
law, mediaeval theology, moral customs and religious customs, and all
• v \  ' '
AyAyy-y-yA y y - y y y ;y£;•:V y  ;£:•>yyy-'i
: ? : y of the legal customs present (as a force) in England. y' Like a -v V.yj
coral reef, the growth of the law, in its smaller parts, began to ■
shape and to form what one knows as the common law. Early on the v 
y common law developed a respect for written judgements 2*, for oral -
argument (but not as we know it now J•, and for a consistency, the y 
consistency would not possess a uniformity such as the Continental 
. .canon law writers would give law; the consistency would be more the 
application of broad general principles, akin to transcendentals, 
and less like strict formal canonical rules. A judgement would seek y'y 
to be fair; an accused would be given some kind of fair hearing; a y 
charge would be openly heard, generally, and openly discussed. Reasons 
would generally be given for decisions. In this way, legal principles 
; . of the common law were transcendental in nature; they were not to be
found codified in a single instance, but were to be found at work in 
. ,V;'''-y the movement of the law. /•”' ' -. '' -‘.y . . . .• y..:y-;.’ ,
; It is, however, a matter of historical fact which I need not
record that the criminal law was the slowest of all of the common law ; 
to change and to make itself humane. Centuries would pass from the time
1. In his brief account of the roots of intention from Anglo Saxon 
times, Professor Plucknett shows how diversified the early roots 
are which impinge upon criminal responsibility in the common law,
y ; y drawing upon Anglo-Saxon laws, French sources, early Penitential
writings, as well as formal theological writings, to form a growing 
« law. Cf. Chapter III, "The Criminal and Intention" in Edward I and
Criminal Law, (Cambridge University Press, 1960). He recapitulates 
. y what Levitt* op.cit., had said, in part, in 1917.
2. A concise account is provided in The Oracles of the Law by J. P. 
Dawson, (The University of Michigan Law School, 1968) in Chapter I, 
"The Growth and Decline of English Case Law", pp. 1-99, especially 
section S thereof, "The Case Law of the Year Books", at pp. 50-65. 
The fullest account is in L.W.Abbott, whom I cited earlier.
: 3. 1907, 7 Edward VII, c.23, Criminal Appeal Act. •. 'y'.,;y?
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of Bracton before the criminal law would reach the humaneness we now ■ . z 
associate with it, and I shall not concern myself with an historical . • 
analysis of this change.
zy ;■ Ivo of Chartres died in 1117 A.D. The authorship of the Leges ! 
is thought to date from 1113 or 1114 A.D., with a terminus ad quern, sug­
gested by Downer ’, to be 1118 A.D. the influence of Ivo can be found 
throughout the Leges, but it would be outside of the scope of my argument 
to locate the textual strands of one text to be found within another text; 
such would be for the textual scholar to demonstrate such manuscriptal 
influences. ’ ,
4. Op. cit., at pp. 34-37,'"The Dating of the Leges." . ; . :
5. The edition of Ivo of Chartres which I have consulted is that pre- / i
pared by Migne in the series Patrologia Latina ( Vol. 161, yol 1 YY —  YZ
■ thereof,;listed as 161:1, PL ), Paris* 1889, Saeculum XII Sancti Ivonis, ZyYy i 
Camotensis Episcopi, OPERA OMNIA. In his bibliographical apparatuszit^’ .Yyy 
is unfortunate that Downer does not list the sources for his secondary . ;Z'YY
references, and, from his edition of the Leges, it is difficult to de­
termine from what written text he is citing when referring to an historical yy
influence upon the Leges. For example, Downer suggests that the immediate ;
source ; for 5,28b, "Reum non facit nisi mens rea." of the Leges is to ''— yyzy 
be found in [Ivo] Pan. viii.Ill. If one turns to the Panormia of Ivo , r - 
as printed in Migne, one will discover that the collation is of no helpYy Z'-yY 
to locate to what passage in particular Downer had referred. Yy-'Y”
Ivo authored two texts on the topic of Homicide. One text is entitled, ; !
DECRETI, and it is a canonical collection of commentaries upon what we : • 
now know as the Decretals. In Migne, DECRETI PARS DECIMA (PL, 161:1, ?
'col. 689-746), the tenth part concerns homicide, and its full title is: >
"De homicidiis spontaneis, et non spontaneis^ De parricidiis, et 'fratri- Z:,,;Yy 
cidiis. Et de occisione legitimarum uxorum, et seniorum, et clericorum. '-.yyZ;
; Et quod non Omnis hominem occidens homicida sit; et de eorum poenitentia." J ;
The work discusses killing, and it examines the conditions which causeYyYyYy 
a killing to be lawful as opposed to those conditions which render a . . 
killing to be unlawfiil, and hence sinful. The traditional language of Z /:
• the Will is preserved suggesting that a voluntary and unlawful killing ,
is serious and sinful, whilst an involuntary, or non-felonious, homicide — 3 :/; 
is excusable. One can observe that there is a refined and existent frame- yY y 
work from which to draft a legal code. One may also observe that Ivo y • /Z,.;.
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Hie body of the Leges is hot of particular concern to the 
greater portion of my argument in this dissertation. Mention needs ;;
to be taken, however, that the common law had a tradition from which
S., cont., yc,;’ f ; ■ t >V .. yy :£ f.  <} ■■'>■■■■
> consistently defers to the major writings of St. Augustine, some 
which I list in brackets taken from Ivo's text, "De Homicidius".
[ Epistola ad Publicolam; Epistola ad Marcellinum; De Civitate Dei; 
Quaestionum in Exodus; Contra Cresconium Grammaticum; Ad Macedoniam;
Ad Donaturn; Ad Laetarium; Super Joan.; Quaestionum super Num; De 
libero arbitrio; Quaestionum in Levlticum; Quaestionum evangeliorum.1 
The linguistic influence, therefore, of Augustine is apparent, the :
text of Ivo in this treatise revealing how the Will is that faculty 
by and through which a consideration of criminal and moral responsibility 
rests. Ivo also, as the title indicates, draws upon the various pro­
nouncements of the Councils of the Church to indicate how degrees of 
seriousness are assigned to immoral acts. He cites with approvai the ? 
broad condition by which criminal conduct may be excused which the 
Council of Worms stated: that the insane are not morally responsible 
for their acts. ["Cap. 154,(of the present text) : De insano si homi- 
’ y cidium perpetrayerit. Ex eodem, cap. 7 (counc. Vorm, c. 28)]. But
throughout this treatise on homicide, Ivo does not use the language y •
of 'intention' directly. If an act occurs in which the question of ; *
moral or culpable responsibility is moot, he asks if the action is 
j voluntary; and the form which the inquiry takes is to use 1sponte* or 
y ’voluntate* in some form or in some nominal construction, as in, y H  ; : 
* sponte comisso * [at col. 734] or 'Qui voluntarie homicidium fecerint...* 
[at col. 730], This construction and language is consistent with the 
use we saw from the Councils, and from Augustine and from Cicero.
WHEN we come to the Panormia, in the edition of Migne, it is not to y y •:
/writing on Homicide that we turn, which occupies the beginning of 
of Book 8 (col. 1303-1318), but to the question entitled, DE JURAMENTO
• LICITO ET ILLICITO, (col. 1325-1334), at Cap.CXI, wherein Ivo con­
y siders this question: "De eo qui jurat falsum quod verum. August. De. ;
- Verb. serm. 28." (col.1331-1332). The ’rain* case is again discussed,
as it was by Augustine, and of it Ivo says, "Dicitur enim vere pluit, 
vere et jurat, et tamen pluit ibi, sed ille nescit, et putat non pluis- 
se, perjurus est. Interest quemadmodum verbum procedat ex animo. Ream ; 
linguam non facit, nisi rea mens." There is no further commentary upon 
the matter, and, one may notice, by referring to the text of Migne both
for Augustine and for Ivo, that the text is a fairly close reproduction
; of the Augustinian text which I reproduced in Chapter 3* at pp . -'. V' :y'•
It should be noted that Ivo * s reproduction of Augustine still locates
an intentional act(in relation to the taking of an oath) to the knowing 
telling of a falsehood by an agent. There is no isolated mental quality 
to be found in his text which would be considered an * intentionT per se.
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to draw upon for the purpose of developing a legal structure under 
which assignments of guilt or innocence could be made. It is true, ,
of course, that legal guilt was not a neutrally pure legal concept; y
it was admixed with the moral beliefs and customs of English society;; 
as reflection upon any number of leading cases will reveal ;,, V the A' - 
early writings of the canonists and moralists provided much material 
which a growing legal structure, like the common law, could incorporate. .
Criminal charges in themselves carried a natural stigma. It was as­
sumed that to break the law was to perform a wicked act. : Not only 'A * 
did one cause a harm, but one1 s . criminal act was Viewed as act worthy 
of condemnation. 7* Penalties for crimes, apart from their cruelty ? 
and physical hideousness, were both to the community and to God. If r
one slayed a religious minister, for instance, one was judged to be yyyyy': 
a religious and civil outlaw both to God and to man, and both had to
6. In Pi1Ians y. Van Mierup, 3 Burr . 1663 (1765) Lord Mansfield held;Ay y A 
y in part, that a moral duty was ground enough for the enforcement of
y a civil contract. In Hawkes v. Saunders, 1 Cowp. 289 (1775), he re­
affirmed the position, holding that the moral duty itself was t h e " : y • 
y consideration in a contract. The House of Lords, however, in the • Ayy 
case of Ranh v. Hughes, 4 Brown P.C. (1778), held that Lord Mansfield 
was mistaken in his understanding of the doctrine of consideration yvy 
in the law of civil contracts, and stated by way of correction of him, 
"It is undoubtedly true that every man is by the law of nature bound y 
to fulfil his engagements. It is equally true that the law of this 
country supplies no means, nor affords any remedy, to compel the per­
formance of an agreement made without sufficient consideration." fy-'y?
This is not a lesson easily learned. In the mid-1970’s, Burmah Oil, 
because of a fall in the English.stock market, was forced to sell off. 
much of its North Sea oil holdings. The market rose in mid-1976; now
that same oil company is undertaking a law suit against the nurchaser
of those same stocks on the grounds that they, Burmah Oil, were forced 
to sell the stocks at an unjustly low and unfair price. The suit, if y 
. it does come to the High Court, will be long and involved; it is also 
very moral at its inception. ,
7. Leges, 61, 18: at page 199 (Downer edition). ;
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be appeased. ^’ Such harmony of disparate worlds may seem natural
to the mediaeval mind which believed in a balanced harmony between \ 
the realms of matter and the realm of the spirit, which the literature 
and theology of the age shows us, and it may seem strange to us now; 
but it should be remembered that blasphemy, for instance, is still 
actionable at common law as a misdemeanour. : ^
! The Leges preserves many of the common cases which were to
be found in mediaeval theological writing. The cases of the tree 
falling upon the unwary passerby, the mother who rolls over in her 
sleep and smothers her child subsequently because of the unfortunate 
accident, the accidental wounding or non-purposeful wounding or killing 
of an innocent third party, the dangerous trap which, set for animals, * 
catches a person, and other such standard cases find themselves in the 
fabric of the Leges. What is lacking from this early compilation is 
any conceptual analysis of what, for instance, is meant by ’Will1 or 
'Purpose1 or 'Mind' or 'Cause’. For such, as well as other key concepts, 
one must borrow from the literature of the period, and even that literature 
is not uniform in its employment of terms. It is the fine-reading which 
makes the terms precise. One such instance is to determine what is meant 
by Mind. Each major mediaevalist has a different theory about how Mind ° 
operates and what its nature is. For the legal scholar he must draw upon
8. Leges, 66,1 at page 209. : : .
* A distinction between 'accidental' and 'non-purposeful' might entail 
this reasoning. An accident may have been avoidable or not (by care 
or means taken by the agent), whilst a non-purposeful happening means 
that the event was out of control of the agent, and he could not 
have reasonably taken precautions to prevent its happening.
'Intellectus' is how I have rendered Mind. The Latin concept has a 
wider range than our present term ‘mind’, but is suitable here. C
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; ; the broad classifications of the period. The literature on this period, Y ; -Y; 
Y : from the Eleventh through to the Fifteenth Centuries, is yet sparse; and ; : /
yy. Y f ■ ;yYthe texts, many of which are of major figures, are yet unedited—
Y ' Z ZyYyZ Y y > ' It would be an unwise reading%of the Leges to require of it Y  yYYZY:
Y  a conceptual refinement it does riot possess. As a skeletal structure. Y . *:
;Y : s Y it possess avenuqs and branches upon which developing legal notions YYY/yy -Y
y could grow, and then develop towards a. maturity. If one wishes to
y ; make legal locations, the work can be used rather much as a common ;
; law Pausanias, showing how certain rudimentary legal operators had
. found themselves in a budding legal structure. Degrees of guilt Y.yY; YyYyY
; ■ z would operate within the legal structure y an adjectival method ; Y Y Y  
. . ; :. would begin to function in which 'mindI would have to be qualified as; Y, Y Y
Y  , being a 'guilty' 'mind' to which guilt was assigned. The language yY•■yv*
YY Y Y;; may appear to seem unnecessarily Platonic, speaking as one would about .
the realm of the mind arid the realm of the body, biit it should be re- y '
y ;, ■ called that the early moral apparatus was Augustinian in nature; an Y £
Aristotelian refinement of terms will not enter into the literature Of YYZYy
y :' the age until, approximately, 1215 A.D. when that corpus was made ...YyyyY ; >Y
Vy ; -y. available to the scholars at Paris, and elsewhere in the younguniversities*— Y
Y , 9. . The major work of the period with regard to its moral concepts and:i Y Y/ YY :y •)
Y - " - Y to its pyschological notions ( as to how the soul 'functions') ..is YYyyZ Y Y  
;; : still D. Odon Lottin's, Psychologie Et Morale Aux XIIe Et XIII , v :
}' Y Siecles, as published by Abbaye Du Mont Cesar (Louvain, Belgique, ' yy y YYyY
1949) and J. Duculot, its editor, at Bembloux (Belgique) . There is- Z Y Y > Y Y
? still not a published text of Stephan Langton's works* and one must ..Y YYY:
Y ./■ v Y be a manuscript scholar to be able physically to read the script'of yyy ZYzYY
the text, one of which copies is at St. John's College, Cambridge. ^Y-YYviyY 
; y Legal philosophy and jurisprudence from 1100 to 1500 is a subject YYv; Y y  
which is riot even in its infancy; it is, at-best, in a foetal stage J YYj 
• :Yy C Y  YYy. of development. • y;. :Y" y .; • . y;,y?;;Y
y 10. Leges, sections c.90 ff. ;c.91 ff ;;c .92 ff.; c. 93 ff. and cY94y
. 11. Cf. Aristotle in the West by F. Van Steenbergen (Louvain). , • y • YZ•
Iy . The notion of a mental intention enters the common law from
mixed sources. The Leges uses the language of intention, but it does 
not refine that language. We read, for instance, that ”No one is 
obliged to make amends for his Own child whom he did not kill intentional­
ly,.. .” Again we read, ” If anyone, while he is endeavouring to separate 
persons fighting among themselves, is killed, though innocent, either 
intentionally or through the negligence of the disputants, the one who 
slew him shall pay amends....” * Differences in the quality of an act - 
V: are reflected by use of this mental distinction, * ” But there shall 
be some difference of result depending on whether someone asked the man
who is killed to join him in the task, or whether he came of his own ;
volition....” The sole use of ’intendit* occurs in this passage, when 
we read, ”....[Wjhere a man intends one thing and something else results 
y . (where what is actually done is the subject of the accusation, and not the
intention) the judges shall...fix a compensation....” At section
. 12. 88,8: ”Nemo ipsius suum infantem reddere cogatur quern uoluntarie
: non occidit.,.” at pages 272-73 of* Downer. vy ;
13. 90,1: ”Si quis dum inter se dimicantes diuidere satagit ex industria 
uel incuria decertantium occidatur innocens reddat eum qui occidit 
quamuis rixam non incepit.” at pages 278-79 of Downer.
14. 90,6b: ”Distantis uero sit si quis eum ad opus suum rogauerit et si
sponte aduenerit,. . .” at pages 280-81 of Downer.
: 15. 90, lid: ”...ubi homo aliud intendit et aliud euenit (ubi opus
■ y;-yV';:' V accusetur, non uoluntas [italics mine]).. .iudices statuant...” at
;i • ; pages 284-85 of Downer. - v:y-;. J ;• '/\ V  , -’y ’-y.)■
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72, 2b of the text, following upon a statement that homicide (72,2) can 
be committed either by accident or by design (consilio), we read of the 
use of ’possibilitatem’ to mean •intention’, as in,’The intention of the 
penitent when doing a good work.', but the meaning of the term in post- 
classical Latin is taken generally to indicate that one has the power 
to undertake to do, and it should be read as a dispositive noun, one 
taking a clue that it is feminine in gender (possibilitas, atis, f.).
It is not normally associated as a synonym for intentio. We will find 
that the early law follows along the pathway of sacramental theology 
on the general notion of intention by accepting variants of the notion 
that an outward deed is itself an expression of an inward state of mind. 
The sacramental refinement of this general notion is well-known to 
theological writings; its logic, however, was not well-known, or well- 
formulated by early common law jurists, and, I would suggest, many of 
our modem difficulties, both with the range and scope of mens rea and 
actus reus, stem from too easily accepting what were general theological 
notions, which worked in one sphere, and forcing them to work in another 
sphere without determining how one sphere, the sacraments, differed from 
another sphere, the law.; - . The language which will describe a serious 
act, such as homicide, will (for the most part) be volitive language, and 
will not be a special language which picks out a mental state or depicts 
a mental event. When Ivo of Chartres speaks of homicide ‘ he speaks of
16. Cf. Principles of Sacramental Theology, by Bernard Leeming, S.J., ;
for a clear statement of the notion of sacramental intention. One 
may consult Chapter Fourteen, "The Doctrine of Intention", pp 435-61, 
- a r i d  Chapter Fifteen, "Presumption of Intention", pp 462-496, (Longmans, 
Green and Co., London, 1955). . •/./ Vrpvyyyy.
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it in terms of the Will *7 ‘He does; it is to be admitted, make reference 
to a guilty mind, but he does so Within the context of lying, and hot
18. A •:> AAv ';'::A' d  ■ ■■ A. ;.#*:of killing. It is the early volitive tradition, with its adherence to
Augustine, and later Augustinian interpretation, which first finds its
way into rudimentary notions of intentional acts. A
When we turn to Bracton's De Legibus we enter a period of
the common law in which religious sources are drawn upon for the »
purpose of transmuting them and making from their impetus a legal . .
tradition outside of theology. This period of the common law, like A ;
the history of the inception of the Inns of Court and of our English yA
legal traditions, is marked by obscurity. The obscurity arises from AA,
not possessing clear and precise texts, from not having clear and A
precise editions of major theological writers, and from not having ;-yA;A%
records which can easily tell one what happened during the period. A
One assumes that the community of scholars was small and intimate A:
enough for their writings to be known, and we butress such an assumption
by trying to show various textual similarities to be found in a writer,
17. At CAP. 39, when speaking about punishment, Ivo replies that a ;A A 
punishment accrues to the type of act, " Si quis voluntarie homi- 
cidium fecerit, ad januam ecclesiae catholicae semper subjaceat,
et communionem in exitu vitae sue recipiat. Si autem non ex 
voluntate, sed ex casu aliquo homicidium fecerit, prior canon 
septem annis agere poenitentiam jussit, quinque secundus mandavit." 
DECRETI PARS X, at col. 702, (PL, 161:1), Paris, 1889. The language 
is familiar from the early Councils when the severity of a penance 
was to be determined by how fully a penitent had consented to an 
act. If one did an act rex casu1 then such precluded that one 
had acted from evil prededTtation, and may, or may not, have been 
careless. It could be open to question if by accident also entailed 
that one1s moral character (as in culpa) may have contributed to the 
accident. It may have been an ’accident' but one which resulted from 
’carelessness’; or it may have been an accident, pure and simple. ;
18. Cf. D£ Mendacio, PL, 161:1 at cols. 1333-1338, 0£. cit; A A
i
v« •’ J
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or, if not by locating direct textual similarities of language, > 
then one may search out for similarities of tone or sentiment or 
style in argument, for the legal philosopher the method is both 
helpful and useful, but he should not make the method of the legal 
historian and textualist his own method. The two ways of seeing 
a text are different. The legal philosopher hopes to withdraw an
argument;and its implications from a text; the legal historian is
v - ",V; : 19 -v- - .  . v/ :- Ycontent, very often, with locating a source * for a concept.
19. I wish to reduce to a footnote an example of what I mean.
When Professor Maitland pioneered in developing early English 
legal history he produced a number of valued texts, and made 
comparisons from historical sources in order to throw light 
; . upon a legal past clothed fairly much in darkness. When he 
edited selections from the writings of A20 and Bracton (Selden 
Society, vol. 8, 1894, as published [then] by Bernard Quaritch,
. 1895: London) he had, by use of an appendix, attempted to show
that Bracton*s attitudes towards homicide were, in part, found 
to have been derived from an exposition on the subject by Bernard , 
of Pavia. By the method of textual comparison, Maitland re- Y 
: produced the text he had of Bracton, and the text he had of
Bernard of Pavia, over pages 225-235 of the volume. The;text 
,V  for Bernard was that which had been prepared by E.A.T. Laspeyres,
and it was entitled, Bernardi Papiensis Summa Decretalium, printed 
at Ratisbonae by G. Iosephum Mans, MDCCCLXI, even though Maitland 
listed the publication date as i860. In the text of Laspeyres 
TITULUS X is to be found in Liber V, and it is entitled, **De 
homicidio voluntario v e l  casuali”, pp. 219-224. In the edition , 
which I consulted one can observe that a final text has yet to :V"Y;Y 
be produced of Bernard’s text, so much textual apparatus of variant 
texts there is to be found reduced to footnotes by Laspeyres. What 
Maitland- did, and I need not reproduce it here, was to show how 
passages from Bracton ( in the impoverished edition which Maitland 
; : had of the text in 1894 ) matched in style (somewhat) and in tone
what had been composed by Bernard of Pavia on the subject, and he 
concluded that from Bernard the major subject matter of Bracton . 
on homicide had been derived. ‘ ; ; • : • : ;
1.:: L
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The portion of Bracton to which Maitland refers is now to be •.
found in the superb edition prepared by Professor Thome of 
Harvard ( Harvard University Press and The Selden Society, 1968) 
at folio 120, and it is entitled ‘'The crime of homicide and the 
divisions into which it falls." [ De crimine homicidio et qualiter 
dividitur ], occupying that portion of De Legibus which is con­
cerned with Pleas of the Crown, beginning at page 340 of the 
Thorne edition. .: V'; • 7  '• ^ ; j ■ .
If we note that Bernard of Pavia died in 1191 A.D., the textual 
influence is plausible. The composition of De Legibus is thought 
to date from the 1250*s, and its emendations place it near to 
1268-1277, when, it is supposed, the redactor(s) gave us the V 
book we now have. But this is a matter for the textualist to 
decide. With the death of Raymond of Pennafort at 1275 A.D., 
and considering the time of the composition of De Legibus, axi- 
other textual scholar, F. Schulz argued that Raymond of Penafort 
(his spelling) was the derivative influence for Bracton's position 
(in folio 120) on homicide. In THE LAW QUARTERLY REVIEW ( July, 
1945, pp. 286-292 ), Schulz argues his thesis by presenting the 
Latin texts of both Bracton and Raymond de Penafort. He used ; 
the Woodbine edition for Bracton; while for Raymond he used the ■ 
edition of 1603, which I shall cite properly, and an unpublished 
manuscript: Bodleian MS. Selden Supra 87 (Summary Catalogue no.
3475) which, in folios 5 through 46, contained the Summa de casibus 
of Raymond and was, in this manuscript, a copy which was written 
in England in the late 13th century. ' j , ; / v /
The copies which I consulted were from the holdings of the library 
of Heythrop College, London* and not the Bodleian holdings which 
Schulz consulted for his article. The edition from Rome is dated 
5 November 1603, and its proper title, not given by Schulz, is: • ^ 
SVMMA Sti. RAYMUNDI DE PENIAFORT BARCINONENSIS, ORD. PRAECICATOR.
DE POENITENTIA ET MATRIMONIO, Cum Glossis Ionnis De Friburgo 
(Nvnc Primvm in lvcem edita), Roma sumptibus Ioannis Tallini.
The next edition I consulted was that which Schhlz did not like
because he claimed that it confused a reader by incorporating ;
into the text of Raymond commentaries other than his own which ^
he cited or used. This is the Veronae edition of MDCCXLIV, Ex >
Typographia Seminarii, Apud Augustinum Carattonium, and its title 
is: SANCTI RAYMUNDI DE PENNAFORT, Ordinis Praedicatorum, SUNWA, 
which was a revision of the edition of MDCCXX. It may be a matter 
of personal taste, but this edition is not confusing. It puts / 
into scare quotes that material which Raymond used, and, by citing
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material in this way, it saves the reader the necessity of
having to use a Vatican Library to find material. The edition '
is, I would urge, therefore of much use. •.7 ■. ’
The judgement which a legal philosopher may wish to make about
the historical research of both of these scholars: is that it 
does show that common law concepts did not originate solely from V
within the method of the common law itself. No doubt both 
Bernard of Pavia and Raymond of Pennafort are writers from whom 
Bracton, or his redactor, may draw, and one must bear this 
historical influence in mind. It does not close the case. The ; 
state of manuscript research into this sphere of mediaeval ^
scholarship is in its infancy. Schulz states that there existed 
other manuscripts in the hands of private collectors which he could 
not locate ( page 290 ). In an adjacent area, Bernard Leeming, 7; 
S.J., could remark, in his Principles of Sacramental Theology 
(op. cit.), on an important issue which concerned differences 
on the validity of sacramental administration in mediaeval theology 
that " The present position of studies in mediaeval canon law and moral 
theology does not permit an exact estimate of the number and in­
fluence of followers of the various positions..." ( page 537 ) . ;;  ^ ;
We are just now having texts edited and put into print of major 
writers of the Middle Ages, and the condition of mediaeval legal 
texts is, at the very least, a century behind in scholarship of 
that of mediaeval theological and philosophical texts. Such ah 
influential follower of St. Thomas Aquinas as was Bernard of ' ' '• :
Trilia has only now come to be printed: QUAESTIONES DISPUTATAE 
DE COGNITIONE ANIMAE SEPARATAE, Ad Fidera Codicum Edidit by Pius 
Kunzle, O.P. ( Editionis Francke Bernas, Fribourg, 1969 ). Thi,s 
edition is superior to that of the 1965 Pontifical Institute edition. 
What the historical research in law does do for the legal philosopher 
is to show him how much one world, that of mediaeval canon law and 
theology, influenced and fostered a newer world, which was the early; 
common law. ■ ' ‘; :• • ' • • • .■ '
Schulz argues, and I do not wish to pursue the matter in my 
dissertation, that the position taken by Maitland,with regard , 
to the influence of Bernard upon Bracton, must be abandoned in 
light of Raymond's Summa de casibus. I prefer to use hoth texts 
to demonstrate that the mediaeval tradition was a living tradition, 
and, as such, one can assume that both ( and other authors too ) 
exercised an influence upon the development of the concept of
homicide in De Legibus. - / V  - - •'/  ^ •
CHAPTER THREE
Many years ago, in factj just after the Second World War, 
there existed a magicians' supply shop in Los Angeles, California, ;
by the name of Merv Taylor1s. It was a shop known for its high 
class equipment, carrying on the tradition of! a great Shop;•Thayer1s, ; Y 
which had closed during the war, having been a fixture for professional  ^
magicians for decades. Taylor's had one hallmark: his equipment was 
finely made, and it was simple. At work in most of his illusions or • ■
devices was One simple principle, and the results were always spectacular > 
to behold. One of his famous tricks was called, ?TMulturn in parvum'Y 
It consisted of a small shot-glass from which the magician appeared to Y: Y 
pour endless amounts of liquids from it into several larger tumblers, Y . 
and then the entire amount in a large tumbler, and thence to cause it Y
all to disappear ! The entire piece of equipment cost an illusionist only . 
$37.50 in American money. V . . : / <; ■ t .• : vs
Not to belabour false analogies, or construct the same, one could 
view the development of our early criminal law principles as a study in 
'much from little' and with great economy and simplicity. The difference, 
certainly, is that the beginnings do not disappear in the end, as did the , 
liquids in the illusion I described. Our principles have become refined, 
and the body of our criminal law has been enlarged greatly from what it once 
was; but even this may be a matter of opinion. There were more crimes in
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the 18th Century for which one could suffer penalties than there now are; 
however, trial processes in our own age tend to be more complicated, as 
well as fairer, and the body of current law seems to possess a complexity 
greater than it once did. But this is another topic, though, for some
other paper. It could equally well be argued, perhaps, that modem law
tends towards simplicity and precision —  mark the reforms in the law of 
property in 1925 —  and though greater in the number of statutory in­
struments, nevertheless, actually simpler to work with.
What we begin to observe, to use the historical present tense, 
from the time of Bracton is that the common law begins to grow out of 
canonical and legal tradition which used remarkably few leading principles. 
Guilt for a crime, however assigned, or whatever torturous ( as, for in- . V 
stance, the hideous peine forte et dure [Statute of Westminster 1, 1275] 
which permitted the accused to be pressed under weights until he pleaded 
Guilty or Not Guilty ) method used to extract a plea, needed to be ( in 
theory, at least ) an admission of the accused. That admission was founded 
upon a theory of human nature, ie that an accused knew what he did, and
that he assented to do what he did. The canonists, as I have shown to now,
balanced the human equation between the movement of the intellect and the 
movement of the will, and, though little formal attention was paid to it 
in an analytic fashion, an appreciation paid to the constitutive elements 
of matter. Mediaeval theological and philosophical theory (save for the 
various treatises on logic, theology and philosophy were intermixed like 
bone and flesh in the writings so that a strict formal distinction between 
philosophy and theology is more academic than useful, notwithstanding the ;
' x v  *'' ‘
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formal distinction Aqinas made between philosophy and theology \*) did 
little to discuss at length the cause(s) of madness * It was acknowledged 
that one could go mad and be insane ^*, but such observations played 
little in the formal development of the law. A cause might be assigned . 
to account for the madness; the accused may have been considered to have " 
been possessed. On the other hand, from the point of view of theory, itv, 
may have been argued that the matter had not been predisposed to accept 
a human form, and thus the madness of an individual may have been accounted 
for in that way without appeal to the instigation of the devil. The in­
sane were excused at law, as texts I shall cite later on will show. ?*'."■
If an accused were simply a Poor Tom, then he might be excused as one f . ; V 
might excuse an infant. I hesitate to compare Poor Tom to an animal, ■
for, although Coke likened madness (later) to raging like an animal, one • 
must, nevertheless, not forget that animals were considered to be re- • 
sponsible fpr their actions (during a period of our common law).
1 . Summa Theologiae^ lav 1,1, in which article one asks, ’’Is another ;
teaching required apart from philosophical studies ?” • •>
v How the distinction intertwines, and what relationship each part has ;; v 
to each, one may read an interesting excursus into the matter, seen 
in "Ratio and Revelatio”, chapter three, of Sacra Doctrina: reason and V  ^
revelation in Aquinas by Per Erik Persson, translated by J.A.R.Mackenzie, : 
published by Basil Blackwell (Oxford: 1970), cf. pp.267-297.
2. Cf. Medieval Minds: Mental Health in the Middle Ages,by Thomas F. Graham,:’ 
chapter three, ”Abelard to Aquinas”, pp. 60-76. v V'"\V
3. It is not until we come to Timothy Bright’s, A Treatise of Melancholie, 
London (by Thomas Vautroller, 1586) that we begin to have separate writings
, concerned with the physical basis for mental ailments. Bright’s work, in 
its title, states that the book is one ’’Containing The Causes thereof, fT 
.reasons of the strange effects it worketh in our minds and bodies: wither 
the phisicke cure, and spiritual consolation for such as have thereto V' .:V 
adioyned an afflected conscience...” It was the first book by an English g 
physician on mental illness. One may read Sir Geoffrey Keynes’s Dr.
'•■'V Timothie Bright 1550-16IS. '
Cf. Liability for Animals by GlanVille Williams (Cambridge:1939).
••• - £ *I'-i .v
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One did not become an animal (as when a man changes into a werewolf); '/Hr:';- 
for, if one did actually become an animal; it would have entailed i (fbr :HH 
a mediaeval thinker) that a man was no longer a man. This is not a H i  
distinction without a difference, nor is it a tautology. The mediaevalis.t 
needed to preserve a real distinction between what was called animal be­
haviour and what was called human behaviour, although deranged in a man.> 
One could liken Poor Tom's actions to those of an animal; but Poor Tom . 
was yet a man because, it was urged. Poor Tom at some time (possibly) 
could again become a moral agent, which an animal could never become. 
Furthermore, Poor Tom, even with his moral faculties and his rational ; H  
faculties suspended, possessed an immortal soul, and an animal did not.
The analogy was a part of mediaeval and renaissance understanding. We Y - 
need only turn to Donne's amorist inclinings to read how the imagination 
and understanding of an Elizabethan poet and lawyer preserved this H
mixture, as' in, / Y'-Y Y/ H- Y y  • H  :,H ■ ■;' .;Y’ Y-Hy: Y ,;,V:YH. / vY' YY.YYv 'H
:'v; Y/-."The soule with body, is a heaven comb in' d :
Y With earth, and for mans ease, but nearer joyn'd."
The law takes over this preservation and, however variously it under­
stands or misunderstands the nature of madness, that a man be mad andYY-,Y' 
not be thought to be the same as. an animal follows into the logic of the ' 
law. Poor Tom, for all that, was always a man for the law. - ' Y Y Y / Y Y Y Y
S. TO THE COUNTESSE OF HUNTINGDON (page 122), John Donne in the edition 
of John Hayward (Penguin Books, 1970). H" ~ r Y YY
v*:'/ . V. S ’ ,;"V'V: '-X: ^  v?
S • "• '• : If a theory of legal responsibility developed, it developed • v •
out of a prior theory that one was always to be considered as a moral 
agent, save when excusing conditions [sleep, unconsciousness, lunacy, 
possession ( ie that one should, at least, try to unpossess a person, 
even if the rites for such unpossession might, finally, cause the person 
to be burned the logic persisted that one should be brought back to a 
human state so that, even in death, one could behold God) ] were thought 
to prevail* Moral, agency, as I have suggested, arose or;could be pre-  ^■ 
dicated of a person, owing to the interaction of Intellect and Will. 
y Much ink would be spilled to argue which was the nobler faculty, the *:
Intellect or the Will, and the force of such arguing would be spent 
mildly in developing legal theory as to what constituted the atomic  ^
elements of a law. Was a legal proposition a law because it appealed 
; to a command, or was it a valid legal proposition, and thus binding ;
upon a subject, because it appealed to one’s reason ? One strand of . 
the theological argument, thus transmuted into legal theory, would ad­
vance the claims of the Will and thus of Edict and Parliamentary pro- , 
v ; . nouncements and enactments, whilst another strand of the theological ' 
theory, woven into legal speculation, would advance the rights of Natural 
Law and thus of Constitutional ( or Contract ) theories of law. 6 *  ^ .
6. I need not belabour my reader here with bibliographical accounts of 
i- ; this well-known legal distinction in legal theory. One may confer *
; The Nature of Law by T.E.Davitt (St. Louis § London, 1951) for an '
; ■; ; account of the volitive vs. the cognitive tradition in early mediaeval
law. For two recent accounts of problems which arise from strict utili­
tarian accounts of law I suggest, English Law and the Moral Law by 
Professor A.L.Goodhart (London:1953) and ’’The Model of Rules" by :
R.M.Dworkin, THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO LAW REVIEW, Vol. 35, No.1.,
J
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Y H  ; - : It may be advanced that the writings of Raymund de Penna- .. v
. . fort influenced Bracton1 s formulations of the law on homicide, and T ;
i that textual comparison will show (as Schultz attempted) how textual
. passages are mirrored in Raymund1s treatise. Liber Secundus ^*of
r Raymund's Svmmae sets forth textual similarities which does support
Y: Y v Schulte partially. For my purposes the chapter shows that Raymund >
: nay have been one of a number of models available to Bracton; our
Y  state of scholarship for that period ( 1200*s ) is not well advanced,
v as I said in my previous chapter.; In the De homicidio itself, one--.Y
; can note how the atomic elements for legal responsibility appear.:';' Y-;Y :
;j Y It may be asked if the homicide were an 'accidental* killing, or Y Y Y
r Y ;V':? was it firom 'necessity', or was it 'deliberate' and, ! voluntary'.
i Y Did one give over to killing without wicked deliberation (.. .odij rY^Y-H;
L49,Col 1] meditatione...). Is one moved to sorrow; for what he has done ? -HHYY ;V
These, and other citations, flow on from the tradition of canonical 
Y Y  Y r writers. Degrees of seriousness are sketched out, the recurring
• Y Y y Y  cases present, ie, accidentally hit by a stone, or the falling tree Y Y  ;
•YYY cut by the woodsman,; concluding that ".. .quod homicidium voluntatiu :
Y. *’ semper est mortal e peccatum, § enorme... si; quis voluntate." [T: 159, Col 2]
7. My gloss of the text comes from the M.DC.Ill edition held by Hey- Y
throp College, SVM1A STi. RAYMVNDI DE PENIAFORT (Romae Sumptibus ' YlY 
Y Ioannis Tallini), with book Two beginning at page 145, "De homicidio". 
The Verona edition,1744, is an easier edition from which to cite. ;YYY 
YY I shall simply abbreviate which I use by putting 'V* for the Verona Yy 
edition, and *T* for the Tallini edition, putting a page number after 
:the initial so that one can cite the portion of the text I have * i Y ‘ 
:/ •’.' glossed-. ' •. ,YV-YY; . YY- :Y^Y Y ' Y /... • •YY;“ ’Y H y  V  YYY
Y ..
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: Raymund preserves the distinction, from Augustine, between
f spiritual and corporeal homicide [T:145 at Cols 1 § 2], Although the
notion may seem strange to us now, it did seem reasonable, and moving, 
to the early canonists,, and, in fact, it found its; way into Elizabethan 
drama. We will recall that the distinction, earlier in theology, con­
; cemed the interior act of the soul, namely, one must not lie. Lying, 
though it may not be perceived by some third party, is yet seen by God,
: Y y y  •. and such seeing, it was thought, by God Himself was to see the soul as
it was: a lying soul was a soul which had suffered a spiritual death.
8. One such instance which comes clearly to mind is from Hamlet.
In Act 3, scene 3, one will recall that the King, Claudius, is 
v at prayer (3.3.35 ff) : Y' - ■ y  ’ ' “ y  yy . y y y y -y
, / KING. ”0, my offence is rank, it smells to heaven,
;-\ ,Y • • y y v It hath -the' .primal eldest curse upon't,. Y Y/YY. Y ;•> '■ y • y -y •
Y/Y:y - ■ Y A brother1 s murder.. Pray can I not,.' ■ >Y Yy Y;y ' : Y-y  Yy ^A
Y . . , "Though inclination be as sharp as will, ^ y
My stronger guilt defeats my strong intent, ; ' •
Aiid like a man to double business bound, A- vY-Y
Vy ; Y o - I stand in pause where I shall first begin,; YY j y 
;yY Y -Y Y ’ And both neglect.M ;• 'y v.;Y:( v y, ;•••; ;YV
Hamlet, of course, does not know what the interior state of the soul 
is to Claudius himself. When Hamlet enters the stage, with intent to 
kill Claudius, he sees Claudius at prayer, and this causes Hamlet to 
. think and say, (3.3.75 ff) : Y ; ’Y*vY- Kn- AY-~Y Y Y ;':' YY
Y Y ' . : HAMLET. "Now might y ' -y "..- ' Y . Y.; “•y.. ■
;y ;y  Y'-Y Y r :Y-'Y'l-'da it pat, now a* is a-praying--- - ; YyYYY y  y y Yy-
V And now I’ll do't, [he draws his sword] and so a*goes to
■ -Y' • ,;.Y . ■  .. ' . .y , Y ;. y  heaven, '• Y YyyY . _ • • . Y y y
; YY Y ; And so am I revenged, that would he scanned: YyYYY 'yyYYi'Y
YV/.y Y  y  A villain kills my father, and for that ; ; Y  y  y Y  ;
Y ~ Y Y" I his sole son do this same villain send YYYY
■’Y YY YY" ■. Y Y-Y To heave.... Y  Y y -Y Y Y  y  y  :;' Y / y .y .y -/-, YY YY'y ;Yy  
Y'YY Why, this is bait and salary, not revenge. ..Y;-Y 
: Y A1 took my father grossly, full of bread, ; y •
Y Y :: y With all his crimes broad blown, as flush as May, t :
Y Y And how his audit stands who knows save heaven ?
Y ; But in our circumstance and course of thought, Y Y
. Y y ; 1 tis heavy with him: and am I then revenged Y Y
Y y Y- To take him ini the purging of his soul,
; Wheii he is fit and seasoned for his passage ? : y  y
- Vy;Yy'; y;-' ' •’ No. " [he sheathes his sword] • -Y ;y : Y'YYyY’
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The force of such belief, and its resultant logic, would fortify the.: . 
integrity of an oath; one would not lie if one believed and knew that 
God was one’s witness. The transference in Elizabethan drama, to cite 
but a single instance, would show the audience how an outward effect, ■ ;
or the possibility of an outward effect, could serve to stand for the 
interior state of an agent. Hamlet, upon sheathing his sword and de­
ciding not to kill Claudius the King at prayer, then reasons, (3.3.90 ff)
\ "Up, sword, and know thou a more horrid hent, ; v . .7 ;-.
- When he is drunk asleep, or in his rage* . ’.--vfK’U."'
, Or in th'incestuous pleasure of his bed, y
At game,- a-swearing, or about'-some act
> 1 , That has no relish of salvation in’t, j .* 1 .. .
Tlien trip him that his heels may kick at heaven, V ; ^ !
And that his soul may be as damned and black r
> As hell-.whereto:it-goes;-.’...." V :;- .. -
The King, however, which Hamlet did not know, had not repented:
; : KING [rises] "My words fly up, my thoughts, 7^
• . remain below,. v'r,’r’*,V«',;'
, Words without thoughts never to heaven go." , . -
Had Hamlet killed Claudius then he would have been guilty of the 
terrible CTime of spiritual homicide. Claudius’ act of praying is a lie 
because: his actions are moved by wrongful intentions, purposed to deceive, 
as Claudius’s refrain revealed, "...Words without thoughts never to 
heaven go." . • / . : ; ;•! V.’. ’V.; V' £v*£V> ■ v ’’ •■■■'■:? •-
, \ Raymund [T: 148, Col 1 § 2] notes the four modes of killing: / v
"Facto quatuor modis, scilicet iustitia, necessitate, casu, § voluntate,”
I shall not dwell upon the gloss at length --- it is far too long a text -­
but I wish to note that Raymund does appeal to intention to ground the y 
goodness of an act. He says [T: 149, Col 2] with regard to sorrow for an 
act that it turns upon a proper goodness of mind ("...bonarum enim mentium
153
fest* ibi culpam agnoscere, vbi culpa no est. . I n  that which happens H: Y 
from necessity, in which an agent has not turned his mind to it to bring - 
it about (or rejoice in it even, "Ah, glad the old bag died !"), did 
not have an "intentionem corruptam", then moral condemnation should;;: 
not fall upon the penitent. One's interior state of mind is pure, and YYY 
to one's inadvertent act ( such as cutting down the tree ) no guilt should 
accrue. The words which operate throughout the text for the purpose of 
determining guilt are 'voluntate' or 'propter intentionem corruptam' 
or a killing which is not done 'justitia'. Although a killing may be 
'sponte', it may have been commanded, as a soldier killing another soldier 
in battle. If the command is lawful, and granted that one himself, does 
not possess a wickedness of will, the killing which results is just be­
cause it is done under the cloak of the law, , Y/.7 Y :
I am not so much concerned with arguing that one text may have Y 
influenced another text, as had Schulz argued, as I am to demonstrate YY 
the. form(s) growing in our early common law to convey intention.
* "inadvertent act" may appear to be an awkward construction. That Y-YYYYy 
which one does is not 'inadvertent'. One turns to cutting down ■ y :'Y.Y 
the tree. The consequence is what one does not foresee, or en- Y 
compass, or imagine, or design, or plan for. But in cases such HH-Y 
as this,one generally speaks about the entire act, the meaning 
of which to be taken to mean that one acted, and there were con- Y-YYY 
sequences, but one had not desired those consequences, nor had 
any knowledge that they would come about, so that of the total /
action, ie cutting down the tree, it is described as an inadvertent
.:';\act. ' Y -Y Y; /:Y -Y' > \ Y Y ; ;* Y Y  f, : •- Y Y - Y : Y Y^Y- C-
9. Comparing Schulz's article with the texts, and now with the availability 
of Thome's majestic text and translation of Bracton, one is moved to . • 
admit that a strong similarity of text exists between Bracton's text -Y;-,-Y 
on homicide [120 folio, page340 onwards in Thorne] and Raymund de 
Penafort's De HomiCidio. If anything, such similarity (which was riotYy 
unusual in mediaeval authors) shows how living and viable was the; 
canonical and penitential tradition of the Middle Ages upon the law.
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’ : y - When we search for the logical structure of intention as it
is thought to be embodied in Bracton, or Raymund de Penafort,or in 
early case law, one finds that one must provide more than a ramiform 
stem, as, for instance, is provided by Sir James Fitzjames Stephen in 
his, A History of The Criminal Law of England. * His schematurn is 
helpful, and it does fall within the tradition of many of the texts', 
on ethics (of an earlier period V-;) which presented a subject as if 
it were a tree; for instance, like the Arbor Bigamiae , ’a tree-like 
drawing showing the degrees of impermissible marital relationships.
10. Cf., Vol. Ill, Ch. xxvi, at page 29, (London: Macmi1land and Co.,1883)
I have simply reproduced his diagram and herewith attached it. I 
have also attached his English version of it, taken from Stephen’s 
A General View of The Criminal Law of England (First edition, 1863, 
London 6 Cambridge: MacMillan and Co.), a volume, I am sorry to state, 
. which is impossible to obtain. (fty own copy was Pollock*s copy.)
^ V->: " • ^ BRACTON ON HOMICIDE:
l lo n i ic i 't iu u i
r—T.iticaA
corjximlo npirittmiu
fu i'to
prvcapto coiuilio tlffcuxinne 
, i siv« tiiitioiie
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. -  \ ■■ 
n e c e s s ita te C(!su ••
i -• --I : ,
V o lu n ta te- . . t
.. •. > ; • 1 . .
' e v it a b i li  nutt c v i t a b i l i  ; I 'lu r ib n s  ast.-n nilm * . e la n r t ilo  nr>nitne„
- . ‘ ‘ ■ / j '  . \ * t  ■ *■’ vi(b:i»tu— m u i.lrm ii ,
. . rtftiis o’|n‘ rnto r t i  liH liiv  y  ' iln n s rui.illi<!it:c. v , • '
1 [oiilicidc.
C o r p o r a l ;  
‘ I .
S p i r i t u a l .
B y  d e e d . ; lJyiword. V '
C o m m a n d .' A d v i c e . .  b o f u u e i v
A c c i d e n t .' I ' W i l f u l .3 By Justice. Necessity. /
A v o i d a b l e .  U n a v o i d a b l e . ;  . I n  a  l a w f u l  ; T u  a n , u n l a w f u l  'If secret*''
. \  r  ■ ' "  act. - V :  . not, i i m r d e i v
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I have appended, for sake of illustration only, examples from texts on 
ethics to show the propensity for trees or tabulations to explain the 
form of a subject matter. Obviously, what the trees or tabulations do 
not do (I am not prejudging that they are not able to do ) is to pre­
sent an analytical examination of their logical or schematic content.
10. Of the division into Voluntate as ’pluribus astantibus et videntibus’ 
against ’clanculo nemine vidente-murdrum’, Stephen himself, in the
; 1 8 8 3  edition in which the Latin branch appears, states ( and this 
, r makes: clear why his 1863 edition of the Criminal Law omits the dis- J ■
V tinctibn which his Latin tabulation cited ) i  :
; ; f!The distinction between vo luntary homicide in the presence
X : V of witnesses and in the absence of witnesses is not only a dis- " 
;: . . tinction without a difference, or with only an accidental dif­
. ference, but it is also open to the remark that if there are no 
' : witnesses it is impossible to say whether the homicide was
necessitate, casu, or voluntate, (in Bracton’s sense of the word). 
[ History of the Criminal Law of England, Stephen, (1883) vol.
: ill, at pp 29-30 of Ch. xxviT]’
11. For example, the schemata of Ioannie Stierio concerning ”De Anima
Rationali” which he subdivides info charts concerning ”De Intel­
; lectu” and ”De Voluntate”. If the texts were easily available
one could instance many examples of this kind of teaching method. ■ 
From, Praecepta Physicae, Editio Tertia, (Ex Officina Rogeri Daniel, 
almae Acadamiae Typographi, 1647) from pp 60-62. I have appended the 
pages to the end of this chapter. i ' V
12. The Arbor Bigamiae is a commonly found device. I have cited my ex­
ample from the SVMMA AVREA of Henrici Cardinalis Hostiensis, (Lugduni,- 
M.D.LVI) at page 57 of the textj from the chapter ”De bigamis non 
ordinandis”. In his chapter on ’Matrimonivm” at page 587, Plar 
centius, who was Bartholomaeo Fumo Villauren, in his SUMMA, AVREA .V V 
ARMILLA ( Antverpiae, apud Petrum Bellerum, 1591 ) cites a branching 
tree to show ’typus graduum consanguinitatis’. Douglas A. Stroud, ^
: in his MENS REA (London: Sweet 8 Maxwell, 1914) continued on in such
a chartist tradition; for example, Ch. 1 is prefaced (at page one) with 
: ' a ramiculated diagram, ’’Excuses From Conviction of Crime.”;
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The diagram may give one a form to follow, as did a mood and figure 
in a syllogism, but the logical forms which intention could take had 
not been thoroughly tabulated, nor premisses examined to answer the 
question if such premisses were true primitives of a system, or were, 
rather, conclusions from premisses the truth of which was itself in . A A- 
need of examination and analysis. : ; ; A "
There appeared to be a common form of scholarship, a com- > 
munity of thought, circulating in the Middle Ages. We can isolate; 
parts of the transmission, as did Schulz, by locating sentential simi- -A 
lari ties from one author to another, ie, Raymund de Penafort upon yY'.yy r v  
Bracton, and/or (to follow on Maitland’s extended argument in
.•••-'■ y. ; - • •. "13-'"  . •• • „ V. y Y-Y* ■•’;Y v'y Y *•» y > ■ Y v ;• *Bracton and Azo ) * the force of Bernard of Pavia upon Bracton. But
even here one cannot rest in simple isolated texts. Of these authors 
one can ask, Shall they serve as if they were first premisses in an ;Ay 
historical demonstration ? and serve solely so ? I doubt very much if Y 
we can rest there if we argue from the .force of a tradition, something YY 
living and viable within and upon a scholarly community.Y If we rest YY A  
only with Raymund or Bernard, like the argument from motion, we find Y 
that they, as authors, do not contain themselves without need of any \ 
other. One finds that One must turn to an adjacent and living tradition: 
that of the Various books of penitentials (Liber PoenitentialiS). From 
recent scholarship it can be demonstrated that Robert of Flamborough, r v 
circa 1205 A.D., through his Liber Poenitentialis, exercised influence ■
13. London: Bernard Quaritch, 1895, at pp. 225-235, where both Bracton
and Bernard are reproduced line for line, (which I indicated earlier) .
i.J
• • : ■ v-" ’• •’ ■ ■' ■ V'-‘v i '*' ■'••••” ■ ' - *’* v * • ' id; • :; '■upon other canonists and theologians of the period. * Flamboroughfs
 ^ ; book was intended to guide confessors, and it was not, as were the i;;) ‘7/:
■ > larger Summas of the period, a speculative 'textbook concerned with :;
difficult topics in theology, ie the existence of God, or the .
nature of the Will, or the justification for the immortality of one,1 s soul.
; 5 14, The? critical edition of this writer has now been edited by : 'j
1 J.J.Francis Firth, C.S.B., and is entitled:
ROBERT OP FLAMBOROUGH, Canon-Penitentiary of Saint-Victor at Paris, - 
; : (TORONTO: Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies, 1971). ;
r ; In the prolegomena to the critical Latin text of Flamborough, Firth : Tv;:
1 : remarks that this penitential differed from that of Writers before it - .•
because this text included ”...in it the new canon law of the decretists ;;;*
' ; v and of the decretals, that law which had been developed in the schools , r '
. ;:;_v .and rednered effective by papal initiative throughout the Church. Alan .
: •; of Lille had* quoted some of the new decretals in his penitential, but ::;
only those which involved matters of public order, such as ecclesiastic; !
cal burial. It seems that he and others hesitated to bring to bear upon :
: ; , the conscience of a penitent the rigid formalities of this new law as:.'it^;f ..JH
\ ” was expounded by the canonists in their commentaries. Insofar as-can be y: 'J^
: : : ; determined at the present state of research, Flamborough was the first
: : . to make available to confessors in a short, readable, comprehensive 1
/ work the new law of the decretists and of the decretals, organized in a i;,
. t practical way for solving cases of conscience. For the first time this
juridical offshoot of the Gregorian Reform extended its influence be- ./ 
yond synods and church courts and was put at .the service of the ordinary ;
. . ' confessor, through whose ministry reform measures could now present a
• : ■ ' > ; ’ more insistent appeal to the individual conscience. V ; •
1 "Flamborough’s manual was soon followed by others in which similar V;
V use was made of the new law: the penitentials of Paul; of Hungary, of f
V '  ; Saint Raymond of Penafort and of many others." (pp 17-18).
For a further commentary upon how the Decretum Gratiani affected 
early Mediaeval church law, one may be referred to the study of Stanley 
1 V Chodorow, entitled: Christian Political Theory and Church Politics in the 'v/jj
V; Mid-Twelfth Century: The Edclesiology of the Gratian's Deereturn. It was •
; « published by the University of California Press, 1972 (Berkeley, Los  ^^
Angeles and London) as a publication of the Center For Medieval and Re- 1
_  naissance Studies, U.C.L.A; O v • V '/v' ■. •'. ■ /•
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When one turns to Albert Magnus, or Aquinas, one finds that the logical
} I 
-Yvr.'v
form of a claim, ie what are the constitutive elements (say) of an 
interior act ; *, is examined;in conjunction with its logical content,
and the form of the examination embodies the argument(s) of an objector, 
a statement of what position is thought to obtain, and then a rejoinder 
in which the propriety of the position is justified by an appeal to 
formal logical argument and to (whait is thought to be) the proper use 
of leading authorities. Flamborough is not arguing in this way; in fact, 
it is leasan argument he is presenting than a statement of how one 
should view penitential matters. What one does extract from his Liber 
Poenitentialis, however, is a usage of language, in tone and in meaningJ 
which will/have found its way into the early language of legal estimation 
and codification, as one reads in Bracton, for instance, in the dis- A 
tinction branched to depict differences of degree of seriousness in re 
gard to homicide. ,
.', > ■ In Book 111 of the Liber Poenitentialis one can read that A A 
*intentionf is functioning as a key word to express an interior state A  A 
of mind ordered towards a proper understanding of a sacramental state. 
Flamborough speaks of "De intentione ordinantis" *and the Opening A y 
sentence is clear in its statement that intention determines a sacra­
mental act, which I quote: "84. Intentio ordinantis est de substantia
“ : ordinis, ut scilicet intendat facere id quod
A ecclesia intendit facere in cujuslibet or-
■ /;'• A ;;. - A'* 'A" ■' dinis cOllatione.!' (17.) Ay. . ' • ? VY  -A
15. For example, cf., S.T.I., Q xix, all of the articles, "Of The 
Good and Evil of the Interior Act of the Will" of Aquinas, or 
DE NATURA BONI, Cap. 2, De voluntario et involuntario by Albert A 
Magnus (Opera Omnia: Tomus xxv Pars 1, De Natura Boni, Primum Edidit 
Ephrem Filthaut, O.P.[Monasterii Westfalorum in Aedibus Aschendorff,
A  ,1974]) p p .  26-29, paras 59-70, as examples of analysis in depth of
• A  a concept. • A . y  ' - A A: y  -A A./; A. > • • A ' ' A A a ;? A y A % A :Y.iA; AA A
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So important is the conjunction of correct speech (or sacramental 
formula) with the intention of the priest (or, in this case, of the 
one who adminsters the sacrament of baptism in accordance with the 
mind of the Church) that Flamborough states what will not serve as 
a valid baptism, as these passages may illustrate. I add, that he
.> ~ v -V  ; ■' v: \ ' ' V  • 1 gwarns against obvious sacramental ommissions, *
”85. Sed, licet intentionem rectam habeat, multotiens 
tamen nnilta omittit.” - “S.*
and then he cites various examples:
Verbi gratia, in baptismo sunt aqua et verba haec: V Hgb ^ :
baptizo te in nomine Patris et Filii et Spiritus sanctL Amen.”’
sets what should be the case or the rule, and these are examples of 
misrule or invalid baptisms ( and thus show how a sacrament, in general, 
can be rendered invalid ). V /•; . : - V V  • ,Y ,
”Si ergo aliquis immergat in quocumque alio liquore quam in 
aqua, non baptizat. . % \ '-v . V - . v\ ■
’’Item, si mutet verba et dicat ”Ego immergo te,” vel ”in- 
tingo”, non baptizat. ; ••  ^ . y
’’Item, si truncat verba dicendo ”Ego baptizo te in nomine 
Patris,” nisi plus addat, non / b a p t i z a t . ' :
The rule is a general one, and he states it in this way to account for 
cases he may not have included, : ; , :
’’Item, si corrupte proferat verba sponte et ex certa scientia, 
cum sciat et possit recte proferre, vel si sic proferat ut er- 
rorem introducat, non baptizat. Gportet igitur ut forma ver- 
borum sit integra, perfecta et ordinata. Item dico in aliis 
sacramentis.” (italics mine)«
16. Op. cit., page 107. 17. ibid. 18. ibid., page 108. All of V  v
. ’7';, v . ; ^ of these "citations, are: from
Y.y :; r v ' - '. section 85, page 108. ;* ft???
J
i-Y" i
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The labour of refining these early declarations about 
instrumental causality would fall upon the later scholastics, and 
I need not develop their notions here. It is enough to state that 
Flamborough has advanced a simple notion of instrumental causality, 
and, to this day, it is found in the workings of the law. When one 
takes a solemn oath, calling God as his witness (in most cases), one :v 
creates speech (one's own words) which stand for, or are instruments 
of, the state of one's mind. Simply put, this is the doctrine of ? < 
sacramental intention, and Flamborough gave instances of it when he . 
cited improper ministrations of a sacrament. - i f. • ;Y:/; - -
I draw upon this early sacramental language to suggest that 
it seemed reasonable for early legal writers to draw upon. It was ; 
not an arcane language, although it was a difficult language, many 
different theologians holding different attitudes as to the precise 
meaning of sacramental intent. Early common law borrowed; heavily 
from a religiously moral past, and one doubts if it could have been V
otherwise, the past being what it was. Logically, there is no need
for a replication or borrowing from the past; but the movement of
human life is, more often than not, a movement of from what was the ”
case to what may be the case, shaped by the past. Human inventiveness 
is seldom de novo: linguistic traditions are carried;, over into what 
is originated or invented, however submerged be the workings of the V\ 
linguistic roots and past of a language. Even mathematical analogies, 
which seem to be beat from a logical purity, possess a past: those ;• 
formulae it must, at the very minimum, overturn are a past upon Which 
the novel theorem draws upon even if to reject that past. * -
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• .^'.VA.'-Tp-'Vrhat extent one can construct a linear map of which texts V 
influenced which later authors, Firth is guarded in his claims, stating 
through his critical edition that, at present, the manuscript tradition A t 
cannot support overly large claims, He tells us that the Libri sen- 
tentiarum of Peter Lombard, as well as the works of Peter Cantor, Summa \* 
de sacramentis et animae consiliis, and of Robert Courson, Summa, are -A 
not cross-indexed against possible parallels with Flamborough1s prose . 
either because the textual study is incomplete* with no critical edition '* 
of an author yet printed, or, at present, there seems no close relationship 
to compare. The state of definitive legal editions is worse yet. Bracton 
is still incompletely editedj with a third and fourth volume to appear, 
the fifth volume only in the planning stage by Professor Thome. Other 
early legalists, such as Thomas Langton or Ralph de Hengham, are in ; Y- , 
manuscripts only, and which of those manuscripts are the critical"''.%■Yv-
manuscripts scholarship has not revealed. A Y'YY’/
■ Y  -t . • Y /:' ■ • Y -  ■ /" . ' '• i q  ! Y . • Y Y -  .• Y  Y'; ; One observes, in Liber Quintus of Flamborough , * that its
author is concerned, as were the early Councils of the Church, to as- Y’y" Y 
sign fairly and justly to a penitent the penances he would have to under­
take for certain sins . ; To the model penitent of the Liber Poenitentialis 
(just as the model student in St. Geanain's Dialogues between a Doctor c 
of Divinity and a Student of the Common Law [circa 1523]) there are put 
model questions by the confessor, the purpose of which is to ascertain
19. The fifth chapter of his penitential book is entitled, ' vY•'•-.'-YY:
DE HOMICIDIO, covering pages 209-228, which is Cap.ii of -
Y ; that chapter, as edited by Firth. It spans paragraphs ; y
- Y 242 to 270 thereof. Y :- yYYYAYy y Y. jY'Yfv Yv YYYyYYY
Y Y A ’1 ■ ■ v.
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the penitent's sorrow for his sins, as well as the degree of seriousness 
of each' siriv /.■>; \ ')': ‘ -C'./ /; V V / ; / / ’ '
; . 1  ^I need not examine the treatise in detail. However, I wish 
to draw upon certain topical portions which may be important to my own - 
understanding of the evolution of 'intention1 at law, and, in this way, 
portions of the Liber Poenitentialis may be helpful to one in an at­
tempt to gain an understanding of certain root legal concepts. M
It: was; patently evident that Flamborough possessed a language 
of intention, revealed in his sections on sacramental intention/ He 
appeared to restrict intentional language to human acts in which emotion 
or compulsion did not hold sway. When one administered a sacrament it 
was assumed that one administered it with a proper disposition. One ,;-K 
would not baptize rashly; one would not absolve in anger; one would not: 
ordain compulsively; one would not celebrate Mass contumeliously. The • 
order of the sacraments was an order; of the mind; an intentional order / ; /
in which the sacrament, as a sign, revealed the State of mind of the • /
its ordiriand, and so confirmed by a valid ritual. . Each sacra­
ment had a certain matter (water for baptism; oils for chrism; bread •
and wine; for Eucharist, and the like ); each sacrament had a certain ; :
(verbal) form. The sacramental form brought one to a cognitive order : 
of existence. It was not the Will, per se, which denominated and dis- ■ / ; 
tinguished each sacrament one from the other, as well as marked out / ( 
what were valid from what were invalid sacramental administarings; rather, 
it was the specific sacramental formula, as properly understood by the 
minister or priest or bishop, which marked a sacrament from another, and 
determined its validity in administration. Flamborough;is clear on the//.^
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matter, as I trust these few selections did reveal and demonstrate«
'[U]nderstand', in this instance, should entail: understand and properly 
perform, as in the concept of a performative utterance. It is no good ~ 
for a minister simply, in S£, to 'understand' a sacramental formula \ 
without, at the same time during its enactment, speaking that formula 
correctly. Were he to 'understand', only, but speak incorrectly, it 
could then be advanced that the sacrament had been administered in­
correctly or invalidly. i '
: The causality for sacramental efficacy is, for Flamborough, ;•
an intentional casuality. The intention of the priest, coupled with 
the proper matter for the particular sacrament, constituted proper 
sacramental administration, all other matters being equal. The 'link' f 
between the private world of an agent; and the public world of ritual ft;
(as in sacramental form),: was to be found in the intention of the agent, 
and the expression of his intention was through the vehicle of the: :•/Y:-v. 
rubric of sacramental form: its proper matter, and its proper language.
Why then does not that same kind of intentional clarity carry 
over into penitential matters ? The answer to this question may be found 
in the act of sinning itself, and as seen by Flamborough's ideal con- Yv 
fessor. One may, also, have to introduce an axiom common to Christian 
theology: if the intellect were at fault for sin, then; mirroring in 
some way its Divine Author, He Himself would be at fault for sin in the Y;/;’ 
world,;and such an assertion was simple heresy for a Christian believer. ••\ - k 
The fault, which Augustine of Hippo argued, lay in the Will of man; it , -
was the Will which produced an act, and also which desired an end. : To
i <*•/ ;
_ I
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sin was both to produce an act ( to consent and to do ) and to seek -A; A'i
a wrongful end, that object of desire1which was a wrongful object to :, A ;
be desired, /object * here being used in a very loose sense-of an at- A v Y;Ai 
tainment one sought or s e e k s T h e  Liber Poenitentialis continued on
in that strong Augustian tradition of the Will as the root of wicked- ./ v;Y
ness.
Y  : By turning to the language of Flamborough’ s advice one canYY'Y Y
observe that it is to the language of the Will that he turns, and not
to the language of the mind, to state human failings. The human will :
is not a simple convulsive or non-cognitive faculty. • To have advocated 
such would have been in bold contrast to the developed rational tradition ; 
from Augustine, through Gregory of Nasianzus ( of the De Animae ) to A A A A ^  
St. John of Damascene ( of the De Fide Orthodoxa Q . The human will wasv' A .Y'Y-A'; 
a rational appetite; it was not thought to be an involuntary response. A YY 
One may not understand how early Christian writers justified such a Y  •
conception, or agree with their understanding of the voluntary; I state
only that they did claim such an understanding of the Will.
Flamborough asks,- to take some instances, if a killing were: A; YA y Y
■: A,A - A• ■ A v A Vf’ '-v '' Y v, “• ■; A A’ • Y' 26 * Y  n*- - Y Yr, 'YY"Si quis voluntarie homicidium fecerit..." * The stress is upon fvolun- ; ;
tary’ . He speaks again of "Si quis casu non volens homicidium perpetraverit ’ A;,
..." P ’again stressing the volitive nature of an act, and not its simple A A :
intentional nature, as he would have spoken of sacramental administration
as possessing a proper or fit 1 intentionf. A ,-:YyA-A;: .‘Y  Y; ’Y’Y-Y V-YY A:Y,; X 1Y- Y;
20. ibid., paragraph 263, of page 225. .
21, ibid., paragraph 263, of page 225 . A AYY A • -A‘ Y' A ■' 'Y£:; - JC .S£A »'
1Y - .  y A A / V Y Y I
165
’ / One is constantly asked to consider the character of the
penitent, and in this regard Flamborough uses dispositive ^predicates- 
to ask about his penitent. Did the sin arise because of jealousy, 
or from greed, or from lustfulness, or from anger, all of which centre 
upon some defect of Will. One of strong character wills not to be 
jealous, or lustful, of violent, or avaricious. An act, such as 
homicide, is to be determined whether or not 11.. .de homicidio sponte 1: , 
commisso..." *, and that verbal form occurs frequently throughout
the treatise. Did the agent act of his own free will ? The con- •?:; 
fessor is then instructed to look for signs of the penitent's sorrow 
for his sinful acts. Flamborough, with regard to serious sins, uses XIk: 
the verb 'lugeat', which suggests that one deplores, or bewails, or : /
laments his past sinful actions. Verbs of this sort show that he wants 
the ideal confessor to recognise in the penitent signs that the penitent 
is voluntarily repulsed towards sin. The confessor is not to seek if 
a penitent 'knows1 only that what he did was wrong; that would be a 
simple intentional state. On the contrary, to know that an act is de­
plorable is not the same as to deplore an act which one knows to be de­
plorable. The latter state brings with it the full movement of the Will 
towards contrition. . : 3 0 -
22. ibid., paragraph 265, lines 76-79, of section xi, "De homicidio 
pro vindicta facto." The following paragraph, 266, of section 
xii; sets out the contrast, which its language reveals: "De homi- 
cidio non sponte commisso." . ; V
V v A : ; '  j
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- , ; Because the giving of absolution is; a practical judgementi ; /
Flamborough asks the priest to determine if the case is a doubtful 
case or not. If "...eo quod incertum sit sif voluntate an casu oc- 
ciderit..." the nature of the penance will turn on determining • 
whether ".. .si voluntate..." is the case, or whether "...si casu..." \
is the case. An act done with full and free commission of one's will 
iSj of the degrees of seriousness, the most serious, and, as such, 
deserves a graver penance. . ' Y- .Y. ; Y y y  Y '•/' ';_v. ' • v''YYvi-
There is, then, a sufficient tradition connecting Christian YY\ 
mediaevalists one with the other that Bracton could draw upon. What 
we do not observe in the Bractonian presentation of culpability is any; 
minute or detailed analysis of human faculties, as we observe in the : Y : " 
writings of the various theologians (writing in an Augustian tradition) 1 
up to the Twelfth and Thirteenth centuries; nor do we observe the de-Y-lYY 
tailed conceptual model analysis of human faculties which early scholastic 
Aristotelians will present in their effort to explain various modes of 
human behaviour. One is left to assume that Bracton drew upon the re­
ligious corpus about him, and one cites certain leading authors to show £/'
how reasonable it appears to make these assumptions that the period did
influence his compilations pf the law which was concerned with human
culpability and criminality. One seeks out the traces, some authors more
23. ibid., section xviii, "Si domina ancillam per iram occiderit" V y ' Y 
at paragraph 273, page 228. In passing, this lenient attitude Y/V I
• towards the killing of slaves survived at common law until the • y ' \^YY 
^niddie of the nineteenth century; but we are seldom not creatures . ; ; 
beyond the mores of our own times. ■ \ r;.' ; , 1 Y Y  - VY'. :yvyy
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others showing stronger, trace elements in Bracton. -
When we come to view that portion of Bracton\s De Legibus ; 
in which he discusses the crime of homicide ‘one has to accept that 
his (Bracton*s) claims do not justify or explain all that he(Bracton) : 
hopes will be justified or explained. Bracton asks both what is homi­
cide and why it is so called, " Hence we must see what it is and why 
it is so called, its various kinds, and the punishment imposed." *.V 
Thorne notes that this definition follows out, in the main, from the 
Summa de casibus of Raymund de Penafort at ii, 1,1. One will recall * 
that Raymund*s statement read as follows; and I shall from De homicidio 
at Tit. 1 of Liber Secundus, the first paragraph, using the Tallini text:
"In prima parte dictum est de quibufda [the Verona text reads: , 
quibfdam criminibus at page 137] criminibus, quae principaliter 
Deum committuntur; in hac secunda parte de ijs, quae in proxi- 
mum specialius committuntur, agendum est: § primo de homicidio. 
Videndum ergo quid f(s)it homicidium, § vnde docatur; quae eius 
species, qua poena homicidae puniantur, § quae dispensario fiat 
v erga clericum homicidam." (T: page 145) ; ,
There is an undeniable parallel in what Bracton set out and in what Ray- 
r mund had written. .**•. - / • ’* \ •?-y.V /^•
24. Through I cite Volume Two of On Th,e Laws and Customs of England / f* 
as translated and revised by Professor Samuel E. Thome of Harvard :•
; (Selden Society and The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, /
; , 1963), and shall henceforth cite it simply as: Thome, 11, giving
/ / the pages from the volume. The portion on homicide is taken from
DE PLACITIS CORONAE, at pages 340-342, entitled: The crime of homi- 
cld° anc^  the divisions into which it falls. [ Cte crimine homicidii •:•• 
et qualiter dividitur.] I shall cite the English translation in 
the body of my text, and place the Latin original in the footnotes/
25. Op. cit.y:Thome, 11, page 340: " Et under imprimus videndum de :v ;
; Koinicidio, quid sit homicidium, et under dicatur, quae eius species,
et qua poena homicidiae puniantur."
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Bracton accepts that a distinction rests between spiritual 3; :
and corporal homicide, but he chooses only to develop the meaning ' A -
of corporal homicide, which he states to be "...the slaying of a man
by man." * The stress is not upon the man dying, but upon how his v -
death was brought about. This is made clear, but without offering a;;'; y5 ;v 
reason for the distinction, when Bracton says, " If it is done by an 
ox, a dog or some thing it will not properly be termed h o m i c i d e 27*
The victim is killed (bodily), and his death is something which the 
other, as agent, causes.; But cause is not a simple empirical connective, 
as in A stabbed B, and B died. The cause of a victim's death can be 
brought about by word (in three ways ) and by deed ( in four ways ).
One turns to some state of the agent to determine the.nature of the ' 
agent's act. Beneath the historical circumstances which surrounded the 
actual making of law and custom 2**a fundamental mental principle runs I; 
through common law, following it to our most recent decisions of this
day:namely, however embodied and expressed, responsibility for a criminal;
26. Thome , 11, at page 340: . "Et est homicidium hominis occiso ab
homine facta." . *'/<;  ^.• \ ; *
27. ibid. , "Si enim a bove, cane, vel alia re,: non dicetur proprie 
. • homicidium." • : ‘ *;■ . • • ' •V'’ ;'. ; '
28. I am not concerned here to develop historical justifications for how 
common law principles evolved through their various historical stages,; 
as, for instance, Professor Kaye might have been in his articles on 
the early history of murder and manslaughter (L.Q.R. July, 1967) which 
involved him in actually reading early court records in manuscript form, 
Even Stephen (page 29) in volume three of his History of the Criminal i 
Law (Op.cit.) confesses that he does not understand Bracton's dis- 
tinetions between homicide as lingua and homicide as facto, although 
he does understand the divisions under deed. For the philosopher it
is sufficient that distinctions were attempted showing that even in 
early criminal codification stress is upon what an agent does, however 
opaque the distinctions seem. Opacity is, and has always been, a major 
legal hazard in the development of the law, as dissenting judgements 
- ; stand to demonstrate. :7vk'V--
/. ; . act rests, in an agent’s state of mind. Criminal guilt is, although Y ; y
: ; Y; v a tortured and difficult process (perhaps) to determine through means (■YYv.Y;
of a tortured and difficult trial process, that which indicates or Y ' Yy••,; \
; symbolises a guilty mind of the agent. The criminal law wi,ll keep
Y'V:> returning to the agent, even in a modified form when the 'law* assumes /\ =
that an agent 'should have foreseen' the 'natural consequences•' of h i s Y  Y YY 
, act. That formula, however, must be struck down in cases of insanity,Yy y YY,
Y , ; which return to the state of an agent's mind: that he couldnot fbnn ; V Y Y.
; ,Y-' a criminal intent (for whatever reason), and thus his 'mind' could not Y y YI
; ; ; .. contain 'guilt' for his act . These are general principles, but as Y ’> YYj
; general principles they are rooted early on in the common law. Bracton .
has drawn upon the sacramental tradition, and upon the moral tradition Y YYY 
Y of the canonists j the yeast of both traditions at work in his early ' 'vY''v Y.Y;' ;-:Y •
Y ; Y’-Y- codification of the criminal law. The sacramental tradition was con- Y ; Y: YY
cerned to establish that a sacrament, by means of its matter and form, ,
Y  ' Y could be administered properly, and it did so (in part) by developing
Y;..YY-Y" > the doctrine of sacramental intention which was present in Twelfth and. y  v Y
Y Y ; Thirteenth theological writings about the nature of a sacrament. The
Y Y moral and canonical tradition needed to establish that a penitent could Y
Y : Y : sin, and also that he could be sorry for His sins. /.this: double-sided ; YV;YY.YY:'-
Y Y :y* Y, Vi aspect of sin (its commission and its contrition) involved both cognitive— -
; and volitive elements: one knew that one sinned, and one willed not to. Y
YY Y : ■ Y Sin; again. The power,; in part, rested in the agent to know w h a t  h e  h a d  Y :YYi^
i done (and, by implication, what he could do) and what he should do. By YYY'-; Y'Y<-
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which serve to form a conception of what is a unified human act, and 
to which some concept of responsibility might attach.
Bractonfs divisions of the crime of homicide provide us 
with little new conceptual analysis. His analysis is fairly much an 
accepted following of earlier theological divisions, save that he does 
bring into his criminal division the statement that the mind of the 
offender, in some way, determines the nature of the act. The link 
between design and execution rests in the intention of the agent, and 
Bracton speaks of it in this way: ;
- , . " ; "But it is homicide if done out of malice or from v
. pleasure in the shedding of human blood [and] though
; the accused is lawfully slain, he Who does the act
commits a mortal sin because of his evil purpose. But 
, ' . if it is done from a love of justice, the judge does not /
• ; sin in condemning him to death, nor in ordering an of-
7: ^icer to slay him, nor does the officer sin if when sent -
■ : by the judge he kills the condemned man. But both sin
; J; ; if they act in this way when proper; legal procedures
7 have not been o b s e r v e d (29) . \.v: ^ ^  v: 'V7'■''/
Q : V 29. Thorne, page 340. The Latin text reads thusly:
"Istud autem homicidium si sit ex livore [ in the tropologic 
v ■ ; ; Xh . sense the second-order meaning of the term is: envy, spite,
malice, ill-will ] vel delectatione effundendi humanum san- 
guinem, licet ille iuste occidatur, iste tamen peccat mortal!- 
ter propter intentionem corruptam. Si vero hoc fiat ex amore 
iustitiae, nec peccat iudex ipsum condemnando ad mortem, et 
w  praecipiendo ministro ut occidat eum, nec minister si missus 
a iudice occidit condemnatum. Et peccat uterque si hoc fece- 
rint iuris ordine non servato. " (page 340)
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The ’intention1, if one attends to the Latin text, is not the intention 
of mens rea; it is the concept of intention which is qualified by a
volitive use of a participle as an adjective, ie .•corruptam1 tells v
one the nature of the intention, "...propter intentionem corruptam." i 
The notion of 'corruption1 followed on in the tradition of St. Augustine; 
of Hippo, that the will, as a human power and faculty, was the seat of 
human corruption. ; . :; .. ; . ; - w /  :• ' V -; V
. I am not trying; to make much of little; but I am concerned ; ;
to argue that if one accepts the notion of intellect that mind cannot 
help but know what is presented to it, then ( within Augustinian theory ) 
evil (within its many manifestations) must spring from the human will.
The priority of value within the casual depiction of a human act will ;
be to attribute to the will the power of being a first cause (however . 
difficult it may be to account for such a notion without at the same 
time.encountering logical paradoxes), and, as a first cause, it may 
or may not embody what it Ought to follow (namely: the good). In any 
case, if one is to have a notion of criminal responsibility (derived,
as it can be seen, from a notion Of theological rectitude) which is
coherent, it makes no logical sense to punish, or to extract any form 
of retribution, if, hypothetically, a theory of human acts is advanced 
which holds that human acts are non-rational in origin . The will , it 
must be argued,' although it may not follow what ought to be the case : ,.
by seeking the highest good, will, nevertheless,; rationally follow , : 7
after some good which is desired to be the case. An evil act ( and, 7- 
by force of similitude for Bracton, a criminal act ) must be a rational 
.act.'*' '' .'•'' • : •. '“
J
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: A mis-emphasis seems to occur when (in theory) one confuses v7
that "one may elect to do" with "one should have done." In general, 
to argue for criminal responsibility it is hot common to have as a v 7777:;7:7 y 
part of a theory a developed concern why an agent may do less 'than-; ;-V:V 7,7''777777  
what he can do, or should do. I am aware, however, that the law will / "V ':7-7y77 
entertain capacity hearings to determine if one is sane, or if a child y
has the capacity to appreciate the meaning of a criminal statute under 
which he is charged *. It is when one turns to a theory of excuses 
or exemptions under the law that one will then concentrate upon the question 
of why an agent did less than he should do. The roots of the assumption
for us in this culture may be Pauline: that one tries for the good, but
does evil, even against one’s willy That is a mystery I am not attempting 7 7\;7 '. 
to solve here. 7 . . ’y;" '• \7yt.t77:'7v7V '77 y%.y7; .7-;; 7 . . . f. . . .-v/7 :yy
The principle had; been part of common discourse of the period that ' 777 V ■ 
1intention* determined how an human act was to be viewed. But such viewing, 7 
if I may press that metaphor, embodies a two-step distinction. First, what V;
made an human act meritorious or not was that such an act had to be an 7
human act, and the humanness of an act rested upon an intention. An intention, 
however, possessed an adjectival quality: namely, the intentio was either a -7 . 
good intention, or it was a bad intention. We can *call to mind tha.t Abelard 
himself had carried forth the distinction that intention was the arbiter of 7 
virtue in these words, ”.. .quod intentio sola separat." 7 • • v :7.:;-7';7-;7:
29a. Cf., State v. Q.D., 102 Wn.2d 19 (1984) at 25: "Frequently, the same facts 
required to prove mens rea will be probative of capacity, yet the overlap is not 
complete. Capacity to be culpable must exist in order to maintain the specific 
mental element of the charged offense. Once the generalized determination of 77 
capacity is found, the State must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the juve­
nile defendant possessed the specific mental element ." 7 ;"y;77y;c.77 7/7 :y
30. ETHICS, by Peter Abelard (translation of D.E. Luscombe, Oxford), one reads * 
in the TE IPSUM, page 28: "It is indeed obvious that works which it is or is not 
at all fitting to do may be performed as much by good men as by bad men who are / 
separated by their intention alone." . ? y  ,*, 7 7 7 - 7 ' '  77-*' 7 * 7 7  ? 7:y7'7~777y >77.77
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If I may, I wish to issue a caution at this point. When I 
am discussing various mental distinctions, using certain mental predi­
cates, I am aware, and I hope my own prose reflects my state of aware­
ness, that I am not talking about a robot. One must readYthe writers; 
from the Middle Ages with a certain giving spirit; it is all too easy 
to hold them up to ridicule at a surface level, and this often reveals 
that one does not understand the force of their own writings. They 
were not talking about 'human machines1 which one assembled from parts 
like a 'will1 and an 'intellect' and other such components. The mind 
of the mediaeval scholar, with all due. respect for his religious as­
sumptions (as well as having an awareness of them), was set upon dis-Y 
tinguishing what was presented to him. In the writings of the period, 
from Peter Lombard ( whose Liber Sententiarum dates from 1150 A.D., 
and was the chief theological work of the Middle Ages upon which all 
scholars commented at some time or other during their writing careers ) 
to John or Joannes de Bromyard, an English Dominican of the late Four­
teenth Century (Summa Praedicantium) and follower of Aquinas, the aim 
of the writings was to distinguish. In language fitting to our own 
time we would say that, in the main, those older writers wrote the Y - 
philosophy of mind. The Latin into which they cast their thoughts; Y 
lends itself to one, generally, reading the works in English now, to 
assume that Latin nominatives indicated substantive conceptual states, 
so that one spoke of 'the' soul, as if one were to speak of 'the' goal­
post. Such an understanding of their Latin is a mi sunder standing i: and 
if one wishes to understand what they did write one should appreciate
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that the writing of the period of the Middle Ages reveals a de- ;
veloped sense of linguistic subtlety (often only discovered when '
one must render into English what they wrote in Latin). Parts of >
their treatises may be taken and quoted out of context, producing 
howlers, but one hardly considers this to be scholarship; properly, 
it is more akin to comedy to distort what one has seen. ; V  %•
The force of the gTeat church Father, Augustine, trans- • 
mitted itself, certainly, to Peter Lombard, and, I would assume, : 
Lombard would have been known to Bracton, either in the full textual 
sense, or (as we speak of knowing Freud in the twentieth century 
without having laboured through all that he has written) known to 
Bracton by general consensus of commentaries made by other writers; 
When Lombard asked "Quid Sit Peccatum'', which is Distinction 35 of
Book Two of his Sentences 31. he refines the notion of malice by
showing that sin, in itself, consists not solely of malice of will, 
but also of a capability and power to do that which is contrary to
law. The Latin reads as follows: a ,7' ; :• ; >*/■ \ r
> • "Ex prima defcriptione aftenditur peccatu effe : . , !
: voluntas mala, fiue locutio § operatio praua, . -f '
31. My edition is: MAGISTRI SENTENTIARVM LIBRI IV, Petro Lombardo 
v Episcopo, edited by F. Robertis VYianti; (LVGDVNI, Sumptibus 
Claudij Landry, M.DC.XVIII), pp. 210*41.; V 7: J: 7 ;
In the citation I have preserved the original spellings. Read 
's' for ''f', and 'V' for *u' (in some words). * i ;
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'■'ir
id est, actus malus tarn interior quam exterior: 'Y'Y.YYY.- ' 
ex altero vero tan turn oftenditur effe actus in-  ^ Y  ^ ;:
terior. Voluntas enim, vt in fuperioribus dictu Y ■
eft, motus animi eft; actus ergo interior eft. Ambr. . \ YY
YY quoque in lib de Paradifo ait, Quid est peccatum, :;Yy Yy Y y '^Y Y;
Y nisi legis diuinae praeuaricatio, 4* celeftium
inobedientia praeceptorum ? Ergo in praeiari- ■ ■ Y   Y:; YY Y Y
Y Y cante peccatum eft, fed in mandante culpa non : Y
eft, non enim confifteret peccatu, fi inter- . '
Y- '••' V *Jdictio non fuiffet. Non confiftente autem pec- -Y:->YYYv.:Yy;YY 
Y% Y Y . cato, no solum malitia, fed etiam virtus fortaffeY'' \ y y " ' ' Y ^ y:
Y non effet: quae nifi aliqua malitiae fuiffent Y tYY'y'YYYY^ Y yY
. semina, vel fubfiftere, vel eminere no poffet. - . ; Y , v i YY
; Ecce praeuaricationem legis § inobedientiam de- : ; Y Y
"YY finit Ambrofius effe peccatum" VV/Y:-— Y ; Y Y Y y YYYY,Y;- Y^ Yy y y Y'.y
There was a sufficient theological framework extant that Bracton
could, by simple substitution, read 'crime1 for 'sin'. He appears Y Y
to have codified (at 340) current theological notions relating to
the capacity to sin, the requirements for sin, and what might be ; Yi YY;
necessary to distinguish wrongful act from non-culpable and (even) V
virtuous acts. Of note is that the objective legal order in itself f
is not the last step in the chain of legal guilt. There is, yes,
a legal order, and against that order One measures the rightness or .
wrongness of acts which one does.: But if One stopped there only with
an objective order one would have had early on a strict liability
theory of criminal guilt at Work in our common law, and this we had
not. Bracton still turns to the 'heart' of a man. He does not demon- Y
strate how guilt isYto be established, no method is given; but he states
that the intention of the agent must act as the last step in the criminal
process in which guilt is to be determined. The model which comes to Y'VY
mind is still the model of the confessor and the penitent for determining
guilt; and that there be guilt; that one can find in oneself a remembrance
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of the elements of a criminal commission on the part of oneself, Bracton 
turns to intention. Intention is that which an agent produces to cause 
a change. The change may be towards a  proper end, and thus no crime 
has been committed; the change may be towards an improper (illegal) 
end, and thus a crime may have been committed. But, and this is where ; 
he twins law and morals, if ore acts well exteriorly (as with a judge 
sentencing a man to death) whilst interiorly ( by taking malicious 
delight in entertaining a wicked purpose) one acts as the: devil’ s own, 
then one has sinned. The criminal law, for the most part, does not;, 
lopk that deeply to human intentions*. , . ; ^ ^ ; 5. ; :
By carrying over an Augustinian concept of the will of man as the 
source of human wickedness, Bracton could ask about the interior . : ^ •
side* of an act. The interior side of an act is not necessarily  ^  ^;
a cumbersome phrase, as one can understand when he, to himself, might v 
resolve to *attempt* to do something, although never doing something. 
Exteriorly the ’attempt1 does not show through in the act, although (
one might observe that an agent was trying hard. But an agent might 
never have tried at all, yet might have resolved to ’attempt* to try.
[Stuart Hampshire remarked, ’’The subject is in the best position to 
judge what his attitude or sentiment is or was; for the subject usually 
knows directly and without inference what he was thinking at the time, ,
and therefore can know whether the content of his thoughts was such as to 
exclude the sentiment imputed.” FREEDOM OF THE INDIVIDUAL, Chapter 5, 
’’Determinism and Psychological Explanation: A Postscript” (1975: Chatto * 
§ Windus, London) at page 130.]
As if one needed more support —  which I believe one does not— - that
the period was sensitive to the language of intention, one may refer to
the Sententiae Divinitatis, (written between 1141 and 1147 by an author
unknown to us) to read: yy-’: V I : ' 7;^  ’ ’7 ' >v5
7 . . j"-/:'- VV ,v v ”...three things are needful that this [Eucharistic]
• change should come about: Order, action, intention. Order, that
v-;-v. there should be a priest; action, that those words should be said;.
intention, that he should utter them with the intention that the : 
v bread and wine should be changed into the true flesh and blood. i 
. , For it he utters them to instruct a deacon how to consecrate, no  ^i
. 'change is produced.”
•'" 1 Die, Ein Sentensenbuch der Gilbertschen Schule,
ed., B. Geyer, in Beitrage, VII, Munster, 1909, cited by Bernard Leeming in 
PRINCIPLES OF SACRAMENTAL THEOLOGY, on. cit., page 43S. I
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v ■ I wish, however, to pause here to comment upon Bracton's 
turning from legal stipulations, ie his divisions of homicide into ,
excusable at law in contrast to what is not permitted by law, to h i s 7 
moral and religious stipulation in the phrase, "...he who does the > • v. 
act commits a mortal sin because of his evil purpose." . .'
Until now I have argued that the concept Which we have come
to know in our criminal law as criminal intention has been a concept:
which, mixed and rich in its sources, has been rooted in a language V
which centered upon the Will. I have also argued that the dominant V 
feature of that concept has been to stress both its rationality and .it 7 
its freedom. In no wise have I meant to suggest that what mediaeval . 
and late renaissance theologians were to call the 'mystery’ of the 
freedom on the Will was in any way 'solved* by its early common law 2
borrowers. Bracton does not present us with any theory of the Will; 
in the De Legibus. If any theory is to be found, it is assumed that 
the reader (of the time) has enough religious association to know what “ 
Bracton is talking about; and for one engaging in philosophical re­
tracings, one must take hints, as it were, from the text itself, and ;; • 
attempt to make associations with what seems to be reasonable con- r 
nexions with the religious and moral tone of the age. In part I have ' 7' 
tried to follow this method by showing how linguistic echoes can be'”>' 
found which lead one back to other texts of the period which seem to . v } ‘f*. 
be germane and pertinent. The common historical assumption about Bracton
in face of the scant evidence for his textual sources has been that he v
was a theologian who knew the early law, and that both forces of learning
I-
. i appear in mixed and a confused fashion in the Dey Legibus. Apart from Y :
. Y Y Y the difficulty (even now) of the text itself, one must fill in the blank-if/YYY
Y spaces in his writing by finding and drawing upon sources which he may Y--/Y
have known (in a general sense) or drew upon actually himself,; or were - r ;• YY 
Y :\ / both drawn upon and known by his redactors. ; ’ : y --YY.Y'-Y;Yj YY":YY Y.,Y- i-YyYY
\ May I show how, for Bracton, the human, will functions in the Y
; same way both for legal culpability and for moral and religious cul- Y , ' Vi
; ; pability by contrasting a modem statement (from our own age) against
Y Y Y it which would suggest (though not with Bracton in mind) that the human Y::
>c , Y will cannot function as a harmonious and unified concept if it be mixed
: with legal and religious guilt. The statement (of theory) which I have H
Y : in mind is that made by Lord Russell^* when he said,
YYyYY* Y Y-'Vy ' Y "Praise and-blame, rewards and punishments, and the :.Y';- yYY^ YYj^ v.YY:^ :
Y • whole apparatus of the criminal law are rational on ' ; - ; , ’
■ Y.: Y:y Y Y ‘;'Y the deterministic hypothesis, but not on the hypo­
. ' v thesis off free win, for they are all mechanisms de- . ' Y
-Y-'-YYY Y'yY,Y;Y;Y;Yy- signed to cause volitions that, are in harmony with YY-Y-yY .YYY^  YYyyyY^Y 
Y? - ; Y the interests of the community, or what are believed 1
'YYY - y;- ..YY- Y---Y; to be its interests. But the conception Of * sin1 ;Y;Y; :P YyyYYy’Y;
; . Yis only rational on the assumption of. free will, for,
y;.y,.Y Y -. y , '•••• .von the deterministic hypothesis, when a man does some- .
Y y Y ' Y , ; Y --..Y Y ; Ything that the community would wish him not to do, that-y: :f'YYYYvY; ;  
,Y; Y iY is because the community has not provided adequate Yy;'V-Vy:-YY :-Yy.yYYYY;
-;y;yY:Y Y- r y Y motives to cause him not to do it; pr perhaps could : .
; Y ;; not have provided adequate motives. We all recognize
/Y,y. Y ; this second possibility in the case of insanity: a - ‘ . ./yY’Y _Y;;-;yY;jY; •
. ! Yy Y y "•homicidal lunatic would not be deterred from murder ; Y • •-• - Y^ 'YYYyYv-yyY^
Y Y , ; \-;Yf * even if he were certain to be hanged for it, and therer , -
YYY.’ -y;.-. _v-.-y - y- Y* fore it is useless to hang him. But sane people, when v $ ’i
; Y they commit a murder; usually do so in the hope of es-
Yy.;-: yYY Yf Y! ■' ;;v. • Y caping detection, and it is this fact that makes it . i- . \? ■ Y V ■; Y,y.Y.y
Y : Y  worth while to punish them when they are detected. - ,
Murder is punished, not because it is a sin and it is 
•YfYyYYY Y: YYy y Y YY good that sinners should suffer, but because the com- Y . ■
Y Y munity wishes to prevent it, and fear of punishment causes ; i
';:Y;Y’"y' v ‘.v.'Y:v most people to abstain from it. This is completely com- Y
YY- y Y. ; ’ patible with"the deterministic hypothesis, and completely Yy Y' Y YYYY’YY;Yi
Y  ^ Y incompatible With the hypothesis of'free will.” - *
Y Y Y'.YYY 32. From: Horizon, Vol .xvii, 97, 1948, the article entitled "Sin'Ypage 14 . y!
Y Also to be found as Chapter vii, "Sin" (pp:89-99) in Russell's book, ! \
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/ Tiie journey itself would take volumes if one were to examine, . 7  
by the critical methods of our times, what leading mediaeval writers 
thought was the nature of the Will in opposition to the nature of ; 77;7'77' 
the Intellect; one must content oneself with a simple statement of : 7 77
the issue, and I shall try to do so here. Against the backdrop of >7777:7 
their concept of God as a perfect, omniscient, onmi-benevolent and 7^ '777:'’7; 
omnipotent being, of whom they knew moire by way of revelation, faith 7  
and personal belief than they did by reason, argument and design, the77;-7;V7  
mediaeval mind was obsessed by two general problems: that man could •7777777/ 
sin and be held responsible for his sinful actions, and that God could- 
know that man could sin but, at the same time, was as deity in no way 77' 
responsible for the fall of man and for his subsequent human trans­
gressions.
To ask what leading mediaeval Writers thought to be the nature 
of theological and philosophical speculation, as if one were searching . .
for the wood from the true cross, met with as many answers compelling .'77:^ 7; 
in their differences as one might find in a modern department of philosophy 
were one to ask each of its members what he thought to be the exact nature: 
of philosophy. There were broad agreements, and at the same time there ; ; 
were diffuse, rich, varied, and logically discrete differences which didU 7; 
not lend to easy mixing of the one into the many.:7' . .....' 77 7
, : There appeared to be a central theme: that, in some fashion,
man was responsible for his sins, a point taken from Revelation and a 
belief in the Final Judgement when Christ would appear as final judge, 7 
the parousia St. Paul speaks of in his first epistle to the Corinthians 7.
in the fifteenth chapter. The religious belief in the physical re-7 77,77
HUMAN SOCIETY IN ETHICS AND POLITICS> (George Allen and Unwin Ltd.,1954), 
at page 97.; 77 v:-*"< ;■>.7- ^;7-7.7- • .; ;7:77 .: - ;77'7 •
>V* *.
•r-77'1
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surrection of the human body gave force to a moral belief that human 
deeds, and human failings, had consequences in the physical world for 
which an accountability was due. / The good of human acts was not in­
terred with one's bones; it arose when one arose again from the dead 
and would be used to mitigate, by the doctrine of good works, the 
evil which one had done in his past life. Howsoever strange this may 
appear to the legal philosopher , for the mediaeval mind the doctrine 
of resurrection made concrete for that mind that one's actions were 
both one's own,and to which merit or demerit attached everlastingly 
through good works or sin. ./• "-V :’;v
In contrast to the considerations of Lord Russell, Bracton, 
as with any other mediaeval, could not accept that one's actions
under the criminal sanction would be conditioned in a way which would
. V  ’V?' 0 • ;32a; •'preclude the freedom of one's will. If that were so, or if that were 
thought to be the case, then no merit, nor demerit, could attach to 
a human action precisely because that action was not a human action. 
The dominating hypothesis for Bracton, and for most mediaevals, would 
have been that, in some way (however mysterious or unexplained)}one 
himself had to decide( without overriding compulsion, which would then
* In a plea of mitigation in a modem trial one does, even if we wish 
to read this as an action in a transferred metaphorical sense in which 
its roots are submerged or forgotten, state to the judge prior to the 
administrating of sentence that the accused is possessed of some merit 
and character, and one often does so by stressing the good qualities
• /apparent in the accused's past. \ :Vv7 *' O-V
32a. Aquinas in his SUMMA THEOLOGIAE, la2ae, Q . 6, art. 6, at least
considers the question in this fashion, but gives an answer to it •
which is both confusing and unconvincing. The question is put
; by him thusly, and I cite Blackftiars text (Eyre § Spottiswoode: ;
London, 1970: Volume 17 of the series) "Does fear render an action 
simply involuntary ?" [Utrum metus causet involuntarium simpliciter.]
serve to lessen the power of one’s will ) what one would do, or would .•.;
7; \ not do, as to choice. One could have before oneself the terrifying. 7 77 7 7" 7
k image of eternal damnation ( as had Dr Faustus, for instance, in 1:7 - , .
Christopher Marlowe’s play ), but if that image did not paralyse one’s 7 7./77.7 v7.7 
will and paralyse one with fear, then one was not relieved of respon- . , ,,k
sibility for his actions. Could one’s will, however, be overborne by 
fear , to such an extent that it would permit one to argue that it was '7.77 7'. ,7 :.J 
not the person who acted criminally, but was some aspect of this physical 77 177
1 creature which acted ? It is a hard position for the criminal law to . '7.\77_r7 ;7
v . admit for two reasons. First, as a theory in and of itself, how then does 77 7771
-777 one account for actions predicated of a person, but not by the- person! 7770-v , V --7
7 Secondly, the practical problem: will juries accept into evidence that : 7  7 ; 7
V" . one’s voluntary powers; can be suspended ( as seem to be in hypnosis ) ,7but '{'■/ .7 v;
7 7;: that one is fully conscious and is not hypnotised', yet one is moving as 77^7 7 ^
would any other conscious person move, save for the fact that one’s will: is77-7-7/77-7:
•77-' .7/ -7-: 7 ; '7',- -7. 7 - .'-7 ‘ ..7.;,' 7 •' '7" .= 7 7  337’' . • . 7  7 ;7;7;abated, or over such a power one does not have personal control ? *
There is a further problem for the law. Assume that indeliberate actions k. ::
7 can be accounted for, in which the power of the voluntary seems not to be . k: 
operable in the person, this question then arises: Are we advancing an in­
; sanity defence, but under a newer guise ? We seem to want to say, ” I was . . :
not myself, but I was not insane.” It may be too fine a distinction for law. ,
7 7 33 . We have current cases where the court permits a consideration that one *s; 77777
f s , will was overborne because of fear or duress. Consider, R. y. Hudson, and 7 77 7:
7, R. v. Taylor, [1971] 2 All ER 244, re/ the question whether threats had 7 '777'777 7;
7;7 overborne the will of a juror, -causing him to testify falsely. However, in 7 77"77 kj;
V U.S.V. Hearst Cl976) (9th Cir.) F.Supp. , the:court did not accept 7 . 7  
the: defence that the defendant had been ’brainwashed”, making her seeming 7 7 7 7
; voluntary actions actually to be involuntary, or non-voluntary, actions.777^ 77-7777 
The civil law of marriage will permit the contract to be vitiated if the ;;?:77.7 
will of one of the parties to the contract has been overborne In some fashion 7 >71 
(which nullifies consent to the union) . , ;  ^77 j
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What then is;a mortal sin, and how does it relate to the com- -
- mon ' l a w : ? ,■.= ■’ ■: / ■' -:’1 v ’ -  v*" ' ••: •: -7 ^v *-‘ ’ . 1 \ ' \ -0
For the purposes here of legal analysis, it is the difference 
within a legal system between crimes of a serious nature, and crimes.; 
of a less serious nature. A number of common law jurisdictions carry 
over the distinction between a felony and a misdemeanour, and then, 
even make further distinctions by talking of the "grade" of the felony, 
as when it is said that murder is a Class A felony, or that manslaughter 
in the first degree is a Class B felony, or assault in the third degree 
is a Class C felony. When one spoke of mortal and venial sins, two dis- 
tihctions were thought to obtain in religious law. It was thought that 
a definition could attach to each sin, setting out a definition of the : 
sin, and then setting forth obvious examples of such sins. The second 
condition ( much like the obverse of a coin is to the reverse of coin ) 
pertained to the state of the agent himself: namely, he had to fulfil
- within himself certain subjective conditions, which, like immediate ; 
knowledge which only a perceiver has, only he and God ( because of his 
Omniscience ) were presumed to know fully whether those conditions wero 
present ( fulfilled) or absent,(unfulfilled ).\ It was assumed that one 
could know the nature and quality of one's acts; or* in a milder sense, 
it was asstoned that one could be aware of what one had done so that one 
had matter to present in a confessional, there and then to permit the 
penitent and the confessor to determine if one had sinned at all. It 
may have been possible, as when a confessOr artfully extracted the con-
/;\ i-
). • * 0 ditions under which a penitent had sinned, to establish if those con- 7 7
: i ditions were present at the time when the penitent sinned, or to .'re- /
move some of the possibility of self-deception on the part of- the p e n i ^ §  
tent; but the actual state of knowledge that the penitent may have had :
. when he actually sinned was, finally, known only to himself, if it was
known at all, as an agent. A certain order of discretionary relief ,
: . obtained to protect the penitent against himself, and this rested upon); / J
• : . the side of the confessor to distinguish, for the sake of administering
; : absolution, a penitent who may have been sinned truly, from a penitent 4
who merely (but painfully) scrupled over committing sin, which, in fact, -A;: j:)'•.;* 
f - had not truly been the case in spite of the penitent's guilt, in the ; •
: , 7; latter instance it was a condition of the sacrament of penance that a !
penitent would be bound by the finding of the confessor. The reason 
. for such a religious condition;was;for the sake of letting the penitent
put his conscience to rest, rather than endlessly worrying over the \
/ worth of his contrition. When the priest stated that he, the priest,
7 ; had absolved, the penitent was supposed to leave the confessional feeling
; and believing that he, the penitent, had been absolved fully and truly. “• 7 ;
' ' The rhetorical device was effective when counselling a scrupulous penitent
. the confessor could say, in words to this effect, "You are truly ab- 7;f7;:
: solved, and you must believe this; for, if you do not, you doubt your .
:7:: v Faith, and, by your presence here in the confessional, I know that you do . ./.
;   v not doubt the teachings of your Faith. It is a teaching of your Faith - ,
/ that I can absolve you. Go in peace." • . ' ■,
)\, . When this relgious theory transferred itself into early common.;). - ^ ;
lawi as we see in Bracton by his reference to mortal sin, it did not^doaoi
‘ - /■■'■"' f.-v! 183 : ; V £ • ■ •' A  ';.;■
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by listing sets of penitential conditions or giving a penitential analysis< . 
of matters of gravity. It was enough, simply, to make mention of a re­
ligious stipulation, which Bracton herewith did. The reference to a v 
'mortal sin' signified both exterior and interior states. There "was Y;/YYyYl■* 
something to be known; and there was a way in which the knowing could 
occur, and thus be knowing of a sinful kind. . .
v s ; - Bracton, in a compressed form, uses the language Which be- % V-YY'.’;Y-v /
speaks of interior conditions for a human act. It is language which Y:Y; y.y..;;. 
for us at present is moderately strange because it is a form of lan- yY, Y Y 
guage which tends to give the ingress ion that hypostatized entities 
or faculties are being depicted or spoken about . I think it can be '.Y..YY-YY 
said, though, that mediaeval writers, although giving the appearance ■ yYYyY 
of speaking about hypostatized entities, were not in fact committing 
the fallacy of concreteness (which Whitehead was wont to call such• 
hypostasis) . It may have been a simple case that Latin, as a form :' • viy* -, 
of expression, lent itself to such apparent hypostasization because ' .•Y Y-Yy 
of its case structure. Mediaevals, by force of their understandingy 
of the nature of first and second intention,were generally careful 
to distinguish those sentences which referred to objects from those 
sentences which referred to constructions of language, or ens rationis. r 
; '[Mjortal SinY as a category of rebuke occurs freely through­
out mediaeval theological treatises. Philosophically one may read the 
appellation in neutral form to mean: it is forbidden, or it is throughtv 
to be serious. But however one wishes to read the usage, when an a c t V )Y/Y 
was deemed to be or have been mortally sinful, it meant that certain ■ Y Y?Y
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conditions were present, and, also, that certain excuses did not obtain. 7
When Bracton, for instance, speaks in this way of homicide he has made j
reference to a standard case from mediaeval writing. Ishallquote him*7:777;:,7 ;7|
and then show what case is instanced:^’ 7 77  '■ . ’' 7. * - .:
- . it pf necessity, and here we must distinguish whether . 7
7; 7, the necessity was avoidable or not; if avoidable" and •
he could excape without slaying, he will then be guilty ; V ./7T7 i
of homicide; if unavoidable, since he kills without pre- 7
: meditated hatred (340) k
V ; ,.7.;' ’ 7'-. 77';:7-' 7 7 v. (341) but with sorrow of heart, in 7:y'.77-';7v,-7//7i
; order to save himself and his family, since he could not .
otherwise escape [danger], he is not liable to the penal- 7 ?
; - • ty of homicide. By ChanCe, as by misadventure, when one
throws a stone at a bird or elsewhere and another passing 
- I-.':;.^ by iinexpectedly is struck and dies, or fells a tree and : ■ . 'i:
7 another is accidentally crushed beneath its fall and
. :.7'7"\-.; - /the' like. But here we must"distinguish whether he has
7 been engaged in a proper or an improper act.” 07-;
I wish, first, only to analyse this portion, end then to continue on
with what remains of the text. W 77 7--V. 7*>*77 7. 7 ;.' 7 7 '. • ^ 7 7. .,- .7- 777.7-'7
347. ’’Necessitate, quo casu distinguendum erit utrum necessitas
ilia fuit evitabilis vel non. Si autem evitabilis et evadere
posset absque occisione, tunc erit reus homicidii. Si autem
. ;. Inevitabilis, quia occidit hominem sine odii meditatione in
: 7 7—  • motu dolore animi, se et sua 1 iberando cum aliter evadere
7 /7;; non posset, non tenetur ad poenam homicidii. Casu, sicut pet -
infortunium, cum aliquis proicit lapidem ad avem vel animal et 
alius transiens ex insperato percutitur et moritur, vel si quis
arborem inciderit, et per casum arboris aliquis oppfimatur, et
huiusmodi. [capitals, mine] SED HIC ERIT DISTINGUENDUM UTRUM 
7 / 7 QUIS DEDERIT OPERAM REI LICITAE VEL ILLICITAE. ”  . 7 v  7
Thome, op.cit. : .7 .-7-/ - 7 ' 77 ' -7 7 ;' ; - 7 " 7; 7 7
'■ V  7 J
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. .  ^J ; v In order for ah act to be thought to be mortally sinful ; yy'*V'j-.-
it had to possess certain elements. What one did had to be serious; yy‘ ' * ,’?yj
• one had to know that what he did was serious; one had to consent V f ;
. • . : • ' • •' . - ’ ; , , ■ 35 "■ •'** • v  .yy'.■• ■' .... y  ryy • y y:freely to his doing what was serious . * The guide was religious, j
. : 35. Aquinas expressed the difference between mortal and venial sin V yy y y^y-y
by means of a comparison, and I shall cite his text. I shall •
cite the fine English translation of the late Joseph Rickaby, S.J.,
; [AQUINUS ETHICUS, vol. 1, London: Bums and Oates, Ltd/. 1896,
: pages 208-209] and shall cite the Latin text from Latin-Engli sh
 ^ ; V; edition prepared by John Fearon,0.P., entitled SIN, which is : :
; : , V volume 25 of the SUMMA THEOLOGIAE in the Blaqkfriars series > -
• [Blackfriars, 1969: London], at pages 42 8 44. 5 r
'The difference of venial and mortal sin follows upon the o v
\ ; diversity of inordination that enters into and makes up sin. y ,
. - T For there is a twofold inordination: one by the withdrawal of Hy-y
the principle of order; another where the principle of order is i;.i
maintained, but some inordination occurs in what follows upon • v ’;v'! 
? principle. Now the principle of all order in morals is the j
: v: ; : last eiid. Hence when a soul is disordered by sin to the extend 5
;  ^ ; of turning away from its last end, that is, from God, to whom
; : it is united by charity, then is the sin mortal; but when the y :
: disorder stops short of turning away from God, the sin is venial. y • J
....For in speculative matters he who errs in principle is beyond .'-yy.^ yy y,: 
yy V the reach of persuasion; but he who errs indeed, but adheres to y Vy • 
:: y- V  y first principles, may be recalled by the aid of those-'same' princi- ■■yyi:y
plea. And so in matters of conduct, he who by sinning turns away y yy . y y 
;. ’ from his last end, supers a fall that is^ so far as the nature of /
. ' /y the sin goes, beyond repair, and exposes himself
everlastingly. But he whose sin stops short Of turning away from ' f ,
,: y God, is under a disorder that by the very nature of the sin admits yy
: ; ; of repair; and therefore he is said to sin vehially, because he
y : does not so sin as to deserve never-ending punishment.’! y ‘ yi
y The Latin text reads as follows: V] vV‘-V ' V’,- yy— . .;yy
y v . "Differentia autem peccati venialis et mortal is consequitur y !
diversitatem inordinationis, quae complet rationem peccati. y Tyi - y-yy- 
yy -.'.v Duplex enim est inordinatio: una per subtractionem principi
yyy' > ordinis; alia qua, salvato principio ordinis, fit inordinatio • y •
yy-.y.-;.;y . circa ea quae sunt post principium. yy-'V:'-';y y.- yyy-y:;yjy^;:^y:’;,y
y y Principium autem totius ordinis in moralibus est finis ultimus, yy .
y';. - y '  *: 'y.y -'[and: this is deleted by Rickaby: qui ita se habet in.•pperatiVis.y y;
y : y sicut principium indemonstrabile in speculativis, ut dicitur in yy'C‘- yy/y?
:yyy'r:y,.y. Ethic (Ethics,;. Vll, 9. 1151al6-17] y; .vy ^ y ;: \!yy y ' y V; y
the Church defining in its teachings what was or was not sinful . 7; 7777- 7 yjj:
; , (The passage to which Aquinas refers is rendered by Ackrill 7 / 7 ?
in His translation of the Nicomachean Ethics , 1151 a, 15-20, *
at page 143 [Faber 5 Faber, 1973] as follows: "For virtue 
ajid vice respectively preserve and destroy the first prin- I
ciple, as the hypotheses are in mathematics; neither in that - * ~ .
-case is it argument that teaches the first principles; nor is a:7 ■. 7:7 i 
it so here - virtue either natural or produced by habituation 
' is what teaches right opinion about the first principle. Such 7
a man as this, then, is temperate; his contrary is the self- v 
• ; indulgent.") ;o7' 7 '- / .  //. •'- - .:77'; v. v 7 7 %'77- 7
With regard to moral order; Fearon, in his gloss on the text 
notes, and I quote, " By moral order; St. Thomas means a se­
quence of moral decisions. In this sequence, intention of 
ultimate end or goad not only preceded choice of means chrono- y !
logically, but also determines which possible human actions are 7/77
'• apt means .:"' (page 42) ; / • ; " ■ :  7-.'7; 77 ; ;)•;• v ’.77'
. 7 The Latin text continues, # " .
"Unde quando anima deordinatur per peccatum usque ad aversionem 7 7":77
ab ultimo fine, scilicet Deo, cui unimur per caritatem, tunc est 7 /7
peccatum mortale: quando vero fit deordinatio citra aversionem a 7 7*7
7- 7 -Deo.,' tunce est peccatum veniale....; ■ • ... 7 7 • ./ • •’ '7 7 . 7/'777\7:777
"Nam *n speculativis qui errat circa principia, impersuasibilis 7
est: qui autem errat salvatis principiis per ipsa principia re- '' 7 77 .77 
yocari potest. [Fearon adds to the Latin text, "The author has 7-7.7 77777 
in mind science which would be deductive, rather than science in 
the sense of empirically attempting to verify a hypothesis.}: 777 7 77.77 77 
7: "Et similiter in operativis qui peccando avertitur ab ultimo fine, 77. 7 7
quantum (42) A,., A - • 7 7 .7' 7- ' 7 '7 ' 7 .777- -7 7 '‘7 7 7 ; ; '7; ' 7 .
7 7. (44) est ex natura peccati, habet lapsum irreparabilem: ; ;7
et ideo dicitur peccare mortaliter aeternaliter puniendus. Qui vero);7'7 )A 
a peccat citra aversionem a Deo, ex ipsa ratione peccati reparabiliter 7 
deordinatur, quia salvatur principium: et ideo dicitur peccare 7 7  ,/
venial iter; quia scilicet non ita peccat ut mereatur interminabilem" .7 7?;:
7,7 poenam."*'7 7 7 '7 >7-77.‘77; - 7-7 . 77':.7-'7 7 A.77' 7 7’:777 1).7 7  /:\7 v7 7 :-7' - ./77;
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It was assumed that one then knew what one ought to do. The broad 7
moral definition and hor tat ion was ’do good; avoid evil' and this 7'7777';7;
had its roots, certainly for a lawyer, in Roman law: primum non 7' 7:7 77:7 7777- 
nocere, avoid causing harm. But how then does one move from an act ;
prohibited by law to committing a mortal sin, as Bracton asserts ? 7;:Y  7:7;7,
: 7 . The move is accomplished by the apparent twinning of con- .
cepts. If the social order did not violate the canons of the 
religious order, then what one did socially one also did with re- : 
ligious approval, save for the broadly unimportant area of neutral / /' 7( 7 7. "7 :>7 
human acts. If one were commanded to do good, one was also com- . 7 Y :vV7,7 
manded by the voice of conscience to seek the good. A social order 7; 7 7 ; .'.V' 
inherently wrong (and for mediaeval thinking this was a state of ; 7: 7 7
affairs almost impossible because it was thought that some social;5. 7 > 77
order, however bad, was: better than no order at all) was an order ,
which one would notj voluntarily, seek (if one sought the good). It 
could also be said that a social order which were inherently WTong 7
would be one, ipso facto, which would not possess a valid legal ;: 
order—  but one could object to this statement on one of two. 7
grounds . It may be empirically the case that most observed social 77---'VY >7- 
orders, fitting such a description, were not possessed of valid '
(ie justly ordered) legal processes, but it would not guarantee t^t 7 ’77;v: 
some social order might not be just, although apparently unjust. 7One >7
might object to communism as a social theory that it was considered • U ;; 
to be unjust, but it could ( and very often does ) possess a sound "7./: 
legal order. The second objection is trivial, but possible: one could >77 > 7
imagine a social order in which, as a hobby, all followed:just procedures,
7, iv Y x\  " :
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but in their heart of hearts al 1 were unjust. To that set Bracton .; a'.;a7 . 
would say they sinned mortally because they had no love of justice-(340) . 7  
I am not suggesting that the social order of society did, 77 7,
in some necessary manner, follow a set of beliefs thought to be divine. ;
What I am suggested is that the text of Bracton, where he introduces 7 A
the concept of a mortal sin, does so as a measure by which a social). ...
act)( in this instance, a legal act ):can be judged privately. One .
may, within the set of one's beliefs, . observe that one's acts h ave ; 7 7 ) .
a double side to them, and it is the presence of such doublersidedness 
which prevents one from interpreting Bracton solely as a lawyer who 
set down legal stipulations and: legal theory pure and single. He did 
not, as the text tells uis. . :. 'a -7 • 7 - 7 7 7 ; ,. 7 ;A A- 7 'a .- .■
7 It is from the insight from the text that Bracton is writing, 7 )
often, from dual view, that of,lawyer and that of theologian ( in that
he borrowed theological texts ), that one must first unravel his re-.
ligious assumptions with regard to law before one can.appreciate his 
'pure * legal concepts. One will not, with the state of the manuscript 
tradition what it is, find sources for every section in De Legibus; even 
to suggest this seems to deny Bracton's status as a writer . He did; not 7 7 . ..
beg, borrow and steal every line; indeed, very far from that. But his 7
touchstone for legal theory appears, the more one examines his texts, to : 
have sprung from the developed religious ideas of the period. In the 
range of the word 'religious' I wish to include writings which were77 77') • 
theological, philosophical (as, for instance, is the Summa Theologiae), 7
or canonical, as were the various commentaries upon Gratian. The writing 
of the mediaeval period ranged over all categories without much distinction,
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save for such treatises which dealt directly with philosophical or logical 7 
commentary. ,v  , • Y Yv ' ■'■•;;'Yv./ 7 -YYY. Y Y ' .•' V  A Y-;': - Y  Y/YY ;Vy  YY'
Bracton does not set out to ’prove1 his stipulations. HisYYfY YYY; 
notion of the voluntary, as opposed to quotation from Lord Russell 
which I wished to cite as a comparison for sake of contrast, was that 
as an expression of the Will (of man) it functioned both in civil and V 
criminal law, and it also ruled in matters of conscience (as the appeal 
to the concept of mortal sin illustrates). Not only did one have a v7;
common world of legal and religious propositions of law; running side 7 ; :
by side (to employ a metaphor), each however possessing an identity of 
its own, but one also had a common power which ranged over and was 
requisite to each system: the Will. It was the 'will' which directed 
a man to act legally; it was the ^will' which directed man to act re- ; 
ligiously. In modem law we see such track theories of law. In the Y , ! 
United States of America, or in Australia or Canada, there are laws k; 7 
which affect each State or province; separately, and one is bound by k-iW ? Y 
them; there are laws, too, which are federal in nature, and are distinct Y 
from the laws of a state or of a province. The double division is 
clearly understood by an appeal to American law. Each state is sovereign Y, 
..in. the union, and, precisely as an independent state,possesses its own 
distinct set of laws; but as a member of a federation (the ’united’ Y ’ > 
states which make up ’America’) the federation itself has a set of laws YyY;, 
known as Federal Laws. The independent states possess their own courts Y 
and procedures; the federal government possesses its courts and its Y ;yY-- : t  
federal procedure. Though there may exist some similarity between the 
procedures of the two systems, each is a distinct system, and the features
■* ‘ /v  * .
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of one do hot bear any controlling influence upon an other. Bracton 
seemed familiar with the two worlds of law, and, like so many of the 
period in other writings, moves freely from one conceptual sphere to 
the other. " j ,y . V - f '' ,: • . . ;'': yy, v
How Bracton viewed the operation of intention is found in ay' 
number of steps which one must isolate from and comment upon in hisi 
text.: There is no proper order for this analysis that I can perceive, 
so I shall begin by isolating his appeal to canon law;' which tells one 
not what intention be ( as one might give a formula for a chemical, 
or isolate an enzyme which causes and induces a Convulsion ) , but 
advances a concept of necessary condition for a licet act. The theory
which Bracton uses is one which goes by the shorthand name of: versari
y V--' / ' '• '36 ''' • VV-'IN*-- ‘.V /-'V • ' ' ■ *:in rei illicita. * It follows the common law to this day, but not in
that Latinized form, as a modified form of a doctrine of natural or y:
probable consequences, and in tort law functions under the doctrine
of f foreseeability *, y \  *y; y V-’y:-‘' 7' .. : " yy' 7 V;.y'y W
The Latin text, of Bracton (341) reads as follows, :
"Sed his erit distinguendum utrum quis dederit operam 
; :;y 7 . rei licitae vel illicitae." V  7 7 .7y: '■■7/
7 ■ y-y'7’ \ y'7.7y. • . . . /■ and Thorne renders it as, "But
here we must distinguish whether he has been engaged in a proper or
an improper act." (341) y;7'' . y7-V7 y : . 7 / y 7y 7y • -.'y
36. I. R. Swoboda, O.F.M., J.C;Li, published his dissertation on the < 
% subject of imputability, IGNORANCE IN RELATION TO THE IMPUTABILITY 
OF DELICTS (The Catholic University of America Press, Washington, 
y D.C., 1941), and it offers a reasonably clear canonical history of 
certain canonical maxims, one of which is the notion;of versari 
in rei illicita. As an early study, however, some of his sources 
. yy are inexact, and some of the writing less than clear analytically;
V* V#
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• v:
; It appears to be the case when a canonical or theological
notion is grafted on to law that the canonical or theological roots 
are lost (or submerged ), and that what remains is a conclusion from 
a set of discarded premisses. There may be an interesting sociological 
explanation for such vanishings or submergences, but the simple fact 
that one can observe of legal reasoning is, often, such reasoning • - " " A "  
attempts to be economical and sparse (barring the obvious exception).
Law, or ’the1 law, functions within the world of practical and con-/; - 
ventional wisdom; its sources, when one comes to examine them at a 7 :-K.:;'i')77 
later date, are woven into the fabric of law, and the distance which .
time represents never lets one get close enough to the fabric; to be ;> 
able to observe the separate and individual strands which make up a /. 7' ' ;777 77 
larger legal pattern. By the time of Plowden notions which were in 7 7^
full flower in continental and civil law were reduced to an abbre­
viation, one reason being that canonists and civil lawyers were not
7 . ;7-A" - ‘ 7 • ' . . \ / 7  35a * ‘ •cited as a matter of form in common law, * But although they were / 7)
not cited, this did not entail that they were not used, or that their 7 - 77/7
legal understandings were not employed. Very often they were.^ *
Canon and Civilian law principles would continue to hold force in , V 7 ,
English canon law. 7: 7 :.7;7;7-;77/
Versari in rei illicita served as a concept through and by
which one could both ascertain the guilt of a penitent and mitigate
36? If one compares the early editions of Plowden, 1571 Les Comentaries...
(In Aedibus Richardi Tottelli, Octobris, 24, 1571), or Cy enfuont ;):V  7-y
certeyne Cafes Reportes... (Anno 1584) ,7 or Vn Report fait per vn ;; 7 7 77
vncerteine...(In Aedibus Richardi Tottelli, 1584) with the later ‘ "A- 7 ’
Englished edition in two volumes of 1816 which I have previously 7/ |7;
cited, one finds that the English editor found it necessary to make f "
7 apparent Plowden's Civil references to Bartholus or Covarruvias. • . . ;
37. One may note that Suarez's De Legibus appears in London,1679, from the 7press of J. Dunmore*T.Dring, B.Touke, § T. Sawbndge. 7 ; . 7 - / ; •
7J
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that guilt. It is unnecessary for me here to give a detailed historical 
analysis of the growth of the concept, save to list some leading writers
; ;■ ';'•• : in footnote form. The concept itself, and the writers who embraced and ; ^
developed it, is sufficient matter for a separate study. The logical 
form of the concept is very well expressed in this citation from Aquinas.
; ‘ It is a long citation, but it contains the nub of the notion, and I con- ;
sider it best to preserve the quotation in toto. Aquinas is discussing ' >
 ^ homicide, and the question he puts for our consideration is: Is somebody
who kills another by accident guilty of homicide ? In his Reply to the 
objections he states, and I quote; s u m m a  t h e o l o g i a , 2a2*. 64, 3> ^ ; ; 1
: < : v i "In Aristotle Vs definition [Physics 11, 6. 197bl8. lect 10], ?
chance is a cause that acts without a personal agent intending 
, it. Simply speaking, therefore, accidental happenings are 
neither intended nor voluntary. And because every sin is, as >
Augustine says [ De Vera Religione, 14, PL 34, 133 ], voluntary,
it follows that accidents as such cannot constitute sins.
}> •: What is not willed or intended as such may nevertheless be
V ^  ^ incidentally vrilled or intended. We may incidentally cause : ^
something by removing the obstacle against that thing hap­
: ! pening [ Aristotle, Physics Vlll, 4 255b24. lect 8 ]. It
; ; ;V ; follows that somebody who does not remove such occasions of ’
. homicide * as he could and should remove will in some way be t ■
V : ; . ; guilty of voluntary homicide +".
j At this point I find that the translation of Rickaby is far more
C  ^ ; ; clear, and I wish to cite it. The Latiii for the full text will
be cited several pages- on. Rickaby says,
"Hence he who does not remove the conditions from which ■ -.'V
■ : homicide follows, supposing it to be his duty to remove > vv !
'  ^ them, incurs in a manner the guilt of wilful homicide; and
v v : this in two ways: in one way when, being engaged upon un-
^  V L . lawful actions which ought to avoid, he incurs homicide;
- . in another way when he does not observe due precaution. C ' V
: • ;,V*  ^ And therefore, according to the Civil and Canon Laws, if : ;A
; : V one is engaged upon a lawful action, taking due care therein;
. v arid homicide follows from it, he does not incur the guilt
; of homicide. But if he is engaged upon an unlawful action,
; ; . or, being engaged upon a lawful one, neglects to observe due; -v
precaution therein, he does not escape the charge of homicide,; 
if the death of man follows from his doing." (pp 48-49, op.cit.V 1
+ Reference is to S.T. Ia2ae,6,3: "Can there be voluntariness without any acv
194
The quotation from the principal text continues, ^
: ''This can come about in. two ways when a person engages ’■ .7;>
. v; in nefarious activities which he should not 'have • engaged. ih>'(
or when he does not take duo care. This is why the law lays :7.'v;7 :7:
down [Decretals of Gregory IX; V, 12,23. RF 1, 157 (R.F.* ,
Corpus Juris Canonici, 2nd edition by E. Richter. E. Fried* r 
r < V 7 berg, Leipzig, 1879 > a two volume edition in which the De-
, cretals is printed) and Gratian in the Decretum 1, 48, 49. 1
; ' R.F. 1, 197-8] that if a man engages in legitimate activities
; \ and uses due care, he is not guilty of any homicide that : 7 7-;v :7>7 7
; may ensue; if, on the other hand, he engages in illicit
; ■ . activities, or even fails to take due care in some legitimate .
enterprise, he is guilty of any homicide that may occur.”
The body of the reply bears weight upon the first objection and answerX^^y^-::
to it. The objection, with its answer, I shall now cite: V : ; : v
. First, It would seem that somebody who kills another by •
accident is guilty of homicide. For we read in Genesis / >. YY;';Y:YVv' 
; , [Genesis 4, 23-4 Lamech said the following to his two \ ;
wives (Ada and Sella); . .no(e my saying well. The man ! - • , > ' ■ £
: that wounds me, the stripling who deals me a blow, I rer
• .. 7 ; ■ ward With death. For Cain, sevenfold vengeance was to be i - 3:
taken; for Lamech, it shall be seventy times as much.” The r 
Hebrew text states 77 times, the Septuagint Greek 
v v - times, and the Latin text can mean either number.] . ' ;■.. .
; 7, that Lamech killed a man when he thought he was killing an : • Y Y Y :
animal and that he was in consequence accounted a killer. :7 Y'.Y:;/;
Therefore a nan who kills another by accident incurs the ; 7
’*• -v’v fault of homicide. 7" 3 ‘ •. Y Y Y 7  Y / Y Y  . ' 7;- 77’ 7 . 7
The reply to this first objection is as follows: *7$) ;7
7 "1. Lamech failed to take sufficient care to avoid hpmicide, (7
? / .7 and therefore incurred the guilt of homicide.”
This first objection and reply (even though its biblical force is 77: 77'7;•>;
less than textuaHy accurate) should be read in conjunction with the
* My concern here, as throughout this study, is not with the meaning of ; j 7;
theological belief, nor its justification, nor with its textual ex­
plication. My reason for saying this is, in this instance, that the >
; the biblical text which is cited does not speak directly of a killing
by accident. It may be ( unless Aquinas's mediaeval objector possessed 7 7
a Latin biblical translation which is now lost to us) that one would 
have to 'infer' accidental killing from the introduction of 'stripling'; 
into the text, reasoning that a youth passing from boyhood into manhood 
could not, o t would not likely possess sufficient malice or meanness of 
' character to killdeliberately. 7 ' 7 .  ■ 7 7 .'.7 777:7-'7.:
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third objection and reply, both of which I cite: .
\ If3. Distinction 50 of the Decretum contains many canons
which impose penalties for accidental homicide [Gratian,
V Decretum 1, 50, 4-8. R.F. 1, 178-80]. But it is only
fault that renders a man liable for punishment. Therefore 
, he who kills a man accidentally becomes guilty of homicide." 
* 3 .  Practerea, in Decretis,4 inducuntur plures canoncs in quibus casuaiia 
The Reply is: homicidia puniuntur. Sed pcena non debetur nisi culpa:. Ergo ille qui
casuaiiter hominem ocddit, incurrit homicidii culpam.* * *Piaaa :-r«anw»
. '’The canons impose penalties on,those who take another* s
: lives accidentally in the course of doing something il-
; -licit or of not taking sufficient care. " [ 3. Ad tertium
dicendum quod secundum canones imponitur poena his qui v ; 
/ casuaiiter occidunt, dantes operam rei illicitae (italics ;
mine) v e l  non adihibentes diligentiam debitam.] 38. y,y.y
38. Herewith appended is a reproduction of the Latin text ;
; which I employed, taken from Volume 38 (2a2ae, (J; 63-79)
/ of the Summa Theologiae as prepared and translated by Marcus
y ; Lefebure,0.P. of the Dominican Chaplaincy of the University 
- of Edinbursh (Blackfriars 19751. and entitled Injustice.
- >. . < / •  • *  arriculus 3 . utruin aliquis casuaiiter occidcm hominvn ineurrathom icidii reatum■
*  R£SPONSto:Dicendumqucd,sccunaumPhilosophum,*casusestcausaagcns : '
prater intendonem. Et ideo ea qua: casuaUa sunt, simpUcirer loquendo, non - .
; sunt intenta neque vbluataria. Et quia omne peccatum est voluntarium, :• •
secundum Augustinum,7 consequens est quod casuaiia, inquantum hujus- 1 : ' •
modi, non sunt peccata. Conungit tamen, id quod non est actu et per se :
‘ ; ; volitum vel intentum, esse per accidens volitum et intentum, secundum
quod causa per accidens dicitur removens prohibens." Unde ille qui non 
removet ea ex quibus sequitur homicidium si debeat removere, erit 
• quodammodo homicidium voluntarium. v . ' ;
*  Hoc autem contingit duplidter: uno modo, quando dans operam rebus 
illititis, quas vitarc debebat, homicidium incurrit; alio modo quando non ;
adhibet debitam sollicitudincm. Et ideo secundum jura,9 si aliquis det 
' - operam rei licitau debitam diligentiam adhibens ct ex hoc homicidium
sequatur, non incurrit homicidii reatum. Si vero det operam rei illicita: 
vel etiam det operam rei licitac, non adhibens diligentiam debitam, non 
evadit homicidii reatum, si ex ejus opere mors hominis conscquatur. .
*  ad octavum sic proceditur:1 I. Vide tur quod aliquis casuaiiter occidens . - 
hominem ineurrat homicidii reatum. Legitur cnim Gen.,- quod Lamcch
/ credens interficere bestiam interfecit hominem, ct rcputatum est ei ad
homicidium. Ergo reatum homicidii incurrit qui casuaiiter hominem y •
' A '; : - occidit. : . y' ' /; , .J; * > V • * . * ’• ;y  y V j . ’•>.*
. • v ; h i. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod Lamech non adhibuit sufheientem . -, . y  '
diligentiam ad homicidium vitandum; et ideo reatum homicidii non evasit.* . . ;
196
The body of the article, as was the custom with mediaeval
disputation, cites a text favourable to itself; in this instance the
text cited to support the Reply which Aquinas made was taken from
St. Augustine, and is as follows: V> i\'V ' v i V'v ; .
"ON THE OTHER HAND, Augustine writes [ Epistola XLVII, •
.. ad Publicolam, PL 33, 187 ] There can be no question ;■:
. / o? our beinjThcld responsible for *any evTl~that may v;'
v ' perchance result from some good and lawful action of V ■ ■ > 
ours. .Homicide may, nevertheless, accidentally result , 
rv : from people doing something good, and it cannot there­
: fore be held to be their fault." f ;
- ' '  r  I f  . ' '  - ' : . V.: ‘  ", : • "  - '• •' " ' I ' M '  \ • '
, ; L SED CONTRA est quod Augustinus dicit ad Pubiicoiam, Absit ut ea qua
' • .'V  propter bortum ac licitum facintus, si quid per hac prater nostram voluntatem
V > cuiquam mali accident, nobis imputentur* Sed contingit quandoque ut
v m ;; Ergo non imputatur fadend ad culpam.’* ] 3 9 , - , Vm
To instance what Aquinas means ( and what is meant ) by an action
the doing of which is unlawful, his second objaction and response
makes clear, both of which r cite: ; .'' : ; .. ’ :
"2. According to Exodus (21, 22-3), "When men strive 
together, and hurt a woman with child, so that there ... , 
is a miscarriage, and any harm follows, then you shall m 
" ;give life for life." But this can come about even though 
> there is no intention to kill. Therefore accidental kill- 
v ing can make a man guilty of homicide.ft 40. ’ mmv
39. Op. cit., Latin, page 44, English, page 45. : ’
40. Op. cit., Latin, page 44, English, page 45. 5
, "  2. Prseterea, Exod. didrur, Si quis percusserit mulieremprcegnantem,et
aborsum fecerit, si mors ejus fuerit subsecuta, reddet ammam pro anima.*
habet homiddii reatum. »»
' ' r M V ':4 M..
'' • V f
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To the response to the second Objection one must be aware that <
Aquinas is considering rational human acts, as the body of his .
discussion throughout Question 64, "De Homicidio” (S.T., 2a2ae. 64,1)
indicates . I give this warning because to quote out of context, y'V;
especially in so vast a work as the Summa Theologiae with its many x
self-references, may mislead a reader as to the force of a Reply
(or to the assumptions which the Reply assumes are known from .-.y.''i-.y
earlier portions of the text). A rational act, for Aquinas,■involves
one in a conscious and deliberate act. In this light his Reply ’
assumes that a reader knows that to deliberately cause an abortion
or to procure an abortion is, for Aquinas, an incidence of an act
clearly which at law is unlawful, and would be known as such to an v
agent so attempting or doing: ; y.* ; ■ : V
"2. A person who strikes a pregnant woman is doing something 
wrong [and it is to the Latin text itself that one must turn 
to appreciate that he is talking here about a wrong in itself:; 
’’...quod ille qui percutit mulierem praegnantem dat operam V;V 
rei illicitae;...], so that if either the woman or the fetus 
lies" as a result, he will be guilty of the crime of homicide, 
.especially since it is so clear that death may result from 
such a blow.** .■ ■ V'" y. ‘X -v-* ^
41. The complete Latin reply to the objection is as follows:
■ ' ■; ■ ' ■ ' t» 2.
dat operam rei illicita; et ideo si sequatur mors vel mulieris vel puerperii 
; animati, non effugiet homicidii crimen; prxcipue cum ex tali percussione 
in promptu sit quod mors sequatum . ; .
Op. tit., Latin, page 46, English, page;47. ' ; / . y
fi; v* .
198
, One may observe from Bracton's use of language, "dederit 
operam rei licitae vel illicitae...", that this format is common to 7 
the statement of the question. His linguistic formulation accords 
with that given by Aquinas to the same maxim.- I have typed the 7 'Yr.'- 
phrase in italics throughout. Y f ' * '7 7". ■ £ $ » '  7' Y Y  'ii.YY Y Y  
Versari in rei illicita l^and its Cognate forms ), if considered 
within a legal framework, was an unrefined causal statement which as­
serted that from causes flow certain effects; The 1egal concept 
which the maxim embraces is that from what is lawful, only the lawful 
should obtain or result. If other than that, say the unlawful obtains, 
then one was to return to considerations other than the agent himself. 
One Investigated intervening causes, such as necessity, or duress, ,Y 
or chance, or, in very general terms, that cause which did not attach 
to the will of ah agent. By definition; if one was pursuing that which 
was lawful, and one was acting lawfully, but what resulted from one's 
lawful actions was some harm or some consequence which was deemed to be 
unlawful, it could not then have been anything unlawful which the agent 
himself brought about. The simple model for early law, no doubt derived
42. A simple example from the period of the logic of the maxim at work is Y  
this case from Pleas of the Crown, The Eyre of Northamptonshire, 3-4 Edward III, 
(Selden Society, 1981, Volume 97 [printed 1983]), page 164: "Simon Osborn was Y  
arrested for killing Nicholas fitz Simon.t.27 July 1328; The jurors...say... 
Simon and Nicholas quarrelled on the way to a tavern...A fight broke out between 
them and Nicholas struck Simon in the head and knocked him down. Simon got up 7 
and straightway fled as best he could.,..When Simon saw that Nicholas would kill'; 
him with that staff and that he must defend himself or die, he took a small pole^ 
axe and struck back at Nicholas and hit him in the head, so that he died on the 
spot....Wherefore they say that Simon killed Nicholas in self-defence and not in 
felony or malice aforethought. And they say expressly that if Simon had not so 
7 defended himself he could not have avoided being killed." -7 7 7 ; Y  .
from religious tradition (in part), was that from good only good should ; 
flow. But a fact of practical life was that harm often flowed from 
human actions. How then was one to account for such harm ( evil, h 
or unlawfulness ) ? ■ -■ .• ■ • '
; v; The simplest model for Bracton, consonant with Canon and Civil , 
theories, was to inquire after the aim of the agent. Bracton set out i 
his legal theory with this assumption: If an agent intended ( and one
need not inquire at this point what were the requirements for an in­
tention ) to do what was lawful, then what effects flowed from the 
acts of the agent should themselves be viewed as effectsj or conditions^ 
condoned by the law. ; .■
• f V,; tet me offer a simple example from life of this: age. ’ 'If '• V*.. £^,5 
I am crossing in a zebra crossing, and am well into pacing across the 
roadway by using the zebra crossing, all oncoming road traffic must f 
stop and give me the right-off-way. Oncoming vehicles owe to me a 
legal duty to stop and to permit me to cross the road. . The Road Traffic 
'Act defines this clearly and simply, / .f ‘.V f ’NV;\ v :f;'/' V. ;f
J ; Consider then that a pedestrian is crossing the roadway in a-f:,.;'V,
properly designated zebra Crossing. Midway he is struck down, and in­
jured, by an approaching automobile. If one stops at this point in the 
example (even though it may be viewed either as an example from the law 
or torts, or as a statutory crime of negligent homicide) one may argue 
that the driver of the vehicle is guilty either of a tortious act or of 
a criminal act, or both. I wish only to consider the example in light of 
criminal law; •.- .. •' V '■ • 'vf
/tA - I ‘ The Elements of our Legal Set are simple. A driver, *p?,
has struck and injured a pedestrian, ?q', at a zebra crossing. If . >:
 ^ we appeal to the simple Bractonian formulation, that of considering
 ^ r the 1lawfulnessT of the act of the agent, then we can conclude that yy
• t v the agent brought about an unlawful act. Because what the agent was
doing, ie striking a pedestrian in a crosswalk whilst the pedestrain >
lawfully crossing, was unlawful, any consequences which flow from y y y y y  
Ayy. y y  ./ the action of the agent are themselves to be considered as unlawful. - 
The example forces us to invert its elements to show how the same 
situation at law could be considered as a lawful situation. It would yy.y
"'•• ;V :»yv-: ■'be done in this way. 1 -y - y y ty:L~' A‘ y-y;y y y ' £■■ y ; > f v y ?  0
: Had the driver of the automobile stopped his car for the sake , .
?y of permitting the pedestrian to cross (safely), then the stopping of ; y i M  "
; his car would have been a lawful act flowing, as it were, from his . ;
;• V . knowledge and understanding of the traffic code which stated that a y^--
r . : ; driver is commanded to yield the right-of-way to pedestrian traffic ;
y , in zebra crossings. The 'not-yielding* ( let us assume for sake of; the
example here ) resulted from an intention of the driver ( to continue :. <• ;;
driving on ) to do what, in this legal context, was illegal, Thus the
.y driver of the vehicle in this example instances versari in rei iilicita. A‘“: 
, His intention to continue driving onwards was, by law,, an intention which :’;'vyy
..V the law forbade by force of the rule regarding pedestrians in zebra cross-
y ings. The consequences, at law, are deemed to be punishable (by fineyyiAyy'':Vy
■ y ' b y  imprisonment, by official rebuke in a Court of law), and, in this  ^ ;
case, 'q*, the injured pedestrian, may have a right at law to redress /• //"y-'yy
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his injury , pain and suffering, and be awarded general and special 7,v7 -Y'73 i: 
damages against *p*, who drove the automobile* 7 : 7 • 7^ = Y Y  Y;:7 ;,‘:Y ?7
I have not moved to consider excuses at law, or exemptions from Y 7 '7; 
the law. When we ask what will serve as an excuse, or when we ask what 
will be an instance of a exemption from the law, it calls for an answer . YV'Y 
wider than I wish to consider here. My interest here is solely to con- 7 :7 
sider the bare and simple elements which the statement Bracton ( and Y-Y Y Y .  
even Aquinas ) produced may contain for legal analysis: "...distinguendum 
utrum quis dederit operam rei licitae vel illicitae." On its face it ap­
pears to be a notion which will strictly contain the limits of liability v 
for an act (and I say this without involving the reader with modern notions 
in tort law as to how we now may limit liability for actions ). What Bracton 
has produced is a legal container in which some limit for liability may be
; In the Braetonian analysis of criminal liability the first element ^
I have sought to isolate has been to ask what function was served by the 
maxim itself: versari in rei illicita ? I have asked this question because 7\
I believe it to be the key question for ascertaining an answer as to what 7 7 
makes an action legal under the law. For the moment I have not wished to con­
sider how the philosophical or religious concepts of ’will’ or * soul ’ may 
function for Bracton because I do not think these are first principles within 
his system. His formal model is that of legal action. He is concerned with 
assigning criminal liability for a criminal act. The criminal wrong is under­
stood as such by asking what relationship an act bears to its cause. If the 7;
cause is tainted by criminality, then the act produced by the agent will be 7
a criminal act. In the strongest sense, ’illicita’ comes about when the agent
forms an intention to do wrong. Our movement is from the realm of the infra­
mental to the realm of the extra-mental, from the aim which is posited by a 7
V
7 7 Y Y Y ’ The reason why the concept of omission is important toY 7 7 7 7 yYYyY;
;; mens rea is because it permits the law to impose duties upon a mem- j .
7 . 7  • ber of society, and thus permits the law to . hold that there may be Y  Y  Y\7 Y Y
7 7 7 : 7  7 Y; a class of wrongs which spring from the concept of duties within Yy Y Y Y ,  y
7  Y «  Y :  ■ 4 3 .  : Y 7 7 7 .  • '  ' : 7  ■ • : V'." . 7 ; . . Y • 7 7  7. ; . .  Y 7 >  Y Y - 7 Y 7 ; Y  7 7 7. , : >- one * s control. If, for instance, a landlord is negligent in not 7 , Y “ -Y*7 v
keeping his fire escapes in good repair, and, subsequently, there is . Y>\
■\ a serious fire on his premisses in which the death or injury of a v i
Y y  tenant ensues, the landlord may be charged with a form of criminal :;;77;7;:Yi;'
7 negligence for not having repaired the fire escapes. That the fire Y - Y - y Y Y
escapes were not repaired may, for sake of consistent legal theory 7 -
;Y 7 (excuses and exemptions aside), be viewed as a positive legal pro- \
Y position that the landlord did not intend to keep the fire escapes;.:'-- y Y Y Y y]:Y
7 Y in proper repair. His ’not doing’ is as positive an act at law as . YY-r 7 7:-7
Y 7 his doing, and here, by appeal to an early concept of Will to account
. 7 77 rfor omission (as well as other matters), one may show how the common r : ; :
7 Y  law grafted on to itself through Bracton, and subsequent legalists, £>
7 / a coherent theory which will account for omission at law. • ] 7 7: YY'; YY]
777; 7 77 -. : y .Aquinas,, in .the instant article, states-, and I quote, 7’;Y .7 'YYY’ ■ Y Y;r7 Y ’
;.Y]\ 'c  "V '. ” 7 77 7 Wi*.be voluntary means to spring from■ the; will. Now one,; 7-Y Y Y Y Y f #
7' 7 .. Y :.- • Y'Y '7;.-- may come from another in two ways. One, directly,] when ‘ ' :
yY Y y .  ^- it proceeds from it precisely as agent, thus heating from 7
7 ; : ; fire. Two, indirectly, when it proceeds from it precisely
: 7 Y  ; 7 v as not acting, thus a shipwreck from loss of helm. , ; 7/7!
 ^ 7 . 7 7 7  Y  "Notice, however, that the result of a lack of action is YY Y Y  7  Y;
: . 7 . n o t  always to be brought home to the non-acting agent, but 7  ■ ’
: only when he could and should have acted; thus if the steer Y Y Y  Y  7 YY]
7 ,  ■ ’ 7; ing had broken down or he were not responsible the helmsman Y YY;!
Y Y  'Y'-Y-v • 7 7 7  is not charged with/the loss of the ship. , ’]Y; yY'Y.Y:
]: Y 7 43., I would distinguish, however, ’omission’ from ’recklessness* Y ? 7 Y;
77. : as the latter term was expanded in Caldwell [1981] 1 All ER 961. 7V Y  - v]
Cf., Divergent Interpretations of Recklessness, NLJ, March 25, 1982, :j7 7
289; 313; and 336, Glanville Williams. To omit means one knows but . '
Y 7 7/ does not act upon that knowledge; to be reckless, as Lord Diplock '7 j
• 77 expanded the notion in Caldwell, meant to be ignorant of, yet to be77':-77.: YY
 ^ V\ . deemed responsible for sucn ignorance. The concepts differ. ,
 ^ formal cause, to its achievement as. is revealed in a final cause. The
achievement in this instance is the forbidden act. Bracton does not ' 
f. tell one how the act is brought about or produced. He is not, as was I Vv‘ i
/... St. Augustine, involved in legal psychology to postulate how an action v.
may proceed "ex suo animo." Nor is Bracton concerned with the possible 
epistemological problem whether one can have actual knowledge of oneself ^ m :
intending to do something. Bracton*s only concern, I believe, is to 
state that if one does intend an act, the identity at law which will at- -
r ; f. tach to that act ( its legal description ) will be given to that act by
the nature of the agent*s intention. If, however, the entertaining of /the V;- , 
f intention itself is forbidden by the law, but yet one intends nonetheless
V'.-;to intend and produce an act under governance of that proscribed intention, ;
then one has engaged in an illicit act. To engage in an illicit act is,- v . ; - : ^
by definition, to have committed a crime. • . '
. What we derive is that an intentional description under Bractonian / • v
; analysis involves two steps in its understanding. First, one must under- :
stand that an agent can intend some act; secondly, one must understand if
/ that act is permitted or not. If one took only the second element to the :
- exclusion of the first element, one would be describing tortious acts only .
r, ' (which often abandon any mens rea concept, or entertain a different burden • ! • •
of proof to establish mens rea ). For example; it is the fact that A struck
B in a crosswalk, which is the forbidden element in, the tort of negligence; - v-i
; not what A actually intended when he struck B in the crosswalk. For Bracton, ; Vm !
both elements which I have indicated must be present for legal guilt to attach
to a criminal act or omission. . • v ’- '■ , • -. •' • , < £ / » : S /V' /V
I should now like to discuss the concept of 'omission*, referring to ;
the Summa Theologica, la.2ae.6.3.,"Can there be voluntariness without any act ?"
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"Now there are cases when by its resolve and action ■
• ‘ ; y the will can intervene to break the inertia with re- y ;
spect to willing and acting, and sometimes ought to 
• V do so.. Then it can be held responsible, for the not ; • ry
willing and not acting are in its charge. Thus there 
can be voluntariness without an act (italics mine), 
sometimes without an external act though with an in­
: temal act, as when a person wills not to act, some­
times, however, without even ah internal act, as when
• -v.. yy he does not will to-,act. " ■ ■ V ■.' • • ■ • ••.. !r  ■' '■ :‘v• y.. -v.y ;■ y - . v, .’:y /•••■•. • - 44 . .vy: -yyy.:- \^‘yy.:
He reinforces the position he developed in the Reply in the three 
articles following it, and, for sake of brevity, I have reduced 
them, Latin and English, to a footnote. * My concern is not 
to develop or defend an Aquinian theory of Will; only to draw upon it 
for sake of illuminating some Bractonian assumptions. y - 3 ^ 3 : 3 ' ^
44. :S.T., Ia2ae., 6.3. I append the Latin text of the article, y ;
> " responsxo: Dicendum quod voluntarium didtur quod esc a voluntate.
. Ab aliquo autem didtur esse aliquid duplidter: uno modo directe, quod 
scilicet procedit ab aliquo inquantum est agens, sicut calefacdo a calore; >;!
alio modo indirecte, ex hoc ipso quod non agit, sicut submersio navis ' ^ V
- ; didtur esse a gubematore, in quantum desistit a gubernando. y  ,»•, ••
Sed sdendum quod non semper id quod sequitur ad defectum actionis • • ’ ' ; ,
redudtur sicut in causam in agens ex eo quod non agit, sed solum tunc 
potest et debet agere. Si enim gubemator non posset navem dirigere vel ; y \ ;;
non esset d  commissa gubetnario navis, non imputaretur ei navis sub- - , . : • ;
, . mersio, quae per absentiam gubematoris contingeret. ;
Quia igitur voluntas volendo et agendo potest impedire hoc quod est > , : y V
non velle et non agere, et aliquando debet; hoc quod est non velle et non :
agere imputatur ei quasi ab ipsa existens. Et sic voluntarium potest esse • y. y '-Z
absque actu; quandoque quidem absque actu exteriori cum actu interiori, • - • y3 v
sicut cum vult non agere ; aliquando autdn etiam absque actu interiori, . • . ; y
j ie u t  cum non vult agere."  14  o f  Volum e 17, e n t i t l e d  ’ ’ • I1/. - v
PSYCHOLOGY OF HUMAN ACTS,, translated by Thomas Gilby, O.P, ,
. (Blackfriars, 1970). / 3 / '  \.yy?; ,yy' :<• yy- - y;  ^ ;y Vv ' 3*
45. Op. cit., supra: ■ :• . y.y V' 3  yy- y • -yyy- ' / ;:. ■ . - - ' y "
"  i .  Ad primum ergo dicendum quod voluntarium didtur, non solum y y ■
quod procedit a voluntate directe sicut ab agente, sed etiam quod est ab s,
. ea indirecte sicut a non agente. *  y ' * > . . . y .
*. H Hence: I. That is defined as voluntary which issues from will, not only
. . directly as acting, but also indirectly as not acting.0'*  y ' '• • y ::- . ; 1 y: :/■ y
articulus 3. utrum vohmtarium possit esu absqtu omm aetu
ad tertium sic proccditur:1 I. Videtur quod voluntarium non possit esse 
sine acru. Voluntarium enim didtur quod est a voluntate. Sed nihil potest 
esse a voluntate nisi per aliquem actum, ad minus ipsius voluntatis. Ergo 
voluntarium non potest esse sine acru. 'V; vf . /•' , . •
2. Prasterea, sicut per actum voluntatis didtur aliquis velle, ita cessante 
actu voluntatis didtur non velle. Sed non velle involuntarium causat, 
quod opponirur voluntario. Ergo voluntarium non potest esse actu volun­
tatis cessante. ; -'i.-v-V , . . - /  ’ /V - ;;/* :*> U V
3. Prasterea, de ratione voluntarii est cognitio, ut dictum est.8 Sed cog­
nitio est per aliquem actum. Ergo voluntarium non potest esse absque 
aliquo actu. ; ■ • , ‘ '/;/, ;r ; ' / • ■ : .
sed contra, iUud cujus domini sumus didtur esse voluntarium. Sed nos 
domini sumus ejus quod est agere et non agere, velle et non velle. Ergo 
sicut agere et velle est voluntarium, ita et non agere et non velle.
resfonszo: Dicendum quod voluntarium didtur quod est a voluntate. 
Ab aliquo autem didtur esse aliquid duplidter: uno modo directe, quod 
sdlicet procedit ab aliquo inquantum est agens, sicut calefactio acalore; 
alio modo indirecte, ex hoc ipso quod non agit, sicut submersio navis 
didtur esse a gubematore, in quantum desisdt a gubemando.
Sed sdendum quod non semper id quod sequitur ad defectum actionis 
redudtur sicut in causam in agens ex eo quod non agit, sed solum tunc 
potest et debet agere. Si enim gubernator non posset navem dirigere vel 
non esset d  commissa gubernatio navis, non imputaretur ei navis sub- 
mersio, qute per absentiam gubexnatoris contingeret. .
Quia igitur voluntas volendo et agendo potest impedire hoc quod est 
non velle et non agere, et aliquando debet; hoc quod est non velle et non 
agere imputatur ei quasi ab ipsa existens. Et sic voluntarium potest esse 
absque actu; quandoque quidem absque actu exteriori cum actu interiori,. 
sicut cum vult non agere; aliquando autem edam absque actu interiori, 
sicut cum non vult agere, . . • / : •.; '• •'//; -  *
I. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod voluntarium didtur, non solum 
quod procedit a voluntate directe sicut ab agente, sed edam quod est ab 
.’/ea indirectesicut a non agente. /f. \ v /..*.• -t. r, ■:> ■.
Xia2x. 71, 5 ad 2. D t malo n, I ad 2. II S«nt xjocv, 3 • *am 2 & 3 above . 
•The teaching of this article lies behind the moral treatment of sins of omission:
m x .  71, 5. 7 * M rr '"■< ’ ' • ’V
*Note that a mere ‘negation’ of willing is not enough, a ‘privation’ of a willing that 
could and should be is required.
V. SUMMA THEOLOGIZE, ia2*. 6, 3
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V -. . V VOLUNTARY AND INVOLUNTARY ;
articU  3. can th*r* b* voluntariness without any act?
th e  th ird  p o in t:1 I. It seems not.® For that is voluntary which proceeds 
from the will, from which nothing proceeds except through some act, 
at least that o f the will itself. Hence given no activity there is nothing 
voluntary. . 7 : • •••  ^ - "• ] * '7.; . .7 7 77 :
2. Again, just as a person is said to will by an act o f will, so when the 
act is over he is said not to will. A  not-willed effect is involuntary, the
willing stops. 7> ./- ■.7 '.7 -  ^ 7’Y .. ; 7: 77 : * 7  7\ 7 •
3. Besides, knowledge is essential to voluntariness, as we haw  seen,2 
and knowledge involves activity. Hence voluntariness cannot be present 
without some activity. ’ 7t7 7v' "77 -7;7;7.:77y 7777-7
or not.
reply: To be voluntary means to spring from will. Now one may come 
from another in two ways. One, directly, when it proceeds from it pre­
cisely as agent, thus heating from fire. Two, indirectly, when it proceeds 
from it precisely as not acting, thus a shipwreck from loss o f helm.
Notice, however, that the result o f a lack o f action is not always to be
have acted; thus if  the steering had broken down or he were not respon-
to do so. , . _
. sometimes
not to act, sometimes, however, without even an internal act, as when he 
does not will to acL*» ;*.*' 7 . 7 7  ' :/ W  7  / . 5 Y Y Y Y ’ Y  '! '
Hence : i .  That is defined as voluntary which issues from will, not only 
directly as acting, but also indirectly as not acting.0
cTo avoid ambiguity, it should be observed that many manualists change St 
Thomas’s terminology. They treat his distinction between the direct and indirect 
voluntary as that between the positive and negative voluntary. They call willing 
something for itself directly voluntary, and willing something which results from 
it, as when a therapeutic operation causes an abortion, indirectly voluntary. This is 
the celebrated volumarium in causa which looms large in casuistry. On this see 
. iaaas. 77, 7i aaaae. 43, 3;\«4,7 & frj.xjo, 4 . . 7 /;' • 1 ' g i j -: 7 7 r.
/; ’ ! v ^ / V ' . V  ■ • ^ SUMMA THEOLOGI&, 192X , 6,4 ■?'I ' / V! ‘ $
2. Ad secundum dicendum quod non velle dicitur dupliciter: uno modo . ,
prout sumitur in vi unius dictionis; secundum quod est infinitivum hujus ' . \
 ^ ' • : verbi nolo; unde sicut cum dico, nolo legere, sensus est} vo/o non legere; ; ! / ' . -
ita hoc quod est, non velle Ugere, significat.w//* non legere; et sic non velle 
causat involuntarium. Alio modo sumitur in vi orationis; et tunc non ’ ••«' •' •' -  '•
; ; - : afBamatiur actus voluntatis; et hujusmodi non velle non. causat involun- .
: . tarium. \  v
■v:-; ;  ^ ; : 3. Ad tertium dicendum quod eo modo requiritur ad voluntarium actus \ ;
cognitionis sicut et actus voluntatis, ut scilicet sit in potestate alicujus 
/; • considerare, et velle, et agere; et tunc sicut non velle et non agere, cum  ^; ^
tempus fuerit, est voluntarium, ita etiam non considerare. ! V
!
. V  ' ’ VOLUNTARY AND INVOLUNTARY ■ ' ; V F >  : ; V ;.
> : 2. ‘Non-willing* has a double meaning. First, when taken as a single . ; ;
. < term, non velle, the infinitive o f non volo or nolo, not to wish or to be un­
willing. So that if  I say, ‘I am unwilling to read’, I can be taken to mean,
*1 am willing not to read*, so that willing not to read and not willing to read ;
are equivalent: in this sense ‘not-to-will* causes involuntariness. Second,
? when taken as a sentence, and then no act o f will is posited: in this sense ;
^  *to will not* does not cause involuntariness.4 , 'v,;
3. Voluntariness requires an act o f cognition by the same token that it 
does an act of will; certainly the ability to consider, as well as to will or 
; act, should lie in a person’s power. Hence just as not willing or not acting \
■ / • . are voluntary on occasion, so also is not considering. /  : ? ^ •
LI
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, In conjunction with this article, one may refer to the Summa Theo1ogiae, ! ,/
■’ ,y v.‘V ‘ \ Y- .‘ X\m r ‘ *- i v. .*•" ■ .v-Y v : k  ^4#v m; la2ae, Question 71, article 5, "Does every sin involve an action:?" \.YYm .YY
/ ; ' ; The Article! itself involves a long commentary on the sin of omission; v ;
: 'i;. r, but, without centering upon its theological topic, one may take the /> ofe'-.Y-Y/
, : , : Article to be a moderately concise statement of how an omission may v.Y ’
Y  involve an act of the will; hence, to omit may mean to intend to omit. . ,
/ • I have placed pertinent portions of the Article, both Latin and English, -y 'Ym ;
y\ ,*-■ in a footnote. :Yv y  y * • "Ym . - : ' y - . ,-Vy ; y y ; .. i-: ' y •y ' . ; y J . ' /,'y ;:~y :
■ V-a *_•,; 46..?' From the body of the 'Reply ‘-I.cite the following portions:Y k
:p ; ; "REPLY: This question arises with regard to sins of omission, y y y  ....-m y
'^YY:Y y y  y ; , and from the fact that there are varying opinions about them. Y:y '-^ v^-Y y 
. Y.\;Y;. ^ .. Some hold [NOTE: Aquinas does not name them] that every sin ;
\ 5 of omission involves activity, either internal or external.
Y;'Y-/'.' ;y -" Ah internal action is involved when one decides not to go to
;-Y'Y?Y YY-' church at a time when he should; An external action is•.in- • J.,; • •;; ' m  •; Y
/ : .. : volved when a man busies himself with other matters either
during church-time or just before church-time and is thereby : ;
v ;  y y  1 / ' “  unable to attend. .'•••• ... Y-:r Y y ; ’y - . ; Y  :
", : In many ways this latter situation is equivalent to the former*
: v V for if a man sets his mind to one course of activity which ex-
J eludes another, then he also chooses to omit the latter un­
’ . . less he is unaware of their incompatibility, in which case . ;.v’ - Y;:y -
m y/y ' Y\ ••••;.'' \ he could be guilty of negligence. Others hold the opposite \
J . point of view, saying that a sin of omission does not neces- Y./Y|(;;\Y*;Y":
: . sarily involve activity, for the mere fact of not doing what
■:./Yy YYY'y .;-; ;^:one':is bound-to do is a sin. . :
; - Both opinions contain an element of truth. If we consider in
y :’ v the sin of omission that which directly and properly pertains ;
to the concept of sin, sometimes the sin of omission is ac- V . > ; : 
" / : : ; . companied by an internal act, e.g. when a man chooses not to
: : . go to church; sometimes, however, it is not accompanied by any s j,
;, : ' ; i. act, either internal or external, e.g. when a man just simply : i/v: / /
does not think either of going or of not going at a time when 
V . he should -be" going; to.-church; r mm v m-' m m-m ;;
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. : V ;• :,%ovrever,if.ve consider in the sin of omission the causes •* >
. or occasion of the omission, then the sin of omisision must L
/  ^ of necessity include some act.* For there is no sin of :
omission unless one omits to do what he is capable of 
doing, (italics mine) When one decides not to do what he
can do there is always an accompanying reason. And if it. :
is beyond his control, there is ho sin, e.g. when one can- 
v - not go to church because of illness. /
However, if the reason for the omission is within his con­
; . trol it is a sin. The reason for the omission, insofar as •
it is voluntary, must include at least an internal act of ;
;. ' the will.• ; - ,.v ; •....;
Sometimes the choice directly involves the omission, as when 
a man chooses not to go because it would be too much trouble.
In this case the choice is properly associated with the omis- ••
Sion. Sin the nature of sin involves free will, the desire V 
. for the sinful constitutes the sin. '.■ \  : ^ Y ::;'
Sometimes, however, the choice directly involves the reason ^ ;
for the omission: whether the thing chosen is concomitant with i.
C:\ the omission (when one chooses to indulge in recreation at a  ^ ■
. •’ ••. ‘ tisie when he should be in church), or whether it precedes (when;
' v one chooses to stay up late at night and fails to arise in time'
' , v / 3(L9^;oi;*SE
A coherent and analytic presentation Of what Aquinas means exactly by ( Va 
his various writings on Will, and its relation to human actions and 
omissions, is a study yet to be done, and it is outside of; the range 
of my study. ,:Y ' f •>.
* In the language of insurance, an insurance underwriter will often ask, 
when reviewing the policy of an assured, if the risk is worth the company 
taking. For example, it may be that the assured has been involved in a 
series of accidents for which, at law, a court has deemed that he was not 
lejgally responsible; nevertheless, an underwriter may ask if the assured 
possibly caused the accidents/ however unintentionally they were caused. 
Did the assured brake his own car suddenly, thus ’causingT [bringing about 
the conitions] for a third party driver to rear-end the assured's car ?
Is the assured, if he has several fall-down cases on his medical claims,V ; 
one who tends to race about, or is he in a profession or avocation which 
exposes him to above-average risk of injury ?
Aquinas is arguing, here, for stronger notions of fault than what an *
insurance underwriter might argue when considering whether or not a ^
policyholder's policy should be renewed or not. But the 'form* of the / v- 
reasoning is similar: namely, each ask if one has contributed to the /..V’ 
chance of risk of harm, and each ask if what the party contributed to 
the risk was non-negligent, negligent, or even deliberate. ■
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46 V, contV, ': '• ' jfv v*. * •'••r'.' f>’7 “ V'V---'-• */•£' :
r -----   ; SUMMA THEOLOGIZE, mae. 71, 5 . ,  ^•-•' /. yy v
'* responsio: Dicendum quod quaestio ista prindpaliter movetur propter 
. peccatum omissionis, de quo aiiqui diversimode opinantur.
. y Quidam enim dicunt quod in omni peccato omissionis est aliquis actus
vel interior vel exterior. Interior quidem, sicut cum aliquis vult non ire 
... ad ecdesiam quando ire tenerur. Exterior autem, sicut cum aliquis Hla
hora qua ad ecdesiam ire tenetur, vel etiam ante, occupat se talibus quibus 
ab eundo ad ecdesiam impeditur. y ^
Et hoc quodammodo videtur in primum redire: qui enim vult aliquid 
cum quo aliud simul esse non potest, ex consequent! vult illo carere, nisi 
V forte non perpendat quod per hoc quod vult facere, impeditur ab eo quod
i f facere tenetur; in quo casu posset per negligentiam culpabilis judicari.
‘ Alii vero dicunt quod in peccato omissionis non requiritur aliquis actus:
‘ : ipsum gnim non facere quod quis facere tenetur peccatum est.
gatur in peccato omissionis illud solum quod per se pertinet ad radonem 
peccati, sic quandoque omissionis peccatum est cum actu interiori, ut cum 
aliquis vult non ire ad ecdesiam, quandoque vero absque omni actu vel 
interiori vel exteriori, sicut cum aliquis hora qua tenetur ire ad ecdesiam
Si vero in peccato omissionis intelligantur etiam causa: vel occasiones 
omittendi, sic necesse est in peccato omissionis aliquem actum esse. Non 
enim est peccatum omissionis nisi cum aliquis pra:termittit quod potest 
facere et non facere. Quod autem aliquis dedinet ad non faciendum Elud 
quod potest facere et non facere, non est nisi ex aliqua causa v d  occasione 
conjuncta vel prsecedente. Et si quidem causa ilia non sit in potestate 
hominis, oxnjssio non habet radonem peccad: sicut cum aliquis propter 
infirmitatem praetermitrit ad ecdesiam ire. . W y  V-:
Si vero causa vel occasio omittendi subjaceat voluntati, omissio habet 
radonem peccad: et tunc semper oportet quod ista causa, inquantum est 
voluntaria, habeat aliquem actum, ad minus interiorem voluntatis.
Qui quidem actus quandoque directe fertur in ipsam omissionem; puta 
cum aliquis vult non ire ad ecdesiam, vitans laborem. Et tunc talis actus 
per se pertinet ad omissionem: voluntas enim cujuscumque peccad per se 
pertinet ad peccatum illud, eo quod voluntarium est de ratione peccad.
Quandoque autem actus voluntatis directe fertur in aliud, per quod 
homo impeditur ab actu debitor sive illud in quod fertur voluntas, sit con- 
junctum omissioni, puta cum aliquis vult ludere quando ad ecdesiam debet 
ire, sive etiam sit prxcedens, puta cum aliquis vult diu vigilare de sero, ex
' L PL:-''
* > -'v:: *
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I have stated that I believed that the fitst element to he y 
isolated in an analysis of Bractonian criminal liability was the : 
element which concerned the licitness of an act, and an expression 
of that element was to be found in how the expression 'versari in 
to illicita * functioned ( in its various sentential forms ). His 
employment of that legal formula, taken from a large range of canoni- ; 
cal instances, caused one to turn to the agent's Will to determine 
if one were to be adjudged guilty of a criminal act. !
, But Bracton expands upon' the notion by requiring us, at •; . 
times, to advert, not to consequences for the sake of determining ■ y 
criminality, to how an act was brought about. He states, and I Y y "V
quote, " But if he was engaged In a lawful act and did not employ Y
due care, liability will be attributed to him."47. It is not an 
unusual comment upon an example (since it occurs following upon an 
example concerning the flogging of a pupil); it serves to illustrate, 
in this compressed treatise of Bracton's, that one adverts to how : ;
a consequence was brought about, as well as to one's intention, to 1 Y
ascertain criminal liability. What may seem unusual in the observation 
is that from the realm of Will the text has turned to the realm of 
instrumentality, seeming to complicate what at first appears simple 
and clear. I think that pile can make sense of this introduction of 
instrumentality without distorting Bracton's text, or its sense.
47. "Sed si dabat operam rei licitae et non adhibuit diligentiam 
debitam, imputabitur ei." Thorne, 0£.cit., at page 341. y;
i.
- j .-.j
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; w y \ What one notices in a mediaeval text such as this is how !
a balance was attempted within the four categories of causality, 
explanatory ways in which to account for phenomena and events. Bracton 
correctly identifies the necessary element in the chain of criminal re­
sponsibility to be intention, but he does not, as (for instance) did 
Abelard, rest there only. Bracton stresses the material side to an 
act; one not only intends, one also brings about what he intends. Hie 
balance of causal notions may be seen in this way. To intend, pure and 
simple, rests within the sphere of formal causes. When the intention > 
is executed, then one has reached a final cause. But two other causal 
elements must link together formal and final causality, if a full ex- ^  
planation is to be offered of a completed human act ( in these terms ) 
One must be able to bring about, and one must bring about. Efficient 
causality is the power to bring about; material causality is the bring­
ing about by means of, as in, I have the power to walk to the store (am
not incapacitated ) and I do walk to the store ( because my feet move V
me there ) . :V: //>, ^ './-y V-;' - v . y (/?' ■
. \ • Material and efficient causality, if one draws upon them for 7 .
legal analysis here, provide one with a ground for two questions: Did 
the agent possess the capacity to bring about... ’ x ’, and in bringing 
about ?x* did he *0’ properly ? If we advert only to intention to es­
tablish criminal liability or criminal guilt, then a legal system is V 
’paved with good intentions1 or it imports strict liability ( as in 
Morissette or Lambert before the United States Supreme Court over-ruled 
them ) ; * tS A: * V»* \ : -J-'J \
48. Morissette v. U.S., 342 U.S. 246 (1952); Lambert v. California
. 35s u.s. 22s (1^57). V v . ■ ’. y ‘ - >; 'V ■ : ; y  V -  , • .;-/y:;v  .
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Any number of examples serve to show why a theory of criminal YYY^Y 
liability must pose the two questions I have mentioned. Criminal lia­
bility ( in the cppooh law, at least ); does/ hot rest between/two :ex-Y‘Y-y 
trenies; it rests between *not guilty1 and *guilty by reason of. ; .*a*... * 
where ’a1 is a variable which some category within the system fills. ,
A choice of selected examples may uncompress what I have stated. ' • .
, If a surgeon operates, and the patient dies, we may ask a Y
number of questions of the matter. Did the surgeon intend to kill the
patient ? If the answer is, No, he did not intend to kill the patient,
we can turn from intention directly to inquire of other aspects surrounding 
the death of the patient. Was the patient the cause of his own death, ie, 
was he in such a medically poor condition that no surgeon at all could 
have saved him ? One turns to a material condition ( the poor health . 
of the patient ) to relieve the surgeon of responsibility Y But what if • ; -
we have neither a criminal intention on the part of the surgeon to cause Y
death, nor a material condition on the part of the patient which was the \ 
cause of death ? What if we have a condition brought about because of Y 
the doctor himself, ie, that he was inebriated when he operated, or used YY -X 
non-sterile instruments, or used Untrained nurses as surgical assistants, Y/Y; 
or failed to perform adequate tests beforehand to determine if the patient J 
might have suffered any toxicity from the anaesthetic ? By asking these; . 
questions we have left direct criminal intention (because in every instance 
p could with all honesty reply that he had not intended to kill the Y . ; ,Y
patient); to the contrary, we are asking about the care with which the ; 
agent brought about an act from which a harmful consequence flowed. YY-'y /YYY
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' The criminal law is replete with examples wherein a lack of Y ;:>Y 
due care entailed criminal responsibility. A police officer may be in 
hot pursuit of a felon, but, while firing a pistol or rifle at the felon, 
may kill an innocent bystander. If a jury found that the officer acted 
without due care for life or limb, he could face criminal charges. A 
soldier, or a government official, may follow the orders of a superior 
officer or official, only to find that he, having followed those orders, 
committed a crime and the defence of superior orders does not obtain. \ ; 
An officer may attempt a lawful arrest of a suspect, only to discover that 
the arrest was unlawful, and now he faces a wrongful arrest charge, or a 
charge of malicious prosecution. The key in these examples ( as with ; 
a whole family of such examples ) is that the defendant, although in a 
lawful pursuit , undertakes the act without due care.
rY To; undertake without due care is not, I shall argue, to find Y 
evidence of a criminal intention carried over into an act . I am not 
arguing that one cannot criminally intend, and thus look to the act and 
its consequences to find evidence to support the charge that D_ did form 
a criminal intention. One can and does. But what Bracton introduces Y Y  
when he speaks of due care is a turn upon a problem which occupied mediaeval 
theologians: it was the problem of the nature of ignorance, and its classi­
fication. ; y. V ; y  '-Y' .
Not to attend with due care is a form of ignorance. This is 
a most complicated topic in mediaeval theology and philosophy, and it 
occupied major writers greatly. Not only, for example, do we find the
49. Military law is replete with examples wherein superior orders is not 
a valid defence to capital crimes. ;>Y . , y /:’-Y ■ ' Y-’:
■ iy major writings of Aquinas occupied with the question, we find also his Y VX r.'/Y
Y ; lesser writings occupied with the question.5 * Ignorance was said toyY X r
y. : be antecedent to an act, concomitant with an act, or consequent.;upbn anXXX/yyX
/ act, and to what degree one could establish that the '-act'ofYj> sprang'YfromYiYyYY’
•Y: Y  his ignorance, and his ignorance was that for which he could not be held Y y Y | 'X / :
. ;/ : accountable, then one excused another from the harmful consequences of y '•>
. his act, or from the act itself.
' Y X In the case of the example with the surgeon and the patient J : X Y
' who died, to exclude due care by an appeal to ignorance, one would have
,; y'to establish that 'not knowing' was a privation which carried with itself X
• Xn° legal penalty or necessity. If the patient (say) died from the anaesthe-!; ;
• / '  - y  Y y  Y: ' tic (  ie, anaphylactic shock wherein one1 s air passages are cut off .by >X
X- : a gross swelling of the tongue ), one might ask if the surgeon had taken y y  yY
(or caused to be taken) a full medical history of the patient. If he said 
X ; that he had not, although he would in fact have been ignorant of the fact 
y > X that the patient was allergic to an anaesthetic,agent, 'ignorance1 of that
v--v.. VYy . kind would not be considered to be absolving of his responsibility as a X.X y y  .y 
YY surgeon to have taken ( been required to take ) due care. y. f. Y'* •
Y... •••'•'•y y y  y X If the patient had died as a result of the surgery itself then XY/y YYY 
X X ; y the lack of skil 1 revealed by the surgeon could be viewed as ,a‘ form: ofX YY X-XYy;
XX; : ; •. ignorance for which he may or may not be responsible. If, during the cpurseX X;
X of making an incision, the operator severed an artery one could ask if the
X .X - artery qua artery were unusual ( ib, during the course of a gall bladder YX 
. . : operation one must distinguish with care the hepatic artery from the com­
: y Xy ; mon bile duct ) , or did the operator fai 1 to determine the origins and ter>- V . ;X
X : :  minations of the two structures ? If the vessel were not unusual ( ie, in •
an unexpected location in the anatomy )Ythen the question of due care /
arises • If he attempted to shunt normal exploratory procedures in theYY,/,Yv Y: 
furtherance of a desire to speed the operation, then he failed to exercise Y 
due care ( the proof being that the patient died, or suffered a greater 
harm as a result of the operation and the falty: surgical procedure )>YYiyY /
The ignorance (of the artery) brought about by a short-cut taken by , Y; 
the surgeon is not a form of ignorance which would excuse him from lia-^ ' I
bility or criminal negligence.
The mediaeval writers went to elaborate lengths to illustrated Ym YMy( 
what served to illustrate the kinds of ignorance, and it is not withinY y  Y;'y- 
the scope of this chapter to pursue them in detail. The classifications 
are, at times, not that clear. The force of the topic does, however; re-yy yy.i 
late to criminal law when we ask if there are conditions which do excuse 
a defendant, and we have already excluded his intention. In modern YYYyY Y 
criminal law we will be concerned with non-intentional states which do, 
nonetheless, produce harm, as in reckless acts, or in harak;causedy Y YYyYYY 
through negligence . One should qualify the descriptions, to; avoid con- ; y Y 
fusing categories from Tort law with Criminal law,by speaking of criminal 
negligence or recklessness if the harm pertains to criminal law. ■
50. In passim one may refer to his various works. In the De Malo, 3.6,, he
* asks whether ignorance can be the clause of a sin. In tKe next question,.
Y  3.7., he asks Whether ignorance is a sin. In the following question, 3.
8., he asks whether ignorance excuses sin, or diminishes it. In his Com­
mentary on the Sentences, at 2-22-2-1, he asks if ignorance is a sin. At 
the subsequent chapter, 2-22-2-2, he asks whether ignorance excuses sin. 
Common to these excursions is a style of question which seeks to establish 
what kinds of conditions will excuse an act when the defence for the harm 
done by the act is a defence of ignorance. The conclusion to be reached 
was to answer, Is the Defendant guilty ( in any shape or form) for his 
ignorance, or is such ignorance permissible at law ? My statement here is 
an immediate simplification of an area in mediaeval thought which is un- 
•. believably complex and detailed, but it is a subject outside my frame of 
Y-l reference. ’Y  y- Y , -Y Y /CYYYYYyY' y!.- >y ' v;.': Y‘ Y1/-Y * m YY
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To attempt to belabour the symmetry which may be thought 
to obtain between the four broad causal categories and a budding 
criminal law would be an exercise in legal archaeology of questionable 
merit* One should be aware from reading Bracton that he drew heavily 
upon mediaeval sources; one should, however, be guarded in making too-;', 
generous attributions towards development from one field to another.
It shows through clearly from the text of De Legibus that intention V
was of paramount importance for the assigning of criminal guilt; but
it was not a sole principle of law without limit. Other legal prin­
ciples come into force for Bracton, one of which was the legal principle
of ’due care’ which imposed the condition upon an actor that he brings 
about what he intends with care and caution. Implicit in such a prin­
ciple is both a respect for the skill of the agent, and a respect to be 
exercised for the patient ( or any third party ). From the seeds which 
we find in De Legibus for this principle will grow, over the centuries, 
an important legal concept. , v
.• Just as the legal historian may answer questions of time / y
with a reserve of caution, as in the question, ’’When, precisely, did
the Inns of Court begin ?”, so also must the legal philosopher answer ; 
certain questions concerning the development of legal principles in ■ 
early common law with just as great a reserve of caution. It is one ; 
question to ask how principles historically influenced the development 
of the law, and this I do not ask; it is another question to ask what 
were the principles which were present, in actual or viral form, and 
this I do ask. But to search for a line with clear and distinct bor­
ders as to what was a heavenly principle, and what was an earthly 
principle, at common law will not be found. Early common law moved * 
with some ease between heaven and earth, within a world of custom and 
all of its elements, and within a world of moral and religious beliefs. 
One has not a simplified appeal to a bold chalk mark across a chalk V  
board to mark off one sphere from the other, as a mediaeval Pope might 
divide the earth into East and West, and let earthly princes sail to y; 
either realm and obtain all that they wished. :. V;' yy y.VX: "
We have some broad historical facts to which we can appeal. V
After the Decretum canonists sprang up to develop law in its various )
sectors, and they were able to draw upon the theoretical foundations : V 
developed by mediaeval theologians. Canon lawyers, however, would pro­
ceed to develop legal principles and would not do ’legal theology’. ^
; :% V :  CHAPTER FOUR . . . ‘ -lS l ' '}:M  -
i  sy:.
: >. r?
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The list and scope of both published and unpublished works is long, and 
far beyond the scope of this study. * The broad theological teachings i
of the Church would serve to guide canonists and legal scholars on the 
Continent, and very much of the published legal work would be done with, 
or under, Church approbation. The Civilians would develop Roman Law in 
accordance with Church beliefs.?* . - ;• : V : i )
• ; Common law would develop with a blend of nominalist and realist
principles . Cases would be decided by judges, and each case would be 
this case; however, though each case was a particular * this1, some kind 
of harmony would be sought so that one would not be thrown into judicial 
randomness. The Realist* side to the law would strive for justice; the - 
’nominalist1 side to the law would work through case by case to conclusions, 
case by case. The case law of the period, from the Plea Rolls, is com- . 
pressed and sparee, and it would seem that a common judicial habit of mind,
1. One may consult the excellent bibliography at the end of Volume Two -
of the translation of Suarez’s works in THE CLASSICS OF INTERNATIONAL 
LAW as edited by James Brown Scott ( Wildys § Sons Ltd., London, 1964* 
and Oceana Publications Inc., New York ). The bibliography (pp 869­
890) lists the writers and/or works to which Suarez appealed in Ete ; 
Legibus, Defensio Fidei, and De Triplici Virtute, and one notices to 
how few English canonists he appeals. No reference is made to English 
case law, which appears to be the distinguishing feature of common 
law against Continental theorists. One may also refer to the detailed 
study by S. H. Russell, The Just War in the Middle Ages, ( 1975: Cam-/ 
bridge University Press ), the bibliography (i-xi) m  which are cited 
a large number of manuscript Summas, unpublished. Many manuscript 
Summas were in circulation (even if in few copies) which could have i
been read by lawyers and judges, and thus inform their legal thinking, 
but we are unable to detail (at present) what influenced whom.
2. Writers such as Azo, Bartolus, Narvarrus, Covarruvias, Hostiensis.
J
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formed from local traditions and customs, put its impress upon the ’ J:
formation of early case law?* The judgements which the Courts rendered . : ■ ;
were abrupt and undetailed, as any examination of the Plea Rolls and ; -y 
records of the various Eyres wi11 demonstrate. How certain key terms -? , V 
of law serve to function is left to personal inference and understanding. :
One can puzzle over the logical force of such key terms in the cases. l/S’lk
There is no system of case law, as we have come to understand the system ;
of case law in our time. One works with: passages and with scattered 
cases, Mid from their reading one may intuit key legal concepts which cOnV-. •* -yyV
trol early legal reasoning. The early law shows us a vocabulary growing, ':
as the forms of action themselves grew. New causes of action bring about y 
new demands upon a language to provide for legal distinctions. The early.. ■ >"-y'; 
language draws; from the religious language Of the period, for that language ;
was rich in its distinctions, and had a long application in penitential di­
rections. .?*•; Religious language, such a theologian might employ, would con- y;; yyyy 
tain complex sets of distinctions, and then explanation of suchdistinctions, ■ 
which the law, in the main, would not. Where a theologian might distinguish 
between ’intention1 and ’motive’ ( that one does not necessarily include the  ^ :
other ), the law will not be that exact. Passages in Bracton bear this out, ; j
3. Cf., The Oracles of the Law, by John P. Dawson, of Harvard Law School, •
(published by: The University of Michigan School of Law, 1968), at Chapter One, y
’’The Growth and Decline of English Case Law”, pp 1-99. . V. •••- i,
4. Or may even be lost. Cf., volume Two of Thorne's Bracton ( op. cit.), p-408, 
when the translator writes of a text in Bracton: "...as [in the Roll] of the
last Eyre of Martin of Pateshull in the county of Lincoln in the tenth year of r
King Henry, among the pleas of the crown, [the case] of Gilbert, son of Archard i -yy 
and Alan Swade, who was beyond the age limit." No record of this case now exists.
5. Gf., The remarkably able Penitential Canons of Confession ( A.D. 963 ) and y 
their clear use of language to determine how a penance is to be assigned to a 
confessed sin. These may be found in: A COLLECTION OF THE LAWS AND CANONS OF ,% 
THE CHURCH OF ENGLAND, [edited by] John Johnson ( Oxford M.DCCCL ) and printed v.i 
by John Henry Parker ( from the edition of M.DCCXX, London ). Volume One, pp-426-
449.v  ^ ■ ' :; >7;y
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• Y  '' ." . Y  • •• ' \  X  ■ XY ■ ‘y  • 5 a  „ ." '“ 5y Y : YBracton speaks of an appeal for malicious arson and robbery, y //Y;YYyY
Thorne's translation of the passage is as follows: ... ; • /Yyy' ..-YyY: •
; ; "If one in the course of a riot or during a civil • yY'Y:-; xyX- 
; ; disturbance commits arson, wickedly and feloniously, ;/ Y ^ + ':& 4 n
Y either through emnity or the sake of spoil, let him Y. / !- y Y.YY X y y y '
be punished by capital punishment. I say 'wickedly', 1
Y because accidental fires or those caused negligently Y'yy / / : 'y X^/yY/Y YVY-•/; 
and without evil intent are not so punished..." * Y X Y Y YX1
It is a simple passage, but it yields, I would suggest, some com­
plicated transformations. If one uses the language of motive by 
which to understand extensions of the passage, motive can be read in y. 
two ways. It may mean that one acted out of spite, and also whilst.XX!XyY’cXYY: 
spiteful one formed an intention at law to act unlawfully. But the
passage may also be read without any appeal to motive. It may mean
that one simply and clearly broke the law knowingly. • y y  X Y
Y; When one looks closely at the Latin text some of.the Latin Y /
uses permit various inferences of meaning. The adverb, 'nequiter', may X 
mean* when translated into English, a state of character,, as When it might 
be said of one who acted wickedly that he so acted because he possessed XX
a wicked nature or disposition or character. But the adverb may also y  !
direct us to the deed itself which was done, as when something is badly done. 
The adjective, 'nequamV also permits various interpretations. When Bracton yX 
speaks of, "...without evil intent..," ("...non mala conscientia.^."), two 
distinct senses may be given of the usage. On the one hand, it may refer/;Y X-Y 
to the actual intent needed to commit a serious crime, which one may call the 
substantive use of the phrase. On the other hand, that same phrase may mean * 
that only one with a wicked disposition would commit a felony, which one may / 
call the adjectival use of the phrase, since it describes a state of character.
5a. Thorne, op cit., volume Two, page 41. Y Y y
* The Latin text, page 414 of Thorne, reads: "Si quis autem turbate seditione y 
incendium fecerit nequiter et in felonia, vel ob inimicitias vel praedae causa, 
capitali puniatur sententia. Nequiter dico, quia incendia fortuita vel per 
negligentiam facta et non mala conscientia, non sic puniuntur." ! .•
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. Language which appeals to motive may be proper to understand a ;\:
criminal act. A criminal act may permit two fundamental questions to 
be asked of it. One may ask how it was that such a dreadful act could:
•, be committed, and an appeal to motive may serve as an answer. But if , ’ 
one were to ask solely how an act was brought about, an appeal to the . v 
concept of a criminal intention serves to answer that question. One 
may postulate that motive and intention are separate concepts, but one 
should also be aware that motive and intention may overlap. In the passage 
cited from Bracton (supra), ’nequiter’ serves to indicate both motive and 
intention. While motive and intention may be distinct concepts logically, 
it is possible that a term or a phrase may express them indifferently, without 
a conceptual conciseness or clarity. In this passage one may argue that ;v: 
mens rea is the predominating concept, but its use is as a cluster concept 
which may permit, at some times, the inclusion of motive into its parsing.
It may mean that one possessed both a wicked character and did intend (/> ;/ ' 
usage one finds in modern revised codes of criminal law ) . The status of 
one’s character would provide a ground for motive, while an appeal to. the 
voluntary (’'sponte") would provide the intentional grounds for the act. :
The overlapping of motive and intention shows through in a number of ;• s
Bracton’s texts. The section in which he has discussed the crime of homicide 
and its subdivision?, ^\ one reads:"...Pro homicidio vero iustitiae iusta ^  * 
et recta intentione facto...", which is a clear case of the presentation of 
;the intentional requisites of an act without any appeal to a motive behind :J 
or accompanying an act. * .
* Cf., Washington Criminal Code [1975 1st ex.s. c 260 I 9A.04>110.] In this 
title unless a different meaning is plainly required: (12) "Malice" and 
"maliciously’^ shall import an evil‘intent,wish, or design to vex,annoy, or 
injure another person. Malice may be inferred from an act done in wilful dis­
regard of the rights of another, or an act wrongfully done without just cause, 
or excuse, or.an act or omission of duty betraying a wilful disregard of social 
duty." : 6. Op.cit., Thorne, at page 341. ■ '• v‘->'“ ; v/v’-
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One may argue, by way of constructing an argument, that Bracton
does assume that intention differs distinctly from motive when he permits
’necessity1 to negative intent, as when he says.; V;--.V V V- V ; ;;
; *»of necessity, ■ and; here.,we;must; distinguish whether'y 
; the necessity was avoidable or not; if avoidable and .
; . : he could escape without slaying, he will then be guilty
; • of homicide; if unavoidable, since he kills without
• premeditated hatred but with sorrow of heart, in order y j 'y‘Ty
V to save himself and his family, since he could not other- . :
y wise escape [danger], he is not liable to the penalty
. for homicide.” ^ * , • /
But his reasoning is not all that clear, since the passage, as well as 
others, shone that if the act is legally permissible, so must the state
of mind accompanying the act be legally and morally without taint. If . ;,;y.
Necessity forced an agent to act ( kill in self-defence, or throw cargo
overboard ), the act can yet be tainted if the agent takes malicious V
delight in the other's death or the other's loss of cargo. One may ex­
plain this intertwining of concepts of motive and intention by suggesting 
that no hard and clear ,distinction was apparent to Bracton between a 7c,y...y 
separation of a system of law from a system of morals. This can be seen 
when, speaking of war, Bracton says,®’ ” if it is unjust he who kills 
will be liable; if just, as a war in defence of the patria, he will not, , . 
unless he acts with evil intent [.. .nisi hoc fecerit corrupts intentione.]
7. Thorne, op.cit., pp 340-41, "Necessitate, quo casu distinguendum erit• v • 
utrum necessitas ilia fuit evitabilis vel non. Si autem evitabilis et 
evadere posset absque occisione, tunc erit reus homicidiiv Si autem in- 
evitabilis, quia occidit hominem sine odii meditatione in motu do1ere : 
animi, se et sua liberando cum aliter evadere non posset, non tenetur 
ad poenam h o m i c i d i i ’• 7 7; v :'77'; • : V*' - '.Vv'.y""
8. Thome, op.cit., at page 342.
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y There/Would have been little difficulty for legal:theoristsY ;
after the time of Bracton to answer a charge that they failed to dis­
tinguish with care and clarity a system of law from a system of morals,
The relation of an agent to a legal proposition would be much the same 
as was the relation of the existence of the world to God. Because
it was thought (for the most part) that the order of the world was the
case because of the internal order of God, and from objects one could 
could argue to the existence of God, so, by parity of reasoning, it 
would be odd if of adherence to a legal proposition ( in criminal law j 
it could be asserted that the agent was lawful by publicly obeying the 
force of the criminal law, but privately withheld obedience to the law 
by force of malice (which only the agent could know) secretly resolved.
The public good, which was law, should express the private good, which 
was morals, just as the public order of the world expressed the private X /
order of Deity. If an human act was to be described as a fully consti- :Y
tuted human act, then both spheres of human behavior, exteriority and in- 
teriority, would of necessity have to be joined in a unitary act. Bracton 
does, within the tradition of natural law, rightly advance the proposition 
that an ’ evil intent1 ( motive ) can vitiate the value of a legal act. / ; 
Elevated to theological speculation it could be said that if God were 
omniscient it would be improper to claim that He knows contradictions X 
approvingly, ie that a man's public act was proper (the domain of law) 
whilst the interior conditions precedent to the act were improper (an X ! 
evil motive). To preserve a consistency between acts and intentions what 
a man did (under the circumstances described) would amount;to a lie, and
9. Infra, page 225.
such would have been assumed to be morally wrong in the eyes of God. It 
was one man doing, as it were, two different acts, but simultaneously. To 
predicate of ’A’ both 'p' and ’-p' would produce a contradiction, and an 
act done from evil motives, yet apparently good in public eyes, would be 
thought to be contradictory. The position was consistent, as a meta-legal 
position, for a system of conduct which made the thought of adultery de­
serving of punishment as serious as if one actually did commit adultery.
9. Although it is not my intention to present or to defend a system of 
natural law which would have been available to common law writers at, 
and after, the time of Bracton, it takes little effort to indicate that 
there existed a strong natural law tradition which common law writers 
(in its formative period to Plowden) could, with ease, have drawn . 
upon. Excluding an analysis of the problem whether it was the Will 
or whether it was the Intellect which was supreme in the making of 
law (a problem which divided natural law theologians equally), any 
number of sources were available to early legal writers on the matter 
of natural law. • -: ii ;■: U V ;V
Sir John Fortescue's, De Laudibus Legum Angliae (second edition, with 
notes and English translation by John Selden: printed by Henry Lintot 
for Daniel Browne, at the Black-Swan, without Tempie-Bar, MDCCXLI) 
presents the Chancellor as a strong natural lawyer. In chapter three 
of the instant work he tells the Prince (Henry) that all laws are 
holy, and lead back to God as their author. In chapter fifteen the 
Chancellor states that all human laws "...are either the Law of (a)
Nature, (b) Customs, or Statutes.. (at,page 28 of this edition).
One would understand that by Nature one meant the world created by 
God which, at the same time, proclaimed His existence. Since law was 
intended to be reasonable, it would be assumed (for sake of argument) 
that Customs and Statutes would be under the guidance of human reason, 
which, in turn, would correct itself ( and save itself from error ) by 
an appeal to the natural order of the world. ':'SY-4h z ~ : ^
In the excellent edition of St. German's Doctor and Student, collated 
and prepared by the late T.F.TvPlucknett, and J.L.Barton- ( Selden Society, 
London, 1974), one may refer not only to the first dialogue, which oc- j 
cupies pp 2-71 of that edition, and which is a discourse on the nature 
of law supporting, in the main, natural law assumptions, but one may 
also refer to the list of editions of both Canonists and Civilians 7: 
to which St. German made appeal, most within a natural law tradition.
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; Bracton*s own account of what natural law is (Volume Two, pp 26«?27) 
as distinct from private law, civil law, and jus gentium, gives one 
a rather clear picture of what assumptions operate in the D<e Legibus.
It is for him, ".*.a certain instinctive impulse arising out of ani- - 
matenature by which individual living things are led to act in cer- / 
tain ways. Hence it is thus defined: Natural law is that which nature, 
that is, God himself, taught all living things. [ Ius naturale est quod 
natura, id est ipse deus, docuit omnia animalia.]" He then proceeds to 
make a latinate distinction, stating, ’’The word ’quod* is then in the 
accusative case the word ’natura* in the nominative. On the other hand, 
it may be said that the word 'quod* is in the nominative case, so that 
the definition will be this: Natural law is that taught all living 
' things by nature, that is, by natural instinct. [Ius naturale, quod 
docuit omnia animalia natura, id est per instinctum naturae.]"
The twining of moral and legal notions, with regard to natural law, 
is put by Bracton thusly ( pp 26-27, Volume Two, Thorne ), and it 
serves to substantiate the assumption that an human act must be unified, 
possessed of no disparity in its interior and exterior elements:
"The word 'natixra' will then be in the ablative case. This is what is 
meant when we say that our first instinctive impulses are not under our 
control, but our second impulses are. ["...primi motus non sunt in 
n°stra potestate, secundi vero sunt."] That is why, if a matter pro­
ceeds only as £ar as simple sensual pleasure, not beyond, only a venial 
sin is committed. But if it proceeds farther, to the contriving of 
something ["...ad aliquid conrponendum..."], as where one puts into 
practice what he has shamefully thought ['*.. .ut exerceat quis quod y.^VV-J 
turpiter cogitavit..."], it will then be called a third impulse and a ^
; mortal sin is committed. And note that for the reason that justice is 
will ["...quod qua ratione iustitia est voluntas..."], taking into 
account rational beings only, natural law is impulse ['*... ius naturale 
. motus...**], regard being had to all creatures, rational and irrational. 
There are some who say that neither will nor impulse may be called jus, 
3US naturale or jus gentium, for they exist, in [the realm of] fact; 
will or impulse are the means by which natural law or justice disclose 
or manifest their effect, for virtues and jura EXIST IN THE SOUL (caps. 
\"v- mine) . " - • ^ ; v~
Of 'law' itself, Bracton says ( page 27 of Thorne, Volume Two ) 
that "...all jura are incorporeal and cannot be seen. ["Iura autem omnia 
sunt incorporalia et videri non possunt."]." The point here being that, 
as a cogmtivist, one knows (through understanding and reason) law. The 
force of law is not a simple proposition; it is a proposition understood 
to be lawful. It is a simple, but important distinction.
; ; ; Reasoning of this, kind with regard to the essence bf a legal / *
system does not move us now ( or generally does not move all of us )
%>. cause we view legal systems as constructions, in much the same way that \;y/■•••'y.j
one can view geometric systems as constructions from consistent and well-  ^ ; U 
defined axioms . For Bracton, however, as for most natural lawyers/,’ :the yy.; 
y  : fundament of a legal system was its parallel, in some ways, with the : ; ■ :
yy'y nature of God. ... /y yyy/y /'yy ,.y'••/y  • .y' \ •* y."
. . ■ •-' / / y■ • ‘ Let me explain this assumption, briefly. •' /•/ y  .’.yy-  y : y  y
y* y'y If God possessed a true and non-contradictory Self-ideiitity y'y 5
:v then what He did would be an expression of His true and non-contradictory
self-identity. Were it the case that He could know one thing, but do 
. % exactly the other, then two ( snd, perhaps, more ) problems would arise
; for the Christian theologian. One problem would be that God would di- / ; ,:
rectly be the author of evil because, it could be argued, if doing and-
knowing were not one, He could know the good, but do less than the good. ;7y
y  ^  y Manichaeanism, and other such dualisms in which .’good’ and 'evil* were . ^
.coeval principles, had long been condemned by the Church. The second 
V . difficulty would be that if the acts of God were not true expressions of : 
Himself one would thereby introduce a contradictory element into His very 
nature, and this Christian theology would not permit, God being the source 
and author of all truth. If one follows this belief and carries it over-.'- A  ;-y •„
' : into the province of law one may argue that following the law is akin to y
y  God doing an act; that act, on the part of God, expresses his true nature; vy y ;
therefore when an agent acts lawfully it is assumed that his public expression 7 ; 
(by following the law) reveals his own interior nature ( a  mind properly , / : 
informed wishing to follow the law ). : ! y /•: • • :y..\-; • V-Nv-A y , 7 y y ;
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The Middle Ages gave witness to legal systems qua legal 
systems without at the same time being exercises in meta-legal logic 
upon theological presuppositions. It would be a mistake for me to con­
vey the impression that every bit of mediaeval law was an expression 
of theocratic law. It was not, as any number of statutes show us.10*
What is important to my argument, however, is to appreciate what in­
debtedness early criminal formulations and theory had to theological 
and canonical writing of the period, and I believe this to be instanced 
clearly in Bracton1s twining of moral and legal concepts (which, at 
times, are incarnate within one word as it functions on both levels).
The formula, then, for the voluntary as a ground for criminal 
guilt finds its expression in Bracton's De Legibus. The language of the 
various appeals in the D£ Placitis Coronae show that the Will, in some 
way, is the ground upon which criminal guilt is built. If it can be shown 
that one acted 'wickedly1 or'maliciously' or 'premeditatedly', and 
that the action sprang from within control of the agent as a voluntary 
action, as an action over which he could exercise reasonable control, 
then the machinery of guilt and responsibility can function by bringing 
to bear the collective legal condemnation of the criminal sanction upon 
the defendant . . • ' V .7 • ; /• . • - V, .. ,
10. For instance, The Consulado del Mar (Code of Barcelona) dates from 
the thirteenth century, and is a set of maritime regulations only.
When, at Chapter 287 "Of Cases of Recapture", titles '8*V '9*, and v 7
'10', we encounter the use of the term 'voluntary' it is used without 
any theological significance, meaning simply, "without force or constraint* 
as in, "(8)...and shall afterwards abandon it [ship], voluntarily, and 
not from any fear or apprehension of any vessel coming upon him." This 
use of 'voluntary' carries over to sections '9' and '10' of the act.
The chapter relates to prize law. Cf RULE OF LAW by R.W.Nice (1965, J 0
Littlefield Adams 6 Co., N.J.) at pp 228-234, esp. page 233.
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The early law itself shows how 'malice* was used adjectivally 
Criminal law writers of the present day suggest that 'malice' can be dis­
tinguished in civil use from criminal use: "Malice in criminal law means 
intention or recklessness...; but malice in the law of tort, or express 
malice, means improper motive, that is, any motive that the law does not ; 
approve of." One notices, however, that in Bracton the distinction
is not that apparent; if apparent, it is virtually, rather than actually 
so. Drawing upon an early case of replevin, a civil action for recovery 
(in this instance, for recovery of straying farm animals), we read:
v‘ " A man brought Replevin against another for an - -; :
ox and forty geese, tortiously... .The plaintiff - : . ^
• is a great lord, and very evilly disposed; and: f  1 % %
. ; whereas my hedge was good enough,, he, in malice* "7; v-
;•>.w.yv-v* broke it down and drove in hiis beasts.": v i
To the objection that, "He ought to fence the place; and if any beasts -vO
come in for want of fencing, one ought, by custom of the country, to drive
them out, and not impound them. .." the reply df the defendant was,
. '..'"The place was fenced with a hedge according to ::;V
custom, and you in malice made a break in the hedge, ■
‘ V; and drove in your beasts..." . • ' .
11. CRIMINAL LAW, The General Part, by Glanville Williams (Stevens, 1953)
\ at page 543. In the second edition (Stevens, 1961) the citation may be
found at page 697. ; ■ •: : • v ■' • O'
12. This case is to be found in the YEAR BOOKS of Edward 1, volume two,
;; at page 64 (published by the authority of Her Majesty*S Treasury, ,
,• under the direction of the Master of the Rolls, 1864, Public Record 
Office, :Ro11s House, LONDON). The law French for the above citation,, :
■ page 65, reads as follows: "Un home porta le replegiare vers un altre 0 
; dun beof e xl. owes atort ... .Cely qe senpleynt est graunt sernur e homej". 
. de graunt malice la fit:abatre, e enchasa lyenz sez avers, prest."
Excluding the plaintiffs rejoinder, the text for the defendant continues, 
"Qe la place fut enclos de hay solum usage, e qu vous par malice feystes 
•• un breke del hay, e vos bestes lyenz enchacates, prest..." ' "
>•1 J
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Notwithstanding that the action is for replevin, one may note from the 
language of the defendant that from his point of view the noble lord had 7 
acted,not only from spitefulness and ill-motive,but also had fully intended 
to cause property damage. The word 'malice* functions in that incarnate 
manner (as I had earlier suggested) here by twiuing both aspects of motive 
and intention. For technical reasons one may, of the instant case, sug­
gest that 'motive' only is to be read because the case, properly, was not . 
a criminal case, but I doubt if this is to rebut the incarnation of con­
cepts in any strong way. 7 'V;\ v .7 ..; ••; ' .7 V- 7
One may advert to early civil cases for the purpose of showing 
how flexible certain key teims were. There is, however, a good body of 
criminal cases, and commentary, to which one may turn to trace the growth 
of key criminal concepts . We have a body of cases from the Year 'Book 
of Edward 1 which may be studied, some of which were presided over by 
Ralph De Hengham who, prior to his appointment, had written a number of 
legal Summas. In his Magna Hengham *we observe that in the second : y / 
chapter, "Qui placita pertinent ad Majorem Curiam Domini Regis, § qua 
ad Vicecomites provinciarum pertinent placitanda.", Hengham cites as a 
separate offence "(15) melletis". The term means 'Chaunce medley' or 
an 'affray', stemming from Twelfth Century usage.** * What is interesting
13. "Radulphi De Hengham, Edward! Regis 1, Capitalis olim Justitiafii
SUMMAE. Magna HENGHAM, § Parvaj vulgo nuhcupatae. ex vett. Codd. MSS. 
cum Cl. Seldeni Notis" (LONDINI: Typis E. § R. NUTT, $ R. GOSLING, ^ 
MDCCXXXVll), at pages 6 and 7 . ; : 7 : v
14. "melleta, 12c., c 1320; mesleta 1221 melee, affray;melletum 1328,
c 1327." from MEDIEVAL LATIN WORD-LIST by Baxter and Johnson,
(Oxford University Press, London, Humphrey Milford, 1S34) at page 
■ 7 262. ■ ' : 77- '77! ; 7 v ‘V :'-0 ‘V'7 7,7- • 7 7  .7 7 V7;V
'<1
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is to note that early on a distinction was recognised between designing
to do ( a crime ) and happening to commit a crime. Selden, in the text,
observes, and I quote,77 y'7 ' . yv:-
"(15) Melletis ] G1anvil and Bracton have de Medletis, s
. . .for suddain affraies or dislikes; the word is so us’d . yy,'
y  ' too in Regiam Ma j est. lib . 1. cap. 3_. and hence our
. . CHAUNCE MEDLEY, corrupted oppos 'd against FORETHOUGHT 
FELONY, as MANSLAUGHTER with us, against MURDER. See 
Skene ad citat. loc. § de verb. Signific. But CHANCE 
MEDLEY is in Stamford otherwise. Skeen interprets / ;
: Chaud melle by Rixa in the Civil Law." ^  , , y  V v77y/:.
15. Op.cit., page 7. The quotation is compressed. The work
of "Skene" to which Selden refers is: SKENE (Sir John):
De verborum significatione. The exposition of the termes ; 
and difficill wordes conteined in the foure buiks of Regiam 
; Majestatem. (Edinburgh, 1597) i There is also a London
edition of 1641. Skene also produced: Regiam Ma j estatem. >. y  I -yy
’ The auld lawes and constitutions of Scotland faithfully "7.,'/;Ayyy 
7 .7 collected. (Edinburgh, 1609). 7'; 77 7 y'y 7 - t y O y
7 :  tfRIXA” is not a term which carries over into common law , .
discourse. The Latin word is rixa, ae, (f) and it means 1,; a quarrel,
brawl, dispute, contest, strife, or contention. A second meanings 2.,
is a battle contest, but the usage is rare. Other forms of the word 
signify to quarrel or to dispute, etc. (The root to the word is given 
as a wide opening of the mouth.). •**i j [ /v-*\
7 In his Introduction to his translation of questions 22 to 30:7yyy7
of the Summa Theologiae (printed as volume 19, THE EMOTIONS;Blackfriars 
§ Eyre § Spottiswoode, London, 1967), Eric D'Arcy states (at pages xxiv 
and xxv) and I quote (in part); "Since...the English word appetite fails 
to reproduce this dual aspect [ie, that 'appetite' has an object in both 
what is pleasant or unpleasant], I propose to render appetitus and appeti- 
tiva as orexis and orectic. This has two advantages: first it may serve 
as a reminder that St Thomas's appetitus has much the same meaning and y  
scope as Aristotle's £us /rather than that of the English appetite;y
second, in modern psychology the terms orexis and orectic are used to .-.y7y 
distinguish the affective and conative aspects of an act from the cognitive.
7:'- 7-.- ' • • • ■ ■ ' • y y':-7y.' 7;'- y' ‘ . . .. ./Continued,7
;!
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o . . .St. Thomas took the words from William of Moerbeke's VV* **>Vr%
Latin translations of Aristotle. In De anima 111 Aristotle
divides the powers of the soul into the logistikon, the rational,
and the orexis, the non-rational; then, within the non-rationa1, 
he divides the aisthetike, the sensory orexis, into epithumetike 
and thumike....Moerbeke rendered thumike *irascibilis* and epi- 
thumike sometimes 'concupiscibilis' and sometimes 1appetitiva *;
....I therefore propose to translate appetitus irasclbilis and 
appetitus concupiscibilis as the spiritual orexis and the affective 
' ;’•*;* . orexis respectively." • :
I cite this longish footnote to suggest that 'rixa' and ' T;
may have in common this root: action done under passion and without 
deliberation. ' [Rjixa1 may be derived in this way from 
In the E.N. 1.2,1 Aristotle employs the word to mean desire or pro­
: '• :'V; V pension. •*' ■ ;% ..A :■ "V, . f
When we turn the use of]'rixa1 and suggest that it is related to V
the Greek meaning 'appetitive' (and in turn meaning action
without rational deliberation and purpose), some continuity is provided 
in the history of the notion. I do not mean to be Procrustean, and I 
put this reading only as a suggestion. I am aware that one must not 
press the reading too far as if it solidly represents Greek legal theory; 
it does, and-it does not. As was pointed out by J.W. Jones in Law and 
Legal Theory of the Greeks, "Perhaps the most important advance made by 
Aristotle was in his insistence that there may be intention without pre­
meditation. Hitherto there had been a tendency to treat acts done in 
sudden anger as involuntary. Patroclus in the Iliad says he killed 
Amplhidamas 'unwillingly in anger' [xxiii.8], and Plato, while not pre­
pared to say that acts done in sudden passion were excusable, thought 
they stood nearer to involuntary than to voluntary acts, especially if 
they were immediately regretted. It is, however, knowledge rather than 
forethought which to Aristotle is the test of liability. Children, and 
in Aristotle's view animals, can act voluntarily but not with forethought. 
[E.N. iii.2.2.]. There need be no previous course of reasoning to stamp 
an act as intentional; sudden acts may be voluntary, and the intent may 
be simultaneous with rather than prior to the physical movement.[As when 
we sit down or stand up. See Mag. Mor. 17...]. Such choice as exists 
may lie only in the preference for acting to refraining, no other alter­
native being present to the mind. In this, Aristotle was only giving 
theoretical expression to a development which had already taken place in 
the courts, where plotting and scheming had come to be seen as but one, 
and not the only, form of intention." pp 272-73 ( Oxford: At the Clarendon 
//"’■' Press, 1956 ). . ; .• : V \
One may refer to the Laws of Plato, Book IX, where he presents his dis­
cussion on the voluntary and involuntary in the course of the discussion 
> v V b e t w e e n  the Athenian and Cl inias. . —  7^
; . v \-iV C.'-V; V;f ;r' 7 " • ’ 7-. • .. ./Continued, . ■
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I do not wish to suggest, however, that common law followed or paral­
leled the positions advanced in Greek criminal law. The force of ;; 
What I have said in this footnote is solely to suggest that in the 
common law, from a Civilian ( and also canonical notion, as I shall show ) 
concept, a modest parallel may be found in the transformation of ’rixa' 
into 'melleta' or Vmedleta1 into 'Cha[u]nce-Medley'. The 'orectic' 
aspect of the notion was preserved,, as one may instance Deacon's ^
Digest. He states, " CHANCE-MEDLEY (or, as some choose to write it, 
chaud-medley) is where homicide is committed by a man upon a sudden 
affray m  his own defence. In its former etymology it signifies a 
casual affray; in the latter, an affray in the heat of blood or passion; 
both of pretty much the same import- though the former is in common 
speech too often erroneously applied to any manner of homicide by mis­
adventure; whereas it appears by the statute of 24 Hen. 8. c. 5 [ and J
repealed by 9 G. 4. c. 31.] and our ancient books, that itis properly 
applied to such killing only, as happens in self-defence upon a sudden
rencounter. 4 Bl. Com. 184." pp 223-24 of A Digest of THE CRIMINAL
LAW of England by Edward E. Deacon (LONDON: Henry Butterworth, 1836), 
volume one. ; -1 ■ *•>
... So described, 'rixa* has, as a legal concept, a philosophical con^ 
sistency which roots it in a sense of action springing from appetite. It 
is not my purpose to attempt to defend an Aristotelian interpretation of 
’intention' in relation to what the same concept may mean in common law 
through various stages of its development. One may see, by reference •
to some leading texts, how the term 'rixa' preserved the meaning of
unintended though voluntary action. Durandus (of St. Purcain, d. 1334) 
offers this definition of ’rixa' in his Repertorium Aureum Juris (Venice: 
Henetijs per Baptistam de Tort is, 1494) at folio 69 as: ;
" M 5 L  “ rixa agitur etia tempore feriato." Which would mean that 
one while agitated or irritated for a time had brought about a death or 
had killed another while fighting with him. The verb, 'agito' indicates 
that one has been roused, unsettled, excited, disquieted; 'ferio, ire’ in 
its participle form means that one has killed by striking, or gave a death 
blow. Its Greek root, which obviates forethought in the act, is ' 9 ©''f 
which means 1 impetuous, and ♦, which means 'to leap1. I read the
phrase to mean that in the heat of passion one, unintentionally, kills or 
injures, and this is in accord with ’rixa' as it found its way into com­
mon law reference. To put 'agito' into the passive form may indicate that 
the agent had the agitation befall him, as a mood or passing vexation. To 
use a verb passively, when it also has an active form, is to minimize its 
intentional and deliberate force, and to stTess that a state or action is 
happening to the agent rather than that the agent is bringing about a. 
description deliberately. We might say in English that one found himself 
to be angered by, rather than that one had intended to be angry at, ; 
Durandus's definition suggests an unintentional but impetuous act.
- " ■' .. , ‘V  . v ’• - , .. ./Continued,
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In English there is an ample study of Greek law from the view of ■
* intentional1 v . 1 unintentional V ( one may consult: Athenian Homicide ’; ■ ; 5
Law by D. M. MacDowell [ Manchester University Press, 1963 and 1966 ], 
or the two volume The Administration of Justice from Homer to Aristotle 
by R. J. Bonner and Gertrude Smith [ Greenwood Press, New York, 1968, / / 
or the original edition from the University of Chicago, 1930 for the 
first volume, 1938 for the second volume ], as well as early collected v; . 
editions of such laws, ie, Leges Atticae...collegit, digessit et libro V  
commentario illustravit by Samuel Petitus [Pansiis: Sumptibus Caroli v
Morelli, 1635], cf. esp. Liber Septimus, "De Sicariis" pp 504-326 ) > :
and some studies on Roman criminal law, when one comes to the period of ; . 
the Middle Ages/ broadly from the time of the Decretals, one finds little 
mondgraphical research in English. Not only is there little in English, 
the texts themselves must be consulted and this demands a specialist V :Xy 
knowledge which; few have. Most of our texts, apart from some reprints 
now being issued here and there, must be those of first instance. To 
close this extended footnote I shall list some sources which reveal how ; 
'rixa1 was treated by some leading lawyers and theologians of the late 
Middle Ages into the Renaissance. My listing shall be brief since, clearly, 
it is not a direct part of my own study. I would add that such a study 
yet needs to be done by some scholar. v  . ; >,* </*•£ .
; r For some of the mediaevals, 'rixa* would be Subsumed to ^raV, and / 
one might speak of an action done as a result of anger. Aquinas in S ;t/ f*.
Ia2ae, article 8 asks "What are the types of anger ?", and in the second :
question and second response in the article speaks of anger which has a ’ f; ;
quick-tempered ( veiocitatem irae ) quality. Other writers may speak: 
about an action done spontaneously or voluntarily as does Cardinal Hostiensis 
(d. 1271) in his Summa Aurea [ Lugduni, M.D.LVI, or Summa Hostiensis, as 
the 1537 printing lists the work, printed at Venice by Iacobus Giunta ] —
in the body of his question, De homicidio voluntario, vel casuali, which
embraces seven articles ( folio 358 - folio 360 ; Liber quintus ) in
the Lugduni edition. The formula of 'operam rei licitae* ( 359 coL one 
and col. two ) is found at work in his third article ,f Homicidia quis ; ; ■
dicatur. "Resort is made to the voluntariness of the act and to the 
knowledge the agent possessed when doing the kct to determine what pun- v,
ishment obtains. / ' •’ - " •../ ■-•y. ,v:-v?
Other writers will maintain ’rixa* as a separate classification, .
as does Angel us de Clavasio ( 1411-95 ) in his Summa Angelica (Summa 
de Casibus Conscientiae), a book which is akin to a modem law dictionary 
in which terms are listed alphabetically, and examples and explanations 
given. In my edition (Lyons, 1513) the reader is told that defending one­
self when attacked is lawful, but to seek to be provoked, and thence to / 
defend oneself, is mortally grievous. Angelus preserves the ingredient 
that a "motus animi” occurs, indicating that one is not under full rational 
control of oneself. One experiences "animo effrenato insurgit impugnatem _ 
ad occideri" which suggests that self-control has been lost; (The entry ;v A
occupies folio cccciij-b to folio cccciiij -a .) ,
v . • ./Continued',’ • <
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When one turns to other leading legal theorists of the period 
one will observe that actions which spring from involuntary causes, ■ 
such as one might describe chance-medley, will, as actions, be as­
sessed by considering to what extent they were voluntary and deliberate. 
In the, Explicatur Clement: si furiosus, de Homicidio, £  Irregulariter, 
of Covarruvias y Leyva (1512-77, Spanish canonist) one finds that ’rixa1 
is not a separate legal category for him; it would be madness,or in­
voluntary action,in which a result occurred, and then the result would 
have to be assessed from the point of view of how responsible was the 
agent for his action. Covarruvias reaffirmed much of Aquinas’s notions 
about the Will, and thus adverts to desprees of rationality when con­
sidering the punishment due for an act. It should be remembered that 
Aquinas tended toward an extreme rationalism in his teaching about the 
Will. The section on* 'Anger* ,* from Which I quoted earlier in this 
footnote, shows him to regard even anger as a form of a rational action 
seeking a rational end., . ;*jvy. : V : v-..;
On the other hand, other canonists accepted 'rixa' as a separate 
category, and included it in their writings or legal dictionaries or in 
books which were referred to as collections of cases on matters of con­
science. Bartholomea Fumo, who died in 1545 and had been an Inquisitor 
of the Faith, wrote, Summa Casuum Conscientia Aurea Armilla. [In my 
own edition he is printed as: Placentinus, Bartholomaeo Fumo Villauren, 
Summa, Aurea Armilla nvncvpata Casvs Omnes ad Animarvm cvam attinentes 
breviter complectens....(printed at Antverpiae, apud Petrum Bellerm, in 
1591)]. His listing appears as follows, and I cite it here to end this 
footnote: • .■ .- ■ « • •*/.» .V; , ' ' : \ •
"DE RIXA. ;
■ Rixa quid § quando mortale. ' . -
Rixa filia irae importat contradictione in factis,
-■ quando ex ira aliqui se inuicem per eutiunt, non ex authoritate 
publica, sed ex voluntate inordinata; § ex sino genere peccatum 
mortale est, in eo, qui iniuste alterium aggreditur, quia nocu- 
mentum proximo contra charitatem infert. In eo autem qui se de- ' 
fendit, animo repellendi ilia iam iniuriam, cum debita moderatione 
peccatum non est. Secus si cum animo vindictae, vel odij, vel 
excedit in moderamine., quia tunc peccatum mortale vel veniale 
est, secundum quantitatem odij vel excessus. Primi enim motus 
communiter veniales sunt, § imperfecta actus, vt saepe diximus.’’ f 
„C; • ...... . ' (from page-725 of the
1591 Antwerp edition.)
Many other citations could be given, but they would serve to be an end 
in themselves, and would be outside of the scope of my own work.
Bartholomea Fumo's entry preserves the consistency of meaning which is 
found in all of the citations I have examined, and his seems to be the 
clearest and briefest, and hence I cite him.;- .< ’ ;
: ■ ’ 'v\• .. T: ; ; . .. ./Continued, . ^
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One should appreciate that even with the introduction of a distinction 
between designed versus sudden human acts , the question always before 
the court will be how to 'prove* that the distinction obtains. Con­
sidering here as we are only the theoretical components of a legal dis­
tinction, one faces little problem with the burden of judicial proof. '
It is enough for my purposes to note that a distinction found its way 
into the common law between kinds of human acts in which the question 
of the degree of control one may or could exercise was admitted as a V  /
valid question for legal solution* What becomes apparent upon serious - ‘ 
philosophical reflection is that the notion, very often, was intuitive;
15., Continued, and end of footnote. : / *• > .
“ To observe how the case law of the period operated on the Continent 
( from that period spanning the late Middle Ages and into the Renaissance ) ''j?' 
one may turn to the various Church courts and inspect their criminal findings 
A fundamental abridgement of criminal law from its sources is to be found ; 
in the Compendium libri quinti Sententiarum.. .in quo, praetennissa opinionvm ! 
varietate.. .verae practice Criminal is... .Iulii Cari. Milan, by Galdericus r 
(Salinus (printed by Iacobum Lantonum in 1621), 340pp." Another "text" 
book of the period is by D* Petri Follerii, entitled, Canonica Criminalis ; 
Praxis (printed in Venice by Bartholomaei Rubini in 1583 ). It treats
of criminal topics, defining them, and making practical comments about ^
various crimes. Of the same.order is the text by Ludovicus Carerius, : !
Practica causarum criminal ium (or Nova Cavsarvm Criminalivm ) which was - : ;
printed at Venice in 1564. [Middle Temple Library holds a copy printed in ? 
1569 at Lugduni.] Giambattista Ziletti was ah editor of a two volume work 
of crimina1 opinion drawn from ’Baldus onwards, and the work is entitled : 
Criminalium consiliorum atque responsorum tam ex veteribys qvam ivnioribvs 
celeberrimis ivrlconsvltis collectorvm, and was printed at Venice, volume /. 
one,1562 and volume two, 1560. ( I have two separate editions, and it can r
be assumed that the tfirst» of each edition was printed 1559-1560. ) • In -$V
the same vein, as a canonical work, is Practica Criminalis Canonica, a Y , V.
very simple handbook of criminal offences compiled and commented upon by 
Juan Bernard DIAZ de Luco, ( Lvgdvni, Apvd Theobadvm Paganvm, M.D.XLIII ). : •; 
One finds that the Decisiones Avreae,7 sev Definitiones, Qvaestionvm Con-? wl 
trouersarum...ex variis S. Regii Consilii Cathaloniae ( printed a t Fanco- 
fvrti Ad Moenvm: Cura, § impendio Rulandiorum, Typis Matthia Beckeri, 1609) %  
compiled by Ludovico a Pegvera considers the problem of 'rixa' in its 
fourteenth decision: "An homicidium secutum ex vulneribus in rixa illatis, 
sit poena ordinaria homicidii puniendum, vel extraordinaria arbitrio iudicis; 
pp 69- 76 thereof. -’V //-' ' ' 7; 7r*7~
-:Lj
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what were assumed to be the conceptual elements of (say) a voluntary 
act, as opposed to any lesser human act as was an involuntary act, were 
hot defined clearly at length ( as the same kind of question might have 
been developed through an extended argument by a mediavel theologian ). 
In order for one to arrive at some clear understanding of how sound 
legal principles came to develop, and to accommodate sound sets of 
workable distinctions within the criminal process, one is required to 
review the early case law, and from such a review attempt to formulate 
what principles seemed to have evolved . Nevertheless, early case law 
tends to be compressed, and this very compression tends to obscure a 
simple statement of legal principles; moreover,] the cases themselves v 
tend to express principles in an enthymematic fashion which leaves a 
legal theorist to wonder over what assumptions were surpressed to lead 
to this obvious conclusion expressed in the judgement of the court. 
Reaching a coherent statement as to what were the dominant sets of 
legal principles in a growing legal system (as was early common law ) 
is an inductive process, and fraught with the hazards of any inductive 
undertaking. Whatever theory arises finds itself limited not only by 
the set of facts which the court finds or admits, but the theory is 
also limited by what interpretation the court places upon the facts. ]\] 
The older mediaeval notion seems apt: that consistency is found far 
from the particular; general principles may be consistent; applications 
of general principles not. It is a caveat only; not a rule. /iVv
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; From a report of cases in the Court of Common Pleas for ; ; *
Michaelmas Term, 31 Edw. 1. ‘, one may observe that Hengham's J.,; ;Vx-
brother of the Bench, Roubury J., found that injury did not neces­
sitate criminal intention. - ; '■ ; fz 7 - - 7  ’ *‘£ v ?
, "One John brought his writ of Trespass, Mid complained 
of W., that he had maimed him, to wit, cut off one of 
; his fingers §c. --- W. said that he was not guilty. --- ; >
THE INQUEST said that he had cut off one of his fingers.
—  It was adjudged by ROUBURY that he (John) should re­
cover his damages of 401.,..v" X v
In Hyam v. Director of Public Prosecutions H.L. [1974] 2 All ER
41, it may be recalled that Lord Diplock, delivering his dissenting
judgement on behalf of the judicial House, stated at page 64 of the X
instant judgement, " . 7.7 ; - . '* 7 . : , x ' i
: «»x have found no trace of the actual expression 1 grievous
bodily harm' being used before 1803, by writers of the law 
of homicide or by judges, to describe what was a sufficient 
evil intention to constitute that 'malice aforethought' that 
was the badge of murder. Apart from minor piecemeal ex­
ceptions of assaults in particular circumstances which had 
been made felonies by earlier statutes, until the passing of 
; of Lord Ellenborough's Act [43 Geo 3 c  58, 1803 ], assaults,
however serious their physical consequences, were classified 
as no more than misdemeanours unless they resulted in death."
Our early Year Books, although not intended to be ruling case citations
16. Op. Git., Vol. One, YEAR BOOKS OF EDWARD 1., at page 322. The
Law French reads as follows: i ' 7 : ■' : 9:
" Un Johan porta soun bref de Trespas, e senpleint de. W., qil 
luy avoyt mahayme, saver, coupe le un dey 8c. — - W. dist qe de 
. rein coupable. —  LENQUEST dist qil luy avoyt coupe le un dey— - 
Agarde fut par ROUBURY qil recoverast ces damages de xl. livres..."
239;' •:/ -y:7- :V'.* 7 ',/; V-... :• ■ \ j r ^
/ f . \  ; ' ■ ■ ? ; - -QW6. finds in much later case law ^ , show how a certain consistency i:-]
J .: :. j permeated the development of common law in its statement of'- assumed-,:: but-: 7.7’:
: 7  never doctrinally stated, first principles. Lord Dip lock held that it 7777.^v”'1
was consistent in Hyam not to let 'intent' mean: statutorily constructed .
. v - I intent, as per Lord Ellenborough's Act. To read intent in such a way
departed from the spirit and course of earlier common law holdings. One7 ;■ 
could, although the noble Lord did not, support the position he developed 7 ;- 
; by an appeal to Cases earlier than those cited in the body of his judge-- '7:;'/ 7
: ment. 7;! :7 *• • ; * Zf-f .7 • 7 ^ 7'X7 7‘/ 7 7-'777^ :-.
; ^ ; ; One need not argue that some early decisions did not follow V •;
;.v ; } the forethought principle, or natural consequence principle. An act 7
V may have had probable natural consequences, but it need not be viewed by :
the court then as the court in our own day might have viewed natural 
7 7 7 consequences ( prior to the Criminal Justice Act, 1967). Nor need ;
. ~'\7 a court follow a forethought principle, as the Year Book case I have - .v;vv.
7 ; > cited demonstrates. American Courts tend toward a stricter construction ; .
. \ ' 7 - . V of the probable and natural consequences of an act, than do English 
7; Courts (presently),because English Courts, as I have stated in the body : 7 ;77!
7 . of miy writing, are controlled by the spirit of the Criminal Justice Act •
7 ; 7: 1967, section 8 (b) of the Act. 18 * ; _ .
7 *’7 v  17. Cf .j "The Origin of the Year Books" pp 268-273,in/Chapter14,’:7v ;77/r7---^
7 7 7 7 of A Concise History of the Common Law by Theodore Plucknett r .
:7r7*V " 7'7-7.- ■ 7,; 7.7 (5tIT edition,Butterworth 6 Co., 1956: LONDON) \ . V ^ V ^  7';7'7
• ; 18. Cf. Chapter 3, "Proof" pp 28-35 in A Guide to Law 8 Practice u n d e r 7
7 7 7:X7v t^- Criminal Justice Act 1967, by (Sir) David* Napley (LONDON: Sweet
t v - ^  7 6 Maxwell, 1967). NOTE: one would now need to consult case law on .7
7, 7 • ; the matter since the enactment of the Act. 7 . 7 7 . -
/ v The early Year Books show that distinctions obtained, as be-,/; •
:  ^ tween murder and manslaughter, but that; little technical elaboration 5:
followed when the distinction was introduced. If the case were one of / 
manslaughter, one reads the following, "SPIGURNEL answered that the 
statute [ with reference to its application in the present case, one 
regarding rape ] did not allow it except in the case of manslaughter £ \ 
; (italics m i n e ) T h e  standard phrase when manslaughter is indicated
is simply, '"de mbrt de- home." /•- ■’ '. y;. L /Ki
> From The Pleas of The Crown before Spigomel, J., * we do
find recorded a phraseology which speaks of the state of a subject, but 
which does so only as a report (of a criminal action) and not as an 
v analysis of a Volitionatl state; We read, %  ".. .and she said that the
said Ralph had ravished and ruined her against her will...", "...and they 
presented that the said Ralph had ravished her against her will...",
■ r v '■ ;y.. ■ ••' .. .A y / ► '• :•...** 22language of a kind which one finds in present day cases of rape. *
Of various killings one might read, "Three men were indicted for the death 
of a man who was murdered..*" If guilt were found, as in the instant case 
v ; : one reads, "THE JURY said that only one was guilty of the deed, and that
the other two were not guilty of the deed, nor of assent to’it (italics 
, .V'' mine) ."^?the latter dis junctive phrase serving to indicate some kind of
; ' \y; intentional finding from the facts of the case. '  ^.
•. 19; Cf. page 520, Appendix 1.,volume one, YEAR BOOKS OF EDWARD 1, op. cit
as well as citations using the same phrase throughout the cases, pp 
■V-T :• ■ 496-526. , - • • • ■. .y
• / 20. 0£. cit., page 496 ff. The criminal pleas date from A.D. 1303; / : :
21. Op. cit., page 506, "...e ele dit qe meme cely Rauf encontre Son gre
lavoyt ravy e parieu.. . .e presenterent qe meme cely Rauf en-
/'•/'/- y.'V; contre son gre la ravyt..." A.D; 1302. ''f~ ■ . V/..
22. Cf., Director of Public Prosecutions v Morgan, H.L. [1975] 2 All E.R.
23. On.cit.. page 508. The Law French reads as follows: .../Continued
347.-
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7 - At other times one will have to read further than the in- ,, 
dictment to find why the charge were (say) one of manslaughter. We ; 
read in one case that Richard and William were indicted for manslaughter* 
and, in the facts of the case, we see that one John, brother to Richard, 
had done the killing, " Richard made an unsuccessful attempt, and the f /; 
thief knocked him down; Richard cried out, and his brother John came 7; 
up, and struck the man on the head, in consequence of which he died." . 
In his judgement, Spigurnel, J., noting that John was not twelve years 
old when the killing occurred, stated, " If he had done the deed before; 
his age of seven yeaas* he should not suffer judgment; but if before : : 
his age of twelve years he had done any other deed not involving the , 
loss of life or limb, and against the peace, he should not. answer, be-
■Xv,  "■ " v ' X ; 7  ' .. . ; 7  . v  :>i - X .  ' ' V v  v  94 ‘ ■ ' - v  'cause before that age he is not with the peace." * . (A.D. 1302) . 7 ,
23., Continued., ■ '
(page 509) "...[PAIS] dit qe lun soulement fut coupable du fet, ; 
e les deux nent del fet, et de las sent; mes disseint qe les deux};:
> le’;[MS has 1 ne1 ] enterrerent sanz vewe de C o r o n e r . " x • :;x7 lV.'
24. Op. cit., page 510. The law French is not important for the facts 7
of the Instant case. The standard phrase for manslaughter appears V
in the law French thusly, " Richard e Willeame furent enditez de 
la mort un home. •." ...• / -•
• Regarding the phrase, "...he is not with the peace." its meaning •' "
was that he, John, was not a member of a tything. A tything was 77. 
"... in its first appointment, the number or company of ten men with.; 
their families, held together in a society, all being bound for the 
: peaceable behaviour of each other" (Jacob, as cited in Stroud1s •
. : Judicial Dictionary, [3rd edition, volume four], Sweet 8 Maxwell,
: : 1965. The reference to 'Jacob* is Jacob's Law Dictionary; 3rd ed.)
v Early criminal case law tends to observe rules and formulae
y to announce legal findings, in marked contrast to theological writing
y j; ’ V of the same period which considered not only hypothetical cases* and
. v citations from leading historical authorities, but also engaged in a
detailed analysis of why and/or how ,A f may have 0-ied. The iaw did
;  ^ - not. A simple narrative of the facts, for the most part, was given;
then a finding was made, and judgement annouwed. If a principle were
; : at work it would be stated in some ancilliary and compressed form in
the body of the case. In a note upon a case of 1302 we read, .
' ,Ayl ; /■’';• : . . f,Note, if a man attack another with premeditation'"• v.;.y y/y
■; . \ / y y  or in any other manner,, the value of the weapon be-vy  y y  7 • yy ; :';yyy
;V y y  s y  y  \ longs to the justices * clerk.as his fee, and shall
y f , be paid to him immediately."
: If is assumed that one can determine if an act were done with pre-
; meditation; no analysis is given of various meanings which could at-/ : y, y ;
,yy'-'y: tach to the term. At other times; as some of the cases in Jaw,latin y V
.< . / illustrate, age will protect (is in footnote 24 of this chapter). We ' / i;
: . read that a boy shot an arrow and, it is to be gathered, by mischance . y. ’
killed a woman. Because of his age he is adjudged not to be guilty ^
. y of a felony, but the thing from which the arrow glanced is a deodand. * y y y y y
; : v 25; Op. cit., volume one at page 514. The Law French is as follows:
'y ■ • : "Nota, si home e^sywt autre en assaut purpense ou en autre manner..." ;
. 26. The Latin • is taken from volume one of, YEAR BOOKS OF EDWARD 1, from j']
V . ; fhe Appendix 11., which contains Reports and Notes in Latin of Criminal 5/
/;r ’ Cases, Temp. Edw. 1., at page 529: "Quidem puer J. de Burtone nomine, ;
:y  .•' - aetatis duodecim annorum, fecit infra quemdam damum, et sagittavit &,
metam extra domum, et per infortunium quamdam mulierem R. nomine in­
/. terfecit. -—  JUSTICIARIUS. Quia non est etatis duodecim annorum non ;/ •
est felo, sed bonus et fidelis. --- Et quia se subtraxit, proclamaturn -Y'.:*
: ■ / . fuit publice quod reveniret si vellet. Et quia le Hoke fuit occasio ■
Y y  ':. Y mortis Rose, eo quod sagifta glaciavit super earn* appreciabatur §c." J
y'-. . ;/Yy: y y  —  V ’ : ; . . ./Continued. -j I J y
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t Or, as with the Law French, so one will read in Latin the use of
legal formula which states that a victim in rape was taken against 
her Will. The defence of the accused, fortunately accepted in this 
ancient case, was the consent of the victim. The text reads.
. 26. Continued, y'yy ' y yy V;. yy.'-y .'' ' .. y ;r /
The meaning of 'Deodand* given in the Terrnes of the Lawes of this y ;
/y Realme (printed by Thomas Wight and Bonham Carter, at London, irty yy-yy..yy; y
y . y 1598)7 a work attributed to William Rastell , the entry for number ,
--,y ; ; y.-: , 155 states, and I quote, . y  [ ■■ . "y yy.yy yy-^y^
y. : ■ "DEODANDE, is when any man by misfortune is * y >y y
■;y : : slaine by a horse or by a- cart; -or-by a n y o t h e r ' t h i n g s yyyyy’yy-vy
y / y \ mooveth to further the death* then the thing that is ''^yyy/y ^
; y : y cause of his death, and which at the time of his mis- : . y y y
' Vy . fortune did move, shall be forfait to the king, and that y y
7 y y 7 is called Deodandem and that pertaineth to the kings Al- • y
y :y . v : y mener for to dispose in almes and deedes of charitfe." i y >
y \ ' , [ I have cited only the English, and not the accompanying ^
y y-y, *• entry in Law French. ]
John Cowell in The Interpreter (London, printed for William Sheares, 'yyy-/v- 
; 1637) gives this definition:. ' yzy .Z t y y~i: ' y ' • : :/'';'y:7yyi
y y "Deodand (deodahdum) is a thing given or forfeited ( as ' ; y 1
it were ) to God for the pacification cfhis wTath in a ;'y yy'=
: y y y y case of misadventure, whereby any Christian soule commeth :7yj
> y V to a violent end, without the fault of any reasonable y y
y - yyy yyyyyy-V y  Creative." 'y ■/■•■■yy '■ . "'yy '■/"
: This is more in accord with the treatment of Deodandvm in Lib. 1, V
Cap. 12 of Les Plees Del Corone by William Stavndford (Londini, Ex ; yy
Typographia Societatis Stationanorum, Anno Domini 1607) pp 20a-21a. \ 7;V y, y’vy 
Cowell contains the standard references to Britton, Staunford, Bracton, y ; ;
and Fitzherbert. Why the concept of 'deodand' is interesting is that :
it provided a link to the old testament, and to the dual nature of law , y 
; ; ; and morals (as I wrote upon earlier), If one returns to Exodus 21, verses
; ; 12 ff, one observes this text: !t Whoever kills a man with intent to kill, ■./*
must pay for it with his life. But where there was no malice aforethought, yy 
y y and God provides the occasion ['Provides the occasion'; literally, 'de- y:
livers him into his hand'. This could mean a chance encounter, followed y y 
by a murder in hot blood, which would be classed as manslaughter; cf.,
y 1 Kg. 26. 23. But accidental killing may be meant (cf. Num. 35, 22, 23;
Deut. 19. 4) , the accident being represented as a Providential ,inter- 
. ference], he shall be allowed to find refuge in such place as I shall ^
; appoint for thee. " The force of the chapter reveals that fines may be y
• , paid by one (under certain stipulations of law) to compensate for a loss. -
( I have cited, with commentary, from The Holy Bible, published by Bums 
■yy : yy £ Oates, London, 1965, p^ age 67..)" f yy . 7 y y y y  ./. ■ . ' yyy\ . ■ / . yyyy.:
J
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, "Item, presentation fuit per duodecim de Y. quod 7 7 :>
H. Rapuit quamdam puellam, et N. et earn duxit ad '
manerium suum in eadem villa, et earn cognovit car- ;
naliter contra suam voluntatem.” . ■: \ ^ v 7 ,,-77 77,7 7;7 ,77:77^
7 " • ' : 77 :7  7;. ■ v 7 . : ;777--7..
The case continues to the extent that it is put to the jury to
decide. .y We read, • "W':V • '7.'’ ': 7 777
"Duodecim. Nos dicimus quod ipsa rapiebatur vi per 
v , homines domini Hugonis. JUSTICIARIUS. Fuit ne Hugo 7 7
consentiens ad factum vel non ? — ^ Duodecim. Non.---
JUSTICIARIUS. Cognoverunt ne earn carnaliter ? ---
Duodecim. Sic. [JUSTICIARIUS]. Muliere invita vel 
consentiente ? — -Duodecim. Consentiente.— -Credo
quod deberet hie quod tamen post defuit. JUSTICI-
ARIUS. Domine Hugo, quia ipsi vos acquietant, nos 
.• vos acquietamus. "  :7 ' " - ; . • ' 7 - : 7 ' -  - 7-..; 7'7 7  ■ . . 7
The findings are simple, by methods of law now. But at the time 7 
it was also simple in comparison to any section of an authoritative 
religious or legal treatise which discussed in what way one’s -■ ■77
will could be overpowered. The exercise reveals that in matters 
practical, as is criminal law (for the most part), one assumes 
much of what directs the case. Such has its virtues; but it 
also has its deficiencies, one of which is to hidfe or obscure first 
principles upon which a decision may have been founded, and this 
kind of obscurity follows mens rea formulations up until the writing 
of this work. One may simply assume that one's will could be over­
powered, and then admit such an assumption into a system of legally 
permissible excuses, only to find that the assumption itself is unclear,
27. This particular case comes from Alfred Horwood’s edition of the
YEAR BOOKS, which I have cited; but the instant case is taken from 
the manuscript of W. [Gulielmi] Fletewoode, and is a report of 
cases from the Cornish Iter . dating from criminal trials of the 
reign of Edward 1. This case comes from manuscript ’A ’, but is not 
dated. Horwood says in his Preface, 7 (continued)
' * /J
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the unclaxity revealing itself when the definition calls for greater 7 >7 
precision ( as the Hearst case revealed when the centre of the dispute 
between the prosecution and defence was to what extent it could be claimed 
that one moved about [walked, talked, continued in companionship with one’s 
abductors] but yet moved without recourse to intention, ie did not in­
tentional partake of a bank robbery, or did not intentionally fire an . y 
automatic rifle*}. How the commonsense legal assumption is refined will 
•dictate how a; jury finds. 7- ' "7; 7 y7 '-77 -:- • ■ 77 7 7' 777V 7 7 7 ; "7
: .. A further analysis of a commonsense legal assumption may reveal
that an assumption is so stated that it will not admit of refinement, save 
for a slight technical refinement in its minor premisses. When looked upon 
in analytic detail one 7may find that, the conceptual form of the assumption 
is such that it does not admit pf a meaningful counter-examp ie, as when one 
claims that ’voluntary* means ’ to spring from within f . If the test of \ 
the voluntary is that it begins from within the agent, and only this, then7
27i, continued, 7
v-77,'7:'-7 -;;y: ’’The absence of the name of the Justice and the surname 77:-7 
of the prisoner in the case at pp. 529-532, and ignorance of 77777 
/ the year when the-trial took place, have placed an obstacle to 7 vT7 :
: • ; •;7- a reference of the proceeding. But this case presents the dis- 77
' tinct and important face that a prisoner who was a knight re-77 77
7; fused (because he was a knight) to be tried by the ordinary v J
77:.>. jury, and claimed to be tried by his peers (per pares meos,
7 p. 531); and that his claim was at once allowed by the Justice,.
7 who must be presumed to have understood what the law was in such v '7;
: 7 case, and who, by his iteration of the prisoner’s phrase (per 7 7
vestros pares) may be supposed to have had in view,and to have 7 7 .7
recognized the prisoner's appeal to, the "judicium parium’’ of ? 
Magna Charta. " (page xlviii, of Volume One, op.cit.). The 
case itself is cited in Appendix 11 of the volume, and is to be found ih 7  
manuscript 'A' only which was held by Lincoln’s Inn. One can assume safely 
that the case dates from the very early 1300's. William Fleetwood was 7  
Recorder of London during the time of Queen Elizabeth 1. Middle Temple 7 
Library holds a single copy of his: Annalium tam regum Edwardi quinti...etc 
[London: 1579]. 77^-71 " 7 V- 7,. v . 7 7 • ' 7  .7*77~v7i
i i
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a number of candidates are excluded from our consideration. The definition Y; 
is either broad, and thus apt to be tautologous, telling one that action yYYYi 
which is conscious is action which the agent does voluntarily; or the 
definition tends to be unnecessarily restrictive, and excludes such cases 
which may arise from fear, constraint, impulse, anxiety, moods, chemical:V y ; y 
changes which the human system itself manufactures, misjudgement (as 
when one thinks he has chosen freely but was, in fact, induced to take or 
to buy unknowingly), or mis-response (as when one believes that he is YY
acting in accord with the wishes of his guest, but, in fact, is fully Y :Y; • 
irritating the guest unawares) . - y y y  Y
Y  y  Commonsense legal principles function as if they are clear and u • 
primitive first principles within a legal system, without need of refine- :; y  
ment; their refinement; and the patent need for such, arises when certain 
questions are answered wrongly. The test for 1wrong* will be what sensi- :
tivity is shown for the knowledge of the time y -why, for instance, pre­
mature codification of the common law is hazardous. The force of each ;
concrete occasion should, in the best fashion, direct the formation of "
legal principles. Hearst, to use a present example, was a case which bent Y 
many unquestioned assumptions and formulations about the nature of mens -Y j
rea. If the definition will not permit one to consider if the definition: y
does not obtain— however paradoxical it may be to assert this then one . 
is in danger of making the concrete instance fit the law; and, as I have 
argued in the first part of my work, to do so assumes that a legal system ’:;!
if fully and necessarily and xmrestrictively well-defined. I think this ; !
is a logically unsound assumption. I also think genuine miscarriages of y  -J
justice occur by adopting such an attitude towards legal reasoning.
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. It is a truism to assert that the criminal law gTOws by 7 7 7
having to solve hew problems and answer new questions. The legis­
lature, in its law-making capacity may make law; but the courts, 
in their interpretative capacity, both make law and make law work 
in a practical sense. The broad principles are laid down by the . •
legislature, but it is for the courts to make those broad principles 7 7:
apply in particular cases. In this way, the courts have a residual 7
but most important law-making capacity. They have a chance to de- 7; 7
velop legal principles, to refine them, and to apply them, and then 
to redefine them again when those general principles work awkwardly. 7^
The jurisprudence which develops through case law is that which grows • - 7 7
out of response to particular difficulties which a particular case 7
presents for resolution. Each newer case, however, may require the 7 7  
court to re-think accepted principles. V '-7\ ' .',7 • -.77/7: 7;7: • 7 • 7777 ^  
New questions may create new difficulties which old ways cannot 77
answer. A simple sentence may illustrate two distinct and exclusive ; 7
ways in which a legal position may be seen. Take this sentence: " I Vv'7-7' 
know that I lifted the book from the table, but for the life of me I do 7 
not know why I did so." If one stresses one aspect only, namely: that one 
acted ( and knows it ) but excludes why one acted ( one cannot account 
with a reason for why one so acted ), one advances a strict on/off notion 
of intention. Such an on/off understanding of intention excludes any 
question about degrees of human action. On the other hand, if one were to 
view intention as a cluster concept, in which various conceptual components 
are conjoined, then any formulation of that cluster concept in terms only 
of one element in the cluster would be a mis-formulation or mis-application
I posit that the conceptual elements are dissimilar each to the other *
• • • •, • yv.- ' \ 29-1 • y  • v y • * ' y y y . / y 1/.V.y.v or misunderstanding of the concept. ' .ryyV,.. yyy- . ■ yyy.. y y y'yyy;
The role of the legal philosopher is generally different from the " : y •
role of the legal historian or law teacher. Although the legal philosopher y ; /y 
will work with case law ( unless he is trying to invent a totally new sys-;; 
y v tem of law— — which is the model of the legislator who devises new laws ), /
yy; ' his aim is to question the logic of the case law with which he works. He y , ; ;
y puts to it the question: why this rather than that ? He will search for *
y; the elements which may underlie legal reasoning or which seem to re­
appear in the bodies of cases he analyses, and he is at liberty to sustain ■ f ; 
; his analysis on isolated legal principles and elements. \ y J:
. y Some of these attitudes did find themselves into legal instruction,, , .
especially Under the impetus of Dean Langdell of Harvard Law School, 1870. i ■ ;;y
29. One may consider R. v. Hadfield (1800), 27 St.Tr. 1281 ( or, later,
" M'Naughton's case (1843) 10 Cl. and F. 200 ). In Hadfield, the great advocate, tyy 
Thomas Erskine, tried to change our legal perceptions of what it meant to be y 
insane at law. At pp 1307-1330, Erskine argued the case. His defence was  ^yyr;}~y 
that an human act must include not only the conceptual element, ie., that one y;: 
acted, but it must also include a question: Why did one act in that fashion ? y y 
For Erskine, an intentional act combined two elements: that and why. Did they y  
not, he reasoned, then one could not advance the defence of insanity. A single y  
sane moment could obliterate an insanity plea. There are elements of an act , 
which make one seem normal ( tying one's shoe, being able to walk without hesi­
tancy, discoursing on simple matters, and the like ), yet these singleinstances !
. y.y /.• of apparently sane conduct are not to be used to prove sanity. Hadfield*s case 1 
was resolved by putting the defendant into what one now would call "preventive”
, detention. Erskine's arguments in the case were many decades ahead of the ';.r'ry,‘yy 
conventional wisdom of the law in 1800 regarding insanity. The defendant was : ;/y, 
spared capital punishment by reason of insanity, but was to remain in detention 
because of his insanity. . : -y ty
By drawing the mind of the court to see a problem afresh, Erskine was v
able to show that the limits heretofore placed upon an understanding of the yy>:y 
operation of a legal notion were limits which needed to be expanded. To a y'-yyy 
new problem, to which newer questions are put, the law may grow. Qne takes . / yy:; 
an older concept ( such as madness ) only to discover upon legal analysis that y '
V it is not a simple black or white notion, but is a notion which contains many yy: 
other elements which only the presentation of the novel case may extract. !
The legal concept, which was thought to have precise boundaries, is now seen-;:';./y :y:i 
or understood to be open-ended. - V y ' :-y> . • •. -y: - . y.
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Langdel1 thought that one could locate the number of fundamental legal
doctrines, and this could be done by selecting leading cases from the .
-’v , .. V.v; 30 ; . •- - Y ‘ - YY*historical advance of the law. * The fallacy in the logic of this !
method (although a method far superior to the prevalent English system 
which is to lecture only on law, and not to discuss independent cases . 
analytically or critically [as one might critically discuss the form : Y  
and substance and theme of a poem]) is that it accepts as the fundament 
of the critical method the assessment of the professor of law. What 
seem to be 1legal principles* are often little more ( but of value, as 
may the impressions of any artist be ) th an the critical impressions 
of the editor or compiler himself; lacking, and extremely obvious to us 
now, fTom these hornbooks of law was any underlying critical principle 
which served to justify the assumption that a law case, by itself* con­
tained the critical principles whereby future decisions would be guided. 
One was given a multiplicity of impressive cases (from their very subject 
matter and/or treatment); what one was not given was a unifying principle 
whereby cases were to be selected and classified. The reasoning was yy 
circular, ie, the justification that a single critical principle was at 
work in the cases was assumed by the cases included in the collections,
By using ?A* one proved *B*; arid then by usirig *B* one set about to prove 
*A*. But the logical form that a legal assumption might take was not V 
isolated or analysed. i
30. A brief, but adequate, account of Langdellianism in the law may be 
read in The Ages of American Law,(Storrs lectures on jurisprudence; 
1974) by Professor Grant Gilmore (Yale University Press). Chapter:
V. 3, "The Age of Faith" (pp .41-67) gives an account of Langde 11 * s
scientific enthusiasm that scientific principles could be introduced 
in the teaching of law, and that one could develop a ’legal method* 
as this quotation from his own Cases on Contracts (1871), and cited 
by Gilmore at'' page 43 reveals: ;
T\V v‘.-
. "4 .
V > \  ‘\
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: The temptation is to assume that the body of the law contains
any set of intuitively self-evident first legal principles. I have
argued, and wish to continue, that one must return to certain historical 
considerations,such as leading cases ( without worrying if some pre­
ordained principle makes them so ), leading writers or treatises, and 
in addition to an examination of these sources ( as might the legal 
historian search ) strive to see what critical principles are at work, 
and thqn set about to answer if they are fundamental legal principles. V 
Pressing the legal philosopher is to determine if the assumption made 
by the law that a relationship obtains not only between the facts of 
this case and a legal principle enunciated therefrom, but that the 
legal principle will hold for other facts of future legal cases. It ~ 
is not a puzzle about induction, although the conflict which inductive 
reasoning presents for logical analysis may appear, as it is a puzzle ;
about a fundamental assumption of the law: that a legal formulation 
; 30., continued, 7; 7. 7 .--' '7 7 .7*7 ' 7 7 7 7  :77--'7 -7 7  7^ *7 * 7 :.~7 ._7 { 7  7/’:'7'*“
" [T]he number of fundamental legal doctrines is much 7 
y v less than is commonly supposed; the many different . . 7  .7 7 '■'
guises in which the same doctrine is constantly making 7 .
7  it appearance, and the great extent to which legal ?7 ‘7 , 7 7
7  treatises are a repetition of each other, being the 7 7
cause of much misapprehension. If these doctrines- . . ^
.: could be so classified and arranged that each should 7 77 7
be found in its proper place, and nowhere else, they 7 7 7  
would cease to formidable from their number.'’
I would agree with the assumption, and I think it is a good guide for 77 77 
both the teaching and analysis of the law. I do not think, however, 
that it has been put in practice. Most case law books are notoriously 
deficient in instruction in analytical method, or in setting out a pro­
cedure whereby a student ( or any person, for that matter ) can progress 7 
in developing a measured understanding of how to read a case with analytical 
thoroughness. Most of the hornbooks throw at the student an undigested 7 ;
collection of cases determined by the-editor to be 'leading cases'  -
and the student, by dint of Socratic intuition, is left to discover for him- 77  
self why these are leading cases, and what (if any) are the guiding principles 
whereby judicial wisdom decided each case. It is a misuse of scientific 7 7  
method when no critical or analytical guidance is given or presented.
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does* in some fashion, reflect or present the nature of things and of : .-'Y-Y
persons. To assert this position, however, does not close the issue. ,
;'■]£ What it does is to set some boundary or some context to the statement ’ YY; Y ■ Y
: of the problem which legal formulation(s) should meet, and perhaps,even,
Y;":' Y solve. Y  _ V:: •. ;; ; * V-'; Y v Y . y - Y  Y  Y'Y ■ •. Y
VVYY ] If one were to advance (what seems to be) a radical position and Y Y] 
claim that between what is said in a legal'proposition, arid that state 
.Y of affairs which is depicted by the legal proposition, have nO connexion,'/YYY
then it appears that one would be saying that between legal propositions 
. and persons or things, in strictu senso, nothing is signified. 5J
; : Y a legal philosopher may ask a further question about. legal reasoning. He •
may ask to what does it apply, and whom does it affect ? He may ask, ail Y Y 
the more, whether the reasons advanced ( or contained in ) by the legal sys­
tem are valid, or coherent, or sensible, or logical, and he may then pro- ; Y Y :Y -
• Y pose ways arid methods whereby to test for each of his questions. He may in- Y.
‘ quire why certain legal assumptions are made ( by a system ), and he may YY
Y : : query if they work, or are workable, or are prudent, or are coherent. He 2
; Y may, then, judge the system, which I see to be the calling of a philosopher. Y YY;
• * I do not want to step outside of my inquiry and be accused of making
Y broad statements about language and the law. I wish only to assert what • :YYY;Yyy
Y is a commonsenSe position about language arid the law. Legal sentences and \
Y legal propositions, and the like, may not strictly describe human natures Or , YYYY 
contingent states of affairs. Legal language may not be a language of es­
sences ( ie., describing the nature of a being or an entity ). But legal 
language is a form of language under which persons are assumed to act, and Yv 
by which persons are assumed to be directed. It is a language which compels, Y
Y from compelling general social conduct, to compelling a lawyer to follow a . ,yy.YYY 
y; .certain procedural form when submitting a motion in a case. I assume ( and / Y Y Y
this may properly be a question about law-making and the legislative ) that Y'Y:; Y
Y- y legal language may be predicated of human nature and states of affairs. How Y ■'
^uch predication may be justified is a question I do not argue here. It / .
Y,: would perhaps be a separate topic in itself. I wish only to tell the reader Y:Y ; i
Y •. Y what assumption I have made about, legal language and states of affairs.
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' 7 y V-• Without attempting to betoken the merits of Fleta, I do turn 7y7^:y
to it, however, to demonstrate how the logical strands of mens rea, or 5
■ " --J.'’ v r* • '• „• ! . .7 ■-, V - .-yy .v-./-: yyy -• : ’•/yV- ■**£'■intention generally, appear in early common law. * Now that we have 
workable and scholarly editions of the text we are able to turn to the
text to note how many of our accepted legal notions, which one easily
can take for granted, came into being. As to the objection that the /■  ^ ; y y 
anonymous treatise does not preserve legal notions from the period in :
a state of untarnished historical exactness, one may reply that such is 7
too much to ask of any text on early common law; moreover, if one argued — '-yy /;y
in this fashion, and were to apply the argument to cases actually de­
cided by judges, what then would one do with the many odd judgements 7>-y 
• which did not contain mainstream teaching or consensus ? For the legal, yy y'y 
philosopher it is enough here that a record of legal opinion is given ; 
which preserves certain legal assumptions which:were current, and which y 77 
have been transmitted. Bracton, Fleta, Britton, The Mirrour of Justices,7 0; 
Fitzherbert, Stavndford, Richard Crompton, amongst many others, serve to .yy7 
give, as distinguished trial counsel, Mr. Louis Nizer once said in his yy....'..' 77': 
autobiography, My Life, in Court, a balance of probability to the truth, y y yyy
31. The editions of Fleta I have used are these. For direct textual -
proofings I have turned to the editon of Selden, which appears as:
"FLETA seu Commentarius Juris Anglicani sic nuncupatus, sub EDWARDO 
Rege primo seu circa annos abhinc CCCXL, ab Anonymo conscriptus, 
atque 6 Codice veteri, autore ipso aliqantulum recentiori, nunc 
primum typis editus.11 Subjungitur etiam JOANNIS SELDENI ad FELTAM . y : . 
Dissertatio Historica. LONDINI, M.DC.XLVII. This; is the first printed 
;r,.y edition of the work. For textual exactness and translation I have .■ y yyy 
used that edition prepared for the Selden Society, FLETA, Volume 11, '
Prologue, Book 1, Book 11, edited and translated by H.G.Richardson and 
G.O.Sayles (LONDON, 1955, Bernard Quaritich), which appears as volume , y y  ^  
72 for 1953 in the series. I have also used volume 89 for 1972 of the ;
Selden Society edition of FLETA, which is Volume 11, Books 111 and IV, 1.
prepared by H.G.Richarson and G.0.Sayles (LONDON, 1972, The Selden Society; 
/ I have consulted David Ogg's edition of:IOANNIS SELDENI Ad Fletam V/. V 
Dissertatio (Cambridge, At The University Press, 1925). . , /;yy y xy,7 7 \y7
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a b a la n ce  tow ards  th e  s t re n g th  o f  th e  t r u t h  b e in g  th e  case in  a g iv e n  
s i t u a t io n  when one f in d s  c e r t a in  n o t io n s  a p p e a r in g , a g a in  and a g a in , /  7 
i n  d i f f e r e n t  and d i s t i n c t  s i t u a t io n s  * I t  i s  n o t  an a p r i o r i  n e c e s s a ry  : 
t r u t h ;  r a t h e r ,  i t  i s  a k in d  o f  lo g ic a l  appearance w h ich  te n d s  t o r e -  77
commend i t s e l f  r a th e r  th a n  to  disrecom m end i t s e l f  to  p r a c t i c a l  re a s o n , 1
c a u s in g  one to  b e l ie v e  (m ost l i k e l y )  t h a t  som e th ing  i s  p ro b a b ly  th e  c a se , 
a k in  to  th e  b a la n ce  o f  p r o b a b i l i t ie s  w h ich  gove rn  e v id e n ce  in  j u r y  f in d in g s ;
i n  c r im in a l  law  cases a t  common la w . 7 ' 7 7 ' :7 t/7 - ’7 /777;.7-7-: 7 7 7 .7-77,
■ :77 . ■" ", 1 :'-7 7 7  77 7 . 7 V  '-7  ,7 .••*7 • '7 - t V '  v-7.-77 - s -7 . • /
% One usage re c o rd e d  by F I e ta  i s  th e  f o l lo w in g :  A 7.7 ;-:7  : / 7 7 7 :
7 7  "S h o u ld  a man r a s h ly  a tte m p t to  d e v is e  th e  k in g ’ s
7  7 d e a th  o r  p ro c u re  o r  i n c i t e  o r  g iv e  a id  o r  a s s e n t ;
. ;7 7 :7 7 j t o ^ t h e i i n g l s b e t r a y a l o r  th e  b e t ra y a l o f  th e  k in g 's  7/7 Z ;/- 7 7 /  arm y, a lth o u g h  he sh o u ld  n o t  have c a r r ie d  h is  i n -  ; 7/  / / /  > 7  /  7
■ ;7 :’ ;7 / ;  7V te n t io n  in t o  e f f e c t y . . . "  ( i t a l i c s  m in e ) .  9 7 7 / 7  -  7 ;7 '- ':7 ;7 7  .*Vf|
•7 77 .77. 7’ 7/. ; 7 7  > 7 7  th e  L a t in  f o r  th e  i t a l i ­
c is e d  p o r t io n  re a d s , "  quam uis v o lu n ta te m  non p e r d u x e r i t  ad e f fe c tu m , . . . "  
One may n o te  t h a t  th e  n o t io n  o f  ’ a t te m p t ’ c a r r ie s  o v e r  a r in g  fro m , 7.7 
; B ra c to n , who, on th e  same s u b j e c t , w ro te :
. , 7  "The c rim e  o f  le s e -m a je s ty  ta k e s  many fo r m s /  one o f  w h ich  7
7 *7 * 7 7  i s  where one r a s h ly  compasses th e  k in g ’ s d e a th , o r  do es7 7 7 .7'7 7
7 ; som e th ing  o r  a rra n g e s  f o r  som e th ing  to  be  done to  th e  b e - ; 7-‘7 77
7 ;.// ; .  t r a y a l  o f  th e  lo r d  k in g  o r  io f  h is  a rm y, o r  g iv e s  a id  and V  7 / 7 7  
c o u n se l o r  a s s e n t t o  th o s e  m aking such a rra n ge m e n ts , even ,7|  7 7 though  w hat he has in  m ind i s  n o t  c a r r ie d  in t o  e f f e c t . "  7 7 7
7...:?. / / '  7 !: 'y.-:7 v 7 7 '  V " ', : 7 ■ :'77 '7.' ‘7 /  77; , ,;7 \  ■ ■■. ( i t a l i c s  m in e ) ' 77' 7
*  N iz e r  had s ta te d  t h a t  c ro s s  e x a m in a tio n , when done w ith  f in e s s e  and 7 
7 s k i l l ,  te n d s , on  th e  b a la n c e  o f  p r o b a b i l i t i e s ,  to  e x t r a c t  th e  t r u t h  77 o f  w hat was th e  case*  I t  i s  a p r a c t i c a l  judgem en t, and f o r  t h a t  re a son  
one a pp e a ls  to  a n o t io n  o f  ’ on th e  b a la n ce  o f  p r o b a b i l i t i e s ’ . By e x - 7 /  
te n d in g  h is  m e tapho r, I  am s u g g e s tin g  t h a t  e a r ly  re c o rd s  o f  th e  common 7 : 
law  ( ca ses , r o l l s ,  t r e a t is e s ,  s ta tu te s  ) ,  even w ith  re g a rd  to  t h e i r  7 ; 
h i s t o r i c a l  in e x a c t i tu d e  a t  t im e s ,  w i l l ,  on th e  b a la n c e  o f  p r o b a b i l i t i e s ,  
/ r e v e a l  more o f  th e  lo g ic  o f  th e  la w  o f  w hat i s  th e  case th a n  what i s  
n o t  th e  ca se , upon p ro lo n g e d  e x a m in a t io n 7  C f . pp 11-13, P ro lo g u e , o f  7
7  MY LIFE IN  COURT, b y  L o u is  N iz e r  (D oub leday 6 Company, I n c . , 1961,7 7 -7  
G a rd e n /C ity ,  New Y o rk ) . / / ;7 ;J / \ '  7 *  7/ ^ 7. /  Zv ; 7 7 '7  7 7 7 / / / 7 7 Z ;
; 32. FLETA, Volume 11, Richardson and Sayles (1955), op.cit., page 56,7-/77/ 
7 7 , "Chapter 21, OF THE CRIME OF LESE MAJESTY”7 7 7  7/  -7 7. 7  :■ 7 7 : 7 / 7 7 - 7 7
7
7  J
7; The Latin text in Bractpn is: "...licet id quod in voluntate habuerit 7'/;/ '77 -77
V 7 7.'-77"7v7"\/. 7v./;\*• 7. ; XX. ■ *• -V. 7 7 S  K'r- :?'■' '7;7 •!non perduxerit ad effectum." * The parallel in notions is close enough ■ !
i tb suggest that they share in a common notion, Fleta using the form ;
"quamuis voluntatem", whilst Bracton employed/ "in voluntate habuerit" 
to express an incqmpleted act. The Latin roots, in the samples of the 7;77'^7/^7:
text,' suggest that a notion had been put into the mind by the agent . :
himself (awkward as the restatement of the notion be in English). One 
- 7 : had willed, and in willing had formed an intention to bring about. . .Some 7 7:7
. 7 end. Common to fAttempt1 is that the agent had formed a design; moot to • f7
- 1Attempt1 is whether the design can, in 7fact/be attempted. The text here'
assumes that one can form an intention ' to doi/ and that a crime (imder 7 7 7
certain circumstances) can be completed at the moment of the mental for- •
v :p mation Cin voluntate habuerit, or, quamuis voluntatem) of it. The Latin 7':/; ,X7v-;
7 7; ;carries over With its sense that one has rooted a concept in the will, as 7
7 7distinct from a concept rqoted solely in the intellect. We no longer speak 7 7-7
" ; in this way presently, and, when put into English prose, it appears that/ ;77 7-
one is talking (simply and exclusively) about the philosophy of mind. One 7 77:
7 is not, but it is only by appreciation of the genuine grammatical form of '
: . . 7 the original statement (in Latin) which reveals a vplitiVe emphasis which
7 7  English usage does not reveal. This distinction will become clearer as more 77^
7 7 texts are cited. The Latin, and, at times, the French reveal that the
7 evilness of an intention arises from a corruption of character; to speak of
7 7 7 7 a corrupt intellect would have been an odd, if not an incorrect, usage of ,7 7
7 7 ' : - mediaeval notions of crime or sin. A wrong could be, and the language Would. 7 7
; 7 ■ 7 tell one, an objective wrong (culpa, or even an accident in which personal',
7 > 7; 7 t ;harm was caused as casus embraced) or a wrong attributable to the intention of ;
, 33. Thome, op .cit., page 334. 7. 7.:' 7 .."" 77:/7''.- -77. ' • ^  if*
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of a subject ( as dolus or peccatum indicated ). When one modified a
notion, as in ’evil intent*, the modification sugges ted that such a cor- '
ruption sprang from the Will of the agent, and an explanation of such a 
corruption would stress how the Will, as a rational appetite in itself, Y > v
wrongly willed. The Will was also a less than rational appetite, butY y y y Y.YYy 
in Latin (at least ), its non-rational use could be explained, as when Y Y
one spoke of blind lust, or raging anger, and the like. I take time to YY'-y '
expostulate upon this distinction because without it, it then seems that 
’intention* pure and simple is, purely and simply, an intellectual notion 
only; and I argue that it is not/ nor have early Common law writers seen YY 
it to be a purely cognitive notion. Because Intellect was thought to be : ;
able to consider any set of propositions ( or concepts, if one wishes to YY
stress the non-propositional powers and abilities of Intellect ),theri, as 
such, it would be to fail to understand the nature of Intellect to claim 
that one predicated responsibility of it for what;it considered. To the 
contrary, responsibility, as a moral predicate ( and, for that matter, as
a legal concept j, rested in the Will for what set of rational considerations
it chose to act upon or under. However reified the language may be, to 
speak about Intellect and to speak about Will, what is as stake is how YY- //
properly to assign a role to a concept. Such a ro 1 e here is the concept
that of'being responsible', and it was thought that Will, as the final Y 
arbiter of human action, occupied that role. To be finally responsible for.: .y Y  
an act brought one (in theory) into the realm of praxis; to shape one * s 
character was a form of action (just as to undergo a change from potency to 
act was a form of action), and action rested within the power of the Will and; 
not Of the Intellect, ." Y: - Y 'Y-Y"'- ,Y .'YY Y-YY Y>''■'1-" .YYY-Y’ ;....>YYYY/ YY;v
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For a legal system developing out of the close of the Middle 
Ages one should not be surprised that the vocabulary of that emerging 7 
system would contain and reflect its theological and philosophical
heritage. The various treatises on law from the early renaissance v
show us these echoes from the Middle Ages, and it would be pleonastic 
to draw upon the large variety of legal texts to demonstrate the extent • 
of this heritage. What may bother us in our generation is that we 
are not sympathetic, generally, to a philosophy of mind which speaks 
in terms of mental faculties. It strikes us as if parts of a com­
puter are being described, while, all the same, the parts themselves 
are remaining hidden when, somehow, it is thought that they ought to : 
be open to inspection.7 We tend, in our age of scientific demonstration, 
to reject metaphysical demonstrations which appealed to conceptual 
distinctions aa if those conceptual distinctions were real and in­
stantiated. - / v  7/ j7: 7  'V . 7; ,77-77 77- v7' . 7 , 7  /V //
• I think it might be of greater profit to accept that our V
emerging legal system did borrow a faculty vocabulary, and that it did 
use it, preserving distinctions between intellection and volition, and, 
to understand how legal notions of criminal responsibility evolved, one/ 
must bear with those early notions. As late as 1696, in the manuscript/ 
by Chief Justice Hale, which I consulted and read in the British Museum, 
entitled, Tract Concerning the Law of Nature , one reads a treatise 
which abounds in scholastic distinctions and usage, preserving (even if
34. Unpublished, Harlean Manuscript 7159, British Museum. , 7';/
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critical of the distinction) the language which distinguished between 
the power of the Will and the power of the Intellect. Now,we may pre­
fer to appreciate the distinction between modes of action without, at 
the same time, ascribing a particular mental faculty to account for 
that particular mode of action. Optative may differ from indicative; 
without the need of postulating an optative faculty in opposition to 
an indicative faculty of mind. ■ v;i;Y Y . Y ■ Y YYYYYY-Yy Y
To return then to Fleta one may appreciate that it reflects a 
use of 'attempt* similar to Bracton. One may intend to attempt, and 
both treatises are satisfied that the intentional portion of the crime 
has been fulfilled. They both are silent on that portion of a crime . 
which one might now describe as actus reus. The actus reus of a pro­
hibited action seems to be incorporated within an intentional des­
cription of the prohibited act; one does not find a separate portion 
dealing specifically with the non-intentional elements of a crime. It 
will be for later, and modem, writers to dwell upon this portion of a 
crime's elements, but even here actus reus is done in passing and without 
treatment in monograph form. YY ’ •Y Y ’" " : '• '• V • • :Y VYv . /
Woven into the discussion of homicide in Fleta is a use of
'intention*which is adjectival* which moves between legal use and moral
use, and which demonstrates the volitional nature of a rational act . I 
shall attempt, by citing passages from Chapter 23, "Of Homicide",to de­
monstrate how all of these usages occur in Fleta. :  ^ YYYYY v. vY;
. The opening sentence of the chapter, "Of Homicide"auses ,
intent as a cluster-word. The sentence is, "Homicide is the slaying 
of man by man with evil intent..." and it is to the Latin text that 
one must turn to see that 'intent' is rendered from 'nequiter'. The 
term does not possess a logical preciseness (which we might expect 
now from key terms), suggesting, as it does, that one may be a man 
of bad character who did a condemned act. To translate the term as 
'evil intent' does not, thereby, render it epistemically clear. The 
vague meaning is that a wrong is done, and that the wrong may reflect 
the character of the agent, his baseness. '[Njequiter’ is used to 
embrace 'motive' in the text, and this passage will support such a 
reading,.:' .7"- . . ‘V'.v’.v, :v ^77-.; ;".V7
, 7 ^  A judge, for example, slays in justice when he
lawfully condemns, unless his intention is corrupt,
[nisi intencionem habeat corruptiam], as, for example,
7; ii: his judgement should be actuated by malice or de-
. light in shedding human blood, [ex liuore (which may
mean, in a tropical sense, envy, spite,malice, ill- 7;: 
will) vel voluptate effundendi humanum sanguinem],
• and in such a case, although the slaying be law­
ful,: it is homicide and he commits mortal sin: but 
it is otherwise if he acts from love of justice,
7 in strict conscientiousness..." ^  7 7
The early discription of muTder in which intention is the key concept 
makes an explicit distinction between law, as one system, and morals, 
as an element of a legal act. The legal act may be legal in a strict 
sense, ie, conforming with a legal code, and one may have adhered to
35. Fleta, op.cit., page 60 (Vol. 11). The sentiment, certainly, is 
old. Seneca detailed such a repugnant emotion when he spoke of 
Hannibal's delight when he saw a trench flowing with human blood. 
Seneca thought such was cruel emotion.7 Cf., On Anger, Book Two, 
v. 3-vi. 1, page 177 of Volume One of Seneca’s mokAL bSSAYS,
(Translated by J.W.Basore, Heinemann Ltd., 1970)
’ ith e  e x t e r n a  1 f o r m  s t r i c t l y  w h i c h  t h a t  l e g a l  c o d e  may d i c t a f e , 7 7 7 7 ;': '':r 7 ;
7 ■ ; i t  i s  s t i l l  p o s s i b l e  t o  f a u l t  t h a t  a c t  m o r a l l y  . One c o u l d  ' v : 17V.777:
; : a r g u e  t h a t  t h e  a b s e n c e  o f  a m e n t a l  e l e m e n t ,  w h i c h  o m i s s i o n  / i
i s  c a u s e d  b y  t h e  a g e n t  h i m s e l f ,  may  r e n d e r  t h e  p e r f e c t  l e g a l  7‘
a c t  a n  i m m o r a l  a c t .  T h i s  p e r m i t s  o n e  i n  t h e o r y  t o  a r g u e  t h a t  , 7.7V'..- ' •-! 
V : a n  a c t  may a d m i t  o f  t w o  d i s t i n c t  d e s c r i p t i o n s ,  e v e n  t h o u g h  V ;
7 t h a t  s e l f - s a m e  a c t  i s  p r e d i c a t e d  o f  a  s i n g l e  i n t e n t i o n .  B y 7 'W V '7 ‘7 -7
: an  a g e n t  i n t e n d i n g  t o  p h i  ( 0) ,  t h e  same a c t  o f  t h e  a g e n t  may ' -C /JVVrVV
7 v a d m i t  o f  tw o  d i s t i n c t ,  e x c l u s i v e  d e s c r i p t i o n s . E a r l y  cpmmon:  77/  7 7
7 la w ,  i n  i t s  c o u r s e  o f  d e v e l o p m e n t ,  a d m i t t e d  o f  t h i s  c o m m o n -  ’ v / ; '
s e n s e  d i s t i n c t i o n .  ; I t  a d m i t t e d  t h a t  t h e r e  w a s  a d i s t i n c t i o n  7 ;-7
b e t w e e n  a m o r a l  a c t  a n d  a l e g a l  a c t .  By  i t s  u s e  o f  '1 a n g u a  g e >. 7 7' "7  :
7 t h e  e a r l y  com m on la w  m i g h t  u s e  t h e  same t e r m  t o  a d m i t  o f  b o t h  < 7 7
: : . d i s t i n c t i o n s , as  w h e n  o n e  r e a d s  1n e q u i t e r ' ,  o r  * l i u o r e  1;  a n d  ;^77-.77.77':
7 v  \  : t e r m s  ■ o f ,  l i k e  w e i g h t . 7 :' / -  7 •- ..7. 7 777.7':7' 7 7 -"  :'-:7.-7''/>7 7 ' 777;777'
. One ;in ay  a r g u e  t h a t  m o r a l  p r e d i c a t e s  a n d  l e g a l  p r e d i c a t e s  
7"7°7'  f u n c t i o n  i n  o p p o s i n g  w a y s  o n e  f r o m  t h e  o t h e r  . B e c a u s e  ea ;p h ; ; . / / --v 7 7  ’
7 v h a s  a d i f f e r e n t  e x p e c t a t i o n  a n d  a i m ,  t h e y  s i g n i f y  i n  m u t u a l l y
7> e x c l u s i v e  w a y s . I n  p a r t  t h i s  i s  t r u e  t o  s a y  . I t  h a 5 ; !b e 'e n 7 ‘. 7 '  7 7 7 7 ; i
; \  t h e  c a s e  h i s t o r i c a l l y ,  e s p e c i a l  l y  w i t h  t h e  c r i m i n a l  s a n c t i o n ,   7 >  'J*
7 t h a t  a 1e g a l  s y s t e m  i s  c o n c e r n e d  w i t h  p u b l i c  a c t s  a n d  n o t ,
g e n e r a l l y ,  w i t h  p r i v a t e  a c t s . One m i g h t  a r g u e  t h a t  i t  w o u l d  i
; b e  t o o  m uch  f o r  a l e g a l  s y s t e m  ( l i k e  t h e  common l a w  ) t o  b e  47
77 c o n c e r n e d  i n  i t s  o f f i c i a l  c a p a c i t y  a n d : t h r o u g h  i t s  m a c h i n e r y  w i t h  :
: *  A m o ra l sys tem  i s  g e n e r a l ly  th o u g h t , t o  be th e  c o n s c ie n c e  o f  th e  p e rs o n . /  ^
7 V  and t h a t  w h ich  g u id e s  o r  p o l ic e s  One*s a c t s .  I t  i s  n o t a n e c e s s a ry  t r u t h  7 /
t h a t  a le g a l  sys tem  and a m o ra l sys tem  c a in o t i n t e r s e c t , — -c o n s id e r  a t h e o c r a t ic  7 
le g a l  sys tem , o r  a le g a l  sys tem  w h ic h  does n o t make th e  d i s t i n c t i o n  b e - .
tw een p u b l ic  and p r iv a t e  fa c e  i n  human a c t io n s .  Some may a rg ue  t h a t  a sys tem  7 
l i k e  S o V ie t la w  b lu r s  th e  d i s t i n c t i o n  be tw een  th e  p e rs o n  and th e  s ta te  f o r  7 7 7 7 ;77 7 7 th e  re a so n  t h a t  th e  s t a t e  i s  th o u g h t t o  embody th e  a im s o f  th e  p e rs o n . I  777
-7/7 7" b e l ie v e ,  how eve r, t h a t  one can l o g i c a l l y  d is t in g u is h  a m o ra l sys tem  fro m  a ; \
le g a l  sys te m . - . ' « ; ']
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the policing of strictly private intra-mental conditions. In the first 
place how could one enforce sanctions against thoughts ? Legal predicates, 
then, would be seen as those which attach to public conditions . How -VY;Y. 
one felt, what one believed, what one privately intended, would be 'YYY, 
'classed as moral‘predicates.. y-Y'Y ■ "Y •' Y  'YY- Yy
Cast into a simple logical fora it would mean that every 
act an agent authored would admit to two distinct logical descriptions.
If a legal act were 'p' and a moral act were 'p-prime*, then any re­
lationship holding between 'p' and 'p-prime1 would be non-necessary. One Y 
would come into the legal sphere by offering his reasons for an action,
" I stole the automobile because..." The legal act would have been YY - 
the taking of the automobile conjoined to what reasons the court might Y y  
accept to excuse one from the act or not. What is stressed, to make 
it a legal matter, is the public nature, ie, "...the stealing of.;."
The private nature of the act would be incorporated into the public 
act when it could be said that the reasons one offered, "I thought
it was my car." were accepted by the court or not. The actions of
an agent fit into what is publically permissible or acceptable. , Y
But the same action could be a moral action, 'p-prime'. ;
One might be an adherent of a strict religious sect which did not 
believe in private ownership. But the problem which is perplexing 
is that criminal law ( as an example ) does not maintain a strict ,
distinction between what an agent believes to be the case, and what 
the law states to be the case. The overlap is blurred when, to some Y
criminal charges, it is material to know what the accused believed Y Y
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or thought was the case. To attempt a distinction between moral and :; 
legal predicates on the basis of extensionality only is a distinction 
which helps the law little, if at all . Some criminal charges are ; v; /7X 
defeased when one states/that he truly believed ’x' to be the case, / 
as in sections of The Theft Act 1963.; ; •-> > ,;v . V 'X"7; 7;: - • ”
'{7 V  , I would wonder further if the distinction between moral > 
and legal predicates on the consideration only of public and private -; 
realms is that strict. Most criminal offences require that a de- ' ;.;7 
fendant acknowledge his guilt. It is not a necessary condition for 
the finding of guilt; but guilt, as such, functions as a judicial v 
and prosecutorial device at trial. If an accused truly cannot ad­
mit guilt, then such could be advanced as a possible defence that the 
accused did not know that he had committed a crime. The ambit of! / , 
the criminal sanction includes mens rea, which is to bring the ac- v 
cused within the boundaries of a criminal sanction, and also includes 
actus reus, which (as a modestly open-ended concept) includes not 
only the definition of the crime, and the legal circumstances which 
may surround a crime, but also the legal abhorence which attaches to 
a crime. I am not arguing that a necessary condition for criminal guilt 
is that the accused himself believes that he is guilty. But it 
may be reasonable to consider, as a form of a defence, if the accused 
understood if he himself did commit a crime. He may in fact have 7 
fulfilled the material conditions surrounding a crime’s definition; . 7  
but if he had no understanding of the formal conditions which attached 
one might argue from such a fact that the accused either did not know
; Y the nature and quality of his acts ( as with a plea of insanity Y
/. or that the accused without benefit of criminal knowledge (scienter), ‘• -, • ,
; or that the accused ( within the strict conditions of a legal system ) y ;Yy YYyIY 
YY/yY acted from diminished responsibility, or that an accused acted without / : ■ > ■ ,Y- 
Y any awareness of what were the elements of an offence— acting Out
Of ignorance— rebutting the assumption that he had committed a crime ^ \ Y /Y.y Y’
Fleta uses a number of key terms to express criminal intention, as • : Y Y Y  yY
Yf -\; ./can be seen in the chapter dealing with homicide ( Chapter 23 );^*The ; • Y \Y
YY: first sentence, it will be recalled, expressed 'wilfully' by the use of H /
the Latin term, 'voluntate'. If an intention ( intencionem ) were cor- /•. . Y
Y. nipt, the sentence modified the word 'intention' with the Latin adjective,
'corruptam', which modification served to indicate that an intention Y . .Y Y’'!
Y ('intentionem') in and of itself did not express malice or wickedness of
mind. A corrupt intention was also expressed in this Latin usage by the Y.>VS- YY'i
. Y ; expression, 'animo corrupto' which indicated that one's soul itself was 
'YYY, Y corrupted or wicked. One may consider this passage for its multiple use 3Y-v’VYY.Y>1 *Y-, 
Y.*:Y ; • of intentional terms: r';Y Y Y;:;- Y Y v':' -‘./■'Y;YY^::Y'- YY -'.-YYY.Y:YYvY f YY'vYYY/Y'YYY
. Y:. Y:-"YY'Y-Y Y yy':-YYYY- "Wilfully, as for example, if a man, with . .
Y Y ; corrupt intention, wickedly arid feloniously slays anyone by YYYsYYy
Y;Y Y ; Y deliberate attack, in anger or hatred or for the sake of gain: vY VY/f !
.•*’ and if this is done secretly, it will be accounted murder."
Y: Save for the historical fact that murder meant a killing done secretly, the :-Yv y YYY:
Y Y language of the sentence preserves the volitional aspect of intending. Y  ;Y . i 
•y:v An intention is not synonymous with verbal formation; the text is not explaining Yi
' Y Y Y  36. Cf., Henderson v. Morgan, 49 L.Ed. 2d 108. ID did not understand that to a ; .’YY| 
plea of guilty to a second degree murder charge a necessary element in the Y ^
Y charge was an intent to cause death. D's guilty plea was thus not a voluntary YY/ 
plea under the circumstances. Y 37. PSge 60, volume II.
Y YY 38. Op.cit., page 60, which Latin text reads: "Voluntate, vt si quis animo ] Y j 
Y corruptio in assultu premeditato, ira vel odio vel causa lucri, nequiter et in 1 i
felonia aliquem interfecit, quod si occulte fiat pro murdrohabebitur." . , f -
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how sentences which express legal intention were formed. What the 
text is attempting to indicate, and possibly explain by its appeal 
to an ablative notion of cause and of source, is that a crime may 
be accounted for'by presenting a particular account of human action 
springing from the soul. An *animo corrupto' is a compressed way 
to account for an internal dissolution; : : /
One cannot but help to appeal to Aquinian notions of human faculties 
when examining this period. His influence upon writers was profound, 
and one finds later legal scholars in constant debt to Aquinas. If 
we chose to draw upon him as representative of much mediaeval theory, 
we cannot avoid how he saw the Will to be. Without trying to offer 
a unified theory of Will, his writings do appear to be consistent, V ' 
in spite of whatever dilemmas they may now cause for us regarding 
how he envisaged his theory of will. Willing was a rational appetite 
(S.T.la2ae. 8. 1). In the first answer of that same article he stated 
that the will is related both to good or evil. The actual desire for ^
the good was the will in act, voluntas; and the will shrinking from 
evil was -'no juntas. In article 2, same question, he stated that the 4 v 
term 'Will' "...sometimes indicates the power of rational desire ahd'^ v^ v;'^ : 
sometimes its activity." Will was that power of the soul which linked 
the realm of the spirit and the realm of matter, and moved the suppositum, 
which was man, to an end. Intellect, of itself, moved nothing. How 
did will and intellect Mnove* At S.T. Ia2ae 9.3. Aquinas says,
"... the mind brings itself from a potential to an actual knowledge of 
a conclusion by its knowing the premises; this is how it sets itself in 
motion. Likewise the will: it moves itself to willing the objects which 
are on account of the end because it wills the end." What we have to 
plug in is that he is depicting a faculty which exists. That a faculty 
does exist (actually) takes that faculty from the drawing board and puts 
it into the world. The questions is not, How can what is unmoved then,-: 
come to move; rather, the question is,How that which exists does move.
In S.T. Ia2aw 78, 1, he asks how malice (malitia) is a cause of sin. One 
of the causes of sin may be a lack of order in the will (ex defectu volun­
tatis) . ’Malice' is an evil habit (E.N. il,4.il05bl9-28). In FIeta we ‘ 
could argue that an 'animo corrupto' is an expression of the soul for;': W !-' 
a disordered end. The disordered end is to infringe the law ( one meaning 
of law was the King 's peace ) . So the phrase, in this text, is a short-;:. . 
hand expression indicatingthat the will has turned against a higher good,; 
the law, and sought a lesser good, ie, the disorder which a crime re- . 
fleets. -V • : . . -; A • . AvvA • v.A ■ A TA . A<A-AA;//;:':-
i?
The phrase 1.. .in assultu premeditato...1 reflects a 
twelfth century usage that one has premeditated upon his act. The 
assault is not spontaneous (like a tavern brawl might be). The assault 
is the expression of a design; one has considered what could be done v 
and one has consented to what could be done. As in the opening sentence 
■ ' 7 to the chapter, 'nequiter ' is used, but not to mean Wicked intention
>. • but to mean only wicked. The cluster of words, then, which we are
- given to portray homicide tend to depict a corruption of character
and an entertaining of a wrongful design for some end. The language
'■ v.-7: 7 • *.v 39 .7777 ••
77. ; of the sentence is parallel to Bracton: / >>
; ; : : ''Voluntate,"ut si quis ex certa scientia et in  ^ 7
7 7 '  ; assultu praemeditato* ira vel odio vel causa - ?
, lucri, nequiter et in feIonia et contra pacem ' 7  : 7  
>7^/.  V ' 7 7 Y ' : 7  • 1 domini regis aliquem interfecerit. "  7 , 7  7 > \ / 7 7  7 ' 7 ' 7  7
7 When Fleta presents an analysis of a felonious act it
is interesting to see what range of action and omission is shown in
7: . 7 the example. If, when two were quarrelling, and one killed the other,
7 7 /  39. Op. cit. ,  Thorne, page 341: ...7 ’ "7: V -7.7 ... 7  7 - 7 7
V'.-V'iv7 "By intention, as where one in anger or hatred 7/ 7
7 or for the sake of gain, deliberately and in pre­
/777; 77 meditated assault, has killed another wickedly ; .
7 7  and feloniously and in breach of the king's peace."
7 *7 Premedit/ o, with premeditation, 11921 7 7 ’7 : . 7
Premetior (deponent), to measure out beforehand, circa 1180; to 
7 consider beforehand, circa 1180. , 7 7
From MEDIEVAL LATIN WORD-LIST by J.H.Baxter and C.Johnson,
77 (Oxford University Press, 1934), at page 325/^7- 7 7 7 7 "
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then the following set of legal conditions seem to obtain: A
, V V  1. There was an intention to kill said to be A'A- ••-.A 
V  ^ in those who were there aid simply wished A , ?
'• A • to kill, but did no deed, A  ; • . ' J A ./A.- A-A'-A ;A. A-A' A.‘­
; . v , 2. those who gave counsel were said to have an V ; 
v intention to kill, v*r. : A A.-.'.-A'-; • ' A'AA A A '
3. Those who physically aided were said to have
A- 1 AA-. A. A : an intention to kill, ; ■ Av* / A A-A; .-A-A A A A . A'
; ; A 4. Those who physically involved themselves, ie., ; A
; A A involved themselves in some non-legal way in A ;A
A  . the affray - A " ' A -.A. ■ A  A-A'  . /.A' A . A A A ' A A A A  ^A-A
O f . *3• and '4' the distinction might have been between active v. : '.AA;; 
passive participation in the affray, ■ :
A ; A , 5. The fighters themselves are found to be by FIeta 
A ' A. • A guilty of intentional killing, one of the other.  ^AA/
The force of the example seems to be, however loosely framed, 
that non-legal acttions which are felonious should not have the pre­
occupation of any one. 'Bystander’ cases ate often a problem a A A A
problem for Courts (in our own century), and there seems to be no •;AA.:AA 
hard and fast rule. If a jurisdiction has a constructive malice :
statutei then the burden of proof shifts to the defendant to prove 
that he was not involved in a conspiracy or an attempt; but the Court, 
or the prosecution, generally advert to the nature of the crime itself. 
Bank Robbery will be treated with greater seriousness by the prosecution 
than will, say, bystanders at a legitimate prize-fighting match who 
cheer on a victor to 'kill' his opponent, even if, in fact, it sadly A; 
happens that his opponent is killed by a blow. FIeta preserves and ;A A 
reflects the heavenly morality of the Middle Ages where, morally, the A 
seriousness of an act rests not in its effect, but in the intention with 
'Which 'the- effect was brought aboUtAA'A’A A* A A  -.A-*' - A/*A A.. A -AAAA. A'-AAS
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The major observation one might make of Fleta is that it 77'V 
mixes intentional language. At times when criminal intention is spoken 777 
of, the /language Will be strictly volitive.; But there are usages in the :i 
instant chapter which make intention mental. What must be done is to . 
locate the text, and ask if intention means an intention authoring an 7 * >7
act, or whether intention means *premeditation1, which, properly, is a '77 
cognitive term. When we read,^* ,
- . "He too, who . slays in an unjust war, and .'likewise 7 7 7 : ' VVVV7
777-  >>. in a just war, if the intention is corrupt, [ dum 7 . 7 7  .77 
- 7 tamen mente corrupts ], commits homicide. , v ;
we should read this, I suggest, as we would have read *corrupto1 -
in conjunction with Tanimo1. ■ . 7 . . 7 \ ; ;
V , There is good sacramental usage to preserve peccatum 7-
holding both to mental and volitive spheres, and an appealto a simple 
example may make this clear. If one does not actively entertain a 7 /
temptation, theologians were wont to say that they came and went, anti
had little to do with the Will. But if mental awareness has little
to do with the Will, it does not follow that every form of rational • 7.
consideration has nothing to do with the Will. The Will, it was accepted, 
was a rational faculty. If, however, one attended to the content of 7 
his own mental musings or temptations, theologians were of the belief , 
that one was actively, volitionally, entertaining mental considerations. 
Intellect, purely as a faculty with its operations, excluded movement 
to a practical end; the sphere of 'movementi (broad as is that notion) 
incorporated the Will. If from an action it could be said that neither 
the Will nor the Intellect was present, then it would have been argued
40 * Fleta, C.23 at page ,61/;- ■ / \\V77/. ; 7 77 ,7/ ,7.7.-_ 7 7  _;
7 /  ; i
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that the movement was of a lower nature only, such as pure sense movement/: 
or simple vegetative movement, or, as in sleep or in a coma, involuntary Yy 
'movement/' "V- 7 y . ' y - ' U ■ -V Y Yk*.V- Y;.'/' //■ ‘ //’ / - ;//;Y;,/YY
V o  ; I directed my attention to peccatum for the simple; reason Y
that in a temptation to sin, as opposed to sinning actually,- the only : ’ , 
difference in description whidi one could provide for the elements of , 
a temptation,as opposed to the elements of sinning actually, would be 
the consent of the agent. Consent was a serious and important category, 
and, for this reason, it Was not sufficient only to demonstrate that one 
knew (some rxf or other); the importance, from a moral point of view 
(and, I would add, a legal point of view), was whether one did consent. 
Consent was a rational volitional act, or seen to be so for moral theory 
of the period. In Fleta we encounter,?again and again, the consensual 
use of mental predicates, and this always leads one back to the will. ‘ 
Later legal usage wil1 turn from this clear volitive use of language, ; 
and will, in turn, begin to speak about intention as a set of logically Y 
possible ends which might be achieved, had the agent properly considered 
them. Here the use of intention excludes the efficient condition which 
will provides, and the linguistic usage depicts intention as if it were /  
only a relationship of a formal to a final cause. The error which this /; 
kind of depiction involves is that it removes from the defendant certain 
kinds of excuses which, I wish to argue, are genuine legal excuses which 
a common law court ought to entertain. As I had stated earlier, Hearst, 
and other such relevant cases which involve compulsion, kinds of duress, 
and forms of automatism, are made difficult to defend to a judge or jury.
s. Y'', •
•iaii
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The textual parallels are obvious between Bracton
and Fleta that one need not belabour citing them. Each work
advances an intentional definition of criminal responsibility,
the scope and range of such propositions are broad rather than
microscopic in detail and assumption. When Fleta discusses /7 7:“7
'Murder” the chief element of the crime, other than its secretness, V
is a slaying ". . .committed wickedly by men's hands. .." (".. .occisio 777
a manibus hominum nequiter perpetrata..."). The parallel text in z:\7V'7
Bracton (Thorne, page 379) reads, "Murder is the secret slaying - ,7 -7-7‘
of man by the hand of man,[whether those slain are known or strangers,]
[committed wickedly,]...” The text, it is suggested, is corrupted, 7
thus its adjectival description "...nequiter perpetrata..." is bracketed
by Thome, the phrase having been omitted in some manuscripts. , ;: , 7
Bracton is, however, more precise when asking ’What is called murder."
The text states why the "hand of man' phrase is inclued: ;7 ; •. \ 7 7 -;
’ "The words 'by the hand of man' are used to distinguish : 7/
it from the case of those slain or devoured by beasts 7/"7'7,7 
- and animals which lack reason;such persons cannot be said
* One may refer to the Selden text from which I cite to locate the 
parallels in text in Bracton. .Richardson and Sayles cite the 
folio pagination of an earlier Bracton Latin text, and that pagi- 7 
nation does not correspond to the (now) definitive volume which 7. 7
had been prepared by Samuel E. Thome, and which edition I cite. 7/. 7 7 
But the folios are off only by one page, or two at most, and one , 7^ / 
can easily find the parallels by comparing Thorne with the Selden 7 
text. Where there is any doubt, I cite the page for the Thorne 77 
edition of Bracton. I wish to note, too, that Richardson and 1
Sayles do not offer a propositional analysis or comparison be-77// 7- .7 
tween Bracton and Fleta; thus an atomic analysis of the sentences 
of each text will reveal larger differences between the two writers.
. •' ?r. •
_ \,A
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: : . Y Y" to be murdered feloniously since animals • ■, •
Y ;• which lack reason cannot be said to commi t
Y?:‘Y- Y-Y Y injuria or felony." Y’YY; '-t \-r.: •' y/Y.;, ;Y.„
Even thought the Fleta states that dead bodies should be examined to 
determine the cause of death (Chapter 25. OF THE OFFICE OF CORONERS), 
the text does not directly advert to the reason why a portion of a : 
definition, ie Murder, contains some of the elements it does contain.
Y . That Bracton considers a reason why a definition contains 
certain particular elements to the exclusion of other elements is not 
an oddness of Bracton as opposed to Fleta. Each treatise rests the 
ascription of legal responsibility in intention (in whatever way 'in­
tention' is technically expressed). For Bracton, because one's in- : 
tention is considered, permits a punishment to be assigned, or not. Y 
Whether we consider the theory successful or not, it was part and YY 
parcel of mediaeval religious theory that a punishment was made to /: 
fit the crime, and this tradition is easily demonstrated by turning. 
to Bracton's De Actionibus. For Bracton, an action was "...nothing
41. The Latin text from Thorne, page 379, reads: : : ,
V : "Item a manu hominum dicitur ad differentiam eortim 
, qui a bestiis et animalibus quae ratione carentoc- ;
; ciduntur vel devorahtur, et qui non possunt dici Y ; 
murdriti in felonia, quia animalia quae ratione 
Carent non possunt dici fecisse iniuriam neque feloniam."
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other than the right of pursuing in a judicial proceeding what is
' A ■■ v '• A A  ' - A  A A . A  " O  . .  ■ A ' A  A; ■ A '-A 'due to one." * Whei* kinds of punishments are considered they are
considered in relation to the magnitude of an iniquity; Lesser crimes
receive lesser punishments; but the magnitude of a crime turns upon
Y-- A A -  :<' ' A ' . A , A A  :■> " '43 A ; •' ■ A A A : " V- ...A  .■ • 'A ' -•/ •its intentional elements . Bracton says, T : v ; A
A "Punishments are rather to be mitigated than increased.
[Offences are committed intentionally, by impulse or 
. . by accident]. Robbers commit offences intentionally,
•: by deliberation; those who are drunk, by impulse, moved
.A • A by their drunkenness. . V  A ?A  A .A A  A A /
;:A:'l :---Av ■ .v'A ''A'- .A A/-A and,a little later in the same >. A-
text,when it is advanced that various offences must be considered from
from seven points of view, we read this sentence concerning 'Fortuity',
ie., one of the seven categories whereby the severity of a punishment
can be determined, a 'AAA a i A A A A A A  aAAA^ a A'A;*/1^ A'>:A
‘A- A A "Fortuity, as where one does some act intentionally and
A  . A with full understanding, as homicide, or does it acci-AAAA
dentally...Depending upon this his deed will be either A
■ A ' v A  • ’ felony or misadventure."A; A ;A  >A-• A A A ’.y A  ’ A~'AAA.  A;;AA A ; s
42. Thome, op. cit., page 282. A  A a A AA'AAA A • .A A A. A? A- ; J a A aA
43. Thome, op.cit., page 299. The Latin text reads: "Et poenae potius A*
molliendae sunt quam exasperandae. Delinquunt latrones proposito 
per factionem. Ebrii, impetu per ebrietatem cum ad manus vel fer-A’-
A rum pervenitur.
44. Thome,, op.cit., idem, "Eventus, ut si ex voluntate et conscientia 
A A certa fecerit quis aliquid, sicut homicidium, an ex eventu...Et se^
cundum hoc aut erit felonia aut infortunium."
* Note: • The Crime, qua crime, would be defined by statute or common
law. That one ha<T^ommitted a crime would depend upon one's defence,
;. ie., whether or not one had formed the requisite intention for the 
commission of the crime. The relationship which obtains is between 
A the crime as defined (statute or common law) and the agent acting • .
under that definition. The objective element to any crime would be A
f its definition; the subjective element would be whether or not one, ;
did commit a crime. In no way do I suggest that crime is purely a A
A subjective category. It is not, and early common law was clear on
A A**1© matter. Nulla poena sine lege. •; K -'A A
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Both treatises are strong in their treatment of in­
tention, and both treatises offer us enough instances of non-in- 
tentional actions,that one can safely assert that each treatise 
mirrors the long tradition in Christian theology to treat intentional 
wrongs one might commit as reasoned acts of the will. There was 
theory enough developed to account for some kinds of human action
which were not reasonable. Fleta speaks of that "...innocence of
45.mind...V which protected a madman or child from legal guilt 
as did Bracton. In Bracton the text states, ”...as may be said of 
a child or a madman, since the absence of intention (’’innocentia
45. The texts themselves are these.
Fleta:”...deed should not be deemed felony, because they were 
not actuated by an intention to slay, but by the equity of the law 
they are to be entirely absolved, because a crime is not committed 
unless the desire to harm is present, just as may be said, more­
over, of a child and a madman, for innocence of mind protects the 
one and the mischance of the deed excuses the other. With crimes, 
regard should be had to the intention and not to the consequence, 
[ITALICS MINE], and it matters nothing whether a man slays or fur­
nishes the occasion of death. Intention and purpose distinguish 
crimes: and theft is not committed unless there is a desire to 
.steal'. ’. \ V .
The Latin text reads: ”In istis autem casibus et similibus 
non debet reputari felonia, eo quod occidendi anomo premissa facta 
non fuerint, set omnino sunt de iuris equitate absoluenda, quia 
crimen non contrahitur nisi voluntas nocendi interueniat, secundum 
quod dici poterit insuper de infante et furioso, cum vnum innocencia 
consilii tueatur et alterum infelicitas facti excuset. .« in maleficiis 
autem spectari debet voluntas et non exitus....Voluntas enim et 
propositum distingunt maleficia: furtum vero non committitur sine ' 
affectu furandi. (page 80, Book 1, C.31). ; -;V.. ' :
The pertinent portion from Bracton (page 384 of Thome) is bracketed, 
but it does read as follows:”It is will and purpose which mark maleficia, 
nor is theft committed unless there is an intent to steal.” [”Et voluntas 
et propositum distinguunt maleficia, et furtum non committitur sine af­
fectu furandi.”] But not bracketed, and immediately following, is,
"In', crimes the intention is regarded, not the result.” [”In maleficiis 
autem spectatur voluntas et non exitus,...”]
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consilii tueatur...") protects the one and the unkindness of fate 
excuses the other." *•/- v .] ; •. ...n /. ; - ;***: - V ?
• , . /These early treatises reveal that a theological tradition 
was taken over into them, and that a crime, like a sin, could only be Y 
attributed to human action if the action were fully human. If a being, 
like an animal, did not possess reason, the measure of punishment would 
be different from the measure of punishment metted to a person. An 
animal might be vicious, from its disposition; but its viciousness 
would be different in kind from any viciousness a person might be 
said to possess or display because of the difference in species. The 
early law developed from within a tradition of reason and will, and 
the measure of an act was the reasonableness it embodied. The language 
of the early legal writings confirm that the way in which criminal 
behaviour was explained was that it was an act of the will. Many of 
the moral predicates assigned to account for transgression were volitive 
predicates, incorporating what one knew, but also expressing that what 
one knew fell under the control of one's will. The will moved one to 
a good. It was not V  theory without application. Minimal conditions 
were assigned so that the law could distinguish grades of actions, as Y
46. Thorne, op.cit., page 384. Thome also footnotes this excuse,
,, to madness or to infancy, to the Digest [48.8.12], which reads: 
"Infans vel furiosus si hominem occiderint lege Cornelia non 
tenentur, cum alterum innocentia consilii tuetur, altemm fati 
infelicitas excusat." ■'.r; : -7 ,Y"Y ' ;
■'  i
* ■'?. *v ; ' - \ v  /  v
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was the distinction between a madman, held to be non-responsible for an 
act, and the murderer, held to be responsible for an act. i
Other writers, and case law, show how the tradition worked* 
into the law. We are given the conclusions of a conventional wisdom 
borrowed from the theologians, leaving their involved and intricate ", 
arguments behind in the tomes of mediaeval theology. If we review , 
Britton, for example, we fine modest indications that commonplace , 
tones and assumptions were at work in the early common law.; I draw 
upon the work not to show that it is an adequate historical recording 
of the law at work, but rather for the purpose of showing how common­
place notions simply entered the law writers' vocabularies. In the
\ • v :• ;; ■ • 4.7 '..;''. Y ■ ' f.sixth chapter of the first book of Britton ; *we read what is now
f ami1iar to us concerning homicide: ' ,  ^ :
; ?1. . .this felony may be committed under colour of :
judgement through malice of the judge[par colour J ; >. 
de jugement par male volunte de juge], or under • Y Y Y^ ';-
some other pretence, as by false physicians and .
. . • > , bad surgeons, and by poison and sundry other ways, >-
, our pleasure is, that all those who have committed Y^ Y'Y-,v;
. . ,Y such secret felonies be indicted...”
The double world which incorporated both the public expression of
a crime, its act, and its private springs of action, the conscience
of the person, is evident in Brittpnv ; Not all serious events were
judged to be felonies , as death by accident made c l e a r ‘But such
mischances were subject to deodand. V j •
47. I have consulted the text of, BRITTON, The Second Edition, by Edm.
V Wingate (LONDON, Printed by the assignes of John Moore, Esquire, ,
Anno 1640), and have employed the French text and translation of, r 
v BRITTON, Volume 1, by Francis Morgan Nichols, M.AY (OXFORD, At The'
.; Clarendon Press, MDCCCLXV). Selection from Nichols, page 34. ; f
48., Nichols, op.cit., page 39, Chapter Vlll, M0f Accidents".
■_ t
■n
: Y 77 ; When speaking of treason, Britton compresses his des­
cription by stating that the crime "...consists of any mischief, which 
a man knowingly does, or procures to be done...["Tresun est en chescun 
damage qe hom fet a escient ou procure de fere a cely a qi hom se fet y Y . / :’- ,
ami." if the full sentence in Law French]" The conditions for 'knowing*
Y. /'•.■' : : • 7  " - Y . " Y . Y  ■ ; : 7  Y  -49' " . ; 50, or 'procuring' are not elaborated upon. 7 Chapter XI " Of Burglars " *
preserves the distinction as to who may or may not be capable of committing 
a felony. But any analysis of the crimes, save for a procedural pre­
Y . sentation on how appeals may be commenced, is lacking. Even the state- ] /
; 7 Y ment regarding homicide speaks simply as, "...and our will is, that those, Y
. Y / w h o  command aid or counsel others to kill [ qi comaundent ou aydent ou
counseilent de tuer la gent ] be indicted for this felony as well as the 
principle actors." The language is broadly statutory, and possesses
no philosophical or theological ampleness as one found in Bracton or Fleta.
•. The text does, however, speak directly about the element of an offence Y
49. Nichols, op.cit., page 40, Chapter IX, "Of Treasons".
50. Idem, page 42, which reads: "Infants under age, and poor people, 7 
who through hunger enter the house of another for victuals under
Y the value of twelve pence, are excepted; as are also idiots and : 7
Y madmen, and others, who are incapable of felony..." It may be 77
/ / argued that one has an example of an appeal to 'Necessity* here / / Y
Y 7 7 in the inclusion of 'poor people' taking less than 12 pence.
Y 51, Idem, page 34, Chapter VI, "Of Homicides". ;*■/ 'h'-,\
275
resting in a consent. The passage in question concerns the escape of -
A A-,.A.'A‘A  52 . A . v  'v v -v. . a -prisoners, and states, • ,,,■. v a:\. , ? / A  ' .AA
, "...and if any gaoler be suspected of having consented :-
to the escape, let him be taken and indicted for con- 
A ; A seating to the felony; and if found guilty of consenting, A .
A • .-.A’ . : let' him have Judgment of death;" ; • ; '• v ;.;A A_> v A j -A' A,
Inquiry could be made to determine if one had been wrongfully imprisoned, 
and the language of the text adverts to; language which states, " ...who
has imprisoned another or detained him wrongfully in his custody, or in
■A" . t ‘..-‘.'V- ■- A- : , : V * - V  A".-our prison maliciously and wrongfully under colour of judgment..."
from: Chapter XIV, "Of Inlawry, or being restored to law." The treatise
does make a passing mention in Chapter XXVI, "Of Appeals of Mayhem" to
striking a knight without any provocation from the knight, but this is
little more than to affirm what was a tradition in the law, that some
actions, done in the heat of passion, were more excusable than other fA
actions which might, as with treason, be done with cool premeditation.* A:
Britton embodies the assumptions which are found written in Bracton
and FI eta, as well as statements of the law from case law. It is to ; A; ■
a later age and later writers that one must turn for legal theory«’• . 'VAA'A
52. Nichols, op.cit., page 44, Chapter XI1, "Of Prisoners". Nichols A  ^
records, as a note, a note which appears in the *NT manuscript,
and I cite it to show how far the notion of consent was taken. :
; "Note, that for a felon slain in prison judgment of homicide shall
be given. For though he was lawfully condemnable for the felony, A A
yet it is necessary that it pass by judgment. For we ought not 
A to hold them absolutely felons Until the law has condemned them." A
The force is the note is that an intentional killing could occur .0
even if one had not acted out of malice, but had acted wrongly ac- 
A cording to the prescriptions of the law. The could be taken as Aa
an early example of constructive malice, the guard thinking he had
the right to kill a felon, but, at law, he did not possess that
right until the court passed formal legal judgement upon a felon. a A
53. Nichols, op.cit., page 48. The Law French, in part, is: ".;.ou en nostre
prisoun par colour de jugement par malice et a tort.V." AA ;A
CHAPTER FIVE
Only in fundamental textbooks does one come to the v; 
definite close of one epoch, and the definite opening of a newer 
epoch, a literary device which has come to be an accepted part, 
perhaps out of necessity, perhaps out of a need for marshalling 
documentary material with some ease and facility, of historical 
genre. A student will read about the 'Renaissance and the Ref or- > 
mation', or read that the vicegerent of Henry VI11 in 1535 issued 
injunctions to the universities at Cambridge and Oxford which did 
require them to cease conferring degrees in canon law but the 
law, accordingly, does not end its peculiar methods because an 
historical period has been defined, or an historical fact has been 
dated* The force of the logic of legal reasoning carries over from 
one period to another, as an examination of the case law and early 
legal writings will reveal / In this chapter I sha 11 coneehtrate on
1. Cf., The Historv of the Canon Law in England by William Stubbs,
7 (at page 274) contained in SELECT ESSAYS IN ANGLO-AMERICAN LEGAL
HISTORY, volume 1, ( Wildy § Sons, Ltd., 1968 )pp 248-288.
2. One may also refer to the holdings of various great libraries in 
England to substantiate the hypothesis that mediaeval and renais­
sance legal writing continued to exercise an influence upon our 
developing common law. For instance, cf., RECORDS OF ALL SOULS 
COLLEGE LIBRARY, 1437-1600, by N.R.Ker ( published for: The Oxford 
Bibliographical Society by the Oxford University Press, 1971 ) at 
pp 66, ff., "List XVIII" which is the earliest list of law books 
of the library, revealing mediaeval and renaissance authors; also, 
cf., the holdings of the libraries of each of the Inns of Court to 
see the extent of mediaeval and renaissance holdings in law. 0ne
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the expression which intention, in its manifold forms, assumes in • 
some of the earliest writers of the common law, both from cases and texts. 
We shall see that a legal notion begins to operate, while at the same Y - V 
time the butlress for that legal notion tends to be less observed, or Y
less evident, as when one might observe the vault of a great hammer- >;
beam ceiling without being conscious of the support Which the flying;YYYY'
buttresses give directly to the ceiling. The reporters and early textu-
alists Were less concerned with directing one's attentions to fuller ,
statements which analysed the nature of Intellect, or Will, or Appetition,
Corit.,
may consult, to evidence the extent of the mediaeval and re- Y- Y- Y ;
naissance holdings of legal texts, the GENERAL REPORT to The
King In Council from the Honourable Board of~ommissioners on • :
THE PUBLIC RECORDS (Printed by Command of His Majesty King William
IV, under the direction of TOE COMMISSIONERS ON THE PUBLIC RECORDS
OF THE KINGDOM, MDCCCXXXVII), especially the chapters entitled, : Y Y"
"Courts of Justice" (pp 111-281) , and "Inns of Court" (pp 352-391) . Y Y  Y ’ Y>: 
One may also consult the ’four volume catalogue, A CATALOGUE of ; Y
the Printed Books in the LIBRARY of The Honourable Society of the Y;-: Y ^ :
MIDDLE TEMPLE by C. E. A. Beclwell, Keeper of The Library ( University .y YY/Y 
Press, Glasgow, 1914, and 1924 (the fourth volume] ), to witness the " 
presence of extensive mediaeval and renaissance holdings in law. Such 'YY;Y 
will be found, also, in the libraries of each of the other three Inns Y ■
of Court. One is aware, too, that available to the English legal scho­
lar was not only the literature developing in England on law from the; Y Y 
sixteenth century, but that the Continent held vast legal resources & :
which were available to the lawyers in the Inns. Great dictionaries ; :
of law which embraced Continental principles in their legal definitions , Y Y 
were of use to the English lawyer. For instance: Lexicon Juridicum: , Yl.
Hoc est, Iuris Civilis et Canonici in Schola atque^loro usitatarum vocum Y;/Y 
Penus,:; (Geneva, J. Stoer, 1615), a work attributed to John Calvin, and: Y Y  V 
a legal dictionary which went through many editions, and anywhere from YYYY 
1300 to 2000 pages in length. ( The British Museum Catalogue record^ Y- ,YYY 
editions of: 1600, 1610, 1619,
columns 328-329, CALVINUS (Joannes)] ). Ample English legal dictionaries, YY i 
ranking (say) with Calvin's in merit and depth, do not come until theY 1
middle of the seventeenth century, ie., Cowell, Raste.ll ( late sixteenth )Y.YV 
Leigh, and the 1 ike. Y Y Y ;YY-- ;u :.Y. "Yc"
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than they were to state in their reports and texts the use of a con­
cept, as when it might be said that D wittingly did, or D wilfully 
did, or that D simply caused the death of P. Correspondingly, the
language used in certain statutes to express aspects of intentional
: • A.'-' A /• 3; .A ■ A ■ A .AA A' a: ; A A;.,, A'AAAA. A/A-A/-guilt was concise. --A. AAA A'AA^A - A . - - A . A\-/•; a  :' "-A " ^ • • ••••/• - A/- A
It is not my chief concern to discuss intention in statute law, 
some of this having been done in 1955 in J.L1.J. Edwards study, a
MENS REA IN STATUTORY OFFENCES ( London: MacMillan § Co., Ltd., -V A;
1955). One could argue, by appeal to the language of cases, that i < 
statutory concepts follow upon case law. Edwards argues that the A 
legal adverb, ’knowingly/ is late in English legal usage; but one 
could assert that the legal concept ’to know what one was doing’ * A 
was not a strange or novel concept when used to establish guilt, A'AA
and one was aware of the mediaeval literature which existed on A. A --A A/­
madness (furiosus) which exempted or excused an accused from guilt A 
because the accused was assumed not to know what he had done. One A AA 
may consult chapter III, entitled, "KNOWINGLY" ( pp 52-97 ) in Ed- ./•; 
wards which shows how the adverb comes late into English statutory A 
language. '^ AA. A . :A ■ "A A /A-. *v ,:A.A ■ ' *:A •. .a :A-A A' - -\v.A''AvA'AvA-:v 
Examples wherein ’wittingly' equals ’knowingly* (and not to be 
found in Edwards's study) may be taken from: THE LAWS of Q. Eliz- A
abeth, ]C. James, and 1C. Charles, the First, CONCERNING Jesuits, y .
Seminary Priests, Recusants, etc.. EXPLAINED by William Cawley, ; /
of Inner Temple ( LONDON, for John Wright and Richard Chiswell, i
MDCLXXX ). (The work may be cited, in short form, as Laws against 
Recusants, with Wing listing as: Wihg-Cr1651c.) v : A A
Stat. v Eliz. cap. 1., s 2 ( page 33 of Cawley ) states, .
"That if any person....shall by Writing, Cyphering, Printing, 
Preaching or Teaching, Deed.or Act, advisedly and wittingly..."
and later,(page 34, Cawley), "...or by any Speech, open Deed or ■ A
Act, advisedly and wittingly attribute.. (italics mine). Cawley ' 
does not gloss wittingly here, since it is assumed that from its useA 
the word needs no comment. He does, however, in the same statute, 
put a gloss upon, "UPON PURPOSE AND TO THE INTENT" (at page 35) andA A 
states: - -AA; " A'' / A/; A: _ ’’ ‘f 'A; A ;.-:.aA' .A . % a H-v •' cC vA:-A .Aa AC:
'A ' "A was Indicted upon this Statute, and that of 13 Eliz. cap 2.
of a Praemunire for aiding one B. knowing (italics mine) him to be
a principal maintainer of the...See of Rome." He continues by saying, 
"And it was held, by the greater part of the Justices, that the In-A 
dictment was insufficient, for want of those words (Upon purpose, and, 
to the intent, to set forth and extol the Authority, etc.) "• A A;.
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: - - A review of early- statutory construction, although without
the purview of this monograph, will reveal that legal pivots, such as 
’malice' or 'wilfully' or 'cause', were used in a simple declarative 
sense not involving technical explanations of their use within a statute.
' i ;' COnt«, : ■ , -vj. . :
; and continuing, states, " And contra formam Statut' will not sup­
ply that defect, Trin. 20 Eliz.Dyer 363. Note, in the Report of 
: this Case the Statute of 1 Eliz. is mistaken for this of 5 Eliz. 
there being no mention of the intent in that of Primo. The intent 
' is a hidden thing, and lies in the Heart, and therefore there must
be some Overt Act or Speech which declares the intent; for the in­
tent it self is not traversable, but that by which it is made mani- 
; fest, as was adjudged in Boothes Case, Co. 5. 77." ■ ,
In his commentary upon Stat.xxvii Eliz. cap.ii., "An Act against Jesuits", 
n. > Cawley, upon section six of that statute ["And every person...shall
wittingly and willingly receive..." [page 90)] says "And if we weigh 
the Grammatical construction of the words..." one will conclude that 
"the receiving, relieving or maintaining of a Jesuit...and known by the 
party to be such, is Felony..." within the meaning of the Act. Here, ? 
the commentator takes 'wittingly' to mean 'knowingly'. I shall have rea­
son to cite from Cawley later because of his appeal to 'intention' to 
explain the finding of an offence under a statute. His explication was, 
sadly, legal literature generally lost to us, no doubt owing to the rarity 
vj; ' ... ■ of his text. • * : .v ♦ / • ’ ' / - :}^rr
For an example of ’wilful murder' one may turn to the language of 23 Hen. 
VIII, cap 1 (1532) which, in part, reads: "Be it therefore enacted by the> 
King...That no person nor persons, which hereafter shal happen to be found 
guilty after the Lawes of this Land for any manner of petit treason, or for 
any wilfull murder of malice prepensed,;..or for wilfull burning of any 
dwelling houses..." as cited in: A Collection of Statutes by Ferdinando 
Pulton (LONDON, 1640, for M Flesher and R. Young [S.T.C. number: 9331]) .
r * . ; V  ’ at: page .506'..,-' *v ; v y
In Statutes Now in Use in the Kingdom of Ireland (DUBLIN, 1678, printed 
for B. Tooke) the use of ’cause* is to be found in the statute of 10 Hen. 
VII, cap xi (1495) in, "...that was causer of that murder..." at page 37./
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One may turn to William Rastall, Sergeaunt at Law,4* to gather many Y;'-YY 
examples from his collection of the statutes indicating such a simple 
and direct use of language in legal construction. One should note, too, 
that statutory construction (which often embraces a meta-legal aim for 
its political ends) does not permit one to say easily that 'the law* is 
this or that necessarily, as when one might urge that the court ’always’ 
excused the idiot or the one who fell into madness *; plainly, this was 
not always the case, as the various statutes on Treason indicated. ByYY 
acquaintance with a large range of case law one may urge that the common 
law did strive for consistency through its judicial operation, but one 
should avoid entertaining an unwarranted assumption that the common law.;? 
necessarily reflected consistency. There is some measure in Holmes’s 
remark that 'consistency is the hobgoblin Of petty minds.'
4. Cf., A Collection of all the Statutes, from the beginning of Magna 
Charta, unto this present yeare of our Lord, 1579. by William Rastall,
Sergeaunt at Law (London: Anno Domini: 1579). One may refer to the
listing: Beale-S 66 ( in: Bibliography of Early English Law Books 
by J.H.Beale [Ames Foundation, 1926j ). For example, with regard to 
murder or manslaughter (Rastell, 344-a), the Coroner is simply directed Y 
to inquire: ; . ' Y “ Y ' - -V- .
"And the Coroner uppon the viewe of the body dead should
enquire of hym or them y had done that death or murder, of
«Y their abbettours and consentours. And whoe were present 
: . when the death or murder was don, whether man Or woma,... "
The conditions, or what legal exemptions ought or may obtain,: are not stated. 
It would have been for case law to determine what legal custom should dictate 
in the matter. .
5 Cf., Rastell, ibid., "Treason" 518-b (col. 2)-529-b (col^2),esp. 521-a 
(col.-1), "And be it that if any person...shall happen to bee attainted 
§ convicted of high treason by aucthority of parliament, or by the due ,;Y Y 
course of y common lawes or statutes of this Realrae, and afterwardes fall.;
:to madnesse or lunacy, that yet neverthelesse they shall have and suffer 
execution, there madnesse or lunacy not withstanding." An.33.H.8.cap.20.Y 
Harsh as this sounds, it is law which obtains in some common law jurisdictions 
in the United States, modified, that if the accused (for felony) gain his J 
sanity, he is liable to full penalty ( ie., Washington State is an example )YY
V:
' V y- Y I shall turn now to the considering of basic, linking .
legal texts of our early common law period. Those which are. dif- .< ;y y: .yyyYY 
ficult to obtain I shall reproduce directly in quotation, either .y yy•
• ; in the body of my argument, or in a footnote. Other texts which may . ,
be easy to locate, I shall cite, unless I have reason to give a ^ y ' s }/;:y
detailed analysis of the logic implicit in any of the claims of '
a cited writer or judicial decision, the association between One •
. . -: v . . text and another I take to be a form of a weak conjunction of ideas» y.yy: \ s 
^  • and the force arid influence which one writer may have upon the de- ^
: • ‘. Velopment and evolution of the common law ( or of another author.) y.- '*•
" • should not be taken to be a necessary direction Or influence, save .
where an author explicitly states if to be such, arid even there the > y Y y y  Y;
avowals should be examined because one author, unintentionally, mis­
represent the mind of his master. If harmony is seen in the develop- Y y  y y  
y y -y yy.- rnent of the common law on intention, I wish to suggest that these  ^ y y*
y early writers found something in the concept which was there, to be ; : v y?
•' vV .* ■ '--'found.-y •; Y". •: Y Y  V y .. Y  ■: ■ ''y'YY;. y  :;Y  '‘ Y Y - y y'y y  ;;y
;■ : 5. cont. , :' .y ' •; - ;' y ■ . v Y : YyY' Y y y y ;y
; ; In the Criminal Code of Canada, Section 16, subsection (1),(2),(3) • 'y. '•: y  -Y we read: \ y ':.y :y Y.yy. y -yy y .-.y : ■ ■ . v; "y. y
y  • "(1) No person shall be convicted of an offence in respect of an
:, .act or omission On his part while he was insane. y 2 yvy  ^: y
• • "(2) For the purposes of this section a person is insane when he ^
is in a state of natural imbecility or has disease of the mind''to'-Y-Vy^oy:y 
• extent that renders him incapable of appreciating the nature arid -y /
yyy . ;' quality of an act or omission or of knowing that an act of omission y
.yy-- . is wrong.  ^ ;y. ; y • , - y : >r ,yY y  y y \'Yy ■ - y; . y .  ^ ' Y y  y
"(3) A person who has specific delusions, but :is inother ■■respects !’■‘‘i 
y sane, shall not be acquitted on the ground of insanity unless the . y y y y ^
• delusions caused him to believe in the existence of a state of things Y-yyy.
that, if it existed, would have justified or excused his act or omis- y,y. ;■ y siori." ; • • • . . ?  y  ' , Y'y'y-Y
y-Y/Y . Subsection (3) of the Code may appear to be as harsh as_the statute y  iy* y ;
under Henry viii (of this note), which disexercised madness or lunacy y yy%yy
* Y ; y' ' . ’; as a defence to the charee. Y,Y Y- -' Y./Y  Y  Yy y\  ; .>Y
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In William Staundford's, Les Plees Del Corone, 1557, we
have an early exposition of the criminal law in England. The value
of the text for my analysis is that the text presents a link from
the Middle Ages from the time of Bracton. Staundford*s book is - A
replete with citations from Bracton*s De Legibus, and I shall cite
from his use of Bracton. As for the purpose of the book itself, in A
his opening chapter the author puts the matter directly to the reader
as to the purpose of a book on Pleas of the Crown. He saySjA A
7 " Plees del Corone, sont les plees queux con- A A
, : , teignont loffences faits encounter law coron ; A  • y  -A AAa A'
. § dignitie le Roy. Per que pur le mieux en- A-
tendement de eux, est requisite a veyer queux / A A  ;■?’ ' A;A'V
,-v /•'A'-A A a A sont les dites offences. Et puis de la maner A... A-a-;- '
; A v coment ils serront pledus. Et darreynement de , a 
A la maner coment ils serront triers § judges." ’ n a *
6, The edition which I have consulted is: LES PLEES DEL CORONE, Ay 
DIVISEES IN PLUSORS TITLES § CONWON LIEUX, by Gvilliavlme 
A Stavndford ( LONDONI, ex Typographia Societatis Stationariorum. - 
Anno Domini 1607). For this edition the S.T.C. number is: A
STC-23224. [ In legal citations his name is variously listed as: 
A, William Stavndford, or Staundford (the modern spelling)* o^ A 
Stanford, or Stamford. A] I shall cite this edition simply as: 
Pleas, Staundford, and use the folio pagination of the 1607 \
edition. A - A A . y A ; ^ ' A- A - - A  A.  : A ' ; : A A '  - A  . y - f  •• f v A v A  A . :' AA>.
; A The abovelisted citation is from: Pleas, Staundford, Cap. 1., 
folio 1-a, "Cy commensa le Liure entitle les Plees del Corone,"
6 . I make mention here of an English abridgement of StaundfordOL which is entitled: A VADE MECUM and CORNU COPIA. AN EPITOME A 
OF Master Stamford's PLEAS OF THE CROWN, With other Notes 
out of approved and good Authors Of the same ARGUMENT, by 
Wa. Young (LONDON, Printed, Anno Dorn. 1660 j. In Wing this A 
edition is listed under number Y-95. The edition which I 
have consulted is the above, although the directions in the A
edition tell one that, " The Committee of the House of Commons 
concerning Printing stated that the book, A Vade Mecum, could 
be printed as of May 26th, 1642." Citations which I shall make 
will be to the text of 1660, and I shall cite the work simply A 
as: VADE MECUM. In passing I wish to note that this is a modestly 
rare text, and, such the case, I shall make my citations ample 
in light of the few recorded copies of the text to be found in 
libraries.' ■' . \ A '• 'Ar' ‘ A,- A-.-A'.-A •'sA.'t A,
It would be unwise of us to overlook an obvious trait
-Y of early legal writers in general, and of Staundford in particular, YY-YiY
; which was their adherence to the ’word* of the law, and their striving Y
Y; Y then to make clear what the language of various statutes meant, as :
Y  well. as to provide a rule for the interpreting of statutory language. * Y : > . ; .-.
Y: Y In Staundford's abridgement of Fitzherbert Y * a reader is made aware
with what care, and caution, statutory language is approached. Passage Y: , ■
: - a^ter passage measures the extent of a legal power (which a King, or YYY
\ some lesser person may be said to possess) against the language of
Y 1 law, or the language of a statute, which confers such a power. The Y Y
• • natural expression of this kind of legal precision came to. be known early ;
Y, Y Y '' on in the common law through Heydon' s case which interpreted statutes
Y ’ narrowly. ‘ * •; ' ; ' • •
Y Y  . 7. In 1548, Sir William Staundford completed this exposition: AN EX- :
v POSITION of the Kings Prerogatiue, collected out of the great Abridge- j
ment of Iustice FITZHERBERT, and other old Writers of the Lawes of>-,Y'-Y'YY Y Y
; England, by the right Worshipful! SIR WILLIAM STANDORD Knight, lately YyY Y '/*«£,
i one of the justices of the late Queenes Majesties Court of Common Plees.
Y ■ • : Y. Y (LONDON, Printed for the Company of Stationers. 1607. Cum priuilegio.) YY-YY1
• : I shal1 cite this work as: Standford's FITZHERBERT, preserving the
. v a r i a n t  spelling 'Standford'. The S.T.C. number for this edition is: 1 ;
Y S.T.Ci-232i8. Y > '"Y- ; YYYY Y,YYY Y •'yYyYYY"' ; ,Y :W
8. (1584) 3 Co. Rep. at 7b, 76 E.R. at 638. There is not a giden rule for Y Y
. ; . Y interpreting statutes, and I do not wish to imply that Staundford, in Y-/Y J.Y.’
Fitzherbert, gave one a simple rule or formula for so doing. What I [i 
- : ; wish to incline one to accept is that in the abridgement of Fitzherbert f'Y Y 
which Staundford composed one is made aware that the language of the Y' :
law must be attended to with linguistic sensitivity, and that, in some .; :YY
- . respects, language itself put limitations upon the powers which law . t ,•
YYY-- ; : may confer. The difficult problem which statutes present is, in ^he ?Y YYYY1
Y . : - main, outside of the purview of my study, but one may read an excel- YYY Y.
Y  Y-. ;• lent and short statement of the difficulties of statutory interpretation YY
in: "The Interpretation of Statutes" (chaptOr seven), pp 96-104, in ; Y 
Y Y Y ' ' LEARNING THE LAW, by Glanville Williams, FBA, QC, ( Stevens, 1969 ). / Y;Y Y  Y
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A ; . . In that portion; of Staundford ’ s text to which I wish tp A A-
direct attention, one will observe that Cap, 3 begins with: ’’Felony 
du mort du h o m e . T h e  text of the edition of 1607 reproduces the- 
statute of Henry VII concerning Conspiracy* but cites the wrong 
regal notation, giving 3. H. 7, ca. 13 for the statute when the cor­
rect citation should be Cap. 14. Cap. 13 concerns long bows. The A 
statute is introduced, without exposition, simply by the heading of:
”0u conspiracy de tuer home serra felony sans act, ou auter rien fait." 
The language of the statute is clear, and I doubt if it requires com­
mentary at length, save to observe that it is a statute concerned with
8. Cont., - ' ' A ; • y.;A. .■ -AA; . A 'A ‘ ;A ’ T A" - A . A ; ' A-A ■
Staundford’s FITZHERBERT discusses other than the interpretation 
of statutes. He takes care to present what other authors may have 
written-,-citing from Bracton, or Britton, or other writers of various- 
books for directing Justices of the Peace; or he may cite statutory Av 
authority to explain how an action operates,;such as ’Trauers1 
[ ’Traverse’ ], for example, ’’Traverse to an Office, entitling theyA 
Kinjg to land by the attainder of another of Felony, treason, or A  A 
premunire. 2 Ed. 6.8." ( as cited in Pulton’s Statutes, 1640 under ; 
"Traverse" ) is commented on at length by Staundford to explain the 
purpose of the action; or he may gloss a legal term, as "catalla" or 
"felon" and explain what could be its various legal usages. An - A' 
example of this kind of commentary at length is to be found in 
Gap. 16, Corone, folios 44-b to 50-a, of the 1607 edition of Staund­
ford ’s FITZHERBERT., Not found at length in the Abridgement is case 
law since case collections do not come into force until Plowden and A 
' Dyer made their collections of selected cases. One has an early .a- A-A 
model for legal analysis here. f Staundford, for example, will begin] 
with common usage, as when he says, "Catalla is a genera11 word which; 
comprehends as well Chattels mouable as not moueable." (folio 45-b),
■' to its different particular uses. , : AA-A A A” A . AA. AA‘A'' A-Av-A; ./Ay.-;'.
9. Op . cit.* Staundford, Pleas, folio 11-a. vX aa-; '-A Ay /• ' ;AA;=:
285
prohibiting certain mental apts of a subject . The statute declares:
"Conspiring to destroy the King, or any Lord Councellour or great 
Officer shall be felony." The statute empowers the King, or Whom he 
directs, to enquire, to question a subject on the matter of what ,  ^ 1
the subject had thought. If, in the course of such an enquiry, it • Yv YY-Y.y 
is discovered that any subject did, ".. .make any confederacies, co- y  YY y y y Y Yyi 
passings, conspiracies, imaginatios w 1 any person or persons, to i •' ••.• •■'"•Yy • 
destroy or murder the king or any lord of this realme, [etc.]...", JY
then if any be found guilty by this inquiry, ,T.. .if such misdoers Y ; Y : ;: Y v v  
be foud guilty by confession, or otherwise, that the said offence ' ,
bee iudged felony..." ’
' Evidence for the felony would have to have been some overt act ; 
of entering into a confederacy, Or, one assumes, testimony to the'--',-- ;,y-Y YYy; Y y y  
effect that one would be implicated in the felony. . One need but re^ V 
fleet upon Sir Walter Ralegh's case (1603) to appreciate that at that r
!;■* Y Y y Y  Y YYYyy... ;Y :-Y y yYy Y Y  yY! V ' : yy'yYyYY'yYy. 1 1 .: 
time an accusation could displace actual proof of an overt act. The 'YYYY Y Y y Y y ;
model for the statute seems to draw upon an old confessional model: "
one should be pure of heart, and one should not make plots. Y  The making Y ; Y Y Y y y
of a plot to overthrow or murder the King, and others of such esteem* y . Y Y y y
touches too cioseiy of Satan plotting against God and his creation.
Like the unforgivable sin against the Holy Spirit, so is the heart of ; YYy ^;
a subject intent Upon treason or murder of the King. The statute preserves ./YY
■these, religious roots. ,' ,;y/ y Y-Y*. / yYYY y : Y  yyY; Y/, Y; Y : yY'YYY''. ■* v'.‘vYY7 .'YyYy yY
10. Staundford, Pleas, folio 11-b.
11. Cf., Criminal Trials, by David Jafdine (1832) for an account of the y Y: v; 
case; or, History and Principles of the Law of Evidence, by J.G. Philli- J.Y
• more (1850) , page 157, ff. , Y-y" . .  . . .■•••;■ '-y '.,y;Y^/YY.yyY'Yy.:
-Y*' ■'.; *• j ' y vj
7 -Ki
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Staundford reproduces the modes of homicide according to 
Bracton. Measured against the modem text which Thorne has prepared 
(and which I have employed), the minor variants within the text of 
Staundford itself compared to Thome'S text Of Bracton do not call 
for extended commentary. A commentator, I would expect, is called upon 
to accept the spirit of the law and not the letter of the law when
comparing the Bracton in the Pleas with the Bracton of our own age .■YYY
The fundamental distinctions and divisions are preserved in the Pleas
of 1607. There Thome, from the benefit of many manuscripts, reads
7 ■ "Corporal homicide is where a man is slain bodily* v
7 , and this is committed in two ways: by word Or by deed. >
; By word in three ways, that is, by precept, by counsel,
; . . and by denial or restraint . By deed in four ways, that
: is, in the administration of justice, of necessity, by ; .7:
. ' . Y chance and by intention. In the administration of justice,
as when a judge or officer kills one lawfully found guilty.
, But it is homicide if done but of malice or from pleasure
in the shedding of human blood [and] though the accused is
lawfully slain, he who does the act commits a mortal sin ;
because of his evil purpose. v , ,
12., Thorne, op cit., page 340, "Pleas of the Crown" in volume 11 of . 
; De Legibus.
7-7 To compare texts, I shall first reproduce the Latin text , 7 V 
from -Thorne, and then I shall reproduce the Latin text of Staundford1s • 
Pleas, the 1607 edition*. Thorne, at page 340-a, reads:- . . Y
y " Sed corporale est quo homo occiditur corporal!ter, et hoc
dupliciter committitur, lingua vel facto. Lingua tribus modis,
; scilicet praecepto, consilio, defensione Sive tentibne. Facto
: . quotuor modis, scilicet iustitia, necessitate, casu et volun-
tate. Iustitia, ut cum iudex vel minister reum iuste damnatum 
occidit... I stud autem homicidium si sit ex livore vel delecta- 
: ? tione effundendi humanum sanguinem, licet ille iuste occidatur,
: . iste tamen peccat mortal iter propter intentionem corrupt am. ' I \
-V S •
'YYY; Y Yj
Of course, any citation one makes from Bracton*s De Legibus should 
carry With it the caveat which Thome himself issued, M It is evi­
dent that we have Bracton's great book only in corrupt form, but » 
many texts have come down to us in worse [form] .*’ As I have in- > 
dicated, the text which Staundford offers I have placed in footnote 
*12*, below. ' . ■. |>! • ; ..y-- J-
12,, cont., ' v •":*.« ; y  v-y;/ yyy*;
V';.- From Staundford*s Plees we read in Lib. 1, folio 11-b to 12-a,
: 1 *^ Est enim homicid* hominis occisio, ab homine fact*. Si aut£ ;
\ a boue, cane vel alia re, no dicitur pprie Homicid*: dicitur .yy- 
homicidium ab homine, § cedo quasi hominis cediu. Species homi- 
cidij sunt multae, nam aliud spuale, aliud corporale, de spuali - 
vero ad presends non est die end*;. Sed corporal e est quo homo ; 
oqciditur corporal iter, § hoc dupliciter committitur, lingua § .yy 
facto. Lingua, tribus modis ys. precepto, consilio, defensione y  
vel tuitione ["by intention**] : facto, quatuor modis, s. iustitia,
• necessitate, casu, § voluntate. Iustitia, vt cum iudex vel ius- , 
titiar, reum iuste danat occidit. Istud autem homicidium si fit 
ex liuore vel delectatione effundendi humanum sanguinem licet "v 
ill*_iuste occidat, iudex tu peccat mortalit, opt intentione cor-
yy: rupta." [I have preserved the type font of the text, save to print
*s* in place of *f * (the older ’s*), and have preserved the joint 
‘ letter * _t> *.] yyy: *•’.'£* y- y y e : \jr?
1.3 Henry De Bracton by Samuel E. Thorne, on the occasion of the 700th
/ anniversary of the death of Henry de Bracton,(printed by: The Uni­
versity of Exeter, 1970.);, at page 20. i ;
The warning which Thorne gives is not new to the labours of Bracton
' • scholars . One need only refer to the essay,’’The Text of Bracton*1,.
by Paul Vinogradoff to appreciate the textual difficulties which 
• ,f ; Bracton presented from the edition of Sir Travers Twiss, onwards.
The essay may be found either in, The Law Quarterly Review, April
1885, or in volume one of: The Collected Papers of Paul Vinogradoff 
(Oxford, At The Clarendon Press, 1928), pp 77-90. It is outside of 
purpose to list the considerable literature on the subject. • ".
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; • '.We know that Staundford intended his text to contain
a presentation of the older authors, some abridgement of their
texts, and an adequate presentation of pleas of the Crown, o r .
criminal matters which would fall under the jurisdiction of the ;•
Crown, and hence be punished by force and pierogative of the State. 7
What is easy to overlook is how the PIees embodied the legal as- '
sumptions and principles of an older age. The Middle Ages did
not end, nor did the Tudor period simply begin; Staundford shows
the truth of this in page after page of his >PIees. The criminal Y
principles of the common law were formed out of older principles;
some principles which directly found themselves transcribed in
the Pleas, and, by indirection, can be found at work in the earliest
records of our case law. Let me offer a direct instance of my claim.
Staundford speaks about licit and illicit killing, In Y;
Lib. 1, at folio 12-a (of the edition I have employed ), we read
this transcription from Bracton. Since I have cited Bracton1s text
earlier* I shall, in this case, cite Staundford1s text. It rbads: 7 '
"Sed his distinguendum est, vtrum quis dederit ; 1
peram rei licitae, an illicitae." : : Y.
;:YY. Y'YYYY: -Y;' Y:?Y-Y’ YY-'  ; 7 77 The doctrine* if that be
not to strong a word, of the licitness of intentions is introduced,
its purpose to be used as a legal tool and concept by and through
which a killing may be excused or condemned. Staundford continues, 7
and asks after what comprises an illicit intention. The text states:
7-7 7 "Vt si lapidem proijciebat quis versus locum, per 7 7  
quem consueuerunt homines transitum facere, vel dum : 7 7 7
14.* Cf.,the preface of the text, "LECTORE’’ of the PIees, folio A-ij7
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J . ' ; insequitur quis equum, vel bouem, § ali-, ' :
/- .•/. quis a Houe, vel equo percussus fuerit, §  ^y ■
:y,; i huiusmodi. Hie imputabi1 ei." y "
y y y  : :y vy.yy-..-/-;. ■/••.'■■-y’ end we may refer to
Thome's text ( at page 341 ) for a fuller text. But the mat­
ter of each is the same, and in each we see carried on a tra­
dition which barkens back to the early* Fathers of the Church. 
Staundford * s Plees state that liability is imputed to the agent. 
That is the case because, as the text informs us, it is assumed /, 
that one should have known better. We are not given an analysis ; 
of liability in terms of negligence, or recklessness, or strictly 
premeditated intent; only a general anatomical statement, to the 
effect that if one knows that he might cause a harm or an injury 
(owing to the nature of the circumstances * ie., a common pathway, 
commonly travelled) , and then acts in a way to bring about such y 
a harm or injury, then liability may be imputed to him.-The text 
of Bracton which Thorne presents * carries over 'illicitae1 by 
opening the sentence, "Si illicitae, ut si lapidem...", whilst the
text of Staundford assumes that one will carry over "...an illicitae..." 
from the previous sentence ^*, although as an editorial device a 
marginal vcap tion i s given,; s imp ly as ’ 111 ici t e,1. V ,y  "L ,/y i '*4 yVvS'; )i
15. Op. cit., volume 11, page 341 at f. 121.
16. Op. cit., Plees, Lib, 1, 12-a at line G-6.
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o : The Latin verb which appears in the text is 1 imputabit1,; YYY/
and it carries over the force of having to reckon, to account for, 
to ascribe to, to measure an account (as when one makes a financial 
entry). The text itself suggests that the illicitness of the in­
tention of the agent is constructed from the force of events; and ? Y YY 
questions which could be put to describe those events.y Is it commonly Y 
known that men use this footpath ? Is it common knowledge that one 
ought not to chase large farm animals across pedestrian footways ?
If a harm has been caused by an agent, and if the agent cannot give 
a lawful excuse, then the events which the agent brought about wil1 be ; 
viewed as events which have unlawfully been brought about. The cate- \
gories of legal excuse were given earlier in the text of Staundford, as Y 
they were in Bracton: killing by privilege of law (’Justitia’); death 
brought about by necessity (’Necessitate’); death which was inevitable 
(’Inevitabilis’); death from an accident, which accident was unavoidable/ 
and riot the result of carelessness (’Casu Infortunium’). Constructive; : 
malice, which has since been rejected as a category of criminal liability 
in English criminal law by force of Section 8 of the Criminal Justice 
Act, 1967 ^  *, is, nevertheless, a way to account a criminal act wheny •> ■ 
as a defence, the accused suggests that he did riot intend the consequences 
which ensued. The theory underlying constructive malice was that anYYyy
17. Op. cit. One will recall that D.P.P. v. Smith [1961] A.C. 290, was ; 
the verdict which served to occasion the remitting of the doctrine of y 
constructive malice. The Home Office reprieved in the instant case./;
18. Cf., State v. Bingham, 40 Wn.App. 553 (1985) re/ "premeditation’’. Y
'IV:
'-.A
,f action, which h&d produced & hsTin, ricddcd to. be siccbuntcd tor within •^vi .
. ' ■*] legal framework which would either tolerate the harm done, or con-,' 1X.VXX X;
demn the harm done. In this instance the framework into which an 
planation would fit would be the framework of the criminal law.
Xc-: : ‘, /".XX -' ’ : Staundford speate of licit intention drawing directly' upon. yX . X/? XXv:
i; v ; •' • X -■■■•’' v : ;• . . ■ . ' /'•■.■■ " <11 . ' ; V i9 • •*' J - f !, . Bracton's example. Thorne rendered Bracton1 s text as : v * X'-X xXXX'XX^
"ButXif he was engaged in a lawful act, as where a XX!
; • • : master has flogged a pupil as a disciplinary measure, •/ XXX-XXXy;-'/
; ; V • v ? . of-if [another is killed] when one was unloading hay ; - XXxXX
xXX ‘ .-.X ' 'X/; from a cart or cutting down a tree., and the like, and X v X XXX
X,',\ : X x ' if; he employed all the care he could, that is,: by iookingXXXXX'X-X X
i / ; about him and shouting out, not too tardily or in too XXXXX.O
v ; low a voice but in good time and loudly, so that if ;X»X ■ X;;.
r -1 ' : :; / X there was anyone there, or approaching the place, he' Xy:;. X-.XX
\ ; might flee and save himself, or in the case of the :XX '--XX X ;
, • /•'..'''•'■'•’master by not exceeding mean and measure in the flogging X
; ,:Vv •; X . -X • X X  of his pupil, liability is not imputed to him.1 XyX X;XX;X.' XXX':
X r  19.; Op. cit., Thorne, volume 11, page 341, The text of Staundford
XX'XXXX itXX . :. reads as follows: X x X y / - ■ ,X:X X  X XX XXyXXX;XXX
; ; . X  "LICITE. Si vero licit? rei operam dabat, vt si magister XXXXX,;* X '
s . . I ; causa disciplinae discipulum verberauerit, vel dum quis de- XXX'!teXX;X
v " v ponebat fenum de curru, vel arborem incidebat § hmidi, ad-X:X"/;
./v-r.y hibuit dilegentiam quam potuit, s. respiciendo, § procla- -
.’■;X ' : mando, nec nimis tarde, aut dimisse, sed tempore congruo XXXX
X"X XXX X; -XXXX § ita clamose, vt si aliquis ibi fuisset, vel illuc venissetXX X X; XXX;X  X : • i ; X  ’ potuisset aufugere, aut sibi praecauere, non imputabitur elX-X'X X  /XX,;.•XX XX X  Idem iuris est de magistro non excedendo modum verberandiX'vXX'X!X:' :X;;V'
"■X.:;X ■ X; -X X X "  discipulum.M From Lib. 1, 12-a, C - D. X \ X X :xXXXX / X X  XXX/XXXX/X&X
X A simple case of an undefined intentional act may be this.Xv X takes a shopping trolley from the Sainsbury supermarket. D/s .
X intention is take her groceries to her car. The shopping trolley .X' ? X
/ ; X has a notice appended to it: " The Metropolitan police ate liable X XX X. 
X to prosecute any person who causes an obstruction by carelessly . X X\
X  leaving a shopping trolley." D/s legal responsibility is larger X  X  X ; :
X than her immediate intention, ie., to use the trolley as a conveyance. ? XX
XX<. X must also safely use the trolley, and it would not (most likely) be ; •
: X an adequate defence to the charge of obstruction that she had intended >; v
■ X  XXX only to deliver her groceries to her car. From the events, therefore, . X • ;
X’v ; -,a criminal intention is constructed, ie., attributed to D_. v-X ;:XXXXz-XX
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Brought into sixteenth and seventeenth century common law is t h e • 
mediaeval doctrine of versari rei in illicita. The PIees enunciates 
intentional language, stating that the licitness of the intention, -
in conjunction with the actus reus of the offence, will determine ; y 
(in great part) whether criminal responsibility and subsequent cri­
minal guilt should be attributed to D. It will be for later writers, 
East, Hale, Hawkins, to expand upon this inclusion when the criminal 
textbook develops as part of the legal literature. The assumption v 
underlying Bracton, and at work in Staundford, is that a legal world ; 
of some kind does exist. Human actions and Omissions and confederations 
and elaborations are to be seen within the domain of an existing legal 
world; It would be a wrong reading of these early writings to assume 
that they were attempts at hypothesizing a legal world ( as Sir Thomas 
More may have hypothesized the world of Utopia ); the sense of human . 
action and possibility is realist and practical, and the early legal . 
writings are not concerned with the subtlety of a presumed counter- ' " y ; 
example or counter-case which One did find in large numbers in the 
Replies and Responses ( "Sed Contra" and "Responsio" ) of mediaeval dis­
putations and treatises. To import legal scepticism to the various •. 
books on Pleas of the Crown is to misread seriously. The world of , 
"Cogito" and its doubts was not part of criminal reasoning. It was not 
that the law doubted its principles; it is that it strived, through its; 
early authors, both to state the principles at work in the law, and then, 
in later and longer works, to elaborate upon its principles.
r- 4f . ■ 3.
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Staundford carries over to the sixteenth century, and also - ■ 
into the seventeenth century by force of the many editions of his work; 
principles which come from Bracton, and arguendo, from the predominating 
mediaeval theologians and moralists. The portion of "Felony du mort 
d’homme" Of the first book of the Plees introduces one, at folio 12-a . 
and 12-b, to language which has been customary to us, as when we read 
about what the ’voluntary' entails when spoken of in conjunction with 
killing:. "Voluntate, vt si quis ex certa scientia, § insultu prae- J ; • 
meditato, ira vel odio, vel causa lucri, iriequiter § in feloriia, contra 
pace domini Regis aliquem interfecerit." Familiarity with the litera­
ture of the period, arid its. history, tells one that the definition re-. 
states the language of the voluntary* and its f elationiship to the Ian- Y 
guage of deliberation and intellection* a theme recurrent in mediaeval
disputes. We are riot being asked to understand how a brain, a physical
organ, can be possessed of arid, simultaneously, direct neurological 
movement *. We are being asked to understand and employ a concept,
that one can will, and that one can deliberate, and that one can enter­
tain an intellectual relationship to a particular. ; Y; ; :
2 0 . Early writers, like M. Andreas Laurentids, in his A DISCOURSE OF THE 
PRESERVATION OF SIGHT (1599) in the Oxford edition of 1938, did in­
terest themselves in the workings of the brain as the chief organ of 
of the body (cf. Chp 1), but always as "...the chiefe arid principal1 
seate of the souleY’ (page 9 thereof) .: Y :
*Y,,Y* y  A
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r'- *' > that the Plees which Staundford Compiled ‘;y
from earlier sources did reveal a growing legal grammar which reflected \ 
a rich assortment of legal distinctions whereby excuses and exemptions 
and responsibility could be assessed and evaluated. The wealth of legal.— , ••'.-5" 
categories showed that the criminal law could deal with :a Wide range of ^
human failings.r The;law could ask after ’imaginings', as in, "Quaunt 
home face compasser ou imaginer law mort nostre Seignor le roy..." ^
It cited ways in which a crime could be brought about, as when the 1557 'y 
Statute of Treason is cited, part of its language stating, "...made tre- iyy 
son, petit treason or misprisio of treason, by words, writing, ciphring, :: 
deeds or otherwise." ^ * When asking after the nature of a killing, the 
language of the Plees carries with it the examples which are found even i ; 
in the early Councils of the Church, and which have been cited in earlier ;
chapters herewithin. The range of the legal questions embrace such as, yy
Was the killing done out of justice ? or out of necessity t  or was it an . y y y  
inevitable killing ? or was there some degree of human fesixjrisibility-^ yyy-y;::;;; 
or was one absolved of all human responsibility ? or did the killing .
come about by accident ? or by misadventure ? or was: it a ki11ing because f yy 
of provocation ? and was the provocation itself enough to excuse? or to \
blame ? or did the killing happen against the wishes, or aims, or in- ;
tent ions of D. ? dr to the contrary ? ; or should it be asked how free was 
the agent ? or was he an idiot ? or a madman ? or one temporally abandoned H
by reason ? or did he premeditate upon the crime ? or confederate ? or ; y
plot ? or retain an agent to kill ? The Plees reflected and embodied a vy-'.,y-; 
rich garden of legal differences. , y ‘
21. Plees, op.cit., at 1-a. 22. ibid., at 4-a and 4-b, and also :.ll-av
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v Y ylf we return to so early a book as The boke of Justices. Y:Y Y-
. ■ :Y 23 . /. • •. Y'Y.Y- Y :*"■ Y- v’y ■ • . yyY' Yof peas * we may see how legal distinctions with regard to respon­
sibility, and degrees of guilt or culpability,, were being incorporated Y Y' 
into the budding common law. Few citations are needed from this Y Y 
short book to show that the mediaeval tradition regarding intention, 
and its relationship both to action and guilt, was a force in the de- Y. 
velopment of criminal liability. The following citations demonstrate ; . 
that the presence or absence of intention served to indicate the severity 
of a crime: . • Y;Y ; '• y;YY*‘ Y/YYv yy ♦’ Yy Y'Y;. rYy--,. Y/Y>
t! £- Also ye shall enquyre of all raaner of felons 
bycause some of the ben more heynouse thenne some 
as murdre § manslaughter / murdre is oprely where 
a mail by malice purpesed lieth in a H&yze to slee a 
man and accordynge to that malycyous entent and pur­
pose he sleeth hym so that he whyche is slayne maketh 
no defence ayenst hym / for yf he doo it is manslaugh­
ter and no murdre / the offence of thys murdre is more 
heynous than the offence of other felons for yf the 
kynge graunt hym a pradon of all maner of felonnyes 
it auayleth him nought for murdre but yf it make ex­
press e mencyon of murdres / § the statute therof is. 
Anno. xiii. Richardi. ii. * ; • Y y ca. primo M
23. THE BOKE OF JUSTICES OF PEAS, 1506, reproduced in: CLASSICAL ENGLISH 
LAW TEXTS, General Editor, P.R. Glazebrook ( LONDON, Professional 
Books Limited, 1972 ). One may read the Editor’s introduction to 
Y to text ( pp iii-vii ), which copy was produced from the s o l e  s u r y  Y 
viving copy in England from the Library of Stonyhurst College, for 
listing of other editions of the work. One should also consult
OXFORD STUDIES IN SOCIAL AND LEGAL HISTORY, edited by Sir Paul Vino-'
gradoff, Volume VII, "Early Treatises on the Practice of the Justices 
of the Peace in the Fifteenth and Sixteenth Centuries" by B.H.Putnam, 
Ph.D. (OXFORD, AT THE CLARENDON PRESS, 1924) in conjunction with 
The Boke, 1506. Y YY>Y /.v-'
NOTE: No pagination exists in The Boke, but the citations are
Y easily located, ie., "ca. primo".
; .- : One may argue, without distortion to the text ( but- -re--.A i-%
spec ting that 'mutdre1 proper carried here the sense of stealth and A ;r 
secret ) that "...malycyous entent and purpose..^ " A y  ;
y( a a,.. -A_ "Ay V y A: -/A’ Ay yA.y'A y A y ' v permits a dis­
tinction between a formal cause ( the "malycyous entent") and a final 
cause ( the "...malycyous purpose..."). The text itself from which 
I am quoting does gloss the side of the page to indicate a paragraph 
heading. It moves from what I have quoted, with the citation of, 
"Murdre and manslaughter", to a definition of "Chaunce-medely." The' 
definition, one will note, omits any appeal to intention, or to purpose
or to maliciousness (in any form, either substantively or adjactively),
u■ V  2 4 -  A ■ y  - a A A A  > A ’ A  :A va a ' .  - ;  > ! ■ * j y . y A y " ■ y  y y - :stating simply: . .\' :>; ‘...A/A A; y  ;;yyyyy- >y \
, ; y . y " £ - And mas laughter is where two men or mo mete . y
, ; and by chaunce medely they fall at affray so that Aa'A-AAAA;
, A one of them sleeth an other is but felonie in hym ;A'yyAAy
selfe and therfore if any persone be defectyf in this ’A Ay-
" Ay A  wyse make your presentement accordynge. vti. ’ "  ; •: y A
•- • \ A- An echo can be heard from the early Placita Corone Coram
Spigornel ',y* when The Boke defines the elements of criminal rape to
, 26. ' . . -  A; ; ■‘ A A %% A C' A y  A4'. A  - " A ' ■ 'A A/' A  >. V‘ A A A Abe:..- .' y ' - . y yy,.--; y.; .y-v '--A vy •yyy
y . £- "•../rape is where a man rauissheth or taketh a manes A 
.yA Wife wydo we or mayde ayest her Will § hath to do with y  
her ayest her Will how be it that she asset after Warde
; yet it-is felony..." A-A;y'v y  A-yy ' A- y A " y - . .  A- A- y  A:. yy,
24., Ibid., y, . A y "'..AAA'' A 'AAA ''-AAaA., A' A '’yAA aAA;.A; ‘AA.
25., 0£. Cit. Year Book of Edward 1, Volume One, at page 497 ff.
26. The Boke, 1506. ' A y *' -a! I- ) ' ' . A’ A .A- ’ • A Ay ■ AA: -AA A A
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, Y  The same text defines 'robberye' by an appeal to planning ■
by j ,^ stating*..-7’ '/• YvYYYY 'Y ■_ Y' ' YY- ; ' YY • YYY. /. . 'Y • ' Y -
Y : "C - There be also felons that contryuyth takynge \Yy.YY'Y-YYY
, : : / awaye of mennes goodes as roberye and thefte rob­
; berye is where a man lyeth by the kiges hygh Waye YYY ' Y YY'•
; to market Towne in woodes diches or in any other -.y Y/YY.'
; secrete places where by they comen forth by and rob Y  Y : ^
.. :/.Y;YY . • beth theym. z.1*. ' Y Y  • Y  ”• Y- ■ Y ' •'/ • Y. Y Y : • '"Y ’YY '
The deed is spoken of as "mallapertnesse
of the dede". The deed's gravity is intentionally described when Y <
we read, . : -Y-'";Y Y Y--; Y ' Y : ; 'YY. ' -Y-  •; 'YY YY Y • • " /• ■'YYY Y-/
Y r " Also yf there be ony man that brenneth his neigh­
: •; ; bours hous maliciously by dae or by nygth it is felonye."
To see that the force of 'wilfully' means to bring about, or actively
to permit ('actively*ranging over commission and also omission) we may
refer to the citation in The Boke * regarding "eschapes wherein we
-Y'Yy y : ■.’ ;:YYY • .-YY.■ ;y y . vYYYV y Y"- •. • • Yyread, Y Y Y'- Y : ’• ; Y . . . \ • ' Y •. .• • felons" Y \Y--YpYYYY
Y  Y . Y. " £  - Also yf ony Sheryf Gaoler or any other persone Y  Y
Y have letten Wylfully eschape ony felon it is felony....
Y.: / § yf a felon eschape out of the! kepinge of any gaoler
YY , Y Y ayest his Will it Is fynabie the fyne is an.'" ' ;
The 'Indicatament feloniae' * we read of intentional language, although
cited in Latin. For that done *vi et armis1 we read, "...§ felonice Y Y
ut  f e lo  d r i i  r e g is  I s id ia n d ”  § i n s u l t "  p m e d ita t"  c t r a  p a c e . . . "  /the
gist of which is that the act was done with full knowledge of its doing;
■27. i b i d . 1 " ; ■ ■ \ Y  Y ; - Y  Y V Y Y Y Y *  . ; ' Y ;• .Y ;  ■' • ..‘YY
28. ibid., though a pagination is indicated by the signature 'Bi' in /YY ;Y 
the folio. I have indicated the caption, above, to correspond to
the odd appearance of it in the text itself . , Y  ; . Y  Y
2 9 . ' ib id , . ,  a t  £a -  i v . o f  th e  " f o l i o " .  V . Y Y ' -'Y'Y. Y y Y :#- Y : 'YY‘
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, . One may refer to Anno Duodecimo Henrici Septimi, CAP.; VII, to the i: .
case of James Grame who murdered Richard Tracy, his master, toap- ; ^
preciate how the language of indictments in The Boke corresponded to ; :
the language in criminal cases of the period ( circa 1497/8 A.D. ).
: I have reported the case in the footnote below. r Other Latin
terms will speak of. .mala pcogitatioe..." to indicate the element
•' • ; 31 v/vH-; ' :y '1 V . . .5 _-l.t . ■ • . v:' r of felonious intent * in The Boke. •••;< :/v
30., As reported in Pulton f infra), . ' at page 430, we read:
; 1 V {to lay person that doth murder his Lord or Master, shall have V  ^^  :
i7 ' 7 i''i-' his Clergie. '.I:; ■■ ;r • ,»•*' 7". jv . • ■'•
• •v ■'/'■■■ V "Where abominable and wilful 1 prepensed Murders be by the Latoes r >’&'■ j
 ^ ; ' / L of God § natural1 reason forbidden, and are go be eschewed, yet riot ; >
v ^  \ the, lesse, many § diuers unreasonable and detestable persons, lack- / ^
ing grace, wilfully commit Murder, to the high displeasure of God, and i 
V  ; contrary to all the Lawes;abouesaid, and moreouer, against their ■
natural! § obliged duty, wilfully commit prepensed Murder, in slay- ;
; ■: . ing their Master.. .in trust [hope] to eschew the perill S execution^ ^^  : ^
V of the Law by benefit of their clery: In hope whereof, of late one
7 James Grame, late of London yeoman, wilfully assented and prepensed ft--.
; the murder of one Richard Tracy Gentleman, then his Master, by him 7 v : •
V 7^ ; § his prepensed assent, the xix. day of February last past, at Brent- :
. y. wood...murdered and slaine, to the right perillous ensample of other 7 f
; . euill disposed: ;< ,be it enacted, that the said James Grame,; for the :
murder of the said Richard Tracy his late Master be attainted of the
. ; - said murder as a felon that hath offended in pety treason^,.that
• ; the same James for...doing like murder have or ought to bee pimished, ;V
' ; any priuiledge of his Clergy, or his demand for same, notwithstanding. ” :.i
* 7 / V vi: NOTE: The case also stated, ”.. .that if any lay person hereafter pre-
/ . ' V pensedly murder their Lord, Master, of Soueraigne immediate, that they 7 ;
hereafter be not admitted to their Clergy. . ;" revoking benefit of ;i: ii;-5
7 Clergy. Pulton noted that Stat 23. H.3.1. and 1. Ed. 6.12. re- ;
; i v affirmed the force of this Statute. It should be appreciated that : 7: if;
. Parliament, temporal and spiritual, was in this case called upon :to/v7y
' f:. ; i : i i to render a decision in a felony case, and as a result of the decision ;
,, a Statute was enacted. (Obviously, twentieth century Pariiamentiary ; :
7 ;; •; procedure would not do the same, respecting; the distinction between J
> ; ? Jyl'Vf.7 executive and judicial matters.) Citation taken from: DE PACE ET ■ :r 
; : v i • .. * [by] Ferainando Pvlton (LONDON, Printed for the Companie v
;;^-,7'V* V. : ctationers, 'ta.^ om. 1610. [second edition].
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I reproduce below a rare edition of THE BOKE FOR
A IVSTYCE OF PEACE, 1534, to show how the language of this work preserved
the language of intention in various aspects, ie., its strictly
cognitive aspect,as where ot£ plans, and its strictly voltional
aspect as where one brings about. I shall let the texts here
32stand without further comment. *
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It may be assumed that the notion of actus reus, which may be read 
both as the non-intentional elements of a crime, and its material 
limits, was embodied in the notion of a judicial power, ie., that 
a Justice had the ’power1 to inquire after the nature of a crime. 
By assumption, we could argue that an inquiry is of some kind or 
other, of some limit or other, if only to limit the nature of one 
crime (say, robbery) from some other crime (say, murder). I re­
produce two folio pages from the Berthelet text of 1534.
Maskettfs
i n rtjarctje 
paedcs.
tfdutctfal 
Spngc of  
Sopng,
<Salp Ijalf pens.
fe a p le ,3 fl.iJ \$ .S .£ a .i+ « -  "  - m :
<£3 lfo pe tyaU enquctc o f  all that kept 
anp fapxes, ox mar&cttes,in church* perde,oj 
in anp other bolp place, 2Dtj«*onp Cebpng is:  
and Uotre long: tbcpbauc continued therm, 
she liatutc tbtrof is  of <20marde the thpxde 
made at io p n d jt llc r 3 n d  alfo in the ttatute 
maoeatajpnetjetter, ttje. i?.pcre o f  <2 . i . it 
to a i defended, ctjac fcpcrs Quioc no mojc be 
hcpte in cburcljt pardes, ■
{£Y elhall cnqucreoftbem that coattfcrfcpf 
tnc kpnges copnc, ox if there be anp faiCe mo* 
nep and paotricnt m ate tberaitb . 3 n 0  o f tbf 
that bxpngefalfcmoneptneotbts rcalmr, os 
that countrcfcit the copnc o f an otbte reaitnc, 
tohicb* br the kpnges fufferauncc is  currant 
txjuhm this rraitnc, pcfljati boo Os to tocte. 
3nd  o f them that clpppe,soa(he,fpic,oxotbee 
topfe falfpfic the moncp o f th is reaitnc: 2 nd 
th is femeth to be h is he trrafonc, fox the das 
cu tefapth ,thathcisatraptourto  the kpnge 
ano his teaime, 2nno, J. i f .y .  ftatuto Ccdo*
jC ap it.s .tt 7. .* • : ......
the fame.m»pcrc o f  the fapb kpngr, it 
tea s  oxbepntD, that galpbalfptns, fofkpns, 
&o&kpns,anb aU moncp of Scotland Ojuloe 
be ail put o u t , and mho that maketb, hpcth. 
copnctb,oxbipngttbcuuo this rralmr galp? 
haifpens,fofkpns,and dodkpns, (hall be pus 
npOjcd a s a felon, and he that takcth ox paps 
etb fuchc moncp,tbal lofc an .C -s. m bctof the 
bpngr (hall baue the one balfe, and be that 
ip p lU cac tbs otbte i?alfc, 2 nd that.. <SS
-  X
o f peace. -  '■ & r ­
tss o f  peace in ruerpethpte o f  this tealm cy „ . . 
r .; ;  fjauepotocr to inquire therof,to hcttiandtta
‘ -I-. serrapnc the Came. .• •  • •• -  -
f- .= < £21fo o f  tbepm that flee tbepx mapftrr,that OffucI)dS: 
f %. ie  fox to fap tbepx foucrapgne, as m onhebis flepcthepx 
‘ . abbottcox pxtour, mpfe h «  hufbande, Ccrs foucramei
j, *; oau ntb is maplier,ox anp,Under mbofeobet*
'  fance he i s : the caufe ts, the mapftct bathe to
• ‘ hVm moxe truftc than to a flranger. Vide Has-
gutum lndc3nno. x f 4 <£.?.cap.z. - . .
d 2 lfo JuHicts of peace hauc ful potcer and n o r fo n ' 
auitoxitic in ttjetr fcffions to enquire of traps K n ie  "
• serous murderers i  murders o f popfonpnge * * * 
a s  tpeilasofthecountrrfcptpngeof copncof
anp outmarde roralinc, fuffrcd to ronnc and 
go xriehm this rraircc bp the kpngts affcnte, . 
and to tnakcpxoccs thcrbpd bp capias onlp: 
fox popfonnpngtsadiudgcd and deemed a s  - ::*
- high treafon bp a ct o f parliament made 2 nd 
r-. - txo. Z2.l? .8.cap.9. . . - .
1, '» C 2 iro pc (bai inquire, if  anp man be flapng 
■v . ox murdered bp tbedap, tobciber tbemurdcs .
tfrbctakenbptljctotonlbPp,toberttbcO etij 
■ oxm ourderm asdoone:foxif hebe not, tbs 
••' tofcmcibpp Ojalbe amerced. An. j.Jx.y.cap.r* •
;d 3 I lfo  pc (hail enquert o f all them, that caQ: ftbzetics 
anp bpllcs into anp mans hoxafe, in the mbps to bxcnc a 
che bpllcs is contcrncd, that if the fame pcrs taas bous 
fonfaxpngenota ccrtapnc fotnme o f moncp,
~ .oxlapitataccrtaprtplace»hotDxt»bishoufc •• • * **
. ;Cjaltr bxcnt,and the moncp be not tbcre lapd, 
.Shchoafcisbxtnt, this is bighc treafon, The 
• vftatats tljcrof i g 3 n .3,l? .6 .cap ,s, . .
- ' tSt .i  35
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fjitfftce
{ £ 3 !fopc(I)alcnqucreof altnfln o f  felonies,' 
mm man* bpcaufefomc of thcmbcnmoxchcpnous ttja 
nauabtcr fomc»a® inurDct on0 mauflaughter. fi^urtcc 
iiou94 ♦ lfl pjopjelp t3?t|erc n man Op malpcc pjcpcnCcD 
' lpcth in nmnptc to flee a man, anb accoxDpng 
: to tljattnnlpcioua intent »pourpofe,heflectij
lipm.fo tliat hc.mhiche is flapnc.mattctl) noo 
Defence apenftc hpm .foxif lie Do, it is matu  
daughter anD no mucber, the offence o f tljta 
m utDcrismoxehcpnousthnn the offence of 
otljcr felon ies: fox if tlic lipng grauut hpm a 
pbon of all mnucr o f felonies,it auopleth him 
nought foxmoucDcr, butpf ftmnlic ctpjcffe 
mention ot mucbers. 3 nb tl)C ftatute ttjerof 
is ,  3nno. ij.IR : .£ a p .i .  
tfhaunce C ^ nb m an flaugh tcrig , tohere tiro men ox 
mcoeler mo mctc»nna bP cfjauttce mcblcp thcp fall at 
e* affrop.fo tliat one of them fleetl) on otlicr.it 
is  but felon? in hpm fclfc, anD thccfoie if an? 
pcrfon Oe Dcfettiue in ttits trifc.matic pour p*
• fentutcnt accoxDpng btf.
laapr. C 2!lfo pc fljnl I’qutrtof rnpe.UUpc is  tohct* 
A man raupfljeth ox tahctli a mans topfc,top« 
Do toe,ox mapbe nrcuft her ir p ll, anb hath to 
Do tmth her apcnit her U>pl, albeit that flje af« 
*‘ Cent afterirarbt.pct it is  felon?,anb toithout 
• the h?nges charter ntahemcncfon of rape,it
auOpletlj hr m nought. fdjeftatu tctljcrofls  
tocftrft.2.iCap.?+.
Uobberie. CT^bce* be alfo felons, that contrpttc ta* 
h?ng atoa? of mens goobes, as b?robbcr?e 
anb theft. Ulobber?(strhereaman lpcth 0? 
the hpnges bpgtj to opt to marhet toioncs, ititoobj
o f peace. • ja
toobbcs, Dpcljes, ox in an? otljcr fccrcfc pia* 
ccs, ir here people come fojtlj bp.aub robbctl) 
them, albeit that Ijc taUeth amap but the ra» 
lu eof apen?,oxlelIe,ttis fclonp,fox the ma* 
lajurtucffe of the bebe anb icopecbie that a 
a man is  in o f hto Ipfc.ir here it fo tabf a trap 
from his pcrfon catifcth tlje office to be greta 
ter, than if it tjab ben ttjcupOjclp ftoilcn.
<£ Cheftc is  inhere a tljcfe ttcalctlj a manneo *ru cu e 
goobes in his ctjaximber o> in his clofe.ox onp ^ 1 
other place,pf tljc baluc paffe.riii.D, it is felo* *„
tip, anb if it be not paffpnge the balue o f. cif.
D.it is but petpte larccnp, ox bjpbcrp; fox ttjs 
totntbe he fhal not b?e,but malic a fpnc to tljc 
hpng: but if ft can be fcunb at Dfucrs tpmes, 
that h« Ijatljtalicn goobes of that balue anb 
inoxt, tijan he Qjall bpe tljerfoxr.
<£3lfo if tljete be anp man,that butncth his Surgula*  
ncpgljbourshotofctualpciouflpbp bap ox bp etc* 
npgtjt.it is fclonp. 3lfo of ttjem that bjeahe 
hotofes bp npgijte, to tljcmtcnte to robbc, 
tljoughtljeptahenothpngcairap, it is burs 
gularp,irhtch in it fclfc is  fclonp,bpcaufc the *:
lame gputth noo colour to b;cahea manncs « •
hotofc bp npgljt. . -
<££lcth cs conuict o f petite trcafon, irplfull ClcrliCS . 
mutbcr.ox cobbcrics bone bp ox ncre the Ijigh coouictcb, 
torfp.u. Ojall matxe no puegation, erccpt ttjep 
Do f pnDe. ii. fufficicnt Curettes, euerp o f tljcm 
Ijaupngelanbcs ox other hercDptamcntcs of 
cljartcrholDeof cnhcritanccto ttjepcrclpbaa 
lucof.K bi.s.b iii.fi.oxclsb c iboxtlje.jcx.ti. in 
wouable fUbftan(e,cchr of tljcm bounbe ‘ • ».«. in
32. This edition was auctioned at Bonhams, London, on November 26th, 
1975, and its owner was gracious enough to permit me to have these 
pages reproduced for use in my research. I am grateful both to the 
firm of Charles W. Traylen, Guildford, England and to his Principal, 
a distinguished Wall Street lawyer, for extending me the privilege 
to use and to reproduce an exceedingly rare text. There is question 
whether the British Museum copy is the same as this copy.
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It is not surprising to read a developed vocabulary in ' t 
which mental and volitional conduct is modified in a number of ways 
in the course of a sentence, when speaking of an act done ’maliciously’, 
or that conduct was ’wilful’. If one refers to the Mirour for Magis- •; 
trates ‘one will read a vocabulary, of rhyme, well suited to express 
machinations and evil designs, offering rich modifications in the 
adjectival presentment of human vices. What one does not find in 
such a vast collection of common rhyme is a justification for the use
of pivotal terms which describe wickedness nor ought one to expect ;
such from poetry; but what the collection does reveal is that a language 
was sufficiently formed to accommodate complex descriptions of human 
conduct. It is but a short space from there to the world of Elizabethan 
drama, part of which depicted in complex ways the complex failings of 
the human condition, tp appreciate that common law notions of legal : , ; 
responsibility and criminality were developing within, and out of, a ~ 
fertile linguistic world. •' ; '■ •. ‘ '•
 ^ , The language of these various early treatises concerned with
criminal offences is both a language which is simple and direct, and also 
a language which incorporates complex notions from mediaeval theology.
33. Cf.t A MIROUR FOR MAGISTRATES, of Maister Baldwine, the edition of 
edition of John Higins (IMPRINTED at London by Henry Marsh, being 
the asiigne of Thomas Marsh, neare to Saint Dunstanes Church in 
Fleetestreete. 1587). Any of the tales will serve to show that a 
full vocabulary existed to describe human gruesomeness, The tale 
of The Lord Hastings (folio 196-204)”...vijanbusly murdered in the 
Tower of London by Richard Duke of Glocester, the 13, of Iune, Anno
1483...”, or ” K. Richarde the iij...murdered his brothers children 
(1 4 85)..to his eventual downfall (folio 230-234), where it is : 
interesting to read a portion of the closing stanza [sixth from the
V;v"1
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The mediaeval originations are by time and use surpressed, much like 
the roots of any language to the common eye. and ear, and one is left \7;7 
with, as it were, conclusions. The supposings and premisses which may 
have led to various conclusions are to be inferred, which inferences 
this monograph has attempted in part. The reason for a terra being 
used in a certain way may be divided into*"The reason for...",which 
is lost through time arid custom, leaving us with, ";..used in a certain 
way." Deliberately do I hesitate to make a simple distinction between 
* denotation1 and ’connotation*v I wish to argue deeper than what these 
notions signify. I wish to argue that a term may grow from within a v 
tradition, as does the term ’Will’, and that the term comes to be used 
in a conclusive way, almost an enthymematic way, forcing one to think :
33., cont., •/' ; ; f, - < ■ 7. v , 7 !7;V 7/7- :7\7
^ end of the poem, at folio 234-a]: '• -
"The brand of malice thus kindling in my brest 7;.'7 -77
j 7 7 Of deadly hate which I to him did beare, 7 7 7 7 ;
. 7 7 Pricked mee forward, and had raeb not desist, ; 7 7 7 - 7 
. 7 : But boldy fight, and take at al1 no f eare, 7
To wyn the field, and Earle to conquere: ' :-y-vY 7 '.'77*7/
7 Thus hoping glory greate to gayne and get, .7 .77777' 7
7/- ■ 7* 7 7 ‘/ *  Mine army then in order did X set. "  7_7, •71T 7 ' '7*7; 77
Whence we may observe how ’malice’ both serves to describe what is 
done through malice, and how ’malice’ serves to describe also that 
one acts,by force of malice. .; 7 : ' 7 -7'v --7:, 7 7-7 ,7;7-:- •••• 7:, 7 \ i V :77">
* From the previous page: I say, simply, ’mediaeval theology’ to 
refer to the vast writings of the vast period which, of course, 
embraced far more than theology itself. By literary convention 
I allude to such writings because it is common to think of the 
Middle Ages as an age of religious endeavour. 7 7  7
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back to what the premisses might have been so that, in turn,; one can 
arrive at some comprehensive understanding of how, and why, the term v 
is. used. The 'method* for such discovery is inore literary in its . 
mode than it is scientific; each new text,> with each newer and fresher J ? 
reading of key terms, renders newer conclusions about a common matter;
One may ask how a term can come to be an entonic term, a word or con- 4 
cept which appears to generate much action and meaning of a strained . 
sort ? And one is brought back to the texts of the period>in search 
after a tradition which gave such energy and tension to a key or pivotal 
term. The late Friedrich Waismann entertained what I believe to be a 
proper concept about philosophical activity when, with regard to lan­
guage, he urged an open-ended model for and of its use, and warned 
against making easy nets into which all linguistic activity could be • 
caught and confined. ^ ’ Linguistic usage is not this simple, as pre­
sent linguistic theory is revealing ( and which literary critics have 
appreciated for a long time ). We may see ( or hear ) a term used; ;
but language carries along a context, so variegated and complex (and 
unobtrusive and unconsious ) that it would be a simple man who thought; : 
that simple propositional analysis exhausted the range of use of a term.
Perhaps— —and I stress 'perhaps * an Omniscient mind could embrace fully
the nuances of larguage in its legal usages, but that is both to assume 
that history couid be viewed as closed, and complete, by an omniscient 
observer; by definition, therefore, excluding human research and enter­
prise, and thus of little practical use. Man is more a metaphor than 
a simple problem which may be solved. ’ - - .
34. Cf. "Language Strata” as chapter iv* in HOW I SEE PHILOSOPHY by >
F. Waismann (Macmillan: LONDON, 1968), pp 91-121. / .
"•i
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From that brief aside let me return to the texts at
'Y--' . ' y ’ ,v ‘ Y; •" •• Y  ■ V •••.-. .35 ' •- ' ■ ■ f Y Y  . ''Y *V- «Yhand. It was advanced in Putnam's study ‘that the text of The Boke,
1506, served as the base upon which Fitzherbert ’s treatise, 1538 Y Y;;-
(and later editions), iprew. The 1574 text bears out■ the:claimv.*V:;:'■ Y-• v;'X:Y;' 
It was also advanced by Putnam, and the text of such edited and  ^. . f,
prepared, that the reading given by Magistri Thome Marowe at Inner 
Temple in 1503 was, M...the first systematic exposition of the pro­
cedure and powers of the justices, based on extensive knowledge of 
the law and practice on the subject.” However, "Apart from Year : :
Books and material connected with the Inns of Court, there seems to 
be no reference to Marowe in legal literature till half a century >;
after his death. Fitzherbert’s failure to mention the De Pace in ^
any of his works is the more mysterious inasmuch as a copy was probably 
produced at his own Inn about 1516 or 1517, and as Marowe was argu­
ing frequently in the courts at Westminster after his call to be ser- Y
' ' 37  ^ Y  ’ 'V, v. • .  Y-JY-Y -'Y Y'^YY"1jeant.” * The chapter of De Pace which is of concern is the Twelfth
lecture (Duodecima Lectura) :”De feloniis inquirendis coram Justiciariis r
pacis.”, contained over pages 375 to 383 of Putnam's edition. The >
---•YY-; 'y J'-Jr-; ; - : Y 38. " 39. -Y/Yytwo lawyers to take cognizance of Marowe were Brooke and Fleetwood. :
35. Op, cit., Putnam, at. page iv. ' .. : Y Y /;y ' ’ Y  '';,:Y Y
36. FIRST THE BOOKE FOR A JUSTICE OF PEACE ( Imprinted at Londo in 
Fletestrete, within Temple Barre at the signe of the hand § Starre
by Richarde Tottyl (*\) 1574. NOTE: This edition is 195 folio pages,
plus The Table. It is listed in Beale as T-IS7, (Harvard:1926), page 12^
37. Op. cit., Putnam, at page 209. 38. ibid., at pages 210-211. •
Sir Robert Brooke in his ’Abridgement', compiled before 1558, but - 'Y;s:Y. 
not published until 1568, citing Marowe on Commission and Riots, as
well as some of Marowe’s court arguments; William Fleetwood, of Mid- ?Y
39. die Temple, his manuscript of 1565, ’The Office of a Justice of Peace.. Y 
Ywas printed in 1658, giving reference to Marowe. Y
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Other writers from later periods do cite Marowe, some of whose texts 7
7/7" are not indicated in Putnam’s, study.4 *^ 7 ' 7  7 ;77s
7 7 /. Putnam constructed her text of De Pace from eleven manu- • 7 ' 7 7 -
7 c 7 7 7; -scripts to produce the law French edition contained in her study of 77-7;7.77.7;7-
, 1924. I am chiefly concerned with chapter twelve of De Pace which - , ; . ’
inquires after the nature of felonies; I am not concerned with the in- 7 7* 
: 77/ ' " tricate and disputed legal historical question regarding what, exactly; 7 7 /7?.
were the powers of the Justices of the Peace, matter outside of the '-.-7;V •7 ://
777  *' scope of this study. I agree with Putnam that De Pace was kept alive 77;7
v v ^ by a manuscript tradition indigenous to the Inns of Court, and re-
77/7 7 ference in my footnote to an instant case may confirm that tradition 7;
;7; • when the Law Lords, during the course of oral argument, required a ’ . ‘
7 v 7/ manuscript citation of an 1816 case to be produced in evidence. 7; 7 7 7 . ^77;;
40. Indeed; omissions to parallel antiquarian law texts may be a '7 777'' 7;7;-'
rule , and not an exception, owing to the state of antiquarian 7 7 :,;;
law holdings. Where Putnam, at page 219 of her study, says: 7 7:'
"The earliest references that have come to my attention are in.7;7;7’7 7  
Fraunce, ’The Lawiers Logike’ [1588 at 44] and in Cowell, ’The-''. 7 • 7\ 7C-^ 
Interpreter’ [1607].", one has a case of not all texts being known, . -7 
:: or available, to her . TERMS DE LA LEY (attributed to Rastall), 7?7. :777
7; the edition of 1598 printed in London by Thomas Wight and Bonham ,
7 Norton, makes reference to Marowe, "1.Ma.cap. 12" under the entry 7 7
for "Rout", at page 175, William Fulbecke’s,"A PARALLELE OR CON- 7 !
.'.i/i, FERENCE OF THE CIVILL Law..." printed by Thomas Wight at London 7
. ; in 1601 (which is the first edition of Fulbeck *s book), makes re- *
r ference to MaroWe in the twelfth dialogue of the work, concerned .
there with, "...vnlawful assemblies, riots, routes, and forcible' 
entries." (at page 83-b). The reference appears as: "Marr. lect 8."
It is still not unusual for legal citations to be drawn from sole ',7-77.7 
manuscripts. Reference under s.48.A of the Criminal Appeal (Northern 7 
77  Ireland] Act 1968 (No. 1 of 1975) H.L. [1976] 2 All E.R. 937, when 7 7 7 
heard by the Law Lords required the manuscript copy of Rex v. Thomas j 
.7/7 because references to the case were inexact . The manscript~copy F 7 77 :1
dated from 1816 of Bayley, J. , and differed in detail from the case -.7’ 
'.777.'4S-'i-t was printed in Cases on Criminal Law (3rd ed. 1964) of..'Turner 77 77r! 
and Armitage [Cambridge], or from its original appearance (1816) . ;7i7-f:
■ 4 M. i.-ind/S'. 441 [Maule $ Selwyn’s King’s Bench Reports 1813-17] V 77'7/ /
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In Mort de home Marowe sets out the four heads of
homicide. Although Bracton is not mentioned by him, Putnam .v \
suggests that it is the Bractonian classification he is
advancing: death by misfortune, suicide, manslaughter by ,
chance medley, and murder. The text reads as follows,from
D e  P a c e : 4 2 ‘ ; v  / i ' ;y  y y  • ■'" ' V ' ' / - ; /■■■/’ ' 'iM-
"Mort de home est auxi enquerable par lez iustices 
, , de pease § ceo poet estre fait en iiii mariers, sdi- CXfy-
; licet, par mysfortune; sicome home est occise par
: chaunce de vne mure gismaunt sur lay on par thonder ; r
; ou autre maner dez chaunez, en toutz ceux casez ceo
nest enquirable deuaunt Justices de peas, ou si home 
• soit felo de se lou home tua luy mesme, ceo nest enr ■ .f v ;
r quirable deuaunt Justices de peas. Mes de manslawgh- 
ter ils poient enquerer § ceo serra entendre lou home 
tua vne autre par chaunce medle il est enquirable 
\;deuaunt eux. Le iiii est murdre § ceo est lou ; •
home par malice prepense gitta en agaite § tua ascun <
home, cetst auxi enquirable deuaunt lez Justice § : , /
cetera.” V': ' " h ' • \y; . ' ;■ y '! ; V- ?.y
The contrasts are simple enough. Death can occur without human
intent, ie., from nature, as by thunder, or a construction ac-
cident, a wall or roof falling upon one. These were common
enough examples from the Fathers, when they spoke about trees v=
falling upon passers by. When the inquiry presses to manslaughter
one is given the example of chance medley, which tradition was
fairly well-defined. The sentence which states that murder is
brought about through malice prepense brings one back to the time
41. , Op; cit., Putnam, her text at page 198 . it could be argued,
: y.; I believe, that Marowe was affirming a tradition, of which ; \ ; 
: Bracton was a chief legal example, but which division of crimes,
as we have seen, was not in statement unique to Bracton.
42. Ibid., page 378 ' ' ■ •' • •' •*' •' V--'■ :
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surrounding Bracton, as well as embodying the expression of in- Y 
tention which can be read in the early cases from Bracton to the ;; 
time of Marowe himself. I shall consider some cases from the early 
courts and rolls, but first shall cite and comment upon the text ; Y..
of De Pace which concerns murder (mort de home). At pages 378 to 
379 the text is to be found in the Putnam edition; I shall provide 
my own translation of the law French. The text continues: YY
• Y Y  " Et not:a que en mort de home 1 entent de celui aue fait Y 
; Y: le mort ne fait le felony come il fait de Theft Y v
come est auauntdit § etc.; quar si home entende ; YY. ' Y-YyYv -;Y 
- ^ Y'-'yYYY. de hater ascun person § en cell baterie il tua, . Y' v Y
: vne autre, ceo est felony nient obstante son en-
tent nefut de luy occider. Mes en ascun cas de ■ Y% Y
Y Y Y  mort de homme 1 entent ferra le felony; sicome vne Y  YY Y
home dona a vne autre corrupt vitaille al entent Y y  YY
. de luy oue cest vitaille de poysoner § murderer Y Y  Y
Y  YV § il deuia de maunger ou boire de ceo vitaille, ; Y :Y Y  Y 
Y ceo est felony. Mes sil ne sauoit le corrupcion ’ Y ; Y
\/r Y/Y ne entend de luy poysoner al temps quaunt il luy
Yy dona, ceo nest felony S issint 1entent en ceo ' ,
: - fait le felony § etc.” .
The notions which the law French embody rest near to being a legal Y YH
shorthand for more expanded legal notions. Since we assume that •
Marowe was giving a Reading or Lecture at Inner Temple, we may be
guided by the custom of the Inns, and we may assume thathis audience
had completed dinner, and that the utter barristers, who were students, .
were preparing to take notes. The examples which occur in this
portion of his text ( as well as other portions ) would have been
jotted down, and the student himself may have embellished the text Y
with his own case citations or examples. Working within this background,
the text can, without distortion, be expanded into sensible English.;Yy Y Y
Y'YYiiSJ
V .V Marowe offers us an extremely compressed and complex com- V ,
; . parison when, at the opening of the sentence, he says that 'mort de ; /
yy : home* is different from ’Theft * . Why is this so ? It is for this n
y reason. His statement embodies the notion: Where is the crime to be V  •
i found ? Does 'stealing* rest in the goods, or in the agent who steals y 1 ?
: : ; ; the goods ? If an owner picks up his bails of goods and carries them v ^ "
V ; . a certain distance, how does this differ from one who does not own the V ,? , :.
1: ■ goods but who does the same as the owner with regard to the goods, ■■,:. ;
- VV'y' namely, picking them up and carrying them away ? The case which had , ?
•'y„ ' y perplexed judges at the latter part of the fifteenth century was Carriers '.yy*•
y ; j , Case, Y .B. T3 Edw. IVy where D, who was hired to carry goods to one , ; ‘y •
^ V y place, promptly carried them to some other and different place, and
y ;•y-;y vy.y seized' the contents he was carrying. He was charged with committing a
"y; y felony,y The case was decided in 1473, but not without causing great yv '
differences amongst the Bench. The law concerning theft has always been y y 
;; . perplexing because one is always at odds in trying to isolate the theftbps .
element in the criminal act so that a criminal charge can be laid against y• 
y V  ■ : D^  Thus Marowe has pressed a subtle point on his listeners, almost in ; y : •
y; j y a way worthy of a Socratic question: to wit, where is 'theft' to be found, -  ^
vy' • as opposed to, where is'murder'to be found ? , Does one simply apply a yy.y
'•yV_ definition to an act of an agent ? But what in the definition is to bey yyy.;’!
y I, •*- • -y. . applied to what ? How is a criminal location made ? What is it which . y
yyyy--.- y;y makes that book your book, and not my book ? . Certainly it is not the  ^ ; ;
v V 'bookishness' of the book which renders it your possession and not my ; . y ‘
; ' possession. It is not simple location which supports one's claim to y y
y ; yyV f The Theft Act 1967 and the legal difficulties. it has produced reveals v
y.-, . ^at an exact statement, as to what are the elements of a theft yet eludes, us ^
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p o s s e s s io n . The book c o u ld  r e s t  j u s t  as e a s i ly  on th e  ta b le  o f  th e  t h i e f  <7 
as o f  th e  ow ner. 7 */*■;• 7 /  v7. ■i/ - / 7  . ■ '7 /.■ 7 7 /7  7v7~. ' 7 7 V /7 7 ;7  • ■ ■ 7. 7 /7 7
Y e t MSrowe advances a n o th e r  e lem en t in  h is  co m p a rison . He 
w ishes  t o  a rgue  t h a t  * in t e n t  * o r  * in t e n t io n  * does n o t by  i t s e l  f  d e f in e  7,' f  
th e  fe lo n io u s  e lem en ts  o f  a c r im e . I t  w i l l  be seen t h a t  he assumes t h a t 7 
a c r im e  has to  i t  a : c e r t a in  m a te r ia l  e lem en t w h ich  b r in g s  th e  c r im e  
s id e  o f  w hat th e  a ge n t a im s a t  o r  w ishes  f o r .  But Marowe advances t h i s  
by exam ple , and n o t s im p ly  b y  d e f i n i t i o n .  The s tu d e n t needed to  see t h a t  
some fo rm s o f  a c t io n s  w ere d i f f e r e n t ,  how ever h a rd  to  p u t  th o s e  d if fe r e n c e s  
in t o  n e a t a p r i o r i  d e s c r ip t io n s .  The la w y e r must needs w ork th ro u g h  ex,? 
p e r ie n c e ; and th e  a ssum ptio n  h e re  i s  th a t  th e  w o r ld  o f  th e  p a r t i c u la r  is  
more com p lex , and more d i f f i c u l t  to  embody l i n g u i s t i c a l l y ,  th a n  m eets o u r 
m in d 's  eye . W ith  t h i s  p ro lo g u e  l e t  me o f f e r  w hat th e  t e x t  s ta te s :
; "  We s h o u ld  ta k e  n o te  o f  t h i s  d i s t i n c t i o n .  When a p e rso n  7
. has been k i l l e d ,  th e  in t e n t  o f  th e  one who k i l l e d  h im  i s
7 n o t o n ly  w hat makes th e  m a tte r  fe lo n io u s ,  a s , f o r  in s ta n c e ,  77
7  th e  in t e n t  o f  an a ge n t in  t h e f t  i s  what makes th e  m a tte r
th e f to u s .  T h is  sh o u ld  be made c le a r  f o r  you by  c o n s i d e r i n g , :
7_ 7'. t h i s  exam ple . :--;'7 ::" *7  * 7 7 . / / : .  t\  ./• ' ; /  ; / . : / ' - V  7 a- -.777'
7 7 ; ! : " I f  c la im s  t h a t  he in te n d e d  o n ly  to  s t r i k e  A  and no one 77 V
v e ls e ,  y e t  b y  means o f  h is  b lo w  s t r ik e s ,  and k i l l s  even, some
in n o c e n t t h i r d  p a r ty ,  i t  w i l l  be no d e fe nce  f o r  to  c la im  7 7  7 /  
t h a t  he had n o t  in te n d e d  o r  aimed a t  t h i s  in n o c e n t t h i r d  '" :7 7 7 7 ;'
7 p a r ty .  D. i s  g u i l t y  o f  a fe lo n y  even i f  he d id  n o t  w ant to  7 / , ;
7 7 /  7 ’ k i l l  t h i s  unknown p e rs o n . 77 v //•••'
- 7 7  "We may ta k e  a n o th e r  case where in t e n t  i s  an in g r e d ie n t  in
th e  d e te rm in a t io n  o f  fe lo n y .  C o n s id e r th e  man who k n o w in g ly  
g iv e s  a p e rson  foo d  w h ich  i s  p o iso n o u s , w i th  th e  in t e n t io n  to  
p o is o n  and cause th e  d e a th  o f  th a t  p e rs o n . B u t, by  chance o r  
good fo r tu n e ,  th e  v ic t im  a v o id s  e a t in g  any o f / t h e  p o isonous
7 7 ; fo o d . What th e n  ? D_ i s  s t i l l  g u i l t y  o f  a fe lo n y .  " • /
’’But let us consider the facts of this same case > .
but in a different way. Assume that £  not only ;
■ does not know that the food is poisoned, but also ; ■;
that £  has no criminal intent to poison his guest.
What shall we say if £  gives this food to his : :
V , guest ? Has £  committed a felony ? No, he has - ‘
. not committed a felony. In this instance his
intent does protect him against the possible charge 
of having committed a felony. ' V
That this kind of case had suasive power in sixteenth century legal 
reasoning will be seen when Plowden, in The Queen v. Saunders and 
Archer (1576) 2 PI. 473, the facts of the case materially embody
many of the elements Marowe put forth for consideration seventy, or
so,, years earlier. ■ ■' •;\ ^ ■ •':
What is interesting to note about Marowe’s language is 
that he moves from an adjectival description, malice prepense, to 
use of strict intentional analysis. In Theft it is the element of 
intention which makes taking theftous, whilst in murder the element 
of intention is one element only in the elements of the crime. The 
example he gives is the use of ’intention1 to. convey: the object of 
intention. It will be no defence to the charge of felony to state 
that ” I intended to strike A but not B." The law, as Marowe expounds, 
it ( and which his students were assumed to understand ), forbade all 
criminal striking, or criminal assault; hence the material element of 
the definition, and which may be subsumed to the actus reus of a crimi­
nal commission or undertaking. In later legal language we have come to 
know what Marowe has spoken of as, ’oblique intention1 or ’indirect in­
tention’ or ’constructive intent’. The felonymurder rule, or con­
structive malice (operable in some common law jurisdictions, but not 
in England), is embodied in the distinction Marowe makes.
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; The other portion of the example shows how intention
may excuse, and there Marowe shifts to demonstrate the two ways 
in which a common example may be entertained. The reason why £  
is guilty in the first poisonous food example is that £ is at­
tempting to kill; the element in attemptis intentional. The case 
could equally have been made more complicated by £ thinking that 
the food was poi sonous, when, in fact, it was not; The examp1e 
shows why it is to intent that an appeal is made in order to de­
termine the guilt of £. We have a number of modem counterparts 
of this example, especially in narcotics enforcement where, often, 
the court will rule that it is immaterial to D ’s guilt whether the / 
sacks of contraband were heroin or sugar at the time when £ 'attempted* 
to sell the items to an undercover narcotics agent.
The closing part of the example shows that an agent devoid 
of criminal intention, and of criminal knowledge ( truly not knowing 
that the food was poisonous; and, we assume, not having brought about 
the poisonous conditions by ignorance or culpable oversight 43 ), then 
the elements for a felonious commission are not present in £, and a 
felony cannot be charged of or attributed to him.
43. One may read a simple and clear discussion on degrees of ignorance 
in Book Two, Chapter One, of Francis Hutcheson's, A SYSTEM OF MORAL 
PHILOSOPHY (Glasgow: R and A. Foulis, 1755). The merit of the dis- 
is its simplicity, contradistinguished from mediaeval discussions of 
the same topic which are detailed, extremely complicated, and do not <
lend themselves to easy English. The chapter is entitled: " The cir-. 
cumstances which increase or diminish the MORAL GOOD, or EVIL of Actions, 
contained in Volume One, pages 227-237; • r
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V \ In accord with Bracton, and most of the mediaeval moral /
theory we have considered, Marowe finally isolates guilt within the
existence of intention itself. The logical primitive for legal guilt
is the guilty intention itself; At this point, as we saw in Bracton,
the guilt of the law and the guilt of moral stain are one. It will 7
be recalled that Bracton saw this moment as the act which only the
heart could know and which God only could judge. The example makes
clear what Bracton may have meant when he said 44 *, " In crimes the
intention is regarded, not the result." Illustrating such a legal ;
preconception is this case from the De Pace:4  ^* :
: ''Item en auncien temps lentent en murdre oue vrie /.
notorious act fait de perfourmer mesme le-murdre T : v
V . •. fut felonye content que il ne fist le murdre en • //•••--'
fait, sicome en cas vne garcoun voile auer tue : :
' . ; • son master quaunt il fut endormant § come il voil- :
: ; • let auer scie son gutter, il gisoit sur luy cy dure
; que il mesme vigiloit § eschape ceo, ii ceo fut ; r
,V; - aiugge felony en le garcoun et vncore le master y
; fut en vie." / V ; • ■ -7 Vi
He is talking about murder by stealth where the very act of murder
as criminal rested in its being planned, which concept was later emr
braced by treason, and which, in some early cases from the Rolls, we
can read of malice as being treasonous when related to a killing. The
44. 0£. cit..", Thorne> vol. 11, at page 384: c"In maleficiis autem 
spectatur voluntas et non exitus." whereupon the text continues, v 
"But; here we distinguish between true cause [and cause in] mis­
adventure, by animals which lack reason, or other movable things, 
which provide the occasio, as a ship, a tree that crushes, etc."
45. De Pace, at page 379. .-/j/ i/.t\ y . - y / y / ; / 1 ,:7
/J
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two following cases show such a usage. * ;•* * : ,
y  1. ..there came there by night the aforesaid Richard y 
Pope and William del Idel, the said John's servants, 
lying in wait feloniously like felons of the king and 
r premeditating assault against the king's peace and his
. y y  ; crown and dignity... .And Richard struck the aforesaid 
. r ; John Carpenter, while John was lying asleep on his bed, 
'.•yyy yy-V with an axe and feloniously and treasonably [italics 
mine] struck him on his head....and he dealt him a 
y  mortal wound... .from which he died. • '  'y v •■;•.;
2. "...Richard Gyse and Robert Cook, servants of the said i'
. v William de Cauntelo, came there feloniously as felons,
y. y y '.V1 ; and with treason aforethought [italics mine] they slew 
y .•' y I.v ' William de Cauntelo as he sat there on his bed, dealing
. “-yy •; ;:.,y • him various mortal wounds, "v * ' / •;: y; ; yy
46. This case appears in Placita Coram Rege as selection number 104, '
over pages 154-156, and is listed as "Coram Rege Roll, no. 431
. (Michaelmas [A.D.] 1368), m. 65d", published as Volume 82 (1965)
y of the Selden Society as: SELECTIONS IN THE COURT OF KING'S BENCH,:
; EDWARD 111 (volume VI), edited by G.O.Sayles (LONDON: Bernard ; ;
y  Quaritch). The Latin for the selection reads: y ; \ ^ y
v..: > "... secundo noctanter ibi venerunt predicti R.P. et W. del I.,
seruientes eiusdem Iohannis, felonice vt felones domini regis \ 
t insidiando et insultu premeditato contra pacem domini regis,
• • •  coronam et dignitatem suam....Et predictus Ricardus percuss it
: prefatum I,C. cum quodam securi dum idem I. iacebat in lecto
suo dormiendo felonice ed ceduciose super capud suum....et •. t 
;, : fecit ei vnam piagam mortalem... .vnde statim obiit." VX-
f -a, " 1 : ;X? ywXy.-:X: Xy. . at page 155. y^y ^ ;yXry
47. The second case appears in the same volume at page 174, and is selec­
tion as number 104, and is listed as "Coram Rege Roll, no. 459
y ; (Michaelmas [A.P.] 1375), m.39 (crown)." The Latin text at page
. y 174 reads: y; ;y-y'y* ;• • : -yy y. vX X
yy ; . .R.G. et R.C., seruientes ipsius W.deC., felonice vt' X
 ^ felones et sedicione precogitata prefatum W.deC. ibidem 
super lecturn suum sedentem interfecerunt, dando ei diuersas
y ; plagas mortales , ' i  • / '- .• V X  V* y. yyy\y'X ■ : 'vry'.; !(yh
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The passage from Marowe may be rendered: ; ; v i ;
"Note this: that in older times when one planned 
; : ; to commit a vicious crime or act, it was the intent . C >
: itself to murder which was viewed as felonious, even ; J .
. though the actual murder had not in fact been per- v
; / formed. Take this example on the point..* A young lad
connives to take the life of his Master Whilst his Master {
\ . is asleep. But this clumsy lad, during the course of /i;
>■ A; attack, awakens his Master who thus escapes from harm, v ^
: Did the lad commit a felony ,? Yes, he did, even though /
his Master suffered no bodily haIm.,, ;  ^ ^
; The passage carefully brings his audience from a world ^ 
in which the elements Of a crime embrace actus reus and intent, to 
a world in which the nub of criminal guilt coincides with the nub ) 
of moral guilt: an agent intending, although the harm may- never. ■"/;'/'Q'/- 
actually.come about, to commit a criminal act. Move down through y 
time as we will, the early books of the Justices, and this germina- ’ 
tive Reading of Marowe in D£ Pace, show how the mediaeval world which 
Bracton embodied did serve to fund the growth of criminal concepts in 
the common law. The fundamental principle upon which criminality is 
founded for us finds its roots in the mediaeval principle, hereinwith 
cited throughout this study, that man is the maker of his acts by force 
of his knowledge and of his will v \ v •- ;  ^ ;■ ^
I find Marowe's text of such importance for one major reason. 
It serves to refute the contention, advanced from time to time by some 
writers, that the early criminal law employed mens rea in a strictly 
adjectival fashion, and did not employ the term, and its adjuncts, in 
any substantive fashion. Marowe, by his analysis of felony by appeal 
to an agent's intention, clearly shows that the elements for criminal
A/ Zr-
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liability; and an analysis thereof, were transmitted in the early 7
legal literature of the period. He also revealed that intention was 7
not simply a grammatical term to reveal rebuke or disapproval. It was 
a term which was employed to analyse the elements of a criminal act.
Like the age of which it was a part, intention permeated early common 
law writings, each writer drawing in part upon a common mediaeval heri­
tage which found itself in the culture--a commonality of spirit which
the late Nicolai Berdyaev, with reference to the Russian spirit, referred
to as sobernost, a prevailing, shared, cultural communality of spirit.
The growing criminal law, circa the 1500' s, revealed a commonness of ; 
legal principles in much the way that the carvings upon diverse churches 
and cathedrals in England revealed a common art form; and, as with any 
member in a qjecies , commonality did not produce uniformity nor sameness, 
nor did individuality produce chaos or unrelieved uniqueness.
: When one turns to examine the 1574 edition of First : 7 V
the booke for a Justice of peace, one will discover that it is 
a replication of the 1534 edition ( which pages were reproduced 
herewithin ), save for some mild modification of spellings, and 
for the fact that the edition was produced by Richarde Tottyl at 
Temple Barre. What is demonstrated is the force of ’the boke’
48. 0£. cit. The entry in Beale is T-157, and it is given as the last
7 edition of this title to be printed by Richarde Tottyi. A brief 7
perusal of Beale's bibliography of legal literature of the period 
7 ( late 1400*s through the 1500*s ) will show that many editions of :
this title appeared. Beale himself admitted that his study of early 
7 English legal literature was incomplete, at best. 7
7 *7 / Or d e te rm in e , even . ; '7 7 ' 7 • 7 ' ; 77' '  '7 / ■ / / 7  / 7 / :77
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over the sixteenth century in England, in various editions and
abridgements and improvements, containing fairly much what is to
be found in the very earliest, 1506, editions. When one reads ; /
that the text is jMNewely imprinted and corrected1’, one should ■ r ' /•'a v.a .
understand not that the text has been revised (as are our editions
of law texts now, ie., Salmond, Russell, Chitty, etc.), but that -
the text has had added to it recent; statutory enactments .• In : •>'" A h
most other ways Tottyl's text of 1574 is akin in most of its parts T
to Wynkyn de Worde's, THE IUSTYCES OF PAES, 1510 [Beale T-132],
like its progeny, printed in 'Fletestrete com[m]orante[mb in signo ha-.
SOliS.*. - >** * * : ■ - •' V. >V; '.V; A. : V- . ■ / 1*
: : I wish now to draw examples from case law. My purpose is
not to force an unnatural conjunction between the early writers of 
the various 'bokes1 or 'Abridgements' as it is to demonstrate -that-''A'..A-' 
the common law had developing a workable Set Of pragmatic principles, <>;
from which later writers would strive to give formality. But even to-' 
our own day the force of the; law, as the courts abjure, is not the texts 
but is the decision? made by the courts on the cases they hear.T Save A 
for some leniency in jurisdictions in the United States of America, it 
is not customary to cite for purpose of legal authority a textbook :
oil the law written by a living author. The legal universe of. early'a  
common law was the community and legal fellowship of the Inns. Without A  
any pre-established analytical guide the cases from the courts seemed 
to present a wholeness of opinion and judgement, and, without any rhetorical 
exaggeration intended, such is the greatness of the common law.
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It is not possible to cite all of the cases which may
bear upon points of this study. I choose some which will serve to
illustrate that a young legal vocabulary was concerned with a wide
range of conceptual distinctions, and out of which concern legal
liability could be justly apportioned.
It had been a moot point in theology, and certainly as
old as the Nicomachean Ethics , Book III, as to how one could be
made to do what he would not do. At law a defence of duress may be
49lodged. Here is how early common law saw that defence. * In modem
language the claim is that a 'hold harmless' agreement between A and
is void at law because such was executed under duress.
"And John, while not acknowledging that the deed had
been made at the day and place mentioned in the said '
deed, says that he ought not to be barred from his 
action [for damages for personal injury] by the afore­
said deed, for he saysthat Thomas by force and arms took 
him, John, at Handsworth, and imprisoned him so that he 
made the aforesaid deed under duress of imprisonment 
[duriciam prisone] and various threats to life and limb 
. and by reason of the fear of death [propter metum mortis],
wherefore he prays judgement whether he ought to be barred 
from his action by the said deed, etc.
"...the jurors likewise came and, chosen and tried by 
consent of the parties, they say on their oath that John, 
at the time when the aforesaid deed was made, was seized : 
by Thomas de Chaourches and kept under detention by Thomas 
and taken away entirely against his will [omnino contra ; 
voluntatem], and he was so greatly menaced in life and limb 
that through fear of death and to save his life he made 
• . the aforesaid deed and, if he had refused to make the said
deed, Thomas would have killed him."
49. 0£. Cit., Placita Coram Rege, Case 43, Coram Rege Roll, no. 355. 
(Hilary 1349 [A.D.]), m.77, at page 68 (SELDEN SOCIETY, Vol.82, 
London, 1965).
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The instant case is of interest because it reveals how the defence 
of Duress may have moved a jury. The case leaves open— because such 
is not ah essential element for its finding— — how the Will is moved, 
or what is meant by Will. As with so much legal reasoning in a court, 
a jury ( or a judge, if sitting without the benefit of a jury ) looks 
towards believableness, and this is a matteri of practical judgement 
which the extended process of a trial at common law may reveal. At 
no one point during the course of the trial is the 'guilt1 or 'in-. . 
nocence' of an accused to be located. The cumulative effect of damaging 
omissions, contradictory testimony, hesitancy, mis-answered questions, 
weigh the scales toward or from a probable verdict in which probable 
doubt convicts or acquits the accused. It will be for subtler cases 
to inquire after the 'movements of the will'. It is enough to see that 
the common law did accept such a finding, and did not restrict such to 
cases of rape only (where one was taken against one's will). '• .■ - yyX;
i In a later case, consistent with the notion from the above­
mentioned case, we read, in R. v. Bradshaw and Pytheous^*, how, :• yy f.
, % "A priest called Bredsha and a woman were indicted for
poisoning, to wit, the woman as principal, and the priest ; 
as accessory by reason of his command." , y
I believe a better rendering of the text would be, "...and the priest 
as accessory through reason of his commanding [her]..."
I put the law French below for the convenience of the reader. :--V
* save of course for that one moment where an accused may simply admit 
that he is guilty, and confesses such guilt in an open court.  ^ X;: <
50. "Vn priest appell B_. et vn femme fueront indite de poisoninge s. lay, 
feme come principal et le priest come accessore per reson de son 
commandment.. H. 23. H.8. plees de corone, from: THE REPORTS OF . 
SIR JOHN SPELMAN, vol.l (SELDEN SOCIETY, vol. 93, 1976: London) edited 
*. by J.H. Baker, at page 48. > ■' -. v y
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It is doubtful if such cases provided a clear statement of \ 
principle which would distinguish between the range of in­
tentional actions and of non-intentional actions and what re- V X 
lationship such classes bore to criminal charges. Such cases 
did not serve to explain how the Will functioned, or could 
fail to function; rather, such cases served to indicate that 
the law would accept as a finding of fact that an accused acted : - 
from Duress, or out of Necessity, or under Coercion. * The 
categories had an ad hoc quality to them beeause of the dif­
ficulty inherent in extending a general notion to include a T
specific range of actions. It is for this reason that I have 
suggested*that the court tends to make a practical judgement 
when these defences appear, and the practical judgement leads 
it consider if what is asserted by the accused in a criminal action 
is to be believed. Those specific questions which a philosopher 
or a theologian (then) might have asked are not.inquired after in 
the judgement of the court . It is not concerned with the subtlety :
of how and in what ways or by what procedure one can be said to de-
, -* \  : • \-v 52. :■- V - :V.'liberate or to will. These early cases admit that guilt will not
51. Cf., "The Defence of Coercion" by J.F.Garner, LL.M.,
CRIMINAL LAW REVIEW, pp 448-450,vwho stated that it was dif­
ficult to draw the general principle as to what are the elements 
in the concept of 'coercion1 which then may be applied to any case. 
The defence has to it the quality that this case only is peculiar, 
and as a defence ought not to be extended to a range of cases.
52. Cf., THE ELEMENTS OF LAW, Part 1.£ Chap 12, by Thomas Hobbes (in v 
the Tonnies edition, second edition edited by M.M.Goldsmith [ FRANK r
. CASS § CO.LTD., 1969: London] ), which is concerned with what is 
deliberation, what is the will, and what is the voluntary, and the 
like, at pp. 61-63. ; • ' ' '
V* Ai ' .V \l.
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be a finding when certain coercive and restraining conditions ob­
tain. That certain kinds of conditions, such as torture, were ex- AA:A 
eluded admits only of the historical strangeness of the criminal 
sanction and to how undeveloped may have been the legal sensibilities 
of the epoch. The criminal law, with its roots in vengeance, was 
the last to crave after the unbloody world of gentlemanly rebuke 
■primarily. ■ \A V--.Y.A{.: > •' ' A:". . A ;A • Av • "-A- . . - A A  .A
‘ =i: The formula for the charges in the early cases is rather n ? v
much standard. \We will continue to read variants of, "...ex malicia >
' -'gs-- A-., - ' vv ’A'A’ rtv?i A: y j . i *::■:* : ■ ■ ■ ■ : / ' . ; • A-Ahsua precogitata..." * Very early cases, which do not have to them a a
any element of murder or manslaughter, are stated directly, without A A -
much complication or circumlocution. A clear statement of the simple and
direct statement of the facts of a case can be found in the Forest ; / <
v.A - • • *• ’ AAA-'.'"- AAAAA A'fii; ‘-‘V-VA; • A*A- AAA A  -A AA ■••/■’■■AEyre Rolls or Forest Inquisitions . These thirteenth century a ; A A/A
cases speak of poachers, and the like, as evil doers (malefactores);
it may, for example, be "...provedthat Robert the son of William
of Loweick is guilty of evil doing to the venison...'A ("Postea convicturn
• • A ■' '■ ■ vv-A* • ’ ' r'--* • • A A * > 'e5-.--.-H ■ A A A'A A-‘ A'A-V, '■‘■"-I ...est culpabilis de malefactis venacionis..A") ‘ The same cases may V
advance a plea in mitigation; A  as for instance, "Afterwards it is
witnessed that Wil 1 iam the son of Henry carried the said venison under A;
coercion and against his will..." - * ("...coactus et inuitus...portabat..
53. R. v. Weston, K.B. 17 May 1536, at page 103 of SpelmanTs Reports,
• (Selden Society, vol. 93, 1976) . a 'A'AA A'A'-'' ,. A .;.v . .  AAAAA' A'a -\ 
54; Cf.,SELECT PLEAS OF THE FOREST, edited by G.J.Turner (Selden Society, r
vol. 13, for 1899)* throughout the volume. A  . '
55., ibid, V(a)„ the body of: PLEAS OF THE FOREST IN COUNTY OF 1 
NORTHAMPTON. BEFORE WILLIAM LE BRETON, et alii, IN THE THIRTY- a  A A A  / > A
: NINTH YEAR OF THE REIGN OF XING HENRY f  25 June 12S5 ] at page 30. HA: A;;
56., ibid, top of page 30. A . • ,
■\\y
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The volume prepared for the Selden Society by D. M. Stenton,
ROLLS OF THE JUSTICES IN EYRE, Being THE ROLLS OF PLEAS AND 
ASSIZES For LINCOLNSHIRE 1218-9 and WORCESTERSHIRE 1221, shows 
a range of cases marked by Bracton himself which demonstrate 
a language rich in making criminal distinctions. The volume 
of the Pleas reports a wide range of killings, robbings, and ’ / 
the like, and in language other than simply A hit B_. For instance,
: v 57. •: ’• X- XV'XvyX:)■ we may read,., . - .. • •; * . . . • .  - ..
'The jurors suspect Hawisa, the mother of Richard,
Alice's husband, that they killed Alice by her counsel 
and wish [...per consilium et voluntatem suam earn oc- 
ciderunt...}, and likewise Christina, Hawisa's nurse, 
and Christina's daughter named Margery....The jurors 
. a l s o  suspect the husband, Richard, that she was killed ;y 
by his command, because he hated her by reason of a 
certain Gloucestershire girl, whom he took to wife soon 
y - . a f t e r  Alice's death, and whom he still has." ; y
It is a rather clear statement of facts, as well as being a clear 
statement giving possible reasons for actions ( and would equal 
many a present-day criminal information ). The volume contains 
many such examples. X* : ’•. v-’ \ ,.j.f
It is when we come to Plowden's Reports that we begin to 
observe how an explanation functions more than a bare statement of 
facts, and begins to function as an explanation of the facts. We 
are presented with what we associate in a modem law report, a dis­
tinction between facts, law, and judgement. ; V
57, Stenton, PLEAS OF CROWN, At Worcester, 1221, case number:1145,f 
"Ricardus de Eghoe et Henricus Estrech' occiderunt Aliciam 
uxorem Ricardi Estrech’ de Estwud' et fugerunt.;." at page 
562, Latin, and page 563, English. ( Selden Society, vol. 53, 
r ' ,1934: LONDON, Bernard Quaritch ) . •. . :
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Plowden's Commentaries may be employed to show how the • 
principles of the Criminal law which are to be found in the writings : 
of Marowe, the various editions of the boke, and its revisions, and b 
in Staundford, were a common feature of the legal milieu. The ', :v' r;,:':'' 
Reports are a source which show the meeting of various worlds of 
thought: the common law itself, the continental tradition (of 
Civilian and Canon thinkers ), and the intertwining of philosophicalv• 
principles in legal argument. * It may be advanced without any dis­
tortion that in Plowden one will find a clearer statement of in­
cipient legal principles than one will find in the early manualists’ 
restatement of Bracton and other early legal writers / Although -
Staundford contained a compendium of legal principles garnered from : v
earliest common law writers, what does not appear in his compendium : .
is any critical presentment of those principles, whereas in Plowden 
one observes the legal process at work, and one observes how prin- \ ;V- 
ciples are applied and extracted. This may have been the case because r > 
his work was to be used by students at the Inns for their study 
and preparation for advocacy . ; ‘i  ■ ' / ■ .' ?W
58. Plowden’s work is interchangeably known either as The Commentaries 
h •;; or The Reports. I have employed two editions for these notes in • v 
this chapter. I have used, Les Comentaries, ou les Reports de 
Edmunde Plowden vn apprentice de le comen Ley [IN AEDIBUS RICHARDI: 
TOTTELLI. Octobris 24. 1571, imprinted at London in Fleetstrete j-V, ; 
within Temple Barre...]; also, Ensuont certeyne Cases Reportes, 
per Edmunde Plowden vn Apprentice de le commen ley...f Anno 1584 ];
. , • also, Vn Report fait per vn vncerteine authour del part de vn
argument del Edmond Plowden de Melieu Temple...| In Aedibus Richardi
, Tottelli. 1584 ]. I used the two volume English edition of THE
. COMMENTARIES (London, 1816, printed by S. Brooke.) I have used . : 
the standard form of legal citation, ie,,;"PI.” = Plowden’s Com- .
} mentaries. 1550-80 [ per: SWEET § M A I L ’S GUIDE TO LAW REPORTS and
. 1 STATUTES, Fourth Edition,(LONDON, 1962)]
NOTE: S.T.C. 20040 and 20049, and Beale R487,R486a, and R488 are :
\ ; v the citations for the original edition used here . o
J, , * 7 ,
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What I would choose to call the legal beauty of Plowden's• f• X . ;X 
Reports is that they reveal an inheritance of common ideas with con­
cern for legal responsibility from diverse sources. One example is -XX 
that Plowden offers a clear report of how the notion of versari in ^XX 
re illicita functions, which, it will be recalled, is that notion . X X :X 
of legal culpability that the harmfulness of the consequences of an 
act is thought to originate within the wrongful intention of. the'X \:X:V; 
agent. If, however, it can be believed that the agent's originating \ 
intent was not evil in itself, or contrary to law, then whatever 
harmful consequences may yet* nevertheless, flow from his originating 
intention should not be thought of as harmful consequences he intended. 
The intention ’p' should not be considered to entail by force of neces­
sary implication the consequences 'q1 which follow. The case in which 
the distinction occurs is: The Queen v. Saunders and Archer (1576) v 
2 p i. 473. >x xxx .X•XX'x'yX- / X ;.. Xx,--^xyvX
X. John Saunders was charged that he had "...voluntarily and ; 
feloniously killed and murdered..."[473] his infant daughter, aged three 
years. From a confederate, one Alexander Archer, Saunders had bought v 
from him the poisons, Arsenick and Roseacre, with the original intent ; : 
to poison his own wife, Eleanor Saunders. ,The 'motive' for the killing 
was love; John Saunders wanted to take another wife. The poison was to 
be mixed into some apples which were then to be roasted, and later eaten. 
When Saunders discovered he had killed his own infant he pleaded that he 
had no malice against her, and was innocent. His wife, unknowing of the 
poison in the apples, had fed them to her little daughter, and she died X- 
from the -poisoned fruit. ; ; Ar--. X v. • XXY; XX'.X-':/tX XX /X/X'X:-; ;/XX
*  v  -i
325
V The Court listened to his case With care, as well as to con-,
sider his defence that the death of his daughter was a non-intentional 
result of an accidental poisoning not within the design or aim or pur­
pose of his criminal intent. He pleaded, simply, that he had not suf­
ficient mens rea for the charge of murder. Plowden reports, .
"...But at last the said Justices, upon Con- . v
^  V ; ..• sideration of the Matter.. .were of the Opinion • , >
; r . v; that the said Offence was Murder in the said John 
'i' s ' v Saunders. And the Reason thereof ( as the said 
:• • , •' ?/r, ’ Justices and the Chief Baron told me [ie., Plowden Y‘ ;
. ' ; himself]) was, because the said John Saunders gave ;
Y ;. the Poison with an intent to kill a Person, and ; ;
Y in the giving of it he intended that Death should
; • j: follow. And when Death followed from his Act, al­
: . though it happened in another Person than her whose ;
y \ Death he directly meditated, yet it shall be Murder
in him, for he was the original Cause of the Death...Vj
The Court took care to distinguish between two kinds of actions. Qne 
species of actions could be those done through ignorance j and the ; 
fact of the ignorance was innocent in itself. This would have borne 
the name actio ex ignorant!a. But a second species of action could 
be that done ignoranter, Where the fact of the ignorance would not re­
lieve the agent of culpability, as in actions done while drunk, Which 
actions produced harmful consequences whether known or remembered by 
the drunken agent. Here the defence of ignorance would not obtain, be­
cause, it would be argued by the Crown, that the state of ignorance was 
brought about deliberately and voluntarily by the agent. I shall Cite 
from Plowden on the matter in short space. In the present case; the 
Court gave; the following example;, : ;' \ • v '/•: . :vvY /-V.
AA; ';A . ; \C ; • 326: ;;AAa a . v .?A.~ , ,  Av  , ; . ;; a
A A - v A : A;. Ay A ' A AA-A A A ;: ■ ."B u t- i f  a Man p re p a re s  P o iso n , and la y s  i t  A- A'AaA’A ' aAAA
A y A.AA'AA"’' A;'' A . ,A' AA. A.a  i n  s e v e ra l P a r ts  o f  h is  House, w i th  ah I n t e n t  A A ' ~,Ay -/a .-V
A;v,a ".AA  a--A;A—AA.'; A;A tp  k i l l  R a ts  and such S o r t  o f  V e rm in , and a A A . A  A ,  a  AAa -Ay^AA/-
A>av''A:"; y  . .a, • •*. A P erson comes and eats ', i t ,  and .'d ies o f  i t , t h i s - ." A.. ‘fiA Ay '  A;
, A . : A y  . i s  n o t  F e lo n y  i n  h im  who p re p a re d  and l a i d  i t  A  A A •
y  A th e r e ,  because he had no In t e n t  to  k i l l  any re a -
'A ■ A y ' • A'va-A ‘ :. ; A " . so na b le  C re a tu re "  [4 7 4 a ] . A . A A A A • A AAA-A y . a ; A A A A A'A
A .y~., a  B ut th e  same exam ple can be ta k e n , as does th e  C o u r t ,  to  make t
th e  m a tte r  c r im in a l : ...A, A .: - = ■, a . . y •. «. ; y <a  y ; ; . ' A  ‘ . ' . y y A AA 'Ay A. A A Ay
A y v A  A' A  ^ A ' A A A a A A ' ^ A a ’A a ^' ! % M W h e a i  he la y s  th e  P o ison  w ith  an I n t e n t  t o A - A A a a AAA a A A a A.a a A  
Ay-AA-A; A a°A AaaA' A.- y ,y.: A k i l i  some re a s o n a b le  C re a tu re , and a n o th e r r e a -  A' AA:yAyArAAAA 
AAyA- A 'A' A'AA A' A A A so n a b le  C re a tu re , whom he does n o t  in te n d  to  k i l l ,  hAaAAaaA'1A A  A/-A.' • Ay.- ,A; y--y AA • i s  p o iso n e d  b y  i t ,  such Death s h a l l  n o t  be d is -  A  A-Ay' - A A A a A'Aa ,
AA * , ■ y.AA-.' p u n is h a b le , b u t  he who p re p a re d  th e  P o ison  s h a l l  A v 'AvA'A '-''AAA.'
be p u n ish e d  f o r  i t ,  because h is  in t e n t  was e v i l . "
A A 0^© cap observe that the concluding sentence of the opinion of the < ;.A:A ;
A Court gives example to versari in re illicita, ie., that the harm- ' aAAa ; ;y-AA
.A fulness of the consequences carry into themselves the originating . , ,
yA harm of the agent's intention, itself forbidden by law. We know .
A y /  that this notion clearly brings one back to bracton in De Placitis -A aAAAA;A~;
y A Coronae wherein he distinguished between acts which were proper and
improper, and intentions which were lawful or wicked, in the title: A/AAaaAaAAa
a A : De crimine homicidii. ^ V  ' * ’ - ‘ ‘
A;AAa- A A A  A’< ’•*/ The element of Versari in re illicita was clearly -embodied"-; -\AA A'A.A;A
A A A A> in Bracton, and we have commented upon it. But the notion, in Plowden, y:A ' A v A y y  
A is drawn not only from his references to Bracton, but also from his AA ;
references to leading canonists of his own age, one such being the A A A;v  AAA;:;
A y .•..:HyAf-.y'^ .^-/CfyA Bracton, vol liA Thorne edition,- at pages 340, 341, and 342. ,
U* ",
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eminent Spanish canonist, Diego de Covarruvias y Leyva (1512-77 A.D.) X 
himself a disciple of Doctor Navarrus ( Martin Azpilcueta, 1491­
1586 A.D. ), outstanding moral theologian and canonist who dis- ■ 7
tihguished himself as a professor of law at Salamanca and Coimbra -7
In the Commentaries if one turns to the case of Rehiger v.- -y- :-X X:' 
Fogossa, (1550), 1 PI. 19, the defence submitted by Serjeant Pollard ;X?
on behalf of his client is of interest because of the mediaeval /X
notions it embodies, both directly from Bracton, and from its appeal 7, ; i. X  • 
to Covarruvias.-vX y X y  ; 'X.X-7 j; X ' X X y x  X * XX" : XCyyXiV1'®'
;7XX(7 7 ; Anthony Fogossa was a foreign merchant whose goods were 
shipped aboard the vessel, St. Maria de Togma. Because of a storm . ,,
the Master of the ship, one. Manuel Lopez, was compelled to .cast into
the sea a great part of his valuable cargo (whichbelonged to'Fo- 7 7 x X :'‘
gossa ). Fogasso was suing for the recovery of his lost cargo which . ; , 
had been jettisoned. To jettison cargo during a storm assumes-that X:
the act of jettisoning was voluntary. The question remained, Was this
act of jettisoning the cargo a voluntary act for which the Master of 7 7 ;XX
the ship should be held responsible at law ? 7; .' Xvy ’7-' XX,-\\V7yX7'X7X:X
60. If one refers to Doctor Navarrus, either the Opera Omnia (Venice, 7  XX
< 1618) , or the four volume edition of his works, OPERVM MARTINI 7'; >7.' 7 7  7
. : AB AZPILCVETA DOCT. NAVARRI, TOMVS SECUNDUS, (ROMAE, Ex Typo- ,
graphia Iacobi Tomerij , M.D.LXXXX ), the work entitled, MDe . 77 7 7 :X 
F ini bus humanorum actuum" will show to what extend both intention 7 ,’XX 
. and ignorance (its nature and causes) related to human action as
categories by and through which legal responsibility could be either
attributed to an agent or excused of an agent. [Romae edition, a fol. X '
466 usque 496; Venice edition pp 90 onwards.] His extended discussion 
on ignorance will be found in: De Poenitentia in Septem dis tine tiones ,:7 ;'X 
a fol. 497 usque 874, Tom. II, Romae edition; or in the Venice edition. ? 
Interestingly, Navarrus states, "Intentio est actus voluntatis." X X .Xry. 
(cte fin, humanorum actuum, @Numerus 2, Romae edition) , which puts him X Xx 
in a volitive position concerning human responsibility for acts.X X X X'XX
•3.'
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• The facts of the instant case were as classic as if they
had been transcribed from the Nicomachean Ethics, Bk. ill, at 1110a,
9-11, which states: “ * \ , Y *
y : -  ^ . .it may be debated whether such actions
Y' ' Y. . ’ are involuntary or voluntary. Something of the
YYY Y sort happens also with .regard to the throwing of ; Y/-
: Y Y;:: Y Y W W  overboard in a storm; for in the abstract t : Y: . Y y Y  no one throws goods away voluntarily, but on con- Y "
, Y'Y-Y'Y dition of its securing the safety of himself and
;YY-:Y Y " Y . Y'his- crew any sensible man does so. Such actions Y\:YY> . 
; - Y . -. ;YY;Y.'are^  mixed; but are more -like' voluntary actions..."
During the course of his pleadings on behalf of Fogossa, Serjeant ’
POllard advanced a fourfold argument which; in his^  own words, did Y  ^Y
state:Y.,:Y  YY' ' Y  '-;y-Y Y'/ Y  Y  Y'Y; • kYy'.v. * : i  .Y :Y  - y Y ' :-‘ "
YY/yY '■ Y r>»..four Causes, vir., the Avoidance of a greater ; Y
Y Mischief, Necessity, Compulsion/ and involuntary •
YY Y ignorance, can severally by themselves excuse a
Y ; Man from the Charge of breaking the Law. . ."Y
Y Y- ? ;Y;,.Y . Y y - :y YY.y  -’Y / Y y [at I: PI. 194-20] YY f
In the body of the report of the case, as the notes of the 1816 , Y;Y
English edition of the Commentaries indicate/ Pollard not only freely 
draws the attention of the Court to portions of Deuteronomy ( cap. . A 
19, v. 4,5/ 6,ie., accidental killing embodying no wrongful intention ) 
and to Aristotle, but reference is made to the ’Civilians1, Bartholinus 
[ of Sassoferrato (1313-56 A.D.), an Italian jurist of great rank ] 
and Covarruvias / with especial ref erence made to that work of Covar- 
ruvias *s, entitled, " Si^  FvriosvS, Rvbrica De Homicidlo. ** ^  * • Y/Y Y
61. Cf. Opera Omnia (ANTVERPIAE, Aptid H. Verdvssivm, M.DC.XXVII) pp- 
521-564, esp., SECVNDAE RELECTIONIS, Partis initium, De delictis 
6 conatibus, beginning with Q.l, "Homicidium quid sit, § de homicidio 
voluntario" at page 531, as well as TERTIA HVIVS RELECTIONNIS PARS, 
beginning at page 556, and cited by Pollard, "De delinquentibus Y;
■ ■ ignoranter." Y— Y. ';YY Y Y  Y' ; • v Y y ; ■
XX/X;7/X; j X ;y .  V  . X'X" 'X;. 329X'XX-Xx.yH^
:;.X X XX;: X--X Covarruvias was a pupil of Martin Azpilcueta (1491-1586 A;DX>yX y y  XX 
known in legal literature as Doctor Navarrus. It is outside the interest XyX 
X-X X °f this monograph to attempt to trace, or make, historical linkages ber i
7 tween one author and another, I believe this is the proper province of X 7
the historian of ideas ... . But I do believe that one should point to Xy-'X' 
some of the traditionX Through Navarrus and Covarruvias there developedy ; yV;X 
::X a literature which analysed both intention and ignorance. X it\would be XXX
X X X artificial to put r i go urous divisions upon the material these writers
. 7  wrote because they easily moved from one mode, as theology, to another X r
mode, like law. The firm divisions which we accept now did not exist
X 7 for writers of law and jurisprudence in this mid-renaissance period; -A • 7 -
7 X ; category could easily be at home operating in a legal treatise as it couldX^ ^^  ^X ';
: XX: X"X be at home operating in a moral treatise. Both of these writers, and , X :
others, drew upon much of what Aquinas had developed in the body of his X
7. - 7 ’ y • y  . "62' ' 7 X  .■. 7-X" .7-:' ■; 7-y C.'-,writings on the subject of ignorance, and of intention. * y y  X " 7 X-XXX>:
.62. How the categories of 'ignoranceV and 'intention' separately and
■ X  X jointly may have functioned in the writings of the great.mediaeval;:.v '••.j • X X.X
theologians, philosophers, canonists, and lawyers, is itself matter X 
X ; for long and extended research and analysis. The texts are difficult y y
to locate; most would be in Latin; aiid all would require a mediaevalist X X
■ X.. ■ XXX • not only who could translate Latin well, but who could analyse what he XyX)
y ! / had translated with some philosophical freshness. Some of these texts.XxXi
7v. 7 ‘X and arguments by their writers will be published in a series forthcoming : XX
X y X X  WILDY'S TEXTS IN LAW AND JURISPRUDENCE; but ah extended analysis of X X 7 X y :
•; X X ; the two topics in mediaeval literature of 'ignorance1 and 'intention'
X  . awaits a scholar, or scholars, to write the study. .
■>
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; . A briaf perusal of the catalogues for the Inns and for the
great universities of the period will show that the writings of the ' A : 
Italian and Spanish jurists and canonists were held by the libraries, A 
and were known, and were cited in law reports and writings. That AaAAy'AA Ay A ? 
canonist or a jurist discussed 'intention* or 'ignorance' would not A 
have been a topic unique to his treatise, nor unique in its style of? A y-A 
treatment/ The canon lawyers tended to hand down what a Master may •
have said, and the Master may have been some earlier thinker, like 
Covarruvias citing Doctor Navarrus ( Martin Azpilcueta), or both men •- •
citing an earlier and deservedly acknowledged Master, as was Thomas
Aquinas (1224-74 A.D. ). ‘For sake of making reading easier I shall A:
v •.. . ; ■ - - ... * .' ?', /. A ■ ' *  <■ ■' -‘-A* ■ A ’: " \ "■ ’}: -,v’ A-A'At-Aplace Aquinas's writing on ignorance in a footnote, as I had previously. y*
By appeal to the body of writings of Doctor Navarrus one will observe
that 1 ignorans'and * ignorantia' occupied much analysis. ^  A He?argued-vAA;A
63. Chiefly, one may refer to these titles for the body of his argu­
ments on the topic. In the SENTENCES he .writes at: 2-22-2-1, i
. "Whether Ignorance is a Sin"; 2-22-2-2, "Whether Ignorance Ex- n
cuses Sin'!; in the DE MALO he writes at: DM-3-6, " Whether Ig^ A’ AAaAA 
norance can be a cause of Sin"; at DM-3-7, "Whether Ignorance is Ay A 
a Sin"; at DM-3-8, "Whether Ignorance excuses Sin, diminishes it."
A One may refer to the body -of the SUMMA THEOLOGIAE and of the SUKMA
CONTRA GENTILES for some development of the same concepts.In all Aa ; 
A cases one will note that Aquinas draws upon what other writers had A
A A to say, ie., quoting from St. Augustine of Hippo, from John of AA
: Damascus, from Origen, from the writers of the Gospels and Apts, V ;A;
. and the like. In the same fashion did the canonists and civilians
A appeal to early authorities, and transmitted their arguments. A
64. ACf. (Op. cit.) Index Capitvm, OPERVM NAVARRI, entries under:
A 1ignorans' and?'Ignorantia' . ROMAE edition, cited.A v -AaA
*.A;i
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that ignorance may have a fourfold division, ie., an ignorance which Y ‘: 
was ’crassa’, or ’affectata’, or ’probabilis’ (a justifiable ignorance,; J
ie., a non-physician would not likely possess knowledge of skilled medi-; 
cal matters ), or ’inuincibilis’ (an ignorance assumed to be over­
powering that it served to excuse or absolve ). These diyis ions were - • 
further refined, commented upon, cases developed, and transmitted through, 
the literature ( to be found variously in theology, law, philosophy, Y 
advocacy, and in case law ), so that one, during the course of a trial&Y 
could make reference to the various writings on the subject of ’ignorance? 
and one’s reference be understood in light of the traditions of the age.Y 
Covarruvias followed in the same tradition. When one is referred 
to ”De delinquentibus ignoranter" ( tom. 1. Par. 3 at 3 8  4 ), what Pol-V 
lard is telling the Court in the course of his oral argument is that the 
Court should take cognizance, ; whilst considering the merits of Reniger v. 
Fogossa, of the traditional arguments concerning ignorance, and its use 
as a legal (and moral ) category to excuse or to exculpate an agent from 
legal guilt. Pollard could:easily have cited Bracton, but the attention 
of the Court was drawn to a continuing tradition viable then during the 
fourth year of the reign of Edward VI ( 1550 A.D. ). The, section re­
ferred to in "De delinquentibus ignoranter" at sections *3’ and ’4’ con-’Y 
cern drunkenness and how that state may, or may notj excuse one if charged 
with killing a third party Y One would inquire if that had been one * s 
primary intention (*’. . .vbi ea intentione se inebriauerit, vt ebrius.. Y 
De Dilinquentibus ignoranter, para-3, page 557-b]), and what ensued would 
be judged in light of the original voluntary act: namely, drinking to be­
come Intoxicated.'- *'/*"* . Y;' .'Y . YY-yyY* ■ Y . '>‘ Y'Y '••' -"v • h’-
i  I X  v 1
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, ■ The g r a v i t y  o f , th e  consequences w ou ld  v a ry  in  le g a l e s t im a t io n  
( o r  m o ra l e s t im a t io n  ) w ith  c o n s id e ra t io n  o f  th e  a g e n t ' s o r ig in a l  i n - / }  
t e n t .  Though , w h i ls t  in t o x ic a te d ,  may have k i l l e d  -Py th e  C o u rt mayX 
th in k  t h a t  th e  a c t  o f  k i l l i n g  was possessed o f  le s s  s e r io u s n e s s  th a n  i f  
D, w h i ls t  s o b e r, had done th e  same a c t  w ith  f u l l  p re m e d ita t io n .  Where X 
th e  c a n o n is ts  m ig h t a rgue  ( and w h ich  has found  i t s e l f  a rgued in  o u r .v; w*
*: • <• 7- 7' 7 '.V . 7 . >. - 7 “7 7X 7-7: 7 55 7" y.- ,;r7;
c o u r ts  to  th e  p re s e n t d a y , as th e  a p p e a l i n  M a je w sk i re v e a le d  ‘ ) •J
m ig h t be tw o fo ld .  One c o u ld  in q u ir e  a f t e r  th e  reasons o f  how th e  s ta te  X 
o f  in e b r ia t io n  was b ro u g h t a b o u t, i e . , d id  th e  a g e n t v o lu n t a r i l y  s i t  
down and d r in k , and become in t o x ic a t e d ; o r  was he d e ce ive d : in to !  d r i l l i n g •X 
p a r ty  punch w h ich  he th o u g h t was f r e e  o f  l i q u o r ,  o r  was h a rm le ss  ( a s  in  
a c o l le g e  p ra n k  a t  a c o l le g e  p a r ty  w ith  a n o n -d r in k e r  ) ;  o r  was he d r in k ­
in g ,  b u t  was unconce rned , o r  u n o b se rva n t ( each s ta te  d i f f e r e n t  ) ,  as to  7  
what he was d r in k in g ,  whereupon consequences fo l lo w e d ?  The s ta te  p re ­
ce d e n t to  th e  in t o x ic a t io n  c o u ld  be a n a lyse d  in  g re a te r  d e t a i l .  Then 
one comes to  th e  s ta te  whereupon consequences f o l lo w ;  V  X X X y
T h a t s ta te  i t s e l f  c o u ld  be a n a ly s e d . I f  D was in to x ic a te d ,  b u t  7 
th ro u g h  no f a u l t  o f  h is  own, b u t  th e n  d id  k i l l  P /  i t  c o u ld  be a rgued  t h a t , 
h is  k i l l i n g T  was n o t p re m e d ita te d  ( c o u ld  n o t fo rm  a r e q u is i t e  c r im in a l  
7 in t e n t  ); o r ,  though  in t o x ic a te d ,  he s t i l l  sh o u ld  have e x e rc is e d  some d e ­
g ree  o f  s e l f - c o n t r o l  ( i e , , e i t h e r  sh o u ld  have become aware t h a t  was com ing y »
unde r th e  in f lu e n c e ,  and th e n  s topped  d r in k in g  f u r t h e r ;  o r ,  even i f  u n d e r 7 "-
th e  in f lu e n c e ,  he m ust have had some degree o f  s e l f - c o n t r o l  ) .  I f  one ;X ; ;
:  c a l le d  th e  s ta te  o f  th e  a g e n t- b e fq fe :d r in k in g  as s ta te  ’ A * , and th e  s t a fe ;7 ;
o f  th e  a gen t d r in k in g  as s ta te ;  ’ B ’ , and w hat he d id  w h i ls t  in to x ic a te d  a s y  X X y
65. D.P.P V; M ajew sk i H .L . [1976] 2 A l l  E.R. 142, i e . ,  s e lf - in d u c e d  in -  7 t p x ic a t io n  n o t an excuse in  c r im e s  o f  g e n e ra l i n t e n t .
• f
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state 'C', one might argue that each of his distinct personal states Ayf 
were brought about by him by force of what he knew and what he did -. 
not know." If one remained in state 'A', one remained in that state AvAa 
for such and such a reason, or reasons. Those reasons might be com- . : v 
plete and sufficient to account for what one was doing, or they might 
be incomplete, and not account for what one was doing; hence, a certain! > 
ignorance is admixed with One's knowledge. Thus for state ' B^; or for;: 
state 'C'. From this complex picture the Court may be enabled to '■ 
form some judgement about why £  did 'x*.
if. * / A simpler picture could be given by appeal to a mechanical
model. In English we do not speak about ’states:of ignorance1.. We 
eschew, generally, using abstract nouns in such a way that they account A 
for action. We prefer to use verbs to account for action. There is 
a case, however, where we do use nominatives to account for action, and;; 
this is in the language of computer programming. If we consider a simple 
triad of 'programme-computer-output' we might .have a present day model 
for 'ignorance-agent-action'. * fA'A’ 'AAV A - A- ;Ay :A I A A A'-A A.yyfA
. ? ; Were one to analyse a computer operation one could 'excuse'AthbA 
computer failure at various stages throughout its operation. One could; :A 
inquire after the programme itself, ie., the particular matrix and itsyAA 
circuitry. If programme 'A' is plugged into the computer, but programme 
'B' was the programme which should have been plugged in, then the fault 
is a simple fault. Disconnect programme 'A'; connect programme 'B'. h A 
But the error could be more complicated than that of a simple wrong in­
put. A The programme itself could be ill-framed. Then one would inquire A
'r' !
: I'! -, .15. m
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after more complicated explanations, ie., was it a mechancial failure, V .y Y-'Y 
such, as wrong wiring, or poor fluid connections at ’on-off’ j unctions ? 
was it improperly made, ie.,greatest care was needed to punch^out the; 
micro-circuits to exact micro-dimensions, and these circuits were too 
large ? or is the .programme illogical ?; • Y-'{:Y . Y'/Y; Y ; ;,Y Y : Y Y 
This analysis could be run at each stage of the; * pro grannie - Y; Y Y  . • Y
computer-output1 model until the error was found, and then a reason v./
provided for why there was an error in the first place, In much the
Same way the mediaeval moralists attempted to analyse the conditions ^" Y-. Y  >? Y
of knowledge prior to an human act. If one assumed that one acted from 'Y^ Y--' 
reasons, then those reasons could be analysed to determine if they were 
sound grounds for action (within a legal or moral context) . If the rea-YY 
sons were unsound, were tainted of ?ignorance', then the moralist would • 
inquire after the ignorance attached to the action. He would seek after 
the 'programme', and see what there was about this particular ’programme1 
which brought about this specific response, or action. Did the fault rest; 
with the knowledge itself ? the 'programme model'. Did the fault rest . 
with the agent ? the computer model, with inquiry after Will and Intellect 
and material dispostions. Or did the fault rest with what was done ? the 
' output' model ?,, The particular moral shorthand for such analyses of ig­
norance was to speak of kinds of ignorance: there might be ignorance which 
was antecedent to an act; or ignorance which was concomitant with an act; 
or ignorance which was consequent to an act . •' Y\. Y' /.Y Y  Y  YYHi
From the admission of a general category of 'to-be-ignorant V Yy  
the moralist would then discuss the fourfold relationship which could be
Y Y Y  Yt ' 'f'Y.'
YYYY,Y>rd
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obtained. The 'kind' of ignorance would be analysed. The powers of 
the agent would be analysed ( in terms of Will and Intellect and dis­
positions ). Why the agent acted under or because of ignorance would 
be analysed. Then an attempt would be made to determine if, And how, 
an excuse might obtain; or not. Various moralists might provide various 
interpretations— -^for instance, a strict cognitivist who argued thatX 7 
responsibility rested only in 'knowing' that something were wrong, might 
argue for a different degree of moral or legal responsibility than might 
a voluntarist who might argue that the human Will was weak, or de­
ceived [ie, given the wrong good to seek after], or was forced, or was 
muddled. There was a tradition, however unclearly enunciated or un- • 
clearly formed, to which moral and legal argument could appeal in an v 
attempt to excuse an agent or pardon an agent for an act, and that was 
the tradition which maintained that certain acts of an agent can be ex­
cused because of ignorance. What kind of ignorance, how brought about, 
whether ignorance s imp1iater, or 'his ignorance' ( that not only could 
one speak of 'ignorance' as simple abstraction, but one also reinforced 
that abstract category by conjoining to it a pronomial element ), would 
be dictated by the persuasiveness of the arguments of each thinker. ; 
7 . ; Thus, in the instant case,when Pollard [1. PI. 19a] makes re­
ference to 'ignorance', he is arguing from within a fairly vigourous and 
acceptable legal and moral tradition. He stated, X. X Xvyy^XXyyX
; * \ .  "But where a man breaks the Words Of the Law ;
by involuntary Ignorance, there he shall not :
be excused. As if a Person that is drunk kills X^; ; ; X'X
■ another, this shall be Felony, and he shall be ' < X
7 y X 7  hanged for it, and yet he did it through Ignorance, ; XX y X
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•V3;C .Ay’ ,J y:A -.--A ; ; A'. for he was drunk he had not Understanding fr yy Av; A A AA^?:yyAA;;
A/A?- ■: :V;7 1 ? •• ? A 'A.. -A A nor Memory; 'but- inasmuch as that Ignorance ? "A A? - A Ay A'Ay Ah
A.? A A;- A AA-' yAA -A..-; ': • ■ - was occasioned- by. his own; Act and Folly, and “A y- AA" A' A'Ay
'A:; ?;,A ?', > y. A he might have avoided it, he shall not be pri- f A
A A‘!a:A-A viledged thereby. And Aristotle says, that
A A such a Man deserves double Punishment, because . A
A ’A - AAA' *fA AS-AA'y he has doubly offended, viz. in being drunk to ‘'Ay/. A-.A, A;Aj
A A--,- y.. v A A AAA' y-fr A the evil Example of others, and- in committing v
AAyAA;' AAA/AA.AaA/A'A.A " the Crime of Homicide. And this Act is said- . :-AAa'"-sAAa?A/ 
yA;vr A-A-y A; AA'Aa, A ‘.;yyA. to be done ignoranter, for that he is the Causey- . y y v,AAA; 
";A A'"?AA' ■ ;A'A-"" /A'-AaAAAA- of his own Ignorance: .and sbythe'piversityAap*yAA: AAAyAA/A 
A .A  A ..AA 'A Ar:-A: vA-;yA-^ An-y Apears between a Thing done ex ignorantia, and . ; . *■
AAAaA A ;. : v'“ A.v-yA A'AAA’A A ignoranter. And therefore, as I said, where the |AA >;:■ y;A A yA. A'.; A:AV..:y A-' y. y . Words of a Law are broken to avoid a' greater In- y
;A -Ay- ■' /Ay yA Ay A A; ;A •./convenience* or by Necessity, or Compulsion, or. AAAy?/ ,/?//./
A A • A involuntary Ignorance, in all these Cases the *
'AAyAA: y '!AyA.:- 'Ay; • Law itself is not broken.’^ ! ■ Ay ■- . A ..
The Court was moved by the conjunction of Pollard's four 'Causes'
AAy,y.A : ^ / A (as he called them), and granted relief. :AA-'- A - A/ A-'; A; Aa  ;Aa 'AA A:Ay aA:\A
A A y A  A  A; I. would; add, at this point, that it is a short step to A A
y y y  argue that Pollard, as reported by Plowden, was familiar with the %
A discussion of intention and the voluntary which was made by' Covar/ ■'' ‘A AA A A A .-Ay?
AA ; fuvias in the course of De Homicidio ( the treatise in short title ).
y AA A In the second part of the opus, "De delictis 6 conatibus" (.pp 531-b.A A » A A A  
y A A to 539-b ), the various senses of killing are analysed. The e s s e n t i a l A
A y A element in the act as criminal is stated as, " Voluntarium homic id ium 1
est» quod dolo mala anima occidendi comittitur." (tom. 1, pars 11, A y A y A
A^ y . y paragraph 1, at page 532-a). His discussion draws heavily upon that. Ay-AA'/ AAA
-?y A A St. Thomas in the Summa Theologiae, la2ae, Question 72: De distinct ione . ~ A;;
A peccatorum, the gist of which is that an action is specified by its v
AA y A' object ( or in relation to its object ). For Aquinas for an act to be / A  
A -  y  . sinful it had to be a deviation from the law of God, the deviation was A y
. ' A A '•; A' A ' itself disordered (* inordinatio '), and the sinful act had to be a voluntary ;
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act. Drawing upon Aquinas, Covarruvias states, • ’ h .
"...interior vero actus semper distiguitur secundum ;
. finem; exterior autem materialiter Secundum obiectum, v ;
in quo exercetur; idcirco maleficia ex proposito fine 
non sunt distinguenda, nec commode' distinguuntur, idem
. .V . vlterius constat, si actuum humanorum distinctionem ex- Y
-• posuerimus.," ( at 533-a, Op. Cit ) :\YYy;~-Y 'J.* Y \ : y -
He then cites the long question of Aquinas from the Summa Theologiae,
"De bonitate et malitia humanorum actuum in general!" , S.T. Ia2ae, 
Question 18 ( in eleven articles ), which serves to recapitulate the 
Aquinian moral tradition and its entaiiments. The state of the * 
Will, at the time of the doing of an act, determines the nature and 
quality of the act with reference to the agent. This is not to di­
minish the material qualities of an act ( its actus reus ) / but it ' ; 
serves to indicate that even a neutral fact can be made evil if the 
will of the agent so directs. Covarruvias affirms this proposition;
from Aquinas (which I cite from a modern text):
".. .sins are differentiated specifically by the voluntary 
•* act rather than the inherent disorder. But voluntary acts
/ are specifically distinguished according to their objects...
it follows that sins are properly differentiated into species ;
■Y v.Y- • according to their objects." ; ' ; ; - 'YY
It is strong enough for purposes of argument here to suggest that ; _ :
Covarruvias restates an Aquinian notion of an intentional object, and
that how the agent considers the object of his intention will indicate
one aspect of the moral worth or wrong of his act. It is not a condition
to be considered solely in itself, for it would make the assigning of a ;;v
66. Cf., SUWA THEOLOGIAE, Volume 25 (la2ae. 72, article 1 [ Blackfriars, 
1978: LONDON]) as translated by John Fearon, 0.P. The Latin text, at 
page 28 of this edition, reads: "Et ideo peccata specie distinguuntur* r 
ex parte actuum voluntariorum, magis quam ex parte inordinationis inY-Y 
peccato existentis. Actus ... voluntarii distinguuntur specie secundum 
objecta. Unde sequitur quod peccata proprie distinguantur specie se->
Y  ’ • cundum objecta." ‘X'''*? : Y - Y v , - ; ; - :.v : • H r V * V  V ’*
m
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moral predicate only what the agent wished. The protection, however, • X 
that Covarruvias as a lawyer would have had would have been an appeal 
to what the law declared. It would not be that of a purely speculative 
case of the kind, How is a moral predicate discovered ? Rather, it 
would be the case that of the agent it could be asked, What did you : . 
intend ? And his reply would be measured against what the law had • " y  
permitted. If a curious intention were advanced, ie.,"I intended only X yX 
to make a noise to scare my cat"---and the noise the agent made was to :
cause a bomb to explod? in a crowded airplane, then his intention would :
be measured against his knowledge or ignorance. The Court could hear . y ! 
that such was his intention, ie>, to make a noise, but they could refuse*; 
to sanction it as a defence to (say) murder because such ignorance on the; 
part of D_ Would not be considered exculpatory. ; . y.\
: For this reason a mediaevalist or a renaissant would Consider X
'intentiont in its relation to 'ignorance', and 'ignorance' in its re- ^
lation to 'intention'. How the merit of an act turned upon the nature 
of an intent ( versari in re illicita j would, in theory> be brought 
about by considering the conditions affecting the subject, and by de­
termining if the subject appreciated the material facts ( the actus reus ) 
or material elements surrounding his intention. The law possessed a 
formal and defined element ( its definition as a sanction ) which could 
be known. If the subject did not know the law, and by his action revealed 
that he did not know the law, then interrogation could be directed to his 
ignorance, and his state of ignorance evaluated, ie., was it reasonable, 
crass, invincible, affected ? .x'- - y ; •• 'X;7 X • ‘ X j .XX;\-
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7 . : It can be seen that a model of reasonableness is being ;: y  ;7 :
advanced by such a use of balances. If one attended only to in- 7'X' -XXYy
tent ion, to the exclusion of all other elements, criminal con­
viction would be impossible. On the other hand, if one attended 
only to the material elements of a crime, then acquittal would 
seldom be the case. But there are some cases ( like Attempt^ or . ;Xf
Conspiracy ) when one must not only inquire after the intention X X; - yX 
of the agent, and be aware of the material elements comprising 7. X'-XXyyXXx 
the defined crime, but one must also: inquire* under what conditions, X 
or from what considerations, the agent came to form an intention, \y- X; : 
and act because of it. If an agent formed an intention which, 'by - XyyX'X'XXx 
definition, the law labelled as criminal, it is yet a licit defence -
to that criminal labelling that the agent did not know that the in­
tention he entertained (and may have acted under ) was criminal. 7 . X
At this point the ignorance of the agent, and the causes of his ig- 7 X 
norance, become a proper subject for legal inquiry with the probative
aim of possibly excusing D. v“ * y'"Xt~yXy if- XX'X,X V  .'--XX :---''-XXX-X' 7 Xy '■ ■ •-• . . - 7 • y-;- X'.X - . J’v^r X XXXyX  , 67 a y .Xy X; y  ;7;XX 7 XxX7 ;7y:^/y
XXX X It is evident that Reniger V. Fogossa, as a case, revealed
that ignorance in relation to a defence was understood well at early y
common law, just as the elements of criminal intent, or malice, were *
understood well by examples from R. V .,Saunders and Archer. I wish to
turn now to R. v. Salisbury, (1553) 1. PI. 100. In a recent English
67. One may refer to Morissette v. United,States, 342 U.S. 246 (1951)
when the Court inquired into the state of mind which accompanied- X 7 7  
the material elements of the crime. The Court found that D did not y  
design to steal and convert government property, contrary toXyXX
18 U.SX. § 641, because, upon inquiry and examination, it was found  - 
that D did not knowingly and wilfully do acts as unlawful. Because 
D_'s ignorance was believable, he was acquitted . X; yXX X'X -7 ;77XyyX’ 
67a. Cf.,’'Accomplices and Transferred Malice" by David Lanham, Jan.
X7- 1980 LOR 110 for a further view of Plowden, and others of the period * ■ f. ' J z
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case the citation given from Plowden was as I have stated; but in 
; Y f . in the Commentaries the case is reported as: Matters of the Crown 
happening at Salop (1553) 1. PI. 96a-101, of which Salisbury is one 
of the reported cases contained within the wider scope of the "Mat-.
"■ Y The power of Salisbury is that it shows a grasp of the A Y ■ Y  
purpose of the Criminal sanction: namely, to deter. Contrary to y ’-
what was held in R. v. Anderson and Morris [ cited in the footnote ; YyYyv. Y Y:; Y 
Y\ ;■/ — below ] $■ Salisbury disputes the contention that there can be honour “ ;
; ; amongst thieves or wrongdoers. The facts of the case are these. v YY;Y
One John Vane Salisbury joined in an affray with his Master. His . " Y Y Y ;YY-Y 
; ' . Master had lain in wait to kill a third party, but none of the ser­
vants of the Master, including Salisbury, knew of the criminal in-
68. The case in which the modern citation occurs is: Ry. Anderson Y
and Morris [1966] 2 All E.R. 644. This was a case, which revealed
Y what Lord Chief Justice Parker himself uttered during the course / ? Y
Y of his written opinion, " The law, of course, is not completely Y •
\ Y logical, but there is nothing really illogical in such a result, Y Y;;
in that it could well.be said as a matter of common sense that Y  r 
; in the latter circumstances the death resulted or was caused by / Y Y Y Y Y Y
the sudden action of the adventurer who decided to kill and killed."
The facts of the case were simple: A and M agreed to attack W.
.'Y, A, however, stabbed W. At the time of trial A was convicted of : Y;
r Y  s murdering ;W; M was convicted of manslaughter . The theory -upon- Y 'YY; /YY Y Y Y Y
which the convictions turned was that A and M had a common de- 
. sign. .M appealed his conviction for manslaughter. The Court of "Yy YYYYY
Y: Y Criminal Appeal granted his appeal, and found that the jury had ;•• YYY:/YY:
been misdirected in the Court of first instance. Parker, C.J., •
: ; rejected the theory in Salisbury on two grounds. He thought that Y ;
it might not have been reported correctly ( a constant bugbear to 
s Y. any legal historian ), and, "...it is in the opinion of the court
; quite clear that the principle [enunciated in Salisbury] is wholly ; Y Y -
;• ;•. , • • : put of touch with the position today . It seems to this court that ; Y
; to say that adventurers are guilty of manslaughter when one of them Y’ Y;
Y . has, departed completely from the concerted action of the common deV
sign and has suddenly formed an intent to kill and has used a weapon - *
Y : and acted in a way which no party to that common design could suspect
Y; : Y Y is something which would -revolt the conscience of people today." YY'YY
• American law would most likely follow Salisbury and reject Parker's,C .J . {
; Y Y Y.Y-"■ finding. • '' 'Y-' \ ,Y’: YY--Y Y. Y:'Yy  v : :Y-. '• . •' YYY Yy- Y  YyYYYYYY- A
tentions of the Master. All were charged with murder. Salisbury appealed. 
; A A A  I wish to cite prevalent portions of the case since the logic of de- 
A cision is contained in the presentation of the case. A  A A y
: The question given for resolution was: A A/
V, "And at the End of the Evidence, the Inquest demanded of ^ a A;^A;A
y r the Court this Question, viz. if so be in Truth, John Vane .^AAAyA
A : A Salisbury was in the Company of them; who of their Malice y ; A > / A
- A ; prepense killed him that is dead, and when he saw them ; AVa
A; A A A combating together, took Part with them suddenly, and had
A  : ’• not Malice prepense, and struck, with the others, him that A  A A
A; y A is dead, whether this be Murder or Manslaughter in John AAA/
'^A AA, "/ A- Vane Salisbury, f 1.P1. 97 f 1553V at 100-al
Lord Chief Justice Parker drew upon two broad principles which he made
A A the basis for a legal decision (as I have indicated in the previous
A footnote). He believed that an enterprise, even if criminal, was bound A
by limits; just as the enterprise of a company or corporation may be A
, bound by limits, and if the company or corporation exceeds the limits A,
; A A of its incorporation, then it, or directors or agents of it, may be said
to have acted ultra vires. Secondly, the Lord Chief Justice assumed that
the conscience of the community would be outraged if the manslaughter A/:;Aa A ’
/ A  verdict, of the instant case, stood— having in mind, no doubt, the furore
which D.P.P.-y. Smith [1961] A.C. 290 had caused when the decision seemed
A : to affirm constructive malice or the felony-murder rule, or seemed to
.. substitute a judicial fiction which would be the rule in the case than to / A.
: accept the given testimony, and intentions, of the defendant. I would
wish to suggest, with due respect for the verdict in Anderson and Morris,
that Salisbury reveals a subtle understanding of the degrees of malice. A. 'AA
AA/v*; The Court framed a careful and logical reply ( which appears to have with- ,
A A ■ : stood the test of time ). It said, abd I quote:
: * I wish to note that the ultra vires does not occur in the judgement. I
A' A have advanced the comparison, beginning at "...just as the enterprise...,f A
•" ;' , % v . 7 •> - . I* >V j ’
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"The Court answered, if John Vane Salisbury had not .
Malice prepense, but suddenly took Part with them who X
X . bad Malice prepense, this is Manslaughter in him, and yy
, : . not Murder, because he had not Malice Prepense." ; - X .
John Vane Salisbury had been arraigned, with others, upon an indictment
of MurdeT for the killing of one Denbigh, who was a servant to a Doc^
tor Ellis. The note which Plowden makes to the reader is a careful
one. In it he raises the problem of a cognitive test: namely, how much
must one know to be charged with sharing in the criminal intention of v
an other ? Plowden [ at 100-a of 1 .PI.97 (1553) ] states,
"Quod nota bene (Lector) for I have heard this greatly 
doubted, viz, if the Master lies in Wait in the High-Way :
to kill a Man, and his Servants attend upon him, and the 
X Master does not mkae his Servants privy to his Intent, and
■ afterwards he, for whom the Master lies in Wait, comes, ;
and the Master attacks him, and his Servants, seeing their 
Master fighting, take his Part, and all of thorn kill.the 
X X ;  Man, whether or no this should be Murder in the Servants,
as it shall be in the Master, because they, without Malice 
XX ~ X prepense, took Part with him that had Malice prepense." XX X .X'Xy
The' Court 'took the. law to be: . \ ; y •' ' V ' 7-XyyXX’ !• "X
"...that the killing of him is Murder, in the Prisoners, ,
; if they killed him upon the Malice which they had -against y/Xx'-XX 
y  v the Master, so that if you shall find that they had Malice ...Xyyy
against the Doctor, that Malice does in the Eye of the Law 
• ; ; make the killing of him that was killed, who was the Doctor’s y'y 
Servant, and in his Company, to be Murder. And therefore X 
- you must take the Law so: quod nota bene Lector . (Ibid) - X;yX,;
The Court had earlier instructed the jury, and the Court had used the , ;
language of conspiracy in its instruction: "...you, Jurors, have heard X
the Evidence which has been given to prove the Prisoners guilty of the
Murder whereof they are impeached, which Evidence proves that the Con-: X X
spiracy was to kill Doctor Ellis, and the Malice prepense was against him,
and not particularly against his Servant who is killed. .." The Court yX:X
' ; :*■
Y YYYY'yyYI
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reasoned that the jurors might think that if the Servants did not know..
their victim, and entertained no direct malice against him whom they had;
killed, then, perhaps, the jurors might reason that murder should not Y
•be found. The instruction of the Court to the jurors displaces the de-Y
fence of oblique intention or unintended victim. But the discharging of
the availability of that defence did not discharge the problems which r
malice prepense presented. YYYY' Yv Y:; Y “iJ&Y; Y>{rVYV’ y
The Court reasoned in steps. To prove the major premise, that
malice against one is malice against all, this was stated by it: ;Y ’ "
. . "...when a Man has Malice against another, and intends ••.'Y.Yv .
. Y t0 kill him, and endeavours to put his Purpose in Execu- Y.Y'.v ?■ 
i■ ; / tion^ and kills one that resists his Purpose, it cannot ;•
• be otherwise but that by Necessity of Reason he has Ma- Y YYY Y
Y • lice against all those who would defeat his Design, and
Y y , . that he would offer Violence to them that would defend .
the Person against whom his Malice is directed, rather Y  YY,.,.YY 
than desist from his Purpose, and therefore if he* kills 
: ■ Y  Y them to whom he had before-hand intended to offer such
Violence, this cannot be any Thing else than Murder;..." Y; , 
:Y; Y/Y'Y,''Yy Y;:.;!‘:. Y  y Y YY> "-YYY.. - [1 .PI. 97 (1553) at 100-a and
The minor premise is contained in the conjunction, which carries on
directly after the semi-colon: YYYY. ' • Y ' / /  - . Y Y Y :  . V:Y'/Y\Y Y
; . "...and so the. Act declares his Intent before, and the/ Y
Malice against the Principal begets in himself another Y Y;YyY 
YY'Y'YY' ' Malice against those whom he presumes will resist his . Y 
v ; Purpose, which Malices are combined one to the other in­
separably." [1 .pi . 97 (1553) at 101] i . Y : Y  Y Y Y
The reasoning is artful, declaring that 'action speaks louder than Y YY. 
words.' It is a careful use, I would suggest, of judicial analysis Y Y 
of the facts of a situation, reasoning that servants are confederates 
because there is no economy in murder. One would kill those who would 
stop his design; but only one person was killed; therefore, it appears 
that all shared in the design, the proof being that they.were alive.
i i
“ 'A-
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The Court had advanced a careful statement as to what was Malice
prepense, drawing upon the model of conspiracy. But conspiracy must be de­
monstrated by some overt act; if not, a conspiracy remains a thought only 
unacted upon. In this instance, upon the instruction by the Court on the y  A /  
law, the jury found that some were guilty. The findings of the jury are
private. We do not have records to tell us how they determined as they did.
Two were found guilty of murder; one was acquitted; and John Vane Salisbury 
was acquitted of murder by reason of his lack of malice prepense, but was 
convicted of manslaughter. He was, however, later reprieved.
; If one compares the two cases, Salisbury against a recent case,; 
Anderson and Morris [1966], or'similar cases, one may argue that Salisbury •
affords a better rule to follow (if the aim of the criminal sanction is to 
educate and dissuade the public against forming any kind of criminal con- Ay .y , 
federation]. Anderson and Morris seems to advance an ultra vires model .
(as I had suggested), and it has to it the logic of precision bombing in A:AA 
which the claim may be advanced that measured harm can be done without risk 
of excess harm being done. But the reality principle is often more forceful. 
Hospitals, in time of war, do get bombed, even if inadvertently; and, in I-
pub brawls, persons do get killed. Is it not a better rule of law to dis- ; A A; 
suade one from begetting a harm, the consequences of which often cannot be y 
controlled, than to protect one who has initiated a harm by finding in his 
favour because he, for some reason or other ( or, perhaps, no reason at all ), i 
could not predict the extent of the harm he engendered ? A; : A
68a. In  Regina v. Caton (1874), 12 Cox 624, we read: "LUSH, J., sa id  th a t the  A; 
on ly  question  fo r  the ju ry  was whether the p riso n e r s tru c k  the f a ta l  b low . I f  
two men concerted tog e the r to  f ig h t  two o th e r men w ith  th e i r  f i s t s ,  and one 
s tru ck  an un luc lyb low  causing death, both would be g u i l t y  o f m anslaughter. But 
i f  one used a k n ife ,  o r o th e r deadly weapon, / .w ith o u t the knowledge o r consent - 
o f the  o th e r, he o n ly  who s tru c k  t? ith  the weapon would be re sp on s ib le A fp r the 
death re s u lt in g  from the blow g iven by i t  A* ?,H is L o rd s h ip ,. . ( s a id ) . . .Catpn was 
on ly  answerable fo r  h is  own a c ts , and no t i f  the o th e r man s tru ck  the fa ta l  blow*
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; .' , ; It may be suggested, purely as a problem of philosophical XXXXx-y-
interest, that Salisbury avoids the difficult issue as to what truly y X : ;y 
an agent intended, and that Parker, C.J., was sympathetic to such a Ji 
difficulty when permitting the appeal in Anderson and Morris. Is it, !:
however, a serious jurisprudential problem to consider if an agent can yXy.yy 
make known to himself what he himself intends ? and then make known Xk ; ,
to a third party the fact of his first-party intention ? The law as­
sumes that A can declare himself to Bj it does not assume that every 7 XX; X  77 
person is an isolated monad, windowless within the world of surrounding 
monads.^  * If difficulties arise in an exchange ( be it contracts, XVXX
torts, trusts, various chancery matters, criminal law, insurance law, 
administrative law, marital law, the law of agency and principal, etc. ) , 
the difficulty, it is assumed, is that an exchange can occur, but that Xyr;:, 7XX 
an exchange can occur but there may be difficulties of clarity one to : y7y
the other. The law will not accept solipsism. The philosopher may. But 
I doubt if a legal philosopher could entertain solipsism with seriousness.
He may, however, y \X ,7 “X  , XyX* • ;:.7yy X-.. 7 / 7 vV X appreciate that •
.the production of some human actions are shrouded in mystery, and hence .7 
simple, efficient cognitive explanations of human action ( to which legal 
liability may attach ) may be difficult, or even not forthcoming because XX 
of limits of explanation. But I doubt if this is to embrace legal solipsism.;;
69. "(2) What is much more usual [ viz., when an agent performs an action ]
X occurs when the agent knows quite a lot about what he is doing, but doesn1 
. know enough and, in particular, doesn't know what turns out to be the 7 XX 
v crucial point in the business. He may know, for instance, that he is 7 
pointing a gun and pressing the trigger, and yet be ignorant that the gun 
was loaded.... It would be tedious to make a list of the sub-types of ig- X 
norance of this order-— ignorance of the instrument, of manner, of amount 
of degree and so forth. In any case Aristotle has done it fE.NX gamma 1, 
1111a.]..." page 48, ON HUMAN FREEDOM by John Laird, op. cit.
The difficulty lies within the human condition itself, that we progress 
from ignorance to knowledge— and this is not peculiar to the law. It? A; A  
may be added that a felony-murder rule had long acceptance in common law* 
and still does. Even section 8 of the Criminal Justice Act, 1967, it 
may be recalled, directs the jury,, pr. judge without jury, to consider all 
• o f the facts surrounding the behaviour of an accused in; a briminaiAcaseA;yAA*'
;; A : : before rendering judgement upon an accused. : IS Salisbury so much dif­
ferent from Anderson and Morris if one applies the test of believability A 
to the facts of each case ? Did not the Court in Salisbury, state the law 
clearly to the jurors, Indicating that it might strain believability to n. ’ ; :
;; suggest that the servants of a master were not joined in his enterprise, A a AA
. - he willing to kill a third party, why then not be willing to kill any of ' -
. ; his servants who did not aid him ? Is murder so mannerly ? 1’/ V -/.AAA'A A " 
A ./A - Each case indicates that a judgement upon the finding Wiil be A A/
; A left to the practical assessment of the jury, or the judge. What is im- . ?
portant is that some matter, other than a private whim of a legislative 
/ ; r ~ body ( as arbitrary arrest, or death without due course of legal defence, /y';:
> or a terror squad randomly killing victims ), is given to the Court or
a a ?.. jury to decide upon. The scale of probability tips in one direction Or - A ;
: the other; legal findings are not infallible nor are the members of a :
Court or jury omniscient. It would be to belabour a straw man to claim . ,
that the law saw itself as such. As Salisbury revealed some were gullty,, .
some were acquitted, and the accused himself was reprieved. It may have y ■
A A been the case that one of the principals in Anderson and Morris had made
an agreement with an other not to cause grievous bodily harm to the victim , ;
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of their intended violence. But no philosophical or jurisprudential VV
problem of deep merit arises from this; consideration.. What does arise, 
as in both cases, is what will a jury believe to have been the case be­
tween those accused of a capital offence. In one case the jury found ;Y ; 
that the accused did not have malice prepense, and they grounded their -Y Y:• 
judgement upon two premisses. The accused had not confederated with 
the Principal in his malice; the accused acted out of the heat of passion. > 
These seemed to be believable premisses to excuse or to mitigate. In .'Y*Y'YY Y. 
the latter case the Court chose to believe that an agreement, although V : 
criminal between intending felons, had to it limits, and that one of,'YYY'YYYY 
parties to the agreement exceeded the limits of what was agreed, ie., Y  Y . Y  
pulled a knife and killed the victim. The Court chose to view this J Y >
killing as the single act of A, and not a conjoint act of A with IJ. : Y
We are left with what is to be believed. It could be advanced that -.-.;Y Y Y Y  
Anderson and Morris does not extend a legal principle, but was a case Y :' ' Y Y Y V  
so peculiar that it was a holding only for that particular set of facts. Y
If a principle is to be extracted from it, it may be of dubious footing Y/:YY'
that criminal testimony with regard to what a-priori limits were put /T YYY 
upon a crime should be testimony accepted in court when given by principals 
charged with serious criminal offences. But is it not a doubtful principle 
at best 2 Why hang five for stealing a sheep when four testify that it • \ 
was not their intention to steal ( after they were apprehended ) ? Is Y>-Y, 
this not to encourage a false hope in felons that they will be able to . Y’ Y; 
’beat a rap’ if they are able to pin the blame on only one member of their Y  Y 
gang ? Who will not accuse the other to save himself ? Y  -YY Y-;Y Y Y Y ' Y
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X . ; ; 'Hiat malice prepense was not confined tp thief actual doing -of-yXX
a deed, or commission of an act, is shown by Plowden in the first part X; 
of Matters of the Crown (1553) 1. Pi. 97. It is cited as: Griffith 
ap David's Case. , ' . x
•. V • Xy. The facts of the case .’are these; X XyVyyX- Xy:. XXX/X 7-y y X y X
"DIVERS Persons of the County of Montgomery were ,
\yy/y' indicted for killing Oliver ap David ap Hoel Vaughan, XXyX;/ y;:y 
:X ...of Malice prepense, vi2. some for giving the Wounds y
whereof he died, and Griffith ap David ap John and oth- y
ers for that they were present, aiding, comforting, and X ,: 
abetting the other to commit the said Murder. And they, ; ; ;
. w h o  gave the Wounds to the said Oliver, and killed him, yXX'
; . had fled and escaped, and Griffith ap David ap John and XX
the rest were brought to the Bar." IffVPlV 97 (1553)] X X ‘
Plowden, at the close of the discussion of this case, with an added £
appeal of one Morris Gittin [1.PI. 98 (1553)] in;which an accessary ;•X X/
to a felony was at Bar, noted (at page 100 of the instant report )
that the law oh the point was unsett led in principl e j and Had changed
in fact. The old law, cited in the case from 4£ Book of Assizes 25.
(which appears to have been from a copy of the book held by Bromley,
J., as his personal manuscript), as well as citing Hill. 7. H. 4. Xy
coram Rege (Hilary Term) wherhin two cases from that term supported X
the olid law. The principle of the older law, Plowden notes, revolved yXX
around a simple problem. If A was charged with killing, but escaped,\Xy;
and B was charged as an accessary, and did not escape, should B^ be \ x
charged and put to death ? : The Xlogical problem was : what if A were
recovered, tried, and acquitted ? The older law enforced the logical 7 X
principle of transitivity* ie., if to have la' and 'b1 one needed 'a',:
but '-a' was the case ( the accused fled and his guilt or innocence
was undetermined ), then it was thought unfair to find against B .
by affirming that ’b 1 was the case. The language of the Court was,;
in an example, (at page 97 of the instant case): "; ; : Y;
; ".. .if A. is indicted for the Rape of a Woman, . /
!■ ;;: and B. is indicted for that he was present and YYYY'V'
abetting A. to do it, now they are both Princi-    /
Y * pals by Law, and if B. is arraigned, and found Y  Y  • •
■ guilty by Inquest, and afterwards A . is arraigned, f;
Y Y and by another Inquest acquitted, now Judgement Y Y y
/ shall not be given against B. because he could not * Y Y' /•••*'
be guilty but in respect that A. was guilty. " \ . YY
The; cases which Plowden recorded as cited in the instant case held
that Accessories could not be tried unless Principals were indicted.
The logical principle appears to be fair, that if the value of 'a*
cannot be determined, but the value of ’b ’ depends upon what value
is assigned to !a", then 'b1 should not be judged until the value of
'a' has been determined; and to determine ’a 1 required a finding and
judgement of a Court. Y-Y -’'YY Y-^Y ' .YY / •' _ Y Y r ' Y' y Y‘'-'/'Y/Y
: Y; But Plowden, as teacher, warns the reader: Y Y  YYYY
"So Note, that at this Day those who are present and 
abetting, or ready to do the Act, are Principals as 
well as he that does it, and may be arraigned not­
V Withstanding the other Principals are absent and not
• »-Y attainted." ( at page 100 of the instant case ]
The force to Plowden’s warning is drawn from, Griffith. Having con^
sidered the problem which transitivity posed, that ’b' should not
be judged unless a value to ’a* has been found at law, the Gourt
rejected such reasoning by a discussion, much sophisticated, of a
distinction between.'legal fact * and "legal deed*. The Court said;
page 98, "So that it cannot be well termed that they, Y
who gave the Wound, are Principals in Deed, and 
the other Principals in Law, but they are all
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7 , . / / A * ; / ' • A  • " P r in c ip a ls  i n  Deed, and in  one same D e g re e ."  A
We w itn e s s  an in t e r e s t in g  e x e rc is e  i n  p r a c t ic a l  lo g ic .  The reason
th e  C o u rt o f f e r s  a t  d e te rm in in g  no d i f fe r e n c e  in  th e  degree  o f  g r a v i t y  7
between a id in g ,  a b e t t in g ,  and com m iss ion , i s  g iv e n  th u s ly :  7.7.? A*
A a  AA/. / A .  A. .when many come to  do an A c t ,  and one o n ly  A A
-  . •: -.7 7 : /  does i t ,  and th e  o th e rs  a re  p re s e n t a b e t t in g  \ r
7 / 7  • 7 7 h im , o r  re a d y  to  a id  h im  in  th e  F a c t ,  th e y  a re  .7 / 'A / A ' / ; ;
A 7 7 ; P r in c ip a ls  to  a l l  In te n ts  as much as he t h a t  ; ? ;
7 ? v . • 7•/ .77 . does th e  F a c t:  f o r  th e  Presence o f  th e  o th e rs  : 7 /.A A AA -7- 
'7 7 .;;A " - / A / - - ’ ;,7 i s  a T e r r o r  to  h im  t h a t  i s  a s s a u lte d ,  so t h a t  , 7 7 7 A:
; 7 7 A  he dare not defend himself, for if a Man sees 7 ' : 'Av;A-
; A •. / • his Enemy and 20 of his Servants coming to as- 7
A y. A ' A  7 7 ; .  .. sault him, and they all draw their Swords and . 7 A A /
: \ :; 7- 7 / ' surround him, and one only strikes him, so that A
7 A: -7A !; he dies thereof, now the others shall with good ^  A/AA.' 
7 7 7 A Reason be adjudged as great Offenders as he that 77 77,
7 . struck him, for if they had not been present ' 7 ' A - -A  A-
7 / ' he might probably have defended himself, and so •
.77 //A A Ahave escaped."[italics mine] - -• " ; A 7 . 7 7 / 7:
The C o u rt c o n t in u e s  f u r t h e r  in  i t s  re a s o n in g , s t a t in g ;  '. . •? A 7 7 /y  , ‘ /> /
/ .A  'A ’7-y 7/ 77, ' . "So t h a t  t h e i r  P resence i s  th e  Cause o f  T e r r o r ,  ‘:7.,,A 7' 
A A  7 : in d  T e rro r-  i s  th e  Reason t h a t  he re c e iv e s A th e  7?^ A 7
7 . : 7 Wounds, and th e  Wouiids a re  th e  Cause o f.  h is
? 7 A D ea th . And th e n  inasm uch as b o th  to g e th e r ,  v i z .7 7 th e  Wounds and th e  Presence o f  th e  o th e rs ,  who
>: A  . 7 7 gave no Wounds a t  a l l ,  a re  ad judged  th e  Cause
v A  o f  h is  D ea th , i t  fo l lo w s  t h a t  a l l  o f  them , v i z .
A  t h a t  s t r i k e ,  and th e  r e s t  t h a t  a re  p re s e n t,7 ;  . / /  • ?' / a r e  in  e q u a l D egree, and each p a r ta k e s  o f  th e  ?
AA Deed of the other." ( at 98 of the instant case )
The case was d i f f i c u l t  f o r  th e  Bench to  c o n s id e r .  Some o f  th e  J u s t ic e s
f e l t  t h a t  th e  e a r l i e r  p r in c ip le  sh o u ld  have been fo l lo w e d ,  th a t  o f  7  . v
'n o t  B u n le s s  A ' ,  b u t  th e  p r a c t i c a l  re a s o n in g  o f  th e  C o u r t,  th ro u g h  7
th e  re m a in in g  J u s t ic e s ,  a f f ir m e d  a change in  p r in c ip le ,  as th e  re a s o n in g
a b o v e s ta te d  in d ic a te d .  7 '• An AA- ' A; ?•'... A /V  7-7 •'
AT -7J
J
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In Hales v. Petit, Michelmas Term, 4 and 5 Elizabeth in the 
Common Bench, (1562) 1 PI. 253 , Lady Margaret Hales was the plain­
tiff in the action of Trespass. She was also, of late, widow of Sir j ; 
James Hales who had committed suicide. The defendant in the action : 
was Cyriack Petit, who was successful. The case revolved on a technical 
point that the action for Trespass would be defeated because the plain­
tiff, Lady Margaret Hales, no longer had an interest in the land which 
was trespassed upon by the defendant's cattle. The plaintiff lost hery 
interest in the land directly as a result of her husband's suicide: The..
Court expressed it thusly, at page 256 of the instant case: ; fx yyf r
' ; ".. .by reason of the Felony [ ie., the suicide ,
/•. X; ; of Sir James Hales] aforesaid by the aforesaid
J&mes Hales, in Form aforesaid, perpetrated and Xx-XX,X:\V 
Vi ;; 7 7 committed, were totally forfeited and lost to the •
':.V. > ; i,i'.x aforesaid late King and Queen, and the whole Right X X
, V .  i i; ; and Interest of the aforesaid Margaret, of and in ;
: •. --X ' 7  : ;  v 1! the same Premisses were ended and extinct.. . "  X X X
We have a modern counterpart of the samb principle. In some property
actions only the owner of the property may bring a legal action, and
not the occupier; The principle, however, in Hales v. Petit was that : 1
Lady Margaret, late wife of Sir James, had lost any interest iitheiX-’i.
property in question due to his suicide. I cite the case not to stress
ancient property law. Rather, I cite the case to illustrate with what y
* A record of the case, Plowden wrote, appears amongst the Records 
of Trinity Term, 3 Elizabeth, Rot[uli Parliamentorum] 921. Cf. 
pp 224-6 for an account of the case in LAW REPORTING IN ENGLAND 
1485-1535 by L.W.Abbott (University of London, The Athlone Press,
1973). Hamlet, Act v., Scene 1 burlesques the case, as: the two yyfyxx 
: Clowns, preparing to dig a grave, discuss death by drowning, when V\
the first Clown wonders if it should be a Christian burial, "How7 *
can that be, unless she drowned herself in her own defence ? " \X"-; : X
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care Plowden recorded the distinctions between certain kinds of acts
which were deemed to be felonious. He sets down that Sir James "... .
killed and murdered himself...V (257a). The drowning of himself was
described as felo de se, and act in which one puts an end to his own
existence deliberately. Plowden said that he had heard only Lord
Dyer's reasoning on the case, who said that the case had five elements
to it: '“•/ Y Y  ' . ' •'//. /'■ Y ~ Y v  Y  A A- Y  ;Y  Y.
. "First, the Quality of the Offence of Y'-Y - Y - Y
Sir James Hales; secondly, to whom the Y
Y  Y Offence is committed; thirdly, what shall
. be forfeit; fourthly, from what Time the Y  Y
Y ; Forfeiture shall commence; and fifthly, if
* Y. '• the Term here shall be taken from the Wife."
Y y y  A Y  Y- /. y’y- Y. A.' A Y  'Y' Y  . Y  y: ; Y Y  . ( at 260a-261)
The ’quality1 of the act was murder, not a simple killing, nor man-
Y  "...for Homicide is the killing a Man faloni- YY/ /
ously with Malice prepense, but Murder is the ;
killing a Man with Malice prepense." (at 261)
side-note in Plowden refers the reader to S.P.C. 18-b, which
is Staundford’s Plees del .CoroneY. "Murder", cap. 10., of Lib.1.,.- Y YYY
Which recapitulates Bracton and Britton on malice prepense.] In
the instant case, '• - Y/A'- Y ...■ YYYY.. YY Y  • - - . A ’:' • ;YY;-v-A
A : ". . .And here the killing of himself was pre- >.Yy Y Y :Y  A pensed and resolved in his Mind before the Act
* 'felo de se1 per 4 B1. Com. 189, as cited by Pollock, C.B. in Clift
v. Schwabe, 3 C.B.476, may embrace unexpected harm, ie., A, intending
to kill B^  pulls the trigger of the gun, but the gun, in discharging, 
/explodes, and A himself is killed by the unexpected explosion, and B 
is hot harmed, "...or commits any uniawful, malicious, act the con­
sequence of which is his own death, as if attempting to kill another he 
runs upon his antagonist's sword; or shooting at another the gun bursts
.- -and'kills- himself." Y  -YY Y Y  Y- '-: Y  AY Y ‘Y. *:*- ' v . '"Y ■■/■ Y y-v • Y-Y-Y
t * r
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'r ’’was done... And also, it agrees in another -^/y
^ V , Point with the ancient Definition of Murder, ','i.
" ■ ■ ■ , ■  viz., [sic., Bracton 134 b; Britton, cap. 6;
. V- •; S.P .C . 12 e, and 17e] that murdrum est oc­
culta hominum occisio, nullo praesente, nullo 
sciente; so that always he who determines to / •
; ;; ; kill himself, determines by the Instigation
• ; ; of the Devil to do it secretly, nullo prae-
sente» nullo sciente, lest he should else be 
prevented from doing it. Wherefore the Quality 
. of the Offence is Murder." (at 261) •• ,y.y.-
the stealthfulness of the act is no longer an aspect of the de­
finition of murder for the common; law; The definition does not ■ ' 
make the distinction between the act as described ( by law ) 
and known as described by law. The Court may have answered that 
it would be unreal to expect that the agent did not know that what 
he was doing was forbidden. Yet the objection may be lodgedj even 
if a mild objection, that to do what is forbidden does not entail 
that one knows what one is doing is forbidden.* ;
NOTE: The French for pertinent portions of this text I take from the 
;’i first edition of thb Commentaries, 1571. "Et quant al quaiitie y 
del offence q le offedour icy ad fait, ii.-dit q il est en degree 
del murder, et nemy de homycide.s.manslaughter, car homycide est 
le occider de honefeloniousment sans malice prepence, mes murdur 
. ; est occider del home sur malice prepence. Et icy le occider de luy 
fuit prepense et resolue en sa ment deuaunt le act fait, et auxi 
/ . V il agree en aut point oue le auncient definicio del murder,. .," 
at folio 261. ' y-.-r’y; t.J V v-/;?-.
* The various manuals of confessors were careful to preserve the - 
the distinction between the matter of the act (or action ) which 
was sinful, and the penitent knowing that his own act ( or action ) 
was sinful. Aquinas, at S.T. Ia2ae,76, 4, Utrum ignorantia dimin- V^; 
n^t peccatum could see this distinction between matter done, and
the subject doing, as way to excuse or extinguish a sin. Covarruvias 
(°P«cit.) at "De Delict is § conatibus" Pars 1, section 2, at page ■ y 
532-b preserves the Aquinian teaching that ignorance may excuse.
7 X 7 x , • X To the second point the Court found that his death was an x ix XX
- • ■ X X • .Offence against Nature, against God, and against the King." (261) ;X
X;Xx Deciding upon the forfeiture, the Court passed to the fourth point re- ; x;
X garding the death; namely, Time. It reasoned in this way, X? y
/... y.’yXy ’X VXX-.X' ••.;. xx "And. , .if one strikes another, so that after- -'X..X7X7 7y’y 
=y* 7 7  7:X-xXX y7 .x wards he dies of it, the Indictment ought to Vy v'-'i-xyxxx-:y;yx:
X-'y;y •/ y.v;' ,7 'x . -y' • say that he struck him feloniously. So that :y  y 7 ;XXy X xyxy
X;-..’ ;.7 XX.,X-' ' x-'-' v!'.XXyxX .’ the Felony is attributed to the Act, which,: Act 
/X 7 Vx y, 7 x X ' X . is always done by a living Man, and in his Life- yyyy^yr.y 
y V 7 . X tiroe# as Brown (Justice Anthony Brown in the X
X X  X x case ) said; for* he said, Sir James Hales
'X X : ' X 7.X ,yx"yXxX-: '/y ' was - dead, and how, came he to his Death ? It;,y;y'X; vyy Xx;XXX:
:x X vX;' X '•7 ;y-'X'.;X . may be answered by drowning; and who drowned , „ -T
7 X‘XXvX'*y XXx: ,7 X y y  him ? Sir James Hales; and'when did he drown ' ; X X ’Xxx-yXyxXX
vXyyy;-'xx 7 7 ■ ;XX.-- y y  . ;.him ? In his life-time. 7 So that Sir James , yXyXy;7 y y / y 7 7
;.XX .x ' iXXX';;, 77:.X X  Hales being alive caused Sir James Hales to *
vVyy;/y''*V'"X'yXVX7 ^Xv die; and the Act of the living Man was the Death
y - ;yyv xx- X'7 'X', 7:;.:y  of- the dead Man." (262) X'. XXy7 :':'- XX X ;- ?. .*7 VX;y 7y X y,;
; 7s The context of the reasoning saves one against a possible 'Morning SfarX,yyyXX
, X ; X, equals the Evening Star’ confusion, ie. * is Sir James, when alive, equal ;
; 7 ; XXto Sir James, now dead ? What this selection from the judgement of the
y yy y Cbprt indicates is that the Court possessed a language with which it
.yX'XXXX' could intricately discuss the manner of,a felony. One only has to cite
X X h'X-.'Xthe case to the Court on behalf of Lady Margaret ( that the goods and •'. y :;yX:-:
X/-y,y x. chattels of her husband ought not to be subject to forfeiture ) put by XXX
7 the Serjeants for the defendant. Here is a sample of Serjeant Walsh's . X
X XX reasoning, .which I cite in part: XX-X 7 ' -7 •• '7-y'’7 X ''X7 / # £ 7
X- 7/.; - >X y  ’ Vi yy-x- " And Walsh said, -that the Act consists of three/ j
7 *.XX7 x,:y.yy X* ;yXy.X xyyyyparts.. The' first is' the Imagination; which is a Xyxy.y' X XyyX 
f . XyVy- ’>> y Reflection or Meditation of the Mind, whether or no .
■X-;' .7 : ' "X. 7, ;-:X‘ ; it is convenient for him to destroy him, and what Way X -77//Xx
Xy’X * 'X ' . X x, 7/ :777  . 7 .;••• ’it can be done. The second is the- Resolution*:, whichy yX/XXy;:,
i " i s  a Determination of the Mind to destroy 
: ; himself, and to do it in this of that par-7
ticular Way. The Third is the Perfection, 77 J.77 
;v. J which is the Execution of what the Mind has v-V , v!;:V  '•
: resolved to do . And this Perfection con- ^
. . sists of two Parts, viz. the Beginning and
; . the End. The Beginning is the doing of the ,
•' / •', Act which causes (the Death, and the End is . • ;7'> 77:7;
the Death, which is only a Sequel to the Act . ‘ 7 , \:7 ?777
; And of all the Parts the doing of the Act is >v:y::y.77-;
’ ■ - : : the greatest in the Judgment of our Law, and .; 7777
7V;::7Siv - 7 :' ;it is in Effect the whole, and the only Part 7 . 7 V'; y y  
• , ‘ that the Law looks upon to be material. For J . f t:%- • •
1 : ■ ; : the Imagination of the Mind to do Wrong, with^ , ' . /.;7; ■
, r : .;/t Vv; out an Act done, is not punishable in our Law, .
V  7-7 \ ::. neither is the Resolution to do what Wrong, / ■
'/777 :7 7 v which he does not, punishable, but the doing
'■ '■■' 7 7 the Act is the only Point which,the' Law 77y.
■ 7 , . ‘ regards; for until the Act is done it cannot . >77 7*
7 • . ''7,7 be an Offence to the World, and when the Act -7;v-7y77X:-?-
>77 'v-> ■ is done it is punishable. Then here the Act 77777.
: . done by Sir James Hales, which is evil and the 77:7 7'.:>77
v : Cause of his Death, is the throwing himself :'-'77;7 7 7 y ■
*77,y ; / ' 5 £;Y \ * into theWatier,/and the Death is but a Sequel
■; V : f; thereof, and this evil Act ought some Way to be;: .
. ■ Punished.*’ (at 259, 259-a, and 260) . 7 7" • 7 77777;
It was a long argument to dissuade the Court from connecting con­
sequences, ie., suicide should be punished in and of itself, and a 
suicide should not be linked to forfeiture of goods. The argument, ; 
however, did not move the Court. The subtle point of the defence was y7 7- 
that the living should be punished as living; but the argument did not f 17- 
defease attainder.. The report of the case states that Sir James Hales 77 
voluntarily drowned himself . (254-a, 258). The discussion of suicide 7 >> 
is ample, and the distinction is appreciated in the text between the ; 
agent and the patient, and that the act of suicide links these two aspects 
of an human act. It is the nature of an human act that a person may • :  
act upon himself, to his detriment, and the language of the judgement 7
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preserves this twinned aspect. It was not the case, certainly, that 
Sir James, when alive, was the same as Sir James, when dead. The sub­
tlety of the Court’s reasoning rested upon what view it took of an 
human act. The language of the Indictment tells us our answer:
"And the Indictment says, and may say, that he 
feloniously threw himself into the Water; for : y .
' : y :•' . that which caused the Death may be said to be .
feloniously done. So that the Felony is at- .;y;-
, tributed to the Act, which Act is always done
; by a living Man, and in his Life-time..."( at - 262 )
I wish not to dispute if this instant case was 'over.reasoned1 
in its analysis of suicide. My purpose for citing the case was to show 
that the Court, then, was able to proffer subtle arguments, and that such 
a subtle style was part of the vocabulary and mind, of the Court in some y 
matters of criminal law. y t;. *■; v. ■  y ;  ^;-V. >’" Iri;
* Al-: ' T° close, ' I wish to cite a case -from- the Year -y '.v\ y' ,
Books which possesses a poetic simplicity, containing as it does a 
simple statement and intuition of the doctrine of versari in re illicita yy 
The general movement of this chapter has been to reveal, from older ^ 
sources, that the common law was equipped in theory, however bare a ::v 
statement of its theory may have been, to concern itself with the fine­
ness of an human act fTora the standpoint of imputing or denying criminal 
intent. The accused in the case is not known. y I ;
' y ; \,y ' Vy,' ANONYMOUS ;' - y / y ■ v; :y .v , y
KING'S BENCH. 1498 YEAR ^OK 14 HEN. VII. f. 14. Hil. 5. ,
-"HUSSEY [C.J.] said that a question was asked of him, which 
y- was this:— —A clerk of a church, being in a room, struck another 
with the keys of the church. And by the force of the blow the / 
keys slipped from his hand, and went through a window and sti^ uckyj 
out a woman's eye. Should this be called mayhem of no ?— -that 
V: was the question. And to him it seemed that it should; for at V/.y
y y y the beginning this man had a bad intent." . f y % ; y:
CHAPTER SIX
The mediaeval period of the common law comes to a natural end 
in the writings of Sir Matthew Hale, Chief Justice of the King's 
Bench, who was at once a great mediaeval philosopher and theologian. X X 
He embodied the spirit of former centuries, and I have chosen him XX • .7
to bring this part of my research to a close. 7 . 7 ?'• 7 x > 7  X X xyy; > Xx
When the Historia Placitorum Coronae found its way intoX X '
print under the guidance and editorship of Sollom Emlyn in 1736, the ‘
English criminal law had there a work which ordered and defined and re­
fined the elements of the common law. Hale did what Coke did not: he 
gave an architectural structure and ponderance to our criminal law.
•X History records the death of Lord Chief Justice Hale \to have been on /X;/ 
Christmas Day, 1676, he thereupon dying at the age of sixty-eight. He 
was a profuse writer, not only upon the law, but upon religion, philo-. 
sophy, and science, with a large number of his manuscripts unpublished 
and held by the British Museum. What causes him to be different X
to consider is that he was a jurist who was also a philosopher, and it 
. is under this aspect which I wish to consider his understanding of action
X under the law to which responsibility, or not, is attributed to an agent
for such an action, or omission, or direction (as in the matter of third 
parties who are directed by A to do ’x' to Y ). 2 * 7  X VX X
The standard bibliography and biography of Matthew Hale is that from which X
:,I have taken earlier extractions: MATTHEW HALE by Edmund Heward, 7  -7
(Robert Hale, London, 1972) . Master Heward, of the Royal Courts of y'-'/Xx7. X 
Justice, gives a ful1 account of both published and unpublished works X ,. , v -X 
of Hale. The Tract on Natural Law is unpublished, and is held by the 
British Museum in its Harlean Collection as: HARL. MS.7159 ( and it , :
is also listed at page 184 as manuscript #5; byHeward [Appendix B, *
Hale Manuscripts at British Museum]). -I shall cite the manuscript a s X 
Natural Law, giving both the manuscript number, and the page.of the ' - -
folio . ;'7’7' >-X7  ’ • . , X. 77. 7  • ••; -.7. X; X \,7 X /. ‘-yX '' V; X% :/y XyXyx /Xy/
"But he that incites a Mad-man to kill another, is a principal Murtherer." X ” 
The Summary (London. 1694), "Murther", page 43. Y \
-■^XXyXXXy; ' • X.X X. ;-X: X. 3S 7 : • ■' ': X ‘ 7 'X , .7 -7 ^ ■7 7 7 iX7iJ
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The small legal handbook, Pleas of the Crown, is a simple
and methodical outline of the criminal law ( as its title suggests ). The
'’method” of the book was common for the time, and has been seen in earlier
authors: a simple, bare statement of the elements of an offence, drawing
4.upon statements given by earlier and authoritative authors. 
5.
From the
one may glean that Hale observes that there are dis- \'.y 
tinct elements or features to a criminal offence. One must consider the 
actor, asking after his capacities, faculties, and abilities; one must 
consider the nature of an act itself, asking if it be lawful or unlawful; 
one must look to the object of an action. The relationship, which is com­
plicated, between the law and the separate elements of a criminal offence 
are not dwelt upon; they are merely stated. A simple extraction will show 
his method: * Mans laughter, V: ' •vyyy;--.yy’ V-yyy --v- yyy yy- - V y
: y KILLING another upon a sudden falling out, ,
. y or provocation, or unjustifiable act, Man- ^^y v y V
• -.-yyy .'slaughter.; ... *** • "y y y yyy^ . : I'^ yy .VAyyy'"'--'.
; yyV- y;' ;.fr','2.y. What;.a sudden provocation ? y . yy vy y
: y Two strive for the Wall, and one kills the other, >
:yyy7; yy Manslaughter. . yy-yy' .yy' -yy ;* y /;/.■'./ ‘ T;y; ;/“!:• 'y.Ji'ATfi
, , y . 3. What unlawful act, whereupon Death ensuing .
,• yy-'' ■' y will make Manslaughter T y ' V  .?yy yy.yy^
y y If the unlawful act be deliberate/ and tend to : y
, y the personal hurt of any immediately, or by way of :
necessary consequence (italics mine), death ensuing,
yy ■'y,y:” /, y is Murder. .
yyyyy; But if either such deliberation or intent of personal ;
y  y y y  wanting, Manslaughter.” . , f ! ,
3. PLEAS OF THE GROWN: or, A Methodical Summary of the Principal Matters
relating to that Subject. BY:. Sir Matthew Hale, Knight, Late Chief .
, y Justice of the King's-Bench (LONDON, Printed by the Assigns of Richard 
Atkyns and Edward Atkyns...For William Shrewsbury and John Leigh. . .1694.
2E- Cit., cf.,"The Table: Notes used by the Author in his References” .
5 Op. Cit., "Heresie" pp 3-5; "Witchcraft" pp 6-8; "High Treason" pp 9-22;
’ "Of Felonies. . ." pp26r59. ' y'j-yy ' ■ ..-y- yyy-' y.y.'.... y ’yyyy':yy:y
6 ‘i l Op C^it.,- 'Manslaughter": pp 56-57.y y - y y y y.' y ..’ •;
a vocabulary known to us. He will also use certain key terms in broad
% ways, and one w i l l  be re q u ir e d ,  fro m  th e  c o n te x t  o f  a te r m ’ s use , to  make 
sense o f  th e  m eaning o f  th e  te rm , t h i s  example may s u f f ic e  to  show my 
. m ean ing . When one spqaks o f  ’ m a l ic e 1, i t  i s  te rm  w h ich  encompasses a y -':
w id e  v a r ie t y  o f  m eanings ( a n d  o f te n  c o n fu s e d ly  ) . B u t th e re  a re  some '7 7 7 ,
; usages o f  th e  te rm  w h ich  a re  c le a r ,  as th e  c o n te x t  w i l l  show: . > 7 7;
. 7 -  7, 7 ■: : .77  / • • y v y y  " M ute , P a ine  f o r t  § d u re . I  • y - \ v ; : "• ■ . ri 77:’’7  77 /. 7 y :7
77  , > . > - ; • ’.’NOW we come to the Demeanor of the Prisoner upon 7 7- 7 ;- 7 :7 7
7-- 7 :- 7  ; ’ . h is  appea rance : •• 7 ; 7 . .................... > -¥7 .
• ,j7;7.;;;-;.'7 ? 7 -> '7 y -'7 • 7--7 :'7  Arid the reupon- e i t h e r ,  7  7 : 7 '  7 7 : •••7- -77. ..7' 7 7 7 7
77.; ,.77*7 7 . . * . 7, ,7 _ 7 - /  -7-' 1 . He s ta n d s  M ute . 7 7 7  7 '7 '7  7 7 7 ' 7 7 7 7 7 y 7 7 7 ; 7 :
7 - 7 7\ 7 7 7 . : 7 : • 7 7  '77 ' 2 . He p le a d s . 7 7 7  ■; * V  7 7-7 ' , 7,v. •, -.y- 7 7 7
‘7-77 777-77: 7 ,7777... 77- - 3 . O r he ' c o n fe s s e th  th e  F a c t.:  7 '777 7 7 A 7 y 7  y ' - ' y y 7 7 7
7;77-7 7 7 :  /7''7'::-,7 :77 7 ' .1 • What said a standing Mute ? '7777 y 7 7 y  ;7
7  7 : .7  7 7 1 . When he answ ers n o th in g  a t  a l l :  and th e n  7 7 7 7 7 7
77.7. ’■ *-7V ‘ - 7 ■’ ’7-7 ¥ . i t  s h a l l  be e n q u ire d , w h e th e r he s ta n d  Mute 7 7  7 7 7 . 77 ::7777  
7 7 ' 7 7 , > v, 7 y . 7 . b y  m a lic e  o r  by  th e  a c t  o f  -God. .7  - 7 , 77- V7  ->777'--':\ -f1-7',777 7 7 > 7 :  
/ . , I f  i t  be b y  th e  a c t  o f  God, th e n  th e  F e lo n y  ¥.V:
7 7 y  7-7:7  :-7 - -7 V : 7  V - s h a l l  be e n q u ire d  o f ,  and w h e th e r he b e  th e  same 7 7 77;7 - >.7/'':
: - 7 7  • . 7 • ;: , 7 '--7 7 7-, p e rs o n , as i f  he had p le aded  n o t g u i l t y .  '7777 7 ; V 5 7 , .7 7 777 7 7 7 *
■i-7'7 7 ' 77,.-777'- 77"7/77/'77 77; I f  by  M a lic e ,  o r  i f  th e  P r is o n e r  h a th  c u t  77'.'77;' f7V?'-Zl&ti
7 7- 7-'. 7- 7 . 7'• - - o u t- 'h is -o w n  Tongue, th e n  he s h a l l  have P enance ."
; * The understanding plainly is, when speaking here of ’malice1, . ‘ that : 7 7 ;7;:
7? 7 t0 testify to the court j for whatever reason on the part : .
77,;. 7 o f  D ( as opposed to  D who may have been in c a p a c ita te d  by madness by an a c t  77- y
7y/'-~' 7 : :\ o f  G od ).- TTie s ig n i f ic a n c e  o f  ’ m a lic e  ’ i s  d i r e c t  and unsub t i e  in, t h i s  co n - 
7 : t e x t .  The usage h e re  is  d i f f e r e n t  fro m  a fo rm  o f  th e  usage h e re : t h a t  a , ,
7 7  - f e l o n y  by s ta tu te  i s  t h a t  o f .  " 5 .H .4 .C .  5 . M a lic io u s  c u t t in g  o u t Tongue, o r  
. 7  p u t t in g  o u t  Eye, F e lo n y ."  ® * ; and one may be t ra n s p o r te d  to  a h ig h e r  1 eve l*^77 .77-7
7 -7 ’ o f  a b s t r a c t io n ,  as in ,  "  Fo r an in t e n t io n  o f  e v i l , though n o t  a g a in s t  a
: 7 7 p a r t i c u la r  p e rs o n , makes a m a l ic e . " :  97 . A s im p le  s ta te m e n t o f  ’ m a lic e ’ in  77 7!
7* Op. Cit., page 225 7 8. Op. cit., page 119. 9. Op 7 cit., ’’Murther" page 4
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this regard is given by Hale in the entry: concerning Petit Treason: ®,'/Xv
. 7 . . [such] "Is confined by Stat. 2S _E. 3. to three Particulars::
X 7 : 7 "3. Where a Servant,upon Malice taken during his
7  77 : Service, kills his Master after departure from X
.'; y V  y  his. Service"."’; 7 /\ y .x X, X./-.:-y .y • 7 //X'
The use of ’malice' is not bothersome or complex in this common instance.
; X v When one comes; to the early usages of ’intent ’— nearly with
regard to the appearance of Hale1s own legal writing and his usage of
the term— —  %.* one has to observe the context in which it occurs, and from
a sum of contexts come to estimate the range of the word. Some Of the7  7
contexts suggest the following meanings. .An ‘intent’ is distinct from
a.consequence or ah act:*2y • '•'••X-7 ; 7777/; '.7yXX- /7 y 7
y ;-’X Xy v-: 7 ■' / 7  -;-X ’’Witchcraft 7; 7/y -X’; x/Xx .'77
X 7  "The Statute of 1 Jac. 12. the only Law now in
• X : 7 X X force against it, and divides it into two Per XX - 7
7' -'X • • ‘Xx * y y / 7 y  grees: / / .Xx- XyXvy X ... X . ; . - y  7  ' ..X' X /
Vv-7 -X.7XV-x-/7;.x •■;•; 1. Witchcraft in the first Degree made Felony y
/ . ’• ; ; . . without benefit of Clergy, including four Species....
X X . 2. Consult, covenant with, entertain, employ,
. 7 •* : ■ feed, or reward any Evil Spirit to any iii- 7
y.,;' X- y X,X;7 7-.' ' X tent, /(though no act be done thereupon.) *'
In the same title, Hale uses ’intent' to mean 'cause’, or to mean 'urge':
7 ”3. Or to the intent to provoke any Person to un-
’ •'•X.;/, :7’’ :x.7; lawful Love; these" Clauses come under the word
\ x /•:/../•; .y;--yX ,/.. X [taking upon.] XX//7/7/X X' y ' - . 7 y  >y /X-/./ *
7.63.
1 0 * 0£. Cit., page 23. •. 777;y7 .7 \. ;y  : -/ 7 y  7/: • y/y:' 7 I Xx ,... I
11. The first edition of the Pleas was iri 1678, two years after Hale's y 
death. Save for this edition of the Summary ( which was the first J//V 
authorised edition, an unauthorised edition appearing, also, in 1678")*..
. we have only his Preface to Rolle’s Abridgment (London, 1668). The book 
is, therefore,7 an early work, and the use of 'intent' throughout the 
work is* subsequently, early within the corpus of Hale's writings.
12. Summary, at page 6. 7  6 3 7 Ibid., at page 7. . ,
-- i .  •!
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In the language of Burglary Hale ( in the Summary ) uses ’intent' in
its simple meaning: to aim at an end, to effect a purpose: 13. . ' 1 .
"If the House be broken and entred (sic) with y v 
•;y y-.y y - an Intent to commit a Trespass, as to beat the ;'-y.yy
y.y . Owner, no Felony.” y-yy ■ . • '• i  ' :•>'••• *•;-’V'-V •:/ I**:.*.
Following upon the passage the usage is instanced again, "If with intent
to commit a Rape...", and stands without need of commentary. A similar
usage is found in his statement regarding Larceny: r y
"1. He that hath a Special property, as a Bailiff, . ; : ; 
y etc'., they are his goods pro tempore. A. bails y f >y.:;
• y Goods to B. and after to the intent to charge B. .
V y y (italics mine) steals them from him, Felony in A.”
To describe an aspect of the ’intent’; Hale will preface it with an ad­
jective,^yis. y :y.; ;y.:. y yyy^ - yyy;yy_>/yy/vy_y- yy” *
, ; ;y "A man throws a Stone at another, which glanceth ; / ; y y
and killeth another, Manslaughter; and not Mur- y . ■ y :’
y ther, because no malicious intent to hurt; (italics - y
One will also meet other standard forms in which ’intent1 is embodied; for
instance, ry y; y ./:••'/ -y , ' ■ '••/ • y-,y . ‘/yVyy '■>y .
’. "If A. and B having malice praepense, meet and. fight..." ^ y .
yy. . "The malice intended to one, egrediturpersonam, and makes /y
the death of another upon that malice, Murther, and quali­
fies the act in the same manner, as if it had had its due
: • e f f e c t ’. " - ; '  y y  *-y ’V::vy• v'-:y  •• V . -v ' : y y . ’ .. -. y  . ■ ,
. ; . . ; ; * . [* but 1 intended’ here means more ’ directed
y >- yy .  ’ ■ V ■ y •; ;. - • ’V ' against’. ]  y   ' . y  ; • -y.y y ’ v ’y  y y / /
’Intend’ will vary in form. It will, from the sense of the sentence(s) 
in the Summary, variously mean "directed to or against"; or ’intend’ will 
itself mean a malicious intent. Generally, the sentences are clear in this 
short treatise. '• - . ■ . y
3. Opy cit., page 83. 14. Op.cit.,page 67. 15. 0p_. cit,/ page 58.
6 Op• cit., page 51 ♦ Op. cit., page 50. y : y y y : ^ ? '
*■
/ . ' I drawupon thesefew instances of how Hale employed certain >.7. 7 7
key terms to show that it is to the text itself one must turn to under- / ■/ ' \ *
stand key concepts. But there is a further reason. Often the charge is
_• given that 1 intent *, and any of its derivative forms, was imprecisely used, 7
and given over to producing confusion. I question this assumption. It :
tends to confuse the inherent irref Tangibility of the concept with the yy.'yy/ 
use of a term. The term may be correctly used, as T believe Hale’s brief . 
usages in the Summary reveal; but his correct usage does not, by its for- : /
mality^ remove the conceptual difficulties inherent in mens rea.
.7 ; : Hale preserves certain usages which were common for the period; - >
but which may not primarily be accepted usage now. When he speaks of;/-!;/;V7' 7 
'compassing,' , as in, ’’Compassing by bare words is not an Overt act...” , * y  
it is an intentional verb (which usage was known to Coke 19.) . Where - in 7-‘77-7:777 
current usage a trial lawyer would ask if D was conscious of what he was :, : 7
doing or attempting, etc., Hale will speak of an act done ’knowingly’ by D. . 1 7
It is a usage we preserve at law, but in ordinary discourse it is an awkward 
or stilted usage. ’Knowingly’ tends to embrace ’intent:', but it does;:prodi^ e7'.[c-;,. 
this awkward locution: D knowingly did what he did not intend. One may t
, knowingly open the latch to enter a room, but one may unintentionally have ; ,
entered the wrong room or thewrong house. One ought not to equate ’intend’ \
with ’knowingly' as if they are synonyms. They may be used synonymously; they / 
7 are not necessarily synonyms. . , 7 - ;77.7-77 7 ' *!'- l7’ 7,7 7/V 7-7-7777777;:
' 3 6 2
18. Op. cit., "High Treason", page 13. ;*>¥¥¥* 77''- 7 ■- ''''777- ■
Cf., The Third Institute,.the title, "High Treason", Cap. 1.,
* paragraph (5) . 7¥;7:77'7 "7"' ;V.. • 7'”v V ¥ * 7 7 ’.V>'
: V  • 7 7 >{ - 77"" i
2 1 ,
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7  ’Knowingly’ may in its usage embrace several distinct
Xy concepts, as these examples will show: . . . XX''VX XpX-X-
; X y ”A man keeps ayBeast used to strike knowingly, f 
and ties it not up, the Beast kills a Man* :
. X X Felony by some, by others not, but a great y
'7;XX v;' - / Misdemeanour.” ; -7- . • 7  y V-'yy X:-/.[X Xy y-' Xyk
Or the essential ingredient to make an offence may be knowledge:
7 X;.y;yyy ’lAll Treason included Misprision: The Concealing. y X  X :y V ; X; !
X’ •.■y-y: XX. y  7  of any Treason, is declared Misprision only by
XX / , X by the Statute of 152 Mar.c.10 que induce auxi 7  7
X , y misprision. - "
"But this in case of bare knowledge; for if knowl- ■ ? X ,
;■/* yx... /• 7 yy edge and Assent, it is Treason: and though the X -X;:XXyy-X;XX/yX/7X
x x . Treason be by Statute, yet the concealing thereof , , , .
/  ; yX-'-y.X' .is Misprision of Treason.’’ y7; ./ ' y; ,y.’X; • 'yXy ‘7 X ;XXyyy.:y7
For the 'offence; of bringing into the Realm counterfeit money an element ' ■ X v;
of the offence is that the money is ’’brought knowingly’’ into the Realm. 22* X;
In this instance the text itself does not resolve the difficulty, ie., , :  ^ ^
that one ’’knowingly brings in false money knowing it to be counterfeit”, j
as opposed to a broader reading, ’’that one brings in money knowingly” and *
it is discovered to be false. This possible ambiguity is found in a number .Xypv
of statutory examples, chief of which is the meaning of ’possession’, when .-X; y «
D is charged with being in possession of some forbidden of an illegal chattel7  X
or substance, etc.- >
xX : r ; X  ; The chief meaning of ’intent’ in this early work by Hale :i^y7.7yyy-;y
y f . ' "• ' - ' 7  . .> 09 V-:! * • 7;that an ’intent’ is the production of an evil, mainly a legal;wrong, * or'7y 7 :y'
* to produce a harm not permitted by law. This is to give, a simple logical' X- - /X
x scheme. The complications within that scheme begin to arise when one asksry ;>XX ; :
20X . Summary, "Murther”, page 53. 21. Op« citX, ’’Misprision of X. X xX y X‘
y  :Py'y ;.y y, ;'y’ : y‘7-\ X’ /'-X'x , X;X Treason., The Negative Misprisions .”X;
2Z Op. cit., "High Treason" page 127. '7
Xy X. . page 21. X: X X;.y •- Py 7.. yXX’, 7 / .  ;.••• y yX ; \ . X;.:X. > X'-x pXyXXyVyX/ X .• X;y;Xy
23, 'Cf-., supra: Note "59 .yX . 7 • • Qp«cit., "Murther", cf., - the body y yy*
X7 . ..-.7 X v,.,:,vy- 7 y  X • ... ' , • X of the question ."What said Malice?";:,/
7  . PX;X-PyP---vP.Xy y •* ;yy 7X7;- -y- 7.X, x X. •: pp 44-45. X'- XX . -X. “ XX; y- ■ / .<
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- Hale presented arid developed a faculty psychology, explaining /
human action by appeal to tliese faculties and their powers. In a lesser
work,which will not concern us, Hale believed that demons and devils could
influence human action, but his statement provides no prolonged analysis
(other than to affirm an accepted truth of Christian believers). The
key to understanding human nature was its rationality, and rationality
presented itself through the operation of various human faculties. It was
a standard presentation of human powers at home in a variety of scholastic
treatises. In addition to the standard five senses which man possessed, he
also possessed two internal senses: 26.
"The internal Sense are of two kinds, viz., 1. Such i U :
, as concern perception of Objects: 2. Such as concern
 ^: 'the- motion to them as useful, or from them as noxious." ;
The seat of organisation whereby the manifold of perception was made a \- ;
unity was the brain, ".. .where it distinguished the Objects of the several
Sensories." 27. statement of how one knows is clearly within the
tradition of the scholastics: 28. \ y ; •
y , , ’’The Phantasie, that in;a way unsearchable unto us, 1. .
; : y Creates the Images of the things delivered from the £ ? •
; . V several Senses to the Commune Sensorium: 2. Com-
• ; pounds those Images into some things not unlike Pro- S ^
.V positions, though confusedly arid indistinctly: . 3. /
Makes particular applications of them one to another,
though still darkly and confusedly, whereby it excites
the Appetite either to prosecture their attainment, or ^
: ^ f l y  from them." , - y :. ' y' y'',"- . y . V-; v .
25. " . . . so the impure and Corrupted angels haunt and f lo c k  about a man 
g iven over to  v ic e , t i l l  they have w ho lly  corrup ted  and p u t r i f ie d  h is  so u l; 
and those good men whom they cannot w in over to them, they pursue w ith  as 
much m alice and envy as they can p o s s ib ly ; and although they cannot come 
w ith in  them, ye t as fa r  as they can, watch o p p o rtu n it ie s  to  ensnare o r 
blem ish them, though the v ig ila n c y  o f a b e tte r  guard, and th e ir  own prudence 
and c ircum spection , do fo r  the most p a rt d isa p p o in t and prevent them.*’ at 
page 361 o f,  "Motives to Watchfulness in Reference to the good and evil 
Angels.", from: THE WORKS, MORAL AND RELIGIOUS of Sir Matthew Hale, edited 
by: Rev. T. Thirlwal1, M.A. (LONDON, for J. White, 1305), volume two.
26. De Homine, page 46. v: - 27. Ibid.  ^ 2g Ibid. :
r - ;y
if there are, what then are the ultimate constituents of action under > yVy ; -^ 
the law ? Broad as the formulation of the question is, it is not a ; i , 
question for a philosopher which does not possess a pedigree. Aristotle 
asked a question of this form when he asked what were the ultimate con­
stituents of drama, which reply was that drama is the imitation of an- ’ >; 
action. It may seem to be unwise to ask after an ’ultimate', but one may 
mitigate any sense of queasiness in a search after ultimates by replying yy yV\ 
that an ultimate make take the form of being this answer to this question. :y 
An answer may be revised in the light of further knowledge. , . ' ; 5
■ i ; I make this preface because Hale thought that he had explained
human action, and, perhaps, ultimately . One is required to turn; from his yy ■ y W  
formal statements on the law and to turn to his- theorisings about human nature j
to be found in: The Primitive Origination of Mankind...according to The , . ' ,
Light of Nature.29. The portion of the vast book which is of concern here
is that section which was entitled, De Homine ^  which fell into the ac-y y V - •
cepted tradition of defining what was the nature of human nature. Hale set ^
but to prove, in very broad ways, that truth which was an,accepted;part of y
the Christian tradition: namely, that the truths of reason Would find them- ;y 
selves to be in harmony with divinely; revealed truths as contained in the ; 
Christian religion. The Middle Ages knew the debate well f,* • , and its ex­
tremes. ^ V- -  ^y £• W  .k. ;>; ?<
29. THE PRIMITIVE ORIGINATION OF MANKIND, Considered and Examined : - .
According to the Light of Nature, by Sir Matthew Hale ( LONDON, 167/)V
30. De Homine occupies pp 1-70 of the first edition of 1677 (supra).V -j ■ ;
31. The theory of "double truth" was one extreme position, espousing that -Vi
one degree of truth applied for philosophy, and another degree of truth ap- : 
plied for theology, and that one sphere could contradict another sphere.
Cf., Boetius of Dacia, "On the Supreme Good" in Medieval Philosophy edited ‘ . „ ~- 
r by John F.Wippel arid A,B.Wblter,O.F.M. (The Free Press, New York 1969), pp
367-75. Also, cf., "On Faith and Reason" by John Duns Scotus, in Medieval y,.-
Philosophy, edited by Herman Shapiro ( Modern Library, 1964 ), pp 441-480. \
;V  V
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From this depiction of how a person comes to gain knowledge of the
world , Hale proceeds to state how knowledge may become action:
7-- : I. ’The Estimative Faculty, which is indeed no other
than the last Operation or composition of the PhantaSie 
before-mentioned, whereby it concludes that this is a 
sensible good or a sensible evil, that it is attain­
> able or feasible, or not attainable; that though it be
. : good, yet sometimes it is not safe to be attempted by
. 7 . V  reason of the impendence of a greater sensible evil.
This seems to be the dark and confused shadow of the
7 : decision of the practical Intellect in Man.”
32. Ibid., pp 46-47. ’••’V'7: >>; v 7 V  v/ 7. V77 • ' \ ;7 ;^>'':'7. 7;,,-,7:;.
[*NOTE: The intricacies of what may be the essence of the Estimative 7 7 ;
Faculty in its development and use in mediaeval philosophy is a topic 
far outside of the field of this study, and is a topic of research unto 
itself. The importance of the concept, long ignored, was pointed out t 
by J. Peghairey in his seminal article, " A Forgotten Sense: The Cogi- 7 ;/ :7
tative, according to St. Thomas Aquinas .", Modem Schoolman, XX (1943) ,■ 
pp 123r40, and pp 210-19. The notion of an internal estimative sense 7 7. 
is not confined to Aquinas. It. was used. ( but seldom formulated in : ? .7
detail ) by a number of mediaeval writers. Cf.J. F. Quinn's study,
THE HISTORICAL CONSTITUTION OF ST. BONAVENTURE1S PHILOSOPHY ( published :: 
by: The Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies* Toronto, Canada, 1973 ), 
especially Chapter Four: Potencies of Human Knowledge, pp 323-365, at 
pp 335 ff, the discussion Of Bonaventure's understanding of the estimative 7 
Sense, and contrast of that understanding with that of Aquinas's, pp 337­
338: "Since the useful or harmful qualities of sensible things are not 
apprehended either by the exterior senses or by the imagination, another 
Interior sense is required for this operation. That sense is called
estimative in the animals, because, in them, it is a natural instinct... , ;
It: is called a cogitative sense in man, who estimates the useful or harm- 7 
ful qualities of sensible things in a discursive manner; so, comparing the 
particular values of sensible things, his sense of estimation is also called , ,7 
a particular reason." ...."Though he does not use the names cogitative 
sense and particular reason. Bonaventure’s description of the estimative - 
sense in man is not much different from the one given by Aquinas, for Bona- 
venture maintains that it is reason which; decides whether or hot.to take :
delight in a good thing perceived through the senses. For both theologians, 
then, the senseof estimation is conjoined to the sense appetites, but it 
operates under the control of reason. Aquinas takes a different stand from 
Bonaventure, however, on the signification of sensuality. For Bonaventure, 
the name signifies an integral power unifying both the cognitive and the 7; r 
appetitive potencies of a man's sensitive nature. For Aquinas, the name 
sensibility designates the totality of cognitive and appetitive potencies of v 
sense in man, whereas, sensuality, properly understood, stands only for his 
sense appetites...(for) Aquinas, the cogitative sense is connected to sensuality 
in a way similar to the connexion between the practical intellect and the will .7= 
in the action of free choice." pp 338-9. ; *>7.7; • 777;;'7 > 7 ' 7 - ; ‘./-7- 7--7' :7->7
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7. % £%  x" \ ' : \ V.. 36*7 vl; > 5  - 1 x •••. - y ,y X ;y’ y  •'
: v 7 : X X I hope that I have not wrongly chosen to state the issue. c : ,;
I have said that Hale tells us "how knowledge may become action." The . Xy 
key to having a theory of responsible human action is that D, as an X ; XyVX;Xyy 
• agent, may not only know what he did, but do because of what;he knows. X y !
An action is a production, broadly; but a responsible human action must yy: y.; X/ 
be a production to which responsibility can be ascribed. It seems to X >y
• be beyond the bounds of ordinary usage to attribute ( unless metaphori- yXV- /'7>yX
caliy ) responsibility to rion-cognitive causes. One’s blood is not’■/y / yy.yyyy 
responsible for its iron deficiency. To be responsible implies both ; yvy y-y.
that one can know, is able to know, how to act; and that one voluntarily : :
X , produces or authors one’s responsible act. Or, simpler yet, that in 
X ■ authoring an human act one can be said to know what one did* and one
yJX; freely did it. How far the responsibility will extend, to wkat range X X XX
Xy X X of consequences* will vary with what degree of responsibility is ac-> X /
y ... ceptdd as feasible ( both for the; agent, and to be imposed upon the agent ). :
XX X ,:X: : 7-.. • Hale links ’knowledge' with 'action1, in the sentence which.. 7X X-7. Xy
*7, says, "This seems to be the dark and confused shadow of the decision of y i . X 
the practical Intellect in M a n . I t  is not that Hale is denying that one :y 
can know without error; it is, rather, that he is assuming that between .XXy XxxX, 
'7- X k n o w l e d g e  and action there: may be a confused and dark side.
X .promise is seldom the promise one may wish. Broadly, too, Hale gives • ’ -
7 Xy , some ground to believe that man has a moral faculty; if only to state tha;t y 7y.yy 
. it is possible for one to perceive naturally correct or naturally evil X
y . . states of affairs. A moral sense is, in some way, a natural human sense, y
\ The act of making a moral judgement, even in its simplest sense, is an X ../•••_/ 7yX77'- 
X XX XV interior act of the s o u l 7 ;. - . .-.y y 7 - 7 r7. 7 X. X.7 P -.-V :X\7,7XXp
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. , In passing, it does command the remark, however, that the v
theory of a natural inner moral sense, or an inner sense upon which .y * y 
one may ground or justify a moral sense, is, itself a difficult theory *•
to defend (and, in our time, an attitude of mind much removed from ^
our common moral sentiment in the English speaking world ). 33. • ,=; ’.V ;.j
this point in my exposition I am not concerned with presenting a justi­
fication of Hale's moral exposition and assumptions. His general under­
standing of moral foundations is, in the main:,, consonant with writers of <;j
his period, and, in this regard, Hale is a consistent and conventional v :' ; •
figure.' 34, v’. >.*;* ~ ; ;■ ^  ; :y..\ V. ’;'
33, Two recent authors would reject Hale's assumptions outright. In
J. L. Mackie's, ETHICS, Inventing Right and Wrong ( Penguin Books, ■
v 1977 ), and in Gilbert Harman's, THE NATURE OF MORALITY, An Intro­
duction to Ethics ( OXFORD UNIVERSITY PRESS, 1977, New York ), both 
scholars would argue generally that moral standards are not grounded; 
upon natural perceptions of a necessary order to be found in the world. 
Moral rules are more conventions and agreements, akin to contracts, J 
and not necessary natural perceptions of an inner moral sense, akin 
to some notions of natural law and natural moral order. A contrary view 
can,: however, be found which is espoused by an English moralist. In 
Authority in Morals by Gerard J. Hughes, S.J., ( published by: HEY- v 
THROP MONOGRAPHS, Heythrop College, London, 1978 ), its author argues 
that moral authority is derived both from natural law and from a con­
sistent natural theology ( cf., Chapter IV of his text, "Authority in 
the Christian Communityrf, '' 91-121 ).
34, One may refer to the following treatise which will bear out how much v
Hale was a voice of standard moral perceptions of the period: A TREATISE
• ■:* OF TOE PASSIONS AND FACVLTIES OF THE SOULE OF MAN, By Edward Reynoldes ,
( late Preacher to the Honorable Society of Lincoln's Inne... ), Printed
for R.H. for Robert Bostock, 1640, LONDON. Hale was called to the Bar
of Lincoln's Inn in 1628, and remained at the Bar until 1651. There is
little doubt, with his interest in theology and philosophy, that Rey- 
noldes would have been known to Hale, and, therefore, that,Reynoldes's 
. . large work, A Treatise, would have been known to Hale. A; Treatise isyyv
a very compelling Work of the philosophy of mind which thoroughly pre­
sents the accepted wisdom of the period, and is deeply indebted to the 
Aristotelian corpus for its fundamental assumptions in psychology and 
epistemology. ;
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As his exposition of the faculties continues it parallels 
a standard Aristotelian understanding of human senses and their opera­
tions. He does draw a parallel between natural appetites (Appetitus y/y 
naturalis) and the human will, which, for sake of harmony in a theory, 
links together the material and immaterial aspects of human activity. 
Hale, it will be appreciated, espoused the dualism common the Christian 
belief. Linking these two disparate realms, Hale says: 35/ 0 ; f 1
- "Now as to what Faculty or those Faculties that 'y\y. ’ y ^
v / concern the pursuit or flight of what is thus y y y y
y y • • propounded by the Phantasie or Estimative Facul- - v V-Vi^ 
. ty* they are generally two: The Appetitus naturalis,' .y
‘ which bears some analogy to the Will in the Reason­
. able Nature; and the acts thereof are either pro- ‘ :y;
L secution of the Sensible Object propounded, if pre- ,W:y y- r
; sen ted by the Phantasie and Estimative Faculty as ;/•; :’*>
: .... * . good; or else aversation from it,  if presented as y :  . y 1 ■,
} * ■ :.-y evil." y ' .1 : y ' y / , v7:"y'--;-7 :
Upon a rather general form of Ayistotelianism,;transmitted through the
Schoolmen, one is given an explanation for human action ( towards the
naturally good, or from the naturally evil, as perceived ) based upon
a Christian understanding of human nature as an hypostatic union of soul
and body. V  y-y. yyy; ///{\y':.> - ,-y •' y. :
-y y  . ’. \/y I need not give a detailed analysis of Hale's presentation
of the operation of the intellective nature of the soul. He himself .i, :
says briefly: 36. ,'y .* • • • , _ -/;• . ; yy y-'.y -yy.
"Now to give a brief Inventory of the Excellence of the ’ ;
' Humane Nature. . . " -'-y V/';--- vf ’a : r y  y.yy V'.- > ; • y ,-yy >•/
. •, /  • - v  •. ■ ' • / • ' ' • y • ; ' ' • ' • , y * .. . y  y
•. . "In relation to himself I shall briefly consider these .
v - •. particulars: 1. The excellency of his Soul or .intellectual /
• nature, in its nature, faculties, acts and habits. . . "
35. De Homine, page 47. ' • ■ • - > ’y - y yy-\yr:^ /
36 Qp« cit., page 52. ' ••.. •'... ' "y-yy' • • •; " .. / ;y :': , y •
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The object of intellection is, "omne intelligibile”, and this is a 
class of objects far wider than the class of objects which comprise v  
the class of sensible objects. 37.' One such ’object’ for the human 
intellect is, ”10, The moral goodness and congruity, or evilness; 
unfitness, and unseasonableness of moral or natural actions, which - ^ 
falls not within the verge of a brutal faculty.” 3.8. ; An effect of;; ; ;
the object of understanding is for that object to radiate or trans- . 
mit itself throughout one’s character, ie., understanding the benefi­
cent may produce a beneficent disposition in an agent: 39. > : ;
"Concerning intellectual Habits or the genuine effects 
of these acts in the understanding Faculty, and they are S  •
divers and diversly expressed by those that have treated
' / / > . ;  thereof. *** - : : :> ;V '. '• '[ --
:, • "5 . Prudence; which is principal ly in reference to actions ~
to be done, the due means, order, season, method of doing • •*
•. . ■ : or not doing. / •  V ;i:v '/•■•.■r''..' ' V-; \ : ’v:"®
• /•;.; ”6. Moral Virtues; as Justice, Temperance, Sobriety, . , vv
: v i: ; Fortitude, Patience, etc,, for these begin in the InH ^ ;
tellect, though their exercise belong principally to 
/ ; the faculty of the Will.” y **?’ * > \
in harmony with many of the English writers of the period, the Will :
was the executor of an action, and, when one transposes this theory into
the law to account for the actions of D at law, it reminds one of the
use of ’voluit’ in early Church law when the action of D was thought to
embrace not only an aim he himself knew, but a corrupt exercise of his'
own will to achieve his aim. To speak of a "corrupt intention" was to
describe the action of D incompletely; intention had to be an expression
of both intellect and will. >v r - **>*•*« *?. V•'■ -V
37. Op. cit., page 54
38. Op. cit., page 55 
3Q.v Op♦ cit., pp 57-8
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X - • 7  Hale presents an ordered understanding of the Will:
;. / ; , X "The Will therefore is that other great. Faculty
"•... J. 7  ./- X, of the Reasonable Soul, and it is not a bare xy X: y
; - - ; - "' XyX 7  appetitive power as that of the sensual appetite, yy
Xy X y-yy/y'yxbut^ii; a rational appetite, and is considerable, X X
- ,' X. y y. /XX X.. 1. In its Nature, 2. In its Object, 3. In its yyXy
-7 ;X x'Xy-y X-x-". Acts-,.; y/v7 7 ry  X sV : xxxy':';-yy xvy. • XX y X ;; x■- -X; x yx
From .this portion of his treatise I wish to make some few large ex- X
tractions. The connexion between the philosopher and the criminal* 7  X
lawyer appears to be located in his descriptions of the Will. Of that
faculty he makes the following assertion: 4*' XXx X y
. . y ; "1. The Nature of the Faculty is that it is X
: free, domina suarum actionum, free from com- .X
X ,  pulsion, and so spontaneous, and free from -X X
X y.. y ; determination by the particular Object, wherein : : X
7 it differs from the sensitive appetite, which
though spontaneous, because moving from an in- 
X 7  7  :’ ward principle, yet is, if not altogether, yet X y,
y y 7  for the most part determined in its choice by x X: Xy
X 7  the External Object. But bow: far forth tbe
X X X- XX X Twill is determined by the last act of the prac-
'■; :,y y7- xV tick Understanding* or how far such a determi^
X; X X X' • XX nation is, or is not consistent with the essential
X or natural liberty of the Will, is not seasonable
y -7 X xyyX,.-'" here to dispute, "(italics mine) ■. X X' y -' X X -• .
'-X'X y V X XX ’ .-/'X ' X ./y.-X' ,<y In the fashion of a judge, Hale puts
aside the thorny issue of how.to explain, and justify, the freedom of ;X X
the will, but, equally, like a judge, he asserts and assumes that the
Will is free. From this assumption he is led to conclude:
:• : ‘ :• xX "This liberty of Will, together with that other X
X; : X . y X Faculty of Understanding, is that which renders ; y 
X X the humane (sic) Nature properly capable of a Law,
. . ; ' and of the consequence of Law, Rewards and Punish-
raents; which doth not properly belong to the animal 
X 7 Nature, because destitute of these two Faculties."
40. De Homine, page 58. 41. Ibid. .XX 42 Ibid. X X X:Ty.V:y;>7
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He then proceeds to state what is the object of the will, and the acts
of the will / v ” - >>;.> / 'f'.;*. > " >.*•/
; > "2. The Object of the Will is not confined to a ■. > •
sensible Good, but is much larger, namely, such , 
a Good as is compatible to an Intellectual Nature -yyy 
; : yin its full latitude, such as are moral and super­
natural Good. yy :-;,y v’. ;,:y->. yy - y v'
y >; "3. The Acts of this Faculty are generally divided *
into Volition, Nolition, and Suspension: That di- 1
‘ vision that herein better suits with my purpose ; ; : £
y  ' / are these, Election and Empire. .
; ; 1. Election or choice, and this in reference  ^: •> ':
.y ; >:;yy both to means and end; for though the Schools tell >, > >•>
>; us, that Electio is only mediorum § non finis, this
> is to be intended of the general end or good at large, y
• . ; . and in its universal conception, for when several ; ;
. ;v particular ends are in proposal, there it belonging i f
to the Will a power of Election of these, as well as 
■ /•>'■■ of the means to attain them.” >.>**. ■ >>.%
Stating that the body and its faculties may, in part, be subject to y
involuntary motion which is outside of the province of the will, Hale
proceeds to depict how and in what ways the will does rulev. The
"Empire of the Will" may restrain the "motion of Appetite". It is ;
a compressed sentence which depicts this exercise: 45. .1.
y >;> "1. Sometimes the very motion of the Appetite ity ' y %.. 
y' >: : self is’ restrained by the Empire of Will, so that a
man doth not appetere that sensible good which other­
' > wise he might or would, because he will not; and this
. :> ■ ■ ' >v; is the most natural’:and noble regiment of the Will over
y->-. .  : the sensual Appetite." >y ;/">> ■>-' >; >>•/ > V,
Vv - V* :
43. Op. cit., pp 58-9.
44. 2E- cit., page 59.
45. tbid. r :
V.; By the use of ’appetere’, which may mean ”to desire earnestly”, Hale :
... seemed to indicate that a desire either had been extinguished, or that • ;>C
- ; it had been prevented. The model given by the Latin verb here is that
V  the will may either extinguish or diminish the force of a desire— or ,
. \ this is the.reading. I give to the passage. r,.
The second example of the will in control is thusly stated: * :
 ^v - ’ ”2 . Though it may fall out that the sensual
: \ \ . Appetite may appetere bonum senslbHe, yet the Will , / V
: ' V ; r. ^ may and doth 'control 1' the empire of the Appetite in
J ^ ; - : : ' . the execution of that appetition: As for instance, ^ i •
A man sees delicious fruit, and he desires it; 'inso .'.''-VC\ : ^
much, that were there not a control 1 over the empire
of his Appetite, it would command the Hand to reach it, - V y y  y:V.
; ' ' and the Mouth to eat it: ; But the contrary command of -f-v
; : . the Will supersedes the command of the Appetite; the ;•
: ; * . , Appetite desires it, but the Hand is forbidden by the
• .Will to reach it.” ‘ ‘ .
;V What the illustration reveals is an echo of practical judgement, familiar;
to any reader of the Nichomachean Ethics, and, during the epoch in which
Hale wrote, a text known to most moralists in England. The logic im- f
plicit here is not that the Estimative Sense has warned that ’x’ may be "7'y; V
. harmful; it is that an object is now seen as delectable, or as desirable,
; but the will does not convert what is seen or beheld as potentially or
*?; possibly a good into; an actual good. A practical judgement, it may be . ; V
recalled from the Ethics, can be resolved into two categories. The good
may be seen as a good, and it is desited. It is assumed that if D were v!':
; ; T , impelled, which is the force of ’appetere', all that woul d prevent D there - . t'
; upon from joining together a universal proposition with a particular . v,y- -
proposition ( ie.,, p seeks after the [sensible] good; this ’x’ is a vi' t: A
. .sensible good; therefore, the hand brings the fruit to the mouth ),to, : ‘7 .
v ;r effect a conclusion ( which is the action itself ) would: be a warning >
' y v 46. Or - Cit., pp 59-60. .v /C >y A
• 1
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, v ; from the Estimative sense that the good, as such, was not a good, but was, v.
A-\ rather, a harm to be eschewed. : I r ' l ' X ■'
■  ^ ; v . ■ But Hale wishes to Use the elements of a practical syllogism
to show how the Will, after a good has been perceived as a desirable good,
. ;; may elect to act towards the good, or may not act towards the; good. The M
practical syllogism in and by itself does not, for Hale, author action in
an agent. Can it ? Hale would admit that an agent can be impelled, as a /
man driven by an uncontrollable desire; but Hale also wishes to argue that
it is not a conceptual contradiction to assert that the will can control
movement towards the sensible good ( appetere bonum senslblie ) if an agent
: Will exercise such control. This is made clear, I believe, in;the text .Y\V:
' 5 later on: 47. ; > \; .. .. * • :  . v . ;;'
V  • : "But the control! of the Will upon the Appetite in .
; the reasonable Nature, is many times, and indeed ; v
0 ;■: most often done, not upon the acccount of a sensible
; - evil felt or feared, which of it self were sufficient
; V to determin the Appetite; but sometimes upon the account • v
' V. - ^ y. of such hopes or fear as fall not under a sensitive no- y V''.'- <**
. ; : > tice, as of the command or prohibition by God; yea many i
 ^  ^ times upon a bare MOral account of the indecorum, un- ,
\ ;y '• reasonableness, unseasonab 1 eness or litter unfitness Of;'V/; ^'.J'; 0.
the thing it self, without any other motive of fear ./•*. •. .. '
either of a present or future sensible inconvenience ' : . :Vyyy
. thereby; which Moral consideration can no way move the ;
sensible Appetite, were it not for the Will, which being i 
' a rational Faculty is moved by it." ; ' f \ :y- , .'y
- ; The logic here is consistent with what was earlier said regarding the a  ^
: Estimative Faculty. If moral datum is not to be found in the sensible
v / perception of Objects themselves, then, according to Hale, the first •;;
ground for a moral predicate is to be found in the Estimative Faculty .
yV : which ^concludes that this [• x'] is a sensible good or a sensible evil.!'
- 47. Op. cit., page 60. : 'y. y • •; i . ; , . /y Vy-y.
J
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7 ; . /The 'link' between the sensible as good, and the: good as / y/'i
moral, is to be located in the nature of the phantasm, which Hale calls
" the Phantasie ". - ’ It will be recalled that he held that .the second
function of the phantasie was to render the perceived, as an image, into y •
something not unlike a proposition. For coherence of theory; therefore, 
he provides a continuity between the perception of good or evil \*hich the 
Estimative Faculty intuits— — we may recal 1 that the ".. .Estimative Faculty/ 
...is indeed no other than the last operation or composition of the Phan- 
tasie before-mentioned..."— ^-and subsequent moral knowledge which is ) 
expressed by and through the construction of moral propositions which are 
the object of the human intellect. jn this way a moral proposition
is not an imaginative invention unconnected with reality; quite to the con-y
trary, a moral proposition is an expression of a fundamental moral prin­
ciple, grounded upon a logically prior aspect of perception: namely, to ■ 
avoid what is naturally harmful, and to seek what is naturally good, aspects 
of the real which are given directly in perception, and extracted by the yo/ 
Estimative Faculty when one comes to know what is contingently the case. > 
(And,: for sake of argument and presentation, it is defined that the 'real’ 
is not the,content of a dream or phantasy, but is the extra-mental given •y 
in perception which, if one wished to attach :a label to the theory, might 
be a form of realism.) ; y  y* V . ' ' i  s r & f i. y .•/ - •. - yyy ’ ; y'.'y’
Any attempt to vindicate this theory of perception and of
knowledge is a study in itself ( which cannot be undertaken here ) . I ■
wish to  present only a simple exposition of what Hale said. y : ; y
48. Op. Cit., cf., page 46-ff. : -y ’:y> . "-.•••>'> ' •;
49v Ibid. . S  - y'y • , 50. Op . Cit., cf., pp 54-5, ff/ /
:■ P>. / /’•
?v  1
• V
,:--V/yy y y y y / - y y ^ - - y
y y  v .V Hale makes a very strong statement as to the power of the y
'-,-, . human will. ( "Impefium voluntatis" ), as the; following excerpt will show: y  ‘
, ; . . "Now this Imperium voluntatis may be considered in relation,
•' y  y ?/y; y- 1? To it self: It can suspend its own acting, either , * . *
y y , • y„..y '. of electing or rejecting. ,vV> . > '
'y y y y y ^ ; ' : 2. To the Understanding: Though it cannot suspend its .
: :>V*; perception, omnibus ad percipiendum requisitis ; 'V;
.yy. y; y : ; y, adhibitis , yet it may suspend its decision or ‘
y y  : determination, or at least its obsequium to such
y  ' y y ' - y'‘y^y y/-decision-.; ' /y C’:-; v::.y, y ' iV >•*> : f-
y y y  'v -/ 3* The Passions, which are as-it were the Satellites ‘''yy *•
r ; voluntatis, and follow the command of the Will,
:y ,, : yy •-y  - y  y • y ,y \ ; ” where the Will acts according to its power and -■ y/; yyyyy-'-y/;
',y“; '.j -T*/ yyy authority. yyy/;- - . y  ;'y -y,--':-y y-'y-.-y/ ' .;y
f yy y / ;4. To the animal Spirits, and the Vessels in which they * y
yy>yy ;y>y'V4*yy. v' y y ' y - ' are received When designed to Motion, namely the y V  . 
y:y ", ■ ■ y.y ■. . • Nerves and Muscles, these are all subject;to■ the y  yyyy/yyy.
/y / , /y' ,"y : ; v ; / Empire of the Will, as to Local Motion of the whole y y y  ;-.:y;
y /'.'y’y y - y y './••’ y, '/,;; f Body or any part thereof , when the Spirits, Nerves ; ;;\y
\ / ; y and Muscles are in their dure and natural state.
. y; ' . 5.; ^ To- the sensual Appetite: And indeed herein is evident
••; // v . y both the Empire and Sovereignty of the Will, and also y yy yy
y ; .„ / the visible discrimination between the Humane Nature
'yy y  *.yy •- y y y and Animal or Brutal Nature, and its preference before !/
;yy ; >,; /y-y y:1«- .y y.it'. In the animal Nature it is evident that the- 'sen-'.;" •.'•/. y v V '
y / y ■/ V■/.;y v  \ sual Appetite is that which hath and exerciseth the *•.
y'y;;;/''/:-:":-'- y ■ y .. sovereignty and dominion; dyer the spontaneous actions ;
y vyy >•, : / of the animal Nature, that commands the Foot to go,
: ; : ; y y the Mouth to eat, and all other the spontaneous motions
y- y y  :;y ; .'in order to a sensible good: But in Man the sensual •/ , ,;•
y. yy , , v ; Appetite is under the government of the Will and con- :
: y ;V; /; y ; y ; ;y trolled by it, iat least when the reasonable Faculty : <
y ' ; is not embased and captived by ill custom or disorder.":< Of y
It is readily apparent that this is a very strong statement of the power y^y;
y of the human will over itself and over the domain of human actions. In;yy yy ; y
; the fifth consideration I have put into italicis what I deem to be Hale.'s
y  ; explanation for the failure either df the;wiii to control itself according
to a rule, or to control the exercise of human appetites; If the Will is
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(apparently) such an ordered and rational faculty, why then does it fail 
in its exercise of proper self control , or in properly seeking the good ?
If one stresses the rationality of the will, then is not one subject to
.-.A ■ .a . ; ■ a A- . ' v ■ ■ . \ 52 * •' • " : ,• a - ' '•* ‘the criticism which Hobbes advanced, namely: A  :'a  a ' ; > a .a  ’ A,.".
’’The Definition of the Will, given commonly by the ; ” a 'a ':- 'A
i'J; , . Schooles,. that it is a Rational Appetite, is notVA A   ^ A
A  good.'-For if it were, then could there be no Volun- .Aa 'Aa ;A;a
. ‘ ; , tary act against Reason. For a Voluntary Act is that, -A,.* - AA;'
:v which proceedeth from the Will, and no other. But if - <
instead of a Rational Appetite, we shall say an Appetite ' A A ^ A ’ A  
' a  resulting from a precedent Deliberation, then/the De- .;/y  '-A'a A a 'a  
finition is the same that I have given here. Wiil 
• therefore is the last Appetite in Deliberating ^ And , v ;
a  though we say in common Discourse, a man had a Will :
. • // once to do a thing, that neverthelesse he forbore to.. .'.A..- A
; A  do; yet that is properly but an Inclination, which / • ; ■
: a  makes no Action Voluntary; because the action depends A A a ;:A'A:
v not of it, but of the last Inclination, or Appetite. ;
• For if the intervenient Appetites, make any action ' ;
, Voluntary; then by the same reason all intervenient
.A;,vAy 'Aversions., should make the same action Involuntary; and
. so one and the same action, Should be both voluntary and
■ Involuntary. "A- '-a ; -a a  -A- a  • y . /AyyAy
V , "By this it is manifest, that not onely actions that have
a  . . a their beginning from Covetousness , Ambition, or other Ap- •
.. petites to the thing propounded; but also those that have
their beginning from Aversion, or Feare of those conse- A
’ . .. quences that follow the omission, are voluntary actions."
Hale would not accept the force of this criticism. It is to be recalled y
that he defined the Will y  a  as ’free’, and that freedom embraced that
the will was free from compulsion, that the will was spontaneous, and that A A
it}was free from the determination: of any particular object ( even, it . . y. ; ' .
may be assumed, the object of an appetite ). Hale posits that it is within y  V y
the gift of free will that free will may be abused; more a statement than
an explanation of weakness of will. The underlying assumption, for Hale,
is that when an agent does not make God the object of his intellect and will,
52. LEVIATHAN, by Thomas Hobbes of Malmesbvry (LONDON, Printed ;fot Andrew '• A.;y 
Crooke, 1651), OF MAN, Part 1, Chapter VI, "Of the Interiour Beginnings of A A A  
Voluntary Motions; commonly called the PASSIONS", pp 28-9. 53; Die Homine, p 5S;
A  - :.,Ai
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then some lesser state of goodness obtains, and this lesser state is
tainted with imperfection. * If the theory is embraced to its logical
end, and if that is applied to legal reasoning, then a legal system has
to be at once also a theocratic legal system ( because the object of a
properly willed act would be the good, and, by definition, only God is
the highest good) . Hale would call this 'good' the 'sovereign Good*: A
"Again, as to the power of the Will, it hath likewise > V
:: Objects of Good answerable to the former distribution.
> :1. The subordinate Good of Moral Virtues, Honesty, So­
briety, Justice* Temperance, and all the train of Moral 
\ : Virtues; these being united to the Will in their acts and
' •';. constant habits, the Will enjoys a great Moral Good, tran­
: quillity of Mind, complacency and delight. 2. The Sovereign
; Good, which is the glorious God,, reached after by the Will
as the chiefest Good, and enjoyed in the manifestations o f  : 
his Love, Favour, PresenceInfluence, and Beneficence;
: .  . this fills the vastest motions of the Will, fills it with 
Peace, Contentation, and G lo r y ,  and keeps it nevertheless 
I • . in a perpetual motion, by returns of Gratitude, humble .
V Love, Obedience, and all imaginable extension of it self ,
,. :, for the Service, Honour,and Glory of that God that hath
54* An aspect of Hale's theory of behaviour is that a wise man must learn 
to control the objects of his desire. In part, then, what objects a per- i 
son entertains will reveal if one is a virtuous person or not. This senti­
ment is expressed in his essay, "Of The Moderation Of The Affections", to 
be found in volume two, at pp 363-372, of: THE WORKS, MORAL AND RELIGIOUS ;: 
of Sir Matthew Hale, edited by: Rev. T. Thirlwall, M.A. (LONDON, for J. White, 
1805). In the essay, "Of Wisdom and The Fear of God", to be found in : 
CONTEMPLATIONS MORAL AND DIVINE (LONDON, printed by William Godbind for .
William Shrowsbury...1676), pp 17-52, Hale advances the general notion that 
a proper fear and reverence of and for God will direct a man's passions 
properly— -which is to advance a standard Christian teaching. The sanie 
sentiment is consistent with what is expressed in Primitive Origination...
"Man hath in  the p e c u l ia r i ty  o f h is  nature  these two g rea t Powers and re ­
cep tive  F a c u lt ie s , whereby he is  rendred amply capable o f a g rea t enjoyment, 
namely h is  Understanding, whose proper Object is  T ru th , and the n ob le s t -\-X~£ 
Truth  th a t is ,  and i t s  proper a c tio n  is  d ire c te d  to  th a t O b jec t, namely, In ­
te l le c t io n  and W i l l ,  whose proper O bject is  [Good,] and the g re a te r and more
sovereign the Good is ,  the more s u ita b le  i t  is  to  th is  power, and the proper I
act o f th is  power is  to  reach a f te r ,  and d e s ire , and embrace, and d e lig h t in  / 
i t  O b ject: and the f i l l i n g  o f these two re ce p tive  powers w ith  the c h ie fe s t in ­
te l le c tu a l  T ru th , and w ith  the c h ie fe s t and in te l le c tu a l  Good, is  th a t which ;
p e rfe c ts , advanceth, and enable th  these F a cu ltie s  o r Powers." pp 377-78,
Section IV, Cap. VIII, "A farther Enquiry touching the End of the Formation 
of Man* so far as the same may be collected by Natural Light § Ratiocination.u
i  ^ - "thus bountifully given to the Soul a power in
some measure receptive of his .Infinite Self...
: ! .?>, . ’’And now because Man hath a doubt state, namely a
state in this Life in conjunction of the Soul with 
; ; the:Body, naturally dissolvible..." [one is led to
: conclude that] v.y <■ »
V : >: . "1.. In this Life, the proportionable fruition of Man ’
. is that which is compatible to the state he hath here*
:i : v ; ; : namely..." [that man may exercise]"...dominion over
y his Passions and inferior; Faculties, and the due :
/ ; S ; placing, ordering, arid moderation of them; a resig-
• ;  ^ 1 nation of his Will to this Divine Will, and a depen-
v ; dance upon his Goodness, Power, and All-sufficiency: "
:V y ; ■: V and from all these: arise peace of Conscience, conten-
tation and tranquility of Mind..;" :
'54. , Cont., . 'y :: p •„ v" :;
/ Hale closes the logic of the argument in the same chapter by 
stating, "And this doth lead us to a just discovery of what that end 
of fruition is, for which Man was designed by his beneficent Creator, 
namely, such as is suitable, answerable, and proportionate to those 
Powers or Faculties in Man whereby he excells all inferior Animals, 
his Understanding and his Will; and herein consists his happiness, 
his end of fruition or enjoyment." at page 378, Op.Cit. This is a 
form of the traditional Christian argument that the proper object of 
the Will and of the Intellect is God: for the Will, God as the ultimate 
good; for the Intellect, God as ultimate truth. And, within the tradition 
of transcendentals, truth and goodness, when applied to God, are conver­
tible. The unity of man is affirmed through his faculties of understanding 
and of will exercised upon an eternal, personal object: God as good and 
God as true. : 'vk% - ’
55 ' ■ . ■ / 4: . . .  '•. . .‘ Section IV, Cap. VIII, "A farther Enquiry touching of the End of
the Formation of Man, so far as the same may be collected by Natural 
Light and Ratiocination." of,The Primitive Origination of Mankind, pp 
378-9. ' •. '-x ' ~ , v - ’
~ ' ' • '■ y.-.j
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: .7 From the point of view of possible application to a A y  " ;
theory of law, and of human actions under the rule of law, Hale has 
espoused a double theory of Will. In the first instance the human 
will has a natural object, just as the intellect has a natural oby.A.Ay-'y 
ject. The will seeks after the good; the intellect seeks after the ; 
true, or truth. He casts his theory into the language of the period, 
redolent with scholastic usage and intonation, and for us in thiis age' 'y  
to use that language is as strange as if a modem singer is asked to A  
sing Gregorian chant: it can be done, but self-consciousness may show 
through. In the natural state the human mind can discover and make 7 
law, and the human will can obey and command, ,both itself ( in the re­
gulation of personal moral behaviour ) and others ( in obeying the pre- 7 
scriptions of a civil law). V . - ' • - 7 ' ’A 7 7  * 7:/.. -Ay 7a\'
' Upon these purely natural operations may be added super­
natural functions both for the intellect and for the Will, and Hale 7 
would state that this comes about when man receives Divine revelation.
At that point, the intellect and will, under the gift of Divine inspira­
tion or Divinely revealed truth, seek after a higher object: God. The 
will seeks after God as the eternal good; the intellect seeks after God 
as the eternal truth; But these objects are given to human kind only 77 7 
through the gift of faith. They are not natural noetic objects, as may 
be a natural object like knowing that the tree is in the quad. Hale pre­
served the distinction between the natural order and the supernatural 
order of being. In this way, for theoretical consistency, responsibility 
for actions could be predicated for purely natural operations. With the
* vyv ’Cyjj
' » V
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gift of supernatural revelation would go a higher degree of moral 
responsibility because it was assumed that if God had revealed him­
self to man— -God who neither deceives nor can be deceived then,
accordingly, the truth contained in that revelation would be of a 
greater purity and refinement than any moral or legal truth a polity 
might achieve without the benefit of Divine revelation. . > \ : -
.. ; ; As with the broad mediaeval synthesis it was assumed that
, human faculties, such as the intellect and will, were perfected by and 
through Divine revelation, with its attendant succours given through ; 
grace. ; Devoid of revelation, the intellect and the will functioned J ; 
seeking their proper natural objects, the intellect seeking to know the 
true, the will seeking after the good, under whatever myriad forms the 
qualities of truth and goodness were presented; Thus, to my earlier : 
question, must a legal system (for Hale) necessarily be a theocratic /; 
legal system, one can reply that he accepted a purely natural order be­
cause that order, in theory, could be the proper natural object of and 
for the exercise of the human faculties of intellect and will. Given 
the long argument presented in Primitive Origination of Mankind, one v 
might assume that Hale would prefer that a common law system be directed 
by Christian principles; and, by appeal to historical knowledge, it was 
and is the case that, broadly, Christian principles broadly informed the 
system of the common law. Is it logically necessary, though, that a 
theocratic system be generated from Hale's assumptions ? I would argue, 
again, that it is not because the fundamental assumption of Christian : 
belief is that faith is"given" by God, and a gift cannot be compelled. 
Such the case, it would be logically improper to formulate a necessary
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proposition ( and its extensions as a legal system, or other) upon What A 
is non-necessary*, ie., faith given by gift. Furthermore, if faith can- A 
not be compelled, then the objects of that faith ( its laws and decrees ) 
cannot, logically, be binding upon one who does not naturally perceive 
those objects. It is to be preserved that the objects of faith were 
supernatural obj ects, known through belief, contrary to the world of 
natural objects which may be known through the natural exercise of one's 
human faculties. Granting, therefore, the assumptions which Hale espouses, 
that there is a difference between the natural and supernatural order of A 
being, one could safely conclude that a legal system need hot necessarily 
be a theocratic system. Inherent in this assumption are the seeds of 
tolerance. AA'' AA A ' ' a : A; :A A :- Ar A^.y
A A A A . Hale * s occupation With the nature and function of the Will A A 
was not a sign of insularity on his part, nor was it a trivial theological . 
obsession. The literature of the period, some of which I reduce to foot- ‘A 
notes; was occupied with the nature and function of the Will. • • If some
effective verbal expression could not be given concerning the nature and A. 
function of the Will, how then would law, be it civil or canonical or A  vy-A 
moral, justify that a man is to be held responsible for his voluntary acts.A?
56. Cf., for instance, any of the following works discussing the Will. ;
THE DARKNESS OF ATHEISM Dispelled by the LIGHT OF NATURE...by Walter Charieton, A;; 
(LONDON, printed for J.F. for William Lee...1652), esp. Chapter VII, "Of the A  
Liberty Elective of Mans (sic) Will." pp 257-238. Also, cf., both of Kenelm A 
Digby's works, 1) TWO TREATISES:...The Nature of Bodies, the other, The Nature A 
of Man's Soul... (LONDON, printed for John Williams..AM.DC.LVIII). The second ; A f; 
Treatise, "The Nature and Operations of Man's Soul" was printed in London, A AAA 
1657. [The Wing number is:W-1450]. In the First Treatise (Bodies) cf., 
chapters 33,34, 35, 36 and 37, pp 346-419, which discuss the human faculties A A  ;A 
in general.‘ In the Second Treatise (Souls)» cf7,chapter two, "Of Thinking and : 1 
Knowing", pp 14-27, and chapter four, "How a man proceedeth to actions" pp 4 lA  ■ -
49. Also, cf., A DISCOURSE OF THE FREEDOM OF THE WILL by Peter Sterry, (LON- ,Ai 
DON, printed for John Starkey... 1675). Also, cf., THE USE OF THE PASSIONS by a A^I 
J.F, Senault, And put into English by Henry, Earl of Monmouth (London, 1649), , /
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Hale possessed the peculiar qualification of having been a lawyer of 
. : outstanding reflectiveness, and also was a philosopher and theologian; ftft 
who, as his published and unpublished treatises show, was concerned not 
only with stating what he thought the law to be, but also who was con- • 
cerned with presenting an organised statement as to what was human nature, ;v 
and what was the nature of its powers, faculties and operations. One ; .
portion of liis speculation revealed that he thought that the nature of ; 
will in relation to human acts needed to be understood if an effective .ft -.ftft 
. and coherent theory of criminal law were to be devised under which one 
could be considered responsible for his actions or omissions. What we do 
not possess from Hale is a study which would have related criminal law to 
. volition; we have only parts, as separate treatises, which must be joined,V 
whereupon a coherent theory may (possibly) be formulated. ; L , : ftftftV-ft ft
56. > Cont. . . .
; . /; . esp., chapter five: The Fifth Treatise, "Of the Power the ft. ft
Passion have upon the Will of Man.", pp 157-192.ft A general text ' f t
; , which concerned human self-control and perfection was: Miscellanea -ft, -, ^  ftft'ft 
Spritualia: or, DEVQVT ESSAIES,[by] Walter Montagu, Esq., (LONDON, printed 
for W. Lee, D. Pakeraan, and G. Bedell...M.DC.XLVITI), where one may refer
• \ to the book at large for its discussion of the will in relation to human
passions and perfection. Joseph Truman argued for the freedom of the will . : 
ftft in his, A Discourse of Natural: and Moral Impotency (LONDON,/printed for f^t^ft:ft 
ftft Robert Clave1, 1671), and one may argue that the book expressed the sentiment 
of the time which Hale himself reflected.. Much of this general sentiment*. /: 
could also be related to the spiritual problem of the period Of the re-: : •
lationship between action and belief, ie., liberty of conscience. One may ft V 
- .v refer to the practical spiritual problem posed by will and differing beliefs,: 
Cf., TRACTS ON LIBERTY OF CONSCIENCE AND PERSECUTION, 1614-1661, Edited fpr 
.the Hanserd Knollys Society...by E.B.Underhill (LONDON, for J. Haddon, 1846), 
the body of the volume. One of the strongest statements as the rationality 
; . will is to be found in Bishop John Bramhal1's ^ A DEFENCE OF TRUE LIBERTY
. FROM ANTECEDENT § EXTRINSECAL NECESSITY...
cupies pp 647-729, as Tome III, found in the collected works,, Dublin, 1676. 
One may assume, too, that Hale./was familiar with Bramhall's other rejoinder 
to Thomas Hobbes: Castigations of Mr. Hobbes, His Laist Animadversions in . ;ft 
/v The Case concerning Liberty, and Universal Necessity (Dublin, 1658) . ' Cftft:
4-
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. . . By turning to his unpublished treatise, the Tract on Natural
Law, one may read affirmations of what is found, in the main, in the, 5
published work, The Primitive Origination of Mankind. In the manuscript yy> 
the comparison between human and brute nature is put forth with the 'aimy"//; 
of justifying notions of control. Hale says, * ; , - ; ' /
: V ' : [95a] From the consideration of the dignity of • ••• y y-y ".yyv./
y/y ; ■ : the humane nature, specifical and appropriate to its ;
selfe, ariseth that natural law which requireth that . / 'y/
. . y the due order and subordination of his faculties be
. ; ~ observed, that the Regent principle in him [control], i  ;
v namely his Soul and his Reason preside and govern . :
: .. IthemselvesJ facultys, and be not commanded or governed
, V \ V; by [impulse ? or, lawlessness ?], [and] that he keep the *
/ y • Reigns of his passions and sensual apetite (sic) in the yy ?-y‘
y: ; . t. hand of reason and moderate them according to the law , "y-
y 1 . y of Nature which is the rule of his Reason, because al-
,';//yy though he doth not order hiinselfe, neither according
/• •/ y.-y/y' to the Dignity nor order of his nature, but inverts it,
*\. y;.y- " ■ going as it were with his heels upwards. , y ;^y:/
/ v  ; ^  He may observe in the Brutal nature the many of his r y
y , y-y ; • same passions that are in Man as Anger, Revenge, Hatred,
'•y ^ . y y etc., in the irrascible part [and] love, delight, joy
: in the concupiscible part . And in the Brutes these are ;’-7yyy: 
. y;,y-yy excited and acted in anminal nature by a kind of necessary - yyy
: y Connexion between the object and the Passion, that they
y ; " y-yyy.'excite, and for the most part they exercise as fully
y . / and directly as the object or the phantasme thereof ,
: v abide before them; for they [are not] under the regime
: y :. of the Superior faculty, but are but the various habitudes -
■yu.;yy':'V and motions of the Animal Appetite which is the supreame :yyy 
y ./ Imperative faculty in the Animal nature."/ ; >
The statement is clear in the manuscript ( however constrained the script j
that there is an. absolute difference between animal and human nature, and
that the ground for the difference rests upon intellect and will. Given
5 7. Tract on Natural Law, by Lord Chief Justice Hale, Harleian Manuscript
71S9, British Museum, folio page 95-a, beginning with, "Fifthly "
The manuscript if fairly well preserved, but the script if difficult 
to decipher. Where I have had difficulties I have put into brackets,
"[ ]", portions which are unclear, or portions which seem to require 
additional words to make sense of the text. ; .y , ; /
58.. Tract, 95a. / .. - yy- " y .'‘' . y ; y. v- j.V- y y ' y-y--yy^
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these two noble faculties, Hale believes that one has the ground for ; ^  
law because one has two separate operations, one which permits knowing, 
and another which permits choice to act upon what is known. After likening 
the conduct of brutes to replying to immediately given stimuli, Hale says 
of human nature, 59‘
* ’’But in the humane nature the passions and sensual 
apetites (sic) are but inferior facultys, and in 
their just state and exercise [are] subject to the : :
: . Empire of the; Will at least as to the [direction],
manner, time, season, and other circumstances of '
• v . its Exertion. v . : ■: ; 'Vv .• sf".A. \\ :£;■
’’And when this subordination and the Exercises there- : v
of are but suspended, Man is under a double offense 
against the Law of Nature that imbaseth and degradeth 
himselfe from the Dignity of his Nature to a Brutal 
; ’• ’ Beast.” ■ ; ' V,'-;'-; V 4; • • • •'.? A* ■ ■
This last sentence leads Hale to conclude that man then may become worse
than a beast. When man becomes "bestial” one sees the following: 60.
”A man on the other side whose lusts and Passions 
are once but of the Regiment and Discipline of rea- 
v ; • son because prodigious in his passions and Lusts im- '•
\ proves [ ie*, makes them more harmful, as one might
: ; ’’improve” the weapons of war by making them more de- ,r
, . structive ] his passions of Anger and hatred into
/ \ Malice and envy, his passions of Love in [to] frenzy,
: invents enormous and unnatural Lusts and becomes in-
V. - Satiable in them.-” ' •
This description would have fitted with any of the descriptions of the 
enormity of vice which the texts in footnote 107 (supra) might indicate,
especially Senault or Montagu. He continues, ■
VSo that happens with reason displaced and the natural 
order of the facultys of the reasonable Soul inverted as 
: \ it happens by the extravagation [ ie., to exceed what is -rS
proper and reasonable ] and displacing of the Animal
59. Tract, 97a-97b. • . V , 60. Tract, 98a^ ; 61. Ibid. f
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'■ • '’Spirits in the Body* from whence arise 'V
:‘V  spasms and convulsions and distortions, and ,V- - < {
; , those terrible Symptoms that wholly disorder ;*£•
'. : the operations and beauty of the Body and Mind. N v
By which it appears that the keeping up of the 
Regiment of the reasonable Soul over the passions 
and lusts of the Animal nature, and the subduing 
of them to the Law of reason is part of that Law 
of nature which concerns the dignity and order 
\ . of the human nature.” , ■' '' .'V- .
Thus, by arguing from the notion of natural law, and from the nature
of human nature, Hale concludes that it is reasonably apparent that
a reasonable order in the world exists, and that from that order it is
reasonable to conclude that human actions themselves must be reasonably
ordered. The rule and measure for the concept of reasonable order is,
for Hale, a theistic concept. Of law, he says, ‘ , . , ; ,!
.  ^ "A law therefore I take to be a rule of morale
Actions given to a Being endowed with Understanding 
and Will by him that hath power or Authority to give 
• ‘ the same and exact obedience thereunto per mod urn Im­
; ’ • peril, Commanding or forbidding such Actions under . r ^
. i some penalty— expressed or contained in such Law.”
The notion of natural law must, for Hale, include the "Supreme Legislator”,
and he argues in this way: ■ • - ' .. / - , v ,■ ;•" • . ■- :
"Yet this rule of reason would not be a Law to him, r.;
unless there were some Superior that gave this Rule 
to him per modum Imperii et sub ratione Legis. For 
; he [i .e., any person whatsoever] would be under no 
•• ! ; . obligation to observe this rule of reason but only : >, -
to himselfe and therefore may absolve himselfe by 
the Liberty of his will from the observing of that 
■ Rule and from all obligation to it.” V; ;; ’ ^
One may note, here, that an Ockhamist understanding of natural law is not
being advanced. The creation of law is not exclusively within the domain
62. Tract, 3a. 63. Tract, 6a. . , V - ■ • r . I
J
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of the will, but more reflects the Aquinian definition of law that law,
; ; ;.was an ordinance of reason, directed to the
, common good, issued by the authority in charge
of the political community, and promulgated;., to'
V its subjects: quaedam rationis ordinatio ad :
. • , v bo num commune et ab eo qui curam communi tat is - r-: . V;.
. habet promulgata. (ST.la-2ae.xc,4.)” ■ v .■ : .■
By stressing the notion that law is ”an ordinance of reason”, the mind %
of that period would understand that law was not an invention, or anf.
imaginative construct made Solely by the force of will unconnected to 5:;'
the direction bf natural law. In language closer to our own habit of s- ;
mind we would distinguish a law of nature, founded upon the essence of .v\
an object, from a postulate or an hypothesis (each bf whibh may help , d
one discover or predict the nature of an object, but not necessarily so ). :
Hale continues the paragraph, stating: ^ *
: ,  ”As hee is Lord of himselfe So he would be Lord - '-vr-
; .. of that Rule which [throughout all was] the law. <
of Reason, and keepe it or break it at his plea- ■ ? * {
' - sure without giving account there of As any but :
himself. ' ’ '■ ... f i y f . ’
. , ”(6a) For though he remained a reasonable Creature, ; ; ’
. ;• and is well acquainted with the rule of his reason, ‘ - -
' yet he remains a free and voluntary Agent and as . .
to the Exercise of his Actions, and is Lord still ; .
of himself ahd them.” - \';i '• ; -V;'A ;;
The force of his objection is, I take it, to illustrate that if reason -
is not measured against the natural law, then feason may be considered
as that faculty, which can invent any set of propositions ( ie., two > ■ >
systems, fL’ and f-L1, may in theory both be reasonable systems; but ,r.
their reasonableness in and of themselves do not compel that one choose v
!L1 to the exclusion of V-L1.). Hale wishes to preserve;the notion that .
64. Taken from page 126 of PRINCIPALITY AND POLITY by Thomas Gilby,d.P., ;
(Longmans, Green and Co., London, 1958), Chapter V, section 2, ”The Concept . 
of Law”. % -V/- ;; * \ . ' ’ i  - - • .
gg Tract, 5b-6a. V- ■* ;\V-“> . . W ' V
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a law must itself be measured against a pre-existing order, and that y
pre-existing order is not the limit of logical categoriesV A law must ;
be logically coherent, but his is not the final measure of a law’is law- y y y 
fulness. The final measure of the authority of a law upon an agent is 
that the law mirrors or is in harmony with the will of God:
y, y "Yet still the rule of reason simply considered y'y/y;/y: ;\y :'
(excluding the Authority of the supreme Legis- 
> y:; : lator) would Still be without the .true formal y
y  nature of a Law, because thoJ it were an excellent
i y ? ; rule, yet it would indure [ ie, 'endure* = support 
. y y Or sustain ] no obligation upon him that hath it,
y / y y  : but lie might use or not use it at at his pleasure, y  y y :.:.y y
; if hee can but delivervHimselfe from the difficul- .
ties of other external supervisiant Government, . / /: y;
, Lawes or Penaltyes either by secrecy or power.
; y-./ Soe that every rule, nay the best of humane rules, / y y  y y
: . y vy; The rule of reason itself considered abstractly from,; ; Vy3"^
y  \ . any superior Authority is not a law--- or a Rule juncta
;• ' C (*'y * cum Imperio— — " :«]:y vVv"y'J'v " -/'yyy/y y  1
y.vy y  -y .y ' I do not feel called upon to attempt a justification of y^ -’y y
natural law, either as a theory in itself, or as Hale expresses his un- ; v"
derstanding of it. . - '/■ ' :y- y 'yy‘ •'■■yS1- - y y , ' y  r. V.. /?.y
v yy . . The importance of his exposition of a notion of natural' : t
law is that he assumes that law is something which a man may know, and. y’.y
when a law is khowable, it follows, upon his reasoning, that the law-.'may;'y
be obeyed. If one does not obey the law, then, for Hale, the fault rests
primarily in the agent for not having disciplined himself, by exercise of >
the power of his rule over his human dispositions and inclinations. By1 ;/
appealing to a notion of natural law, Hale wishes to argue that law is noty
random or arbitrary, but law of a legal system (in this case, common law )
reflects the ordered mind of God,; /Whether one espouses this view or not, it
is a consistent view, and it discharges a scholarly obligation that it has
66. Tract, 6b-7b.
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attempted, at least, to develop and present a coherent and systematic 
set of principles concerning the nature sof civil law, and reasons for 
compelling obedience to the law. One may appreciate this effort without 
minimising difficulties inherent in it.
. • 1 .v In the Fifth Book of the Tract ,, Hale argued that the mind
and the will of man gave true value to his moral actions, and, each under
•\■;' ;'7- >'■ '• • ~ V v - * /-gv■ \j£.‘ " ■ ■ 67. ■his control, a man was deemed to be responsible for his actions: v V r:
; "And as before I observed that the true notion ^
; 7 of God is the natural root of all those Lawes . A .J
7 7 of nature that in special manner relate to God, v ; ', ;
"•,7" - So the true notion of the humane nature, and the ; ; v
: : Constitution and value is the true fountain of *
those natruall Lawes that relate to a mans selfe. , ; .
" -’7 . i wherein there are those postulata which almost • 7-. V .7 7'- ^
:  ^ ; all Mankind agree ini that are necessary to be 77;-r;:  ^{7; 7
" " promised to .this purpose. £ -‘j1%'••’2 ’;V
 ^; 1st., That Man tho' he hath many of
. •  affections and Lusts that are common to him and the
. -*V animal Nature, yet he hath a specific dignity be-
77 longing to his nature far more Excellent than the ; 7.7:7''
7  ^ common Animal nature [:]> namely his reasonable Soul.
* / * > 7  - V v '■ 77 ... ' ;• \ - • * * *  i  /• .7 * •' / ;  '\,7"'' * v‘ : 7 7  ■ 77 - ;7 >
"3rd., That that reasonable Soul ought to have the 7 ' 7 ;' ' , / ' 7  7 
; ; ? 7 regiment and regancy over the Animal Lusts and Af^ 7 7 ;: 77'^
7 fections; otherwise in this life hee Should: have, no’7;7 ;7 7 :77 *77;
7; 7’. • . prelation [ ie . superiority , pre-eminence, dignity ] 7^77
7 over the brutal and animal nature. , 7 ; ■’77::.v -7‘*:’7''7'7\
7 7 7.7 4thly., That although there may be accidental and ad-7 t-i 7.7777
7 7 , 7 v’i ventitious proponeraces [ ? from 1 propone1, as "to •
. propose" or "to propound", or a variant of Scots law 7 7f7 7 
. .7 wherein a plea is made to a court, which may or may not, *>7; .^-V> \
7 " " be rejected before a final decree is given ] that may:
. Y : give one man preformance [ie., earlier rank ] and prp-77-VV, v'7.
• ^ 7 7  ;7;. lation above another, yet essentially naturally and in 7 7:7V77^
7 7 77 7 7" 7 the specifical Constitution all men are equal. 7 ' 7 7 7 v7 7 7 7 7>
What places man under this law, he concludes, is man's nature as rea- ^ 7:.'
sonable and man’s nature as voluntary,- and, as a logical conjunct, natural7777
law itself properly inclines the will and reason of man to what is reasonable
and to what is a proper object of the will 7;. 7 7 ;7\ ‘.'>777 -;'r
67. Tract, 90a-92a, ff. 7 >77',- • -. 7--,.-. . ; • . ; 7 7.7-77 7 . ^ 7:r-;
he states,
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This last notion is adumbrated later in the Tract,.when
; yy; y  /’// "But the rational instin cts [of man] have in them y - . .yy : 1
/ y  formalem rationem Legis being implanted in a > • yy"' . i
creature ordered with understanding and will ; : . .; *
and therefore capable of Law," -y, ,• . • y ' y./y /y'./ y" .36"yyy- y
Although the powers of man may, in some ways, be necessitated, ie,, 
the mind if knowing, necessarily knows what it knows, Hale does not be­
lieve that necessary operations necessitate conduct: ^ * f y "
. y  y  *’/ "That animal instincts are in their kind necessary y'yyy\ 
v ■ ’ y /and do for the most part absolutely determine the yy/-; yfy
y  y  ■"yv' phantasy [ ie., /'phantasm* as an epistemological ,y . y
:: concept ] and Appetite to act conformable to them: /.yy ;/y
\ y T y But this rational instinct is still under the domin-
yy y  y'.v y"y ion,.of the Will in Man, And though it incline, per-
/•/. /y yy;'- suade and move the Will to a conformity to it, it - y •' y',y
- y r. /doth not necessitat (sic) or compel! it: For the y yy
; . V Will is essentially free and renders a man free to . ..""y
/ y y v y /-act or not. And therefore his conformity thereunto 
; / "/ is truely (sic) and formally Obedience: And his '/ ' " /y
L : disconformity thereunto is Sin: The Consequence where- •/.
, /"/ 3 *s g^ilt....[W]hereas the rational instincts 6f"  y / r
y y the human nature tho' they perswade (sic) and incline
-y. y'y/yy-: the Will, yet are under the dominion of it." /■y y
The conclusion of his prolonged argument is, broadly, that there is a •/
natural imprinting in the soul by God upon the creation of each .soul, y
and the proper and natural order of human existence is expressed by y ■
the natural appetite to moral rectitude. / The-argument is a kind of //.••
theistic intuitionism: that moral principles are imprinted upon the soul,,
and may be discovered (in some way) by reflection. ; / y ’^ y ;V - y' ":y
. yy, .... The last point which I wish to touch upon, and that in passing
only, was that Hale thought that one need riot steadfastly maintain that they
6 8 . T r a c t ,  196b. - y y y  ' ; .y y  " y "  . y r y ./' . " V  y '  v '- : / / y y y y /
■69i v T r a c t , 197a- 1 9 7 b . /  . y ■//; •. y y : , ! y ; / - / "  y  • y y  y- " y y  • /"'.. y  y  y v
v i
- y yJ
1■I
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? / *•: > ; * • ■ »  •; - t "  ; ,./w  •>,■;*•:,v:,r - ' ; .• ■ %;rV>&v$pvWill was a distinct and separate faculty. He said early on in the Tract:
; ■ > : "And although possibly it may be true, that in ■
: ^ the true method and Actings of the reasonable •:
, ; soul, and its proper and orderly motion, the f -
WILL being a reasonable Faculty should follow 
/ v the decision of the Understanding— — and possibly  ^
the Understanding and the Will are not so much 
.. two distinct faculties, but rather the Will is :
> : the Last Act of the Soul in things practical and/. • :•?'••• . ; :
: as it were the confirmation of the Act of the •; ,; • ' v
Practical Understanding, Yet it is certaine wee 
: : Find in our selves a Power to suspend the decisions
•t'i, of Understanding, And sometimes we Act contrary to .
it, video meliora deteriora sequor.
So that there is some kind of Regent Power in the 
; ■ humane nature that is free and opposite which we
“ , call the WILL and the Liberty and Dominion thereof ; ;
 ^■ wherein the Soul Exerciseth, Whereby a Man hath >
: within himselfe a Dominion over that which he doth,  ^f
tho1 it be Regmra sub graviore regno, namely the v ;
, de terming and Commanding power of Good.11 ,v y ‘h'
; ,;v: v The picture which we have from these extracts is 'that;
Hale believed that there was an absolute difference in kind between
animal and human nature; that human nature had within itself, because C
he believed it to have been divinely created, the seeds of its own moral 
wisdom and principles; that these 'irradiated1 principles could be know 
upon reasonable reflection; that man was the master of his actions be­
cause of his intellect and will, and to fail to govern oneself was yet
a fault for which one could be held responsible, save for the excuse which 
madness or infirmity permitted. Hale advanced a protective notion con- ^
cerning conscience and the obligation to obey the law by stating that,
M.. .noe law can primarily and immediately oblige the conscience, but that
• • ^71; \ : ■ - ; >''•■ ' £' . .of God.11 It was but another way of stating that laws contrary to natural
Tract, 14a-15a. : * 'irradiated1 was a word used by Hale
71. Tract, 142a. Also, cf., De Vera t0 account for moral principles im-
Obedientia oratio by Bishop Stephen pressed in the soul and diffusing
Gardiner (Thomas Berthelet, 1535),[STC themselves to the soul through the
Number: 11584] who permits such dissent gaining of moral knowledge. v
for'similar- reasons. • * ' V W-- - -v .*•• **•••'£
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law, which was construed as an expression of God's will, were not laws 
at all, and, therefore, did not legitimately compel the obedience or ad­
' herence of the subject.*> 7 • • ' * ,  TV:- 7 7; 7; 7  ^V; ' . ' ■:7 7;■:7'
It is evident that Hale did not accept that an appetite 
determined and compelled the will, but he did admit that the will could 
forsake control, and thus one could be driven by one’s passions. We would 
not to-day tend to speak of ’will’ and *intellect' when describing human 
action, and one must appreciate that Hale did not wrongly concretise 
faculties but spoke of 'will' and 'intellect' with the understanding that 
any reader would appreciate that he was talking about man as one who may7 
will, or may know. It is easy to overlook that Hale was not talking about 
disembodied faculties. ■ .77 7 -7 7  . : 7 7. ' :7
; 7 7 When one returns to law, by means of the Placitorum Coronae,
having been acquainted with the wide theological and philosophical learn- 
irig Hale possessed,’one is aware then that a definite,and fairly weir- 
formed theory of human nature is at work in Hale's understanding of the 7' 
criminal law, and what may be the duties and responsibilities of subjects 
under that law, and to that law. One may easily transpose the sentiment 
expressed in the Tract on Natural Law that . .disconformity. . ,is Sin:
The Consequence whereof is guilt. <," 7 ^ * vfith regard to the voluntary
* A large portion of the Tract, caput 8, 147a, ff 198, concerns the 
theory of mind, and discusses^how the intellect knows. The discussion 
of the agent intellect, phantasy [ie., phantasm], and the relation of 
the known to the thing known, is at home in an Aristotelian-scholastic 
discourse on Epistemology, and I omit it here. The text is proof enough 
that Hale was familiar scholastic epistemology. But the discussion bears 
little upon intention as such, and I have excluded it accordingly.
■ 72 . Cf. footnote 69 . (supra). • . 7. " ' 7. . • ' • • 7 7  '7' ; -7: •
. v’ v 393 'V• ’
commission of a wrongful act to state that the voluntary infraction of 
the criminal law brings with it justified guilt and punishment. One may 
read *Sin’ to mean an offence within a legal system, ie., a theological 
legal system, i : ••''• • . \ . •' ' V v .
I wish to turn, then, to consider the formal statements 
made by Hale with regard to the elements necessary for criminal offences .^ 
and their commission. In the second chapter of Placitorum Coronae he sets
■ f jc ." - •• ■: :*■??; •. V: - 73forth his formal understanding for responsibility under the criminal law:
• "MAN is naturally endowed with these two great facul- V
; . ; ; ’ties, understanding and liberty of will, and there-
v . fore is a subject properly capable of law properly so
. \ , called, and consequently obnoxious to guilt and pun- 7 ■
■ ; : ; : ; ishment for the’violation of that law, which in re- '
= : . -vi spect of these two great faculties he hath a capacity
! ^ to obey: The consent of the will is that, which ren- . ;
. fders human actions either commendable or culpable; as
 ^ , where there is no law, there is no transgression, so .
M  v- 7 = regularly, where there is no will to commit an offense,
• there can be no transgression, or just reason to incur , . ' *
r ; • the penalty or sanction of that law instituted for the
v punishment of crimes or offenses. And because the liber-
/ " . ty or choice of the will presupposeth an act of the un­
; t.4% derStanding to know the thing or action chosen by the i% " \ ; >
Xy: : will, it follows that, where there is a total defect
v. : of the understanding, there is no free act of the will
v  in the choice of things or actions.” V
* A transposed reading,of this kind,of a term does not commit one to equating 
’sin1 with ’crime’. In a meta-legal fashion one can say that a sin is an 
example of a kind of offence within a kind of legal system. I am prepared 
to accept such a meta-legal comparison. To produce the similarity one . ^ 
stresses the common features, of each system, for the assigning of guilt
• 7■ and responsibility for actions done under the legal system. This does
not commit one to the position that all crimes are sins, or that legal 
and moral systems are one ( to attempt to yield the conclusion that a 
; ; legal system must necessarily embody a moral system ) ; V f
-  ^ 73i 1 Hale P.G., pp 14-15; Chap. II, ’’Concerning the several incapacities
of persons, and their exemptions from penalties by reason thereof.”
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Because Hale admitted that the law of England excused one from culpability 
because of personal incapacity or personal defect, some of his analysis I 
wish to consider here for philosophical purposes. The general categories 
are broadly known ( certainly from Hawkins;' s edition of Pleas of 1716, y 
which pre-dated Placitorum Coronae by some twenty years ). Hale put in 
an ordered list three general categories which may serve to excuse D from 
criminal liability: natural incapacity owing to infancy; accidental defects 
caused in D through 1) Dementia, 2) Casualty or chance, 3) Ignorance; and / , 
lastly, defects springing from civil causes, 1) Civil Subjection, 2) Com­
pulsion, 3) Necessity, and 4) Fear. ^ ; '
/  ^ The core of his reasoning that infancy incapacitated an , 7
offender was the principle ( or the assumption ) that a youth of tender 
years did not know the difference between good and evil. ■ ./.. * But one / ' //
may educe from this s tatement a more manif e.s t as sump tion: exerci se of ; y
will and intellect ( as those terms would have been understood by Hale 
from the scholastic past ) is a practical exercise upon a content of yy / "  
information. An infant, though assumed to have such faculties in a ; ; ,
potential state, cannot exercise them because he knows little to nothing, / 
and certainly possesses no formal knowledge. If the root for punishing ..
by means of the Criminal sanction is that one both knows, arid then elects
to act contrary to what he knows ( he ought to do ), then, barring any "•/; 
reasonable excuse, D may be held criminally responsible for his acts.
7 4 . ibid. v;.:f
75 . 1 Hale P.C., page 25. part ' 1' of section II, of Chap. III/ . / y y y  
"Touching the defect of infancy and n o n a g e .. : • . . ■;.: y  y
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By assumption,thenya youth is held not to be able criminally to intend; or : ; 
to be able, formally, criminally to commit. There may be the material/ele­
ments present for the commission of or attribution of a crime, but a lack
of knowledge simpliciter excuses. The latent assumption, therefore, by
introduction of the category that infancy per se excuses, is that. there";.• 
must pre-exist a body of acceptable practical knowledge and social codes 
in order for it to be assumed that one has intentionally violated the 
criminal code of a society. The assigning of an age of consent, or an .
age of responsibility, will be a practical matter, estimated by the practical/: , 
canons of the society. ‘ -
An extension of this reasoning, that the natural state of 
man may serve to excuse, follows on to what Hale says of ideocy, that..-it 
excuses because of its existence . That one is an idiot he held to be a-’ ' • ~ - 
question for a jury to determine. -vV«/;•••"v/'*• :"Z~u
. . ' ••;/- Madness was a state of being which permitted of degrees.
Partial madness (dementia) Hale found not tp excuse D from criminal conduct /' 
because it was assumed that D had some control over himself. The statement 
given is this: . .. '.,;V - 1 y
".. . some persons, that have a competent use of rea- ;
son in respect of some subjects, are: yet under a . /
' - ;• ; particular dementia in respect of some particular ■ '
, discourses, subject or application; or else,it is
partial in respect of degrees; and this is the con­
dition of very many, especially melancholy persons,
: who for the most part discover their defect' in ex- V
-r: cessive fears and griefs, and yet are not wholly ;/ v ;
. destitute of the use of reason; and this partial ; V *
. . insanity seems not to excuse them in the committing ::y.;Z\sS
of any offense for its matter capital;.
76 1 Hale P.C., page 30, of Chap. IV, "Concerning the defect of IDEOCY,
MADNESS and LUNACY, in reference to criminal offenses and punishments."
. . .. . ■. -.4
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The assumption at work here is not that one is half sane, say from the • .
hours' of six o ’clock in the morning until midday, and then becomes in- ,
sane from midday until the following morning. Were that the case, it
could be argued that such an insane state would excuse because any action V
done in such an insane state would be unintentional action at law. Hale ’
Says of the partial insanity he depicts ( which we might now determine to ;
be a Depression of some kind ): ^  *
’’...the best measure thatI can this of is this; . r ■
i such a person as labouring un melancholy dis- V  V \ V
. , tempters hath yet ordinarily as great understand- . v
; ing, as ordinarily a child of fourteen years hath, C ,: \ 7  ^/
: ; [and therefore] is such a person as may be guilty
of treason or felony.’’ ,
One may question if this is an explanation on his part, or if it is dn
assertion of an assumption ? Hale has not explained the state of D sub- ' ,v V, ^vj-
jectively. He has assumed, I believe, that some forms of mental insta- ,
bility may be like a headache: there and present, but bearable; also,.  ^ '
such a mental incapacity, though causing or influencing one ’s full adult ' }
powers to be less than flourishing, nevertheless do not so disable a person • _
so as to render him irrational or incapable of willing. One may yet in- .
tend, but with diminished knowledge! and foresight, appears to: be the as- f K
sumption at work. Total madness excuses, and (loc .cit.) the authority
'7? * Ibid. , : - ."v-v-
, * [Note] The parallel here may come from the theology of the period. An 
assumption attributed to Luther was that man was so sinful that without 
the grace of God, man could do no other than to sin.. A contrary position was
adopted by most branches of Catholicism: namely, that although man did
fall from grace, the fall itself did not so corrupt his nature that he could 
not choose the naturally good. By parity of reasoning,Hale has suggested, at 
law, that a partial insanity is not to lose one’s ability to understand or to 
‘will, an assumption within the same family that man after the Fall; could yet- •/ 
seek the good% even if. imperfectly so in his seeking. \ ' .
' V - i
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for the proposition is taken from Coke’s Pleas of the Crown, with the
condition that the madness is absolute, and a total deprivation of memory.
If, when mad, one becomes sane, and during a period of sanity does commit ;
a crime, then one is culpable and made subject to punishment. However, . *
. "If a man is his sound memory commits a capital
, . offense, and before his arraignment he becomes
absolutely mad, he ought not by law to be ar- 
/ ^ r a i g n e d  during such his phrenzy, but be remitted 
to prison until that incapacity be removed; the 
> reason is, because he cannot advisedly plead to ■ '
: : the indictment.” '; .' .• ■.“ . ■: -v&’S  ^
The determination of sanity is a matter of fact for a jury to determine.
If the phrenzy or madness ( to preserve Hale’s usage ) is permanent, he
then gives a direct statement why it should, as a mental condition, excuse
one: fro m  c u lp a b i l i t y :  * V *
. ’’Touching the great crime of treason regularly the 
same is to be said, as in case of homicide, such a 
phrenzy or insanity, as excuseth from the guilt of -V-: •?.
■. , ; . the one, excuseth from the guilt Of the other: the
. reason is the same; he that cannot act felonice * or
animo felonico cannot act proditorie *, for being under 
v a full alienation of mind, he acts not per electionem
%- . v.‘ ; i or intentionem.” * ; :. W-' %
78 .- j  H a le  P.C., page 34 f f . ;
*79 ^ 1 Hale P.C., pp 36-7. [Note] If one cannot knowledgeably commit a
* felony, then, by parity of reasoning, one cannot commit treason so 
knowingly to be a betrayer [’proditorie1]. In this excerpt Hale 
distinguishes an action done wilfully (’per electionem’) from an 
action done with the guidance of knowledge (’intentionem*). It 
is to be remembered, from his own observations on the nature of 
the will and the intellect, that each are reasonable faculties, 
but with regard to the Will its reasonable nature does not, of
necessity, compel its motion- and, as I have remarked earlier,
an appetite iji se_ as an appetite ( and thus a proper object for the 
Will ) does not, out of logical necessity, compel the Will to it as 
an object necessarily to be willed. An appetite may direct the Will; 
it would not, to use Hobbesean language, for Hale compel the Will or 
necessarily direct the Will in its election.
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Hale resorts to logical scheme to describe criminal
acts in his discussion of actions done through misfortune. 80. His
description appears to divide between actions done from intention, from
those done voluntarily. It will be best to set down his own language:
"As to criminal proceedings, if the act, that is v
committed, be simply casual, and per infortunium, /'
; . ;, . / regularly that act, which, were it done ex animi
intentione, were punishable with death, is not by 
/.the laws of England to undergo that punishment; for ' 
v it is the will and intention, that regularly is 
required, as well as the act, and event, to make ;
' . •,/ .• : the' offense capital.11, '. * -. . -
If this distinction between 'will* and ’intention' is seen within the 
background of Hale's own understanding of Will and Intellect, his dis­
tinction makes logical sense without,: at the same time, committing one 
to a theory that criminal culpability is solely intentionality.
. ’ / . . Hale had maintained that the Will could act by diiit of -y ;
moral propositions compounded by the understanding. 82. jj^ e object of
the human intellect was that which was omne intelligibile, and one such 
class of objects wOuld be moral propositions, or, as he phrased it,
"The moral goodness and.congruity, or evilness, unfitness, and unseason-
81 .
ableness of moral or natural notions...ti 8 3, The province of the Wi11
was not to make moral propositions. They, if a causal explanation be 
needed, were compounded of the imagination and the intellect, rBut the 
will, in accord with the rationalness of a moral intuition, or a moral ..;. 
proposition compounded by the intellect, may perceive the rational quality ; 
of a moral good, and accordingly direct itself to act. Thus it would be 
linguistically improper for Hale, with these assumptions,to say that the
, T * 1 Hale P.C. page 38-41, Chap. V. "Concerning casualty and misfortune, 
how it excuseth in criminals . " 81 . Ibid, page 38. 82 . Cf., ge_ Homine,
Sect. 1, Cap. 2, page 50, ff. 03 2®. Homine, page S5. - ; : ■
, : : /; Will forms an intention, ie., that it reasonably makes a plan. One ■- A ‘ ‘
? : may repair to De Homine ; in which he stated: f .,’y A> '•••AayyA
: ; . AA" .."yA-.AA VTouching the thing called Reason, we must con- \A 'Jv
AAA -*'y A \ A  ' ‘ \ sider that it hath a double acceptation: It is.' Ay  .'A; A : Ay^‘; y A  : ..
>< ; Y  -y A, taken for every conduct of any thing by fitting / :
', ! means to fitting ends, or the due and convenient - Y
ordering and adapting of one thing to another...,
P y ;" ; :  A .v" Aa y  A viz., Active, Passive, or Mixt: 1 . That I call A-./ : A. y  y A;-. t  : A
Y  Ay ' - A , . y  Active Reason which from an inward intellective AaA A A A :
y  " y  . principle orders and disposeth; as the Watch-maker y A ' A A :;A ;A A-y AA;
v . / contrives, order, and dispOseth the several parts AA:.y AAA Y
A • " . 6f the Watch, so that it excites a regular and use-
Y" V / : A ful motion: 2. The Passive Reason ( which is A # ; A A
A ; y  A : more properly Reasonableness ) is that order and \ y 'y Ay  -y y
A / A ; A : A congruity which is impressed upon the thing thus A "A A.A
.*. , A wrought; . as in the Watch I see every thing moves AyAAAA^A Ay-AA
A.A...'YA'A A ' A' duly and orderly, and the reason of the motion of • A A, A A A :<A.
y  A A A the Balance is by the motion of the next Wheel, and A A./ AAa.y A-A : \
, , , that by the motion of the Spring- and the whole frame, Ay ’
■VA:-AA-A-. - A A''A;AA/ A* order and contexture of the Watch carries a reason- , / A y  AA :-' AA’ 
A'AA; : ; ableness in it, the passive impression of the Reason v A
A ; y  A or intellectual Idea that was in the Artist: 3. The ; /A
A A Mixt sort of Reason seems to be/when a thing concurrs hy.; : AA v'Ay; ;A A
A actively and from an internal principle, and ( in . ' A
A A things that have life ) vitally, to the production A.
,y  AA ; •- '' . of"a' reasonable effect; but yet per modum instrumenti, y A
AA-AA;. A : A' ' A 'A- and in the virtue of a superiour direction of a rea- A ' : Y~y  .A/
AAAy ’- -A A A/' sonable agent..." A ■ '
:YAf-..^ ;*•' -A ' ' A.- A A A M Y 2. / But there is another kind of Reason which we. ; ?AA'.Vy A ./"Ay y "/ 
A ; Y y  ; ■ call Ratiocination, or Discursus rationalis, which \ ;A A A A;
A y  A A • A A consists principally in these three things, though A /A / AAAA .-A A;A
’A/;. A;yyA y A A  ■ ■ the two .former without .the; latter make not up a Com- . AVAvVA-A'r -Ay 
A A, . A pleat Ratiocination: 1 . The simple apprehension of AyA ; ' A;
• A/- AAA/A y/Ay A;' AA things themselves, which is done by images or repre- A  y 'Y/AAAy /AA
•A A A . Aa y A sentations thereof, made either by the Intellect, or T yyyy. A-t" Aa|a
: . A A by the representations made thereunto by Phantasie: / , , " A;
A ; a A ■ A y 2. . The compounding of the images or representation =
A y. . r A' ;•'» y ';^ of things with an affirmation or negation; this makes A AAyyy.AAACy '-
• Y A. A . • A a Proposition (italics mine): 3. The composition of ;
AA y. ‘ A A , ‘ several Propositions among themselves, and drawing from ...A'- A 'AyAA\'AA>A
Y A A:l A A;A;-; A ;.Ay them Conclusions; and this is called Sy 11 o gi smus, Ratio- AyA A A ' Ay
;aA • A"' ' v ; A cination or Discourse." ; ' • ■ ■ •. A''-A>;‘Y-' y . ■ yA/ '.AA • i'v;."
84 . A De Homine, Sect . 1., CAP . Hi, "Touching the Excellency of the ; A. Y- AyA'aAAY: 
AA ,/ y ; Humane Nature in general.", pp 50-51. > )
v!'faculty, but that the property of "rationalness" rests in the abi 1 ity , '
of the Will to recognise the rational elements in a proposition by which?:v-s 
r> : ,; ;. . an agent may or may not act. The Will is rational in its abi1ity to : •
: acknowledge rational propositions and purposes, appreciating that each
... may contain a rational element upon which the Will may, or may not,
elect to act or acknowledge. This is hot to "solve" the mystery or . • ^
the difficulties inherent in a language of a faculty psychology which 
speaks of ’intellect1 and of ’will ’. My purpose is only to dispose of ;? •
- the rational claim which Hale makes by giving to his assertions a rational ^
disposition. It seems to make sense, within the framework of his as- - =
v >•*'. sumptions, to say that some kind of a relationship obtains between the ; ; • ■;
/ v 1 Intellect and the Will; and it seems further apparent that the framework
Vv } • of that relationship must be within the grounds of rationality, a common : v
: , ; ; element shared both by the intellect and by the will, but manifested ‘
V . < i n quite separate ways -just as one might say of different objects, that } j
. : <>. they share in "colour", but that each object manifests the common property\ -'V;j
:. j differently ( the lamp shade may be red, whilist a sunset may be faintly v
_ r pastel, but each depiction, by analogy, is coloured and manifests the : s 
. ••'/ , property of being coloured in some way ). .
v - 7 I have understood the grounds for the relationship between .  ^v :
: , the Intellect and the Will to rest in rationality, and I would state V-.;
;y ;- 7 ; that to; make sense of this relationship ( nojt necessarily to
:V ' ; conceptual difficulties j it is best to understand Hale, when he speaks' - ' :
• : about the rational nature of the Wil1, to mean that the Will is able to j ; ■ ,
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appreciate the rational elements in intellective processes and/or 
propositions it forms. How such might occur I seek not to explain, , r ; v 
and, therefore, offer my reading of Hale's language of the Will as .;;
’ a postulate. Since both the Intellect dnd the Will are seen by Hale ;
to be faculties of the human Soul, they could be described as having', •;
«;/:•’ two grounds for a relationship. They may be thought of as 'a'R'b', -v:-
sharing a mutual and biconditional relationship, 'R', through the soul., v -
If 'a' were the Intellect, and 'b' were the Will, then the relationship 
of 'a' to 'b', and of *b' to 'a',, would be via the common ground 
which they inhabit, ie., both are expressions of operations of the Soul.. '•
. 1 \ . But there is a stronger way to express the relationship between:^;
one faculty and another. It may be to state that they both share in a
common activity, ie., both are 'rational', and each, in its way; expresses 
’rationality. I wish to state that one way of expressing rationality is 
to appreciate it, just as ( by way of a simile ) one who plays the piano ;vv
.. -and causes music to be made is appreciated by- one who listens to music,
and ( in this instance ) understands the music which has been played : -
( as might a conductor, music critic, or one educated in the art of 
Y  musical composition or playing j. r:I want to use this extended simile to ' :
illustrate that though both are doing something different, ie., one is ,
playing and another is listening, both share in their understanding of 
of a musical composition. For Hale, there would be a balance in this 
extended simile. As the Intellect is seen by him to be both active and 
passive, so the Will is both active and passive in that it may elect•Vtov>>v
j act or refrain from acting. As the Intellect may err in •it.s- speculation^ .
■ : so may the Will err in its elections to act. \ > " “-v k
: ; Where some writers of our own period might say the re-^  / ; \
■ lationship of action to volition would be through the category of
• ' /. . ••• 8 5 .  ‘ . . . . • ' t . v - ' ; . • / . • ••; • . %  K' £ \ $
^ ‘ 'trying' • ; , Hale would ground the fact Of an action through the , '
; ' ^ Soul: namely, since he deems Intellect and Will both to be faculties £
' of the Soul, relationship of one faculty to the other is expressed
in or by some further action of the Soul upon its members. The simple
:V'v;'v; case for Hale is the proposition that something sweet is desirable, : ^
; V:/7;;- this 'x' is sweet, therefore— -barring some reason for restraint-— * '
: the Soul, at the direction of the Intellect and the Will, moves the ' . ” ; 1
hand to pick up the sweet object to be eaten. One metaphor by which
7 ; Hale described human actions was that of wheels within wheels, the action m
of one part is expressed and communicated to another part, an image which -7
early deists appreciated.; \ ‘ .• \ ' ■ ■
85. Cf., WILLING, TRYING AND DOING by Michael Gorr ( Australian Journal 
; v V- of Philosophy, Volume 57, Number 3, September 1979 [ published by: .
La Trobe University, Bundoora, Melbourne, Victoria, Australia, 3083])77.
' pp 237 - 250, for a modern statement of expressing the re 1 ationship ;7.\
; . ;  ^ between volition, intellection, and action. Representative examples of his i
: ;• position may be seen in these excerpts:
"Volitions are mental events or processes which function to explain the in­
! tentionality or purposiveness that is characteristic of action; consquently 7 ; 7
they can never be rightly analysed as actions ( or even as parts of actions)."
: •; page 237. " ’Volition', .. .denotes a mental state or process which expresses
 ^ : a propositional attitude and which tends to initiate behavioural episodes r;.
, 7 7 7 • corresponding to the content of that propositional attitude." Ibid. 7  ; • *.
. •. "An important objection that might be raised...is that my suggestion leaves >7
, . quite mysterious the exact nature of the relationship between volitiohs
intentions. If the two are as alike as I have supposed, considerations of • .7
simplicity would seem to dictate that they be identified with one another. .
7 k. Standing in the way of such an identitification...is the fact that,; in general;
. volitions appear much more closely tied to actions than do intentions. If. . . i
\ ' • ••-M- will' to reach out with my hand and pick up the pencil on my desk, my reach^ •
ing out and picking up the pencil is almost always what actually follows. If .
I merely form the intention of going to Chicago next week, it is nowhere near 
.• - . / as likely that such an intention will in fact be fulfil led." page 248.
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The logical divisions Hale makes with respect to : v .
faculties and operations and powers of the Soul are that: logical V v  ^
divisions . An human being is a total unity in which powers and 
operations express themselves through the agency of the Soul. One i
is therefore cautioned against concretising the various faculties;: 
inadvertently , then, to speak of them as if they were distinct and 
separate objects or operations ( as an pil pump or a carburettor in  ^f
an automobile engine are distinct and separate operations and functions ). 
For Hale they are faculties and operations and powers functioning within 
the unity of the human soul. Such an attitude would stress the holistic > 
view of human operations, in opposition to that human view which might 
view the human self asacollection and sum of operations ( as might be f ; 
a robot, a collection of its parts ). F o r  Hale the human person is a
whole in which there are parts., The human person is not a collection. ; .
of parts out of which a whole emerges. The difficulty for a later reader,
as may be those of us of this century; is that when reading him and ob­
serving his partitive use of language, ie., naming parts of the human - L
person, as with Intellect, Will, Soul, it is easy to assume that he is '
speaking;of distinct and finitely separate units, when, in fact, he is 
only using a language to refer to separate operations within a whole or 
human unity. For Hale the equation is not expressed thusly: from Soul V 7.
+ Body; how is a human unity formed ? to the contrary, for Hale the : :
human person is^  the unity of the soul and the body, which puts Hale in 
the family of the scholastic philosophers, who assumed the unity of soul ■% 
and body, and does not put him into the school of Descartes, whom, it may
be said, wondered how a unity could be produced of soul and body. . .
*0r, if not produced, then logically justified and explained. ,v./V
.
: If I may return again to the language used by Hale
of act and intention ( supra, footnote 81.) it may now be under­
stood that he uses the terms consistently within the framework of 
: his own depiction of the faculties of intellect and will. One meaning
of ’intention’ is that which pertains to the intellect per se: to form, 
intellective propositions. But another meaning of ’intention’ is that 
rational good the Will elects to put into motion or to achieve. The 
term,’intention’, denotes both meanings. From the point of view of 
defence counsel what might make a sound intention not soundly intended 
would be an irrational, or uninformed, will. By appeal to Hale’s under- 
standing of Intellect and Will this defence objection would be a valid 
objection against the charge that D intended to phi. Any state of affairs 
may be able to be described intentionally; but it is a fallacy, akin to 
that of affirming the consequence, to assume that a state of affairs which 
permits of some intentional description, necessarily was an intended state, 
of affairs. One comes to know if the state of affairs was intentionally 
;.v . opted for, when, and only when, one has knowledge of the causes of the
7 1 act, or action, so intentionally described. A material feature of any ^
state of affairs is that such state of affairs may be described; and, 
furthermore, as so described, may be assumed to have been intended ( on 
: y ; the assumption that a describable state of affairs may also be seen as v :i;
- an intentional state of affairs But from this material assumption, a
formal assumption is not yielded. The formal assumption is the knowledge 
of causes, and, until one knows the cause of phi, one does not completely 
know phi. ' :v-' ^ ’• ^
404 )l r p ^ ' i  V V-';
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In what the law depicts in our present time as constructive A 
manslaughter, Hale describes by using the language of additional events 
upon the doing of an unlawful act, and that language possesses a history
which is known to us from the Fathers. The cases set down in Chapter V
bear examination because they show how distinct categories are employed
to discuss the possibility of culpability. A A
. . The first case is a simple and common one, but I cite it
•. A A," 86 AAAyAA/ Y A/A 7 y y AAAS V  . ;
-for' Hale1 s use -of. language:; ...; / . " /y . A "A ' ..y ./ .yy ■.....: -AA]
A A y 'A A A‘A A ;/:• .A'" /A-r -, ,fIf a man do ex intentione and voluntarily /A, A/
y. /•:.. an unlawful act tending to bodily hurt of any person, A/ ,A A A* as by striking or beating him, tho he did not intend A . A
A ; A to kill him, but the death of the party struck doth ; /A
, .. yy  ' / follow....or if he strike at one, and missing him kills A.y y
•. y another whom he did not intend, this is felony and y A y
A: - A7 / AA 'A' *• 'homicide. V- A A:Y A / Ay :A - AAA-/ A- -AAA AAA." Ay A/ A/ A AA/.
In modem language the law now expresses the concept as the doing of 
grievous bodily harm with intent to wound or harm, which offence is y  /A
expressed in section 18, as amended by the Criminal Law Act 1967,
schedule 3 Pt. Ill, of the Offences Against the Person Act of 1861. V y 
What Hale has incorporated in his description of D doing an unlawful A y 
act, voluntarily so, is a notion of responsibility for harm. If D 
puts into effect a harmful chain of consequences/ then, if those con- A/' 
sequences extend in their actuality outside of the intention of D, / A/ 
it is to be the case that D is to be held responsible for the harm, A yA
which, in this case, is the death of a victim. The underlying pre­
sumption is that one may not set an intentional limit upon a serious - A A 
harm; D intended a harm, and it was a serious harm ( inflicting injury
86 . 1 Hale P.C., Chap. V., "Concerning casualty and misfortune, how far
Y ' -' it excuseth in criminals . page .39 . A A , - A. ;vA ’ A/A; •„ A  • Ayy.;..'
! ' 
/ '  A S  
A A/,;,
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and it is not an allowable defence that D, in the doing of an unlawful > 
act which caused harm, caused a harm greater than he had expected. - The 7  
force of the law is to protect the citizen or subject against unlawful 
harms, be they with mild but harmful consequences, or serious and un- 7 
expected consequences. Both outcomes are envisaged by the extension 
of the law. Any consequences which flow from the unlawful act are un- . 
lawful consequences; and it is not a requirement for the doing of an un­
lawful act that one know all of the possible consequences into considera­
tion prior to the doing of the unlawful act. Since the consequences 
which flow from D's unlawful assault are attributable to D, then it 
does not matter; for the sake of legal consistency, if the consequences 
are mild or serious in their extent; they are, simp 1 ic 1 ter',- consequences 
for which D is accountable because they are consequences which flow from 
his unlawful act which he did both ex intentione and voluntarily.
. The next example takes rather much the same circumstance, 
hut from it the notion of intention is lessened: :
. • 7 "So it is if he is doing an unlawful ' \
, , act, tho hot intending bodily harm of any person,
; ; 7  i as throwing a stone at another's horse, if it -hit V 7 7  7;: \777
- . "7 7 a person and kill him; this is felony and homicide, , 777'
, and not per infortunium; for the act was voluntary, 7 ,•
7 thb the event not intended; and therefore the act it 7 ;
-77 v77 sel being unlawful, he is criminally guilty of the; ; ; 7
consequence, -that follows." 7  .  ^; ■ 7 "77 " 77­
In the prior example the act done was seriously wrong from which further 
serious consequences flowed. In this example Hale wishes to preserve 
the element of wrongfulness by law, but a harmless intention, is it v 77 
a different case ? Save for mitigating the intention, one is presented
■ 87 . Ibid. page 39. '7/ ; >7.' 7 7 7 7 7 ^  7 V ' :' 7. >7’ 7 7' '-7 ■
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. . . t h e  notion of an action evaluated by force of a legal definition. In
modern language the example constructed by Hale could be taken as one o-
embodying recklessness, but one must express that with a caveat. Some 
embodiments of the concept express a subjective factor to be taken into 
account, as, for instance, ’reckless' as used in section 1 of the Road 
Traffic Act 1972 which speaks Of "Causing death by reckless driving".
This category is contrasted, in the same Act, with ’careless', as em­
bodied in section" 3 thereof: - v ; ■. \ v-7 ■•■VS-' ' '. --V
f "Careless, and inconsiderate, driving. . . A
. . If a person drives a motor vehicle on a road without
••v ' . . due care and attention, or without reasonable consid- 
, •. >•; C . eration for other persons using the road, he shall be ; X r
.-'.v •' ’.• Y-*':' ' guilty of an o f f e n c e • ' .• ■/’ ■ '7'-\
In section 3 the test is an objective; test, without reference to ;the'• V'v'
subjective state of D at the time of the offence committed— -save for ■■
some truly unusual state of affairs which D, in defence, could present 
. to the court for consideration, ie., D was drugged and kidnapped, and 
put behind the wheel of the car, etc. f .
. - Hale, in the example (supra, footnote 138); may permit us; «
•s ; to consider that D had acted recklessly, ie., that D had created a harm,
? and Was unconcerned as to what could have been, the consequences of harm,;:'
be they serious, as with death, or be they innocent, as to have caused 
the. horse to shy. In this example, contrary to the first example in
which bodily harm was envisaged by D, one may say that, objectively, D
was negligent, and the proof of his negligence is twofold.First, that 
he voluntarily committed a criminal offence; secondly, that however D 
may have depicted his own actions and measure of Care, objectively a v
A death ensued, but for the actions of D/would not have occurred. In thatAA-AA
.sense, D was reckless, and the test for recklessness in this-example is an 
objective test: that,/in fact, a death did occur. In the prior example> a/AA-AAA 
Y in which grievous bodily harm was Occasioned and death resulted, the test ' \/YA'A;f
5 for recklessness (because of the example) Could be a subjective test; and/ AA f t
v subjectively, D did intend bodily harm. A ; //•.'‘■/■■A •AAAAA AA Af ya"  A" //
A A rA'-;'Does it matter then what intention D entertains if what.D/A :A;A:Y"'ff
A voluntarily does is criminal ? The law moves on this point, and it moves A a AyaA;
;A With a certain uneasiness. In Tort law there has been, in this centuryy a fA":
a great uneasiness about a doctrine of strict liability for unforeseen, -A
AA y but caused harm, as the change from the doctrine of strict; causal/lia-A //. -/a AA"/;'/ .
; bility held in Re Polemis, 1921, to the notion of expectable or reasonable Ay
. AAy / foreseeability Of harms announced in The Wagon Mound, 1961. I appeal to
. A a y  recent .[Tort law only to suggest that the law; is uneasy with doctrines of
a :A a . strict liability not admitting of reasonableness; but this is not to say •/ AA/AA
/AaaA'A that the criminal law does not employ strict liability constructions to-A -//•:, A-A/;/
."AA secure prosecutions and convictions. It does . A ;A; ; •A-;-; '.A A / " ^ /a -AAaA/Ay -;"//
/ a AA /y / What the legal philosopher must ask, however, is this: Is it 
; . / A reasonable to have constructive offences where malice is attributable to A" / • .A/A.
f A D, when, in fact/ D did not entertain the harm caused as an object of. His / / J ];
’ intention ? -
 ^/* A A A ■ A ' It was not a defence to a criminal charge that D killed Y, :•-"/.;,/////
A- A but did so unintentionally, his true intention being to kill X. The / a y
logical move in legal theory was simple:. D killed Y, who, like X, was of >
/ // • a legally protected class . It is not a defence to theft or burglary that A  A-//
* The correct citations are: Ite Polemis and Furness, IVithy §_ Co. Ltd [1921] ,A;-
/•/.. y -A; 3 K.B.560. Overseas Tank ship (U.K.) Ltd. v. Morts Dock $ Engineering Co - Ltd. / //A'
A A a (The Wagon Mound) fl96l! A.C. . /: ./■ a A;/.y A/ -
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7 7  , v v Pound notes only. in some jurisdictions constructive felonies are absolute,7 77 
as: with Federal bank robbing statutes in the United States, i e t h e  .driver/7.'J 7  
- of the car is as guilty of murder as the man he drove to the bank where the 7 7 '
• killing happened in the course of the commission of a Federal felony. In 
> : ■ other jurisdictions, as is Great Britain, the law may mitigate an offence :;;7:
, v : . by requiring the judge, and/or jury, to consider all of the pertinent cir- -7 ?
' cumstances surrounding the act ( as does the Criminal Justice Act 1967 ) . 7 V,J777
• Nonetheless, there is no hard and fast rule* with regard to constructive . .
offences. If a justification it may be that it is not an acceptable de- 
7 7  fence to permit D, because of his own ignorance,to plead that he meant only 7;7;
to transgress so much of the law, like a restaurateur who wanted bnly the ;" 7 7 7  .• 
meat without the vegetables. When a statutory wrong creates a harm, it 
;; necessarily embodies consequences which flow as a direct result of that - 7 ;
; 7 harm Having been voluntarily committed; The true "defence" is to be found. . 7
in the language of Hale's case itself, "...for the act was voluntary. . . ' 7  
: 7 and, if the act was voluntarily, pari passu, then D did not have to:coinit ;>-;7
the act . He could have avoided the consequences by not having committed f 7 ;. 
v ; . the prosdirbed act., 77. ' ' . ... • ; 77 '• ;v ’ . 7 . ; 7: 'Yates'-'*
; / / : In the two cases, only the first follows the logical doctrine . ; , ;
• of versari in re illicita, but yet takes its force by adding that whatever
7 , . consequences flow from a harmful wrongful act, D is to be held responsible
7 7'. t. for them, even for a death he might not have foreseen or desired. The ;jus.-/7 7 
tification for the reasoning (or assumption at law ) is that harm cannot 7 7 :
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- ^unwisely to take an unjustifiable risk. Such, properly, ,:is to be reckless:,:.
namely; to be mindless or heedless as to consequences. A-.;;]:.!;
: I In the second case one is committing a forbidden act to which /
the law states other penalties may attach. It is a logically weak case, . 
but it does have some justification that if D voluntarily creates a. risk, > 
out of which a greater harm develops as a consequence of the risk D had; >r, ■ /; 
created, is it then reasonable to:permit a defence of (some form of) ig- • 
norance on the part of D, even though he voluntarily assumed the (criminal) ; 
risk ? May a wrongdoer profit from his wrong ? to which the criminal law, 
generally, replies : No, he may not . Furthermore, although D did not in- ; K  
tend the harm, not all of what we deem to be harmful need be intended.
The reckless man, in the finest logical sense, does not intend the harm . 
he causes; he intends only a particular harm, ie., a bruised body, and ? , 
not the natural result of his assault, the possible death of V. A self­
induced ignorance is not a strong grounds upon which to base a defence ; 
against having brought about a criminal harm.;, . " • •;.: ■> T-v‘-7 -''
; . Although he does not use. the word, 'harm1, Hale does in the \
examples in his chapter on casualty and misfortune assume that a harm ;;v;; 
; has to: be explained; and that,there are three ways in which a* harm may 7; 
occur and be unjustified at law., One may intend phi, and phi occurs.
One may intend phi,but psi occurs, and psi and phi .are both harms, but , 
psi is a greater harm which could spring from the situation, and actually . I 
did. One may not intend psi, but psi occurs as a conjunct of the unlawful 
: act D is committing, and it is a conjunct D brings a b o u t A l l  three cases :
.' are examples of harms having been brought about by D, the last of which 
; .is a 'but for' si tuation accompanying D ' s unla\vful commission. - v C ; : l
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7 s : 7. I wish now to turn to that class of actions which may ''777.:/
be compelled, or may be done because of fear. As a class of
actions they are troublesome for a legalist, and they are often a
class of actions which are not reflected upon in appreciation for 7 .
the conceptual problems they present as a class of actions. Hale 
seems to dismiss them out of hand, proffering an unreflective cog­
nitive bias that there are simply some actions that one will .not 7 /
do, no matter what the case. Let me turn to his language, and then 7
* '■ ' "*’7 - 7. ;■ ; ’V -1 .• ,oq 7 7 . /; ' .v ••./ ■- •■•• 7 ' -7:develop my discussion. He says, ; * 7 - ' /•.'**. •. -7?,*>>'* >; 7
7 7 7  / 7 "If a man be menaced with death, unless he ; 7;\{ ; f 7
7, V 7; will commit an act of treason, murder* or robbery,; ; ;v 7 :? / /
• 7 7  the fear of death doth not excuse him, if he com- 7 ‘
. mit the fact; for the law hath provided a sufficient ^
7 7 7  remedy against such fears by applying himself to the : /  7
courts and officers of justice for a writ or precept 7 7  7^
. ; de securitate pacis. ”
This is the obvious case that given menaces, one should consult with .
the police and assume that they will protect him. At best, it is a ;
factual question about the nature and effectiveness of a police force 7.
in a given society. For Hale, at this point* has advanced not, an ’ 7 .77
argument but a remedy, and the effectiveness of the remedy depends 77  7
Upon the effectiveness of the police force. That D might give in be.r/77-
cause of reasonably grounded fears (for his own personal well-being,
or that of his family, or even of an innocent and unknown third party ) .
has not been disproved; D has only been rebuked, and to rebuke is not
to prove nor disprove, 7  7 \ ;  - 7 - 7 > 7 7 7 7 7 / 7 7 7 - - 7 f v  7 -7 7 ;7
88 . 1 Hale P.C., page 49, ff., Chap. VIII, ’’Concerning the civil in­
capacities by compulsion and fear.” .. .7''' 7' ; 7\’ 'A’**'.; !7;77- :,"/7777'7
f g Ibid, page 51. ;. T 7 '7 / 7  7^ ;77 ^  7 .; 7/ 7 :.;:,7;
7*7.* '7 'v7 . ’ ,
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. ..A- A : ' 1 •. ., . •' ay ■ r gQ . YA The same example is taken a step further: ‘ A' ( Y A
Y ..if a man be desperately assaulted, and in / A-
peril of death, and cannot otherwise escape, unless a .y  / ■' a
y A to satisfy his assailant’s fury he will kill an in- A a a A'; // 
nocent person then present, the fear and actual force . / : a /-.,' 
A will not acquit him of the crime and punishment of •://Y;Ya Y:
, A a murder, if he commit the fact; for he ought rather -A'-y 'a a
A to die himself, than kill an innocent: but if he can- A
a ; a ;  not otherwise save his own life, the law permits him
A A A  in his own defense, to kil 1 the. assailant...” J; .
It will be noticed that a moral proposition is advanced to control • a ’ A YYY
an action of the will. ; This is paradoxical, for the force of the ■/'. - ;AA';AA;
example is to ask if any state of affairs may so overpower the will
of a person that/he will act ’out of fear’ rather thian to act out of
consideration for a moral proposition or a moral good. What we have ./'/’a /' A/, a
here is the Christian rationalist speaking, and it is a weak form • / a AYa a /
of argument/even upon the principles advanced by Hale.
90. Ibid, page 51. , •, '
* NOTE: It is not my intention here to recapitulate the tradition of A  : '  . : / 
of the kinds of actions which voluntary or involuntary, and if there A 
are certain actions, no matter what force is put upon an agent, which !
yet are voluntary. If the key to attributing the predicate ’just’ to./ 7y \v-’* 
an action of a man is that such an action was done voluntarily [ cf Bk.A/ 1;. 
V, Chap, xii, Nicomachean Ethics: Justice and Injustice viewed in re­
lation to the intentions of the agent. ] , then to extinguish the cause •///’// .
of the voluntary will remove the act, or actions, from the sphere of Y/
the just.or unjust with relation to D, His actions may reflect the ' 
justness or unjustness of him, or them, that may control him; but his 
own actions, in^  ee, will not be just or unjust with regard to him. In vY a a 
the gloss upon Bk V, Chap xii, which was part of the corpus which para- A; 
phrased the Niocmachean Ethics, one reads this comment: "As was demonstrated 
in the previous examination, it is possible for a man to do unjust things / 
without being himself unjust: a man will only be unjust when his action •■/'//" 
depends upon himself and there is no one to constrain him, and he knows A
and is not ignorant of all the surrounding circumstances... .A man will ./ a:
only be just and and his action will only be * just dealing' in the true /, /
sense of the term when it is done voluntarily." [from: The Moral Philosophy/: 
of Aristotle...The Nicomachean Ethics, and...The Paraphrase Attributed to a 
Andronicus of Rhodes, by Walter M. Hatch (LONDON, John Murray, 1879), the 
paraphrase at page 283]. If, therefore, D's action is involuntary, or 
non-voluntary, then a defence has been offered, or justified, for what/ •; A
otherwise would be regarded as a heinous act done out of fear. /A ’ a A/'A,/aa
: v>
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’ 4 .‘ V ;•' • V ■ . V The position which Hale takes in the citation given ; y.Vy; 
is reminiscent of the argument given in the first book of The Laws: * '
that the aim of the law is to inculcate in a man a fear of the law, and . •
a fear for the law: v-/.\y’. • \   ^;v' ;/- ; ;> ' ..y- • y.\:. ^ ,7
"Ath. And consequently each of us needs to . 
be at once free from fear and filled with fear; •' / -J ;:Vy.\
: the reason for these contrasted moods being as
• Vy.\ -we’-have'stated ? , y'' V V '• ‘ • ' . . ;v’. /.'y ; :• '
_ "Clin. Agreed.;.' ' ’ ,• y'.y.'
"Ath. And when we intend to make a man immune ■ : 7-
from various fears, we achieve our purpose by bring- .-.y^
v ; 4 ing him into contact with fear, under the direction ,yy y >
• V ’ of the law ? ^. ’ 7 .yy; ’: -yy :.y ~ • .-y" >: . , y ? >  :-y yy; -y
'• ' •. V ;:'y "Clin. So it would appear." * - . . . ■ i y.; ;y ; ’yyyyy 4 4
But we may argue that a man should embody a respect for and desire to ■y:y;Vv 
be lawful, but not answered is the objection that fear may so over­
power one that one could not act voluntarily, but acted at the command
of another moved by fear. Hale seems to assume that to act out of fear y.y;y
means that one takes the object of fear as an object by which to jus- -.y y
tify one' s action. ’<*.v iy ty  ' y : y-yV,: y. ■ ’ :-^ :;y'’:y.'.v\y-.
For Hale the object of human existence is the good. And 
God only is the total embodiment of that objective condition.' Hale then? y 
assumes that man can be perfected only by and through union with God; any
lesser category towards which one moves will, of necessity, not satisfy,:I
human desires and aims. If a man is moved by fear to harm another in
a grievous way, then, Hale might reason, a man (in some way) has sub- . 
stituted some lesser object than God to satisfy himself: that ’is to say, y y 
. one chooses; or prefers, some lesser condition..- y ^. C - y.'.;"‘
91. The Laws (of Plato), translated by A.E.Taylor ( Everyman’s Library, 7
New York and London, 1969 ) , Book 1, section 647 to 648, page 25. yyyjyj
.^ 1
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. 7 : But is this not to offer a reasonable approach to the Will, .
to assume that the Will necessarily follows the dictates of reason, ie., 
necessarily it is wrong to kill an innocent man; therefore, necessarily 
one will not kill an innocent man ? Fear then becomes an object which 7 
no man could entertain. But if Will relates to human character, and 
if moral virtue is a practise due to human character and habit, the 
only "excuse” for an action done through fear would be one's own weakness 
of character, and, for such a weakness of character, one would be held 
in blame. To have desired to have relieved oneself from any contingent 
state of suffering, at the expense of an innocent man's suffering, could 
not excuse, it is argued^— ^reflective, certainly, of the sentiments of
the Third Book of the Nicomachean Ethics. * Hale, in the chapter,
"Of Homicide" reiterated this view:
"If there be an actual forcing of a man, 7
as if A. by force take the arm of B. and the weapon
in his hand, and therewith stabs C. whereof he dies, 
this is murder is A. but B. is not guilty." 7 7
"But if it be only a moral force [italics mine],
as by threatening, duress, or imprisonment, etc., this ex­
cuseth not, [italics mine]
The first instance is where D becomes reduced to the category of pure 
non-intentional instrumentality; but in the second instance it is as­
sumed that if D considers the moral argument ( or, to return to the 
earlier example, [supra, footnote 14j, a physical forcing which does 
not reduce D to simple instrumentality, but presents D with a moral di­
lemma ), to yield to its conclusion which, in turn, it is assumed directs
92. •Ei.N., 3k.Ill, part 1," Limitations of moral consent " at page 124 
(of the Hatch edition, ojd. cit,), "On the other hand there are deeds, 
consent to which, even under compulsion, is inconceivable: death itself 
under the direst tortures, is to be preferred thereto."
93 , 1 Hale P.C., .page 434. -7 ?:• 7y.;7'7;:77 • .'7v77r;
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his reason, and thus his will, is to yield to what is morally, and, /
here, legally unacceptable. The case however is hot that pure;/
If one returns to the Nicomachean Ethics ( Bk III. part 1 )
Aristotle presents just such a case which he considers to be open to
question, as does his commentator, Andronicus of Rhodes. The case /
is reported' as follows :Y-. YY Y  • Y Y;Y,y Y' ■*’ Y- ' Y Y /YA/y ;,-
YVY'Y > ; / ."Actions, however; which are done under ap- Y y ,/'.
Y  prehension of evils greater than ourselves, or in order
Y y ' to gain some honourable end (as, for instance, if a ty- Y
Y  rant enjoined the commission of some foul deed when he Y
; A ;. had our parents and children under his power, and in the Y
a Y \ event of our compliance they would be saved, and in the
other alternative they would be put to death) such cases, :
; r. I say, raise an issue of dispute whether they are voluntary 
S- V- Y  or involuntary." Y a , y : • ' y :y ' .  a '■ ' ;Y .  Y Y ,
; Y (Androni cus of Rhodes): "There are , however, certain Y
actions which are neither involuntary in the perfect YY
Y a  sense of- the form nor yet voluntary, but in a kind of
intermediate position. Of this character are actions Y
doneunder apprehension of evils worse than themselves,
A : /  ^ or in order to gain some honourable end. An instance ofY .Y
- this kind would be a case where a tyrant enjoined some Y
: foul deed when he had power both over the agent himself Y
Y Y - / and his parents and children, and was able to save them Y Y 
a : Y, all the victim and his friends, in the event of com- Y
Y Y pliance, or to put them all to death in the event of re-/;Y
■ j fusal. Such an instance raises a question whether an act Y
Y done under such, pressure would be voluntary or involuntary."
Can it not be said that the form of the question will, greatly, a
indicate what will serve as an acceptable answer to that question ? - a
If, in questions about the nature of the action of the. Will, a ;
question takes the form,'..What be the proper object of the Will ?
then have we not answered the question already by assuming that 
the language of ’proper object of the Will’ is the proper form in Y
which--to. cast' our answer ?. y v 'y  yYy • y  YY Y: Yy  y Y Y/Y-YYY/ . Y
94. Op. Cit. (supra, footnote 143), pp 122-23.
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y y  y -  W l
. , I had intimated that Hale revealed a strong tendancy 1 - - =
to use' the assumptions of a Christian rationalist, and', I-say this &  "
for this reason. For Christian theology— -and Hale certainly was an 
accomplished Christian theologian— the Will could be a stumbling \ yyy
7y blockif, by counter-arguments, it could be advanced that there were
a class of actions for which a man couid not be held accountable. yy'::-y:yyjyyy
Following along in a general vein advanced in Book III, the first ,
part, of the Nicomachean Ethics, was a tradition that a man was, inyy':
, the end, responsible for his own actions. The concept of 'grace1 in .) y „
y,y Christian theology served to vindicate the proposition ( and assumption f y •
• that no moral test would be presented to a man greater than a man's own
; ; capacities to withstand moral evil. New Testament teachings seemed; to  ■
■ - advance the general notion that Satan, the author of all evil; could 'noty.■yy".-
.for all of his power, overpower the Will of man to force a man to com-
ymit evil actions. ' *
; y y y y y On the other hand, from that same Christian revelation, there; - y > 7 
was the fact of human -failing and sinfulness. The apostles were men of . : ..
; demonstrated weakness, having fled Christ in a moment of great moral
crisis; and Christ himseif revealed natural human weakness in the ac- . \rJ 
. count given of his crucifixion and death. How then were these human yy
failings to be accounted for ? One had the rule that one knew he must ,^;y ; {;•;
, follow, as said St. Paul, .but did not follow. The paradoxical nature of ;:
man did not admit of easy and complete description; nor, for that matter,
of logical consistency. It would appear that the nature of man was bet^y; V,y
ter described by appeal to its inconsistencies than by an appeal to a
y logically consistent picture of human nature, untempered by human experience.
4 1 7  ' •  V  7 ' %  :  7 7 :  / '  5 : v - ! ; ' ' .> r 7
In Hale, therefore, one finds a curious inconsistency. He 7 7: 
is aware, as a thinker, that the Will is not a maker of moral propo- y 
sitions; they fell within the province of the Intellect. He did, how- . 
ever, advance the notion of the Will that it was moved by the good. His.r , 
own theological inclinations directed him in his belief, and assumption,/ 
that God was the highest good; and, therefore, that all men should seek 
after God. The belief occurs Over and over throughout his moral and 7/ 
spiritual writings. What then of an action compelled by fear ? or, as 
Hale refined expression, of "moral fear" ? 7  . .
Hale the theologian, as well as Hale the advocate of the / ;
Nicomachean Ethics (3.i.), seems to speak for Hale the lawyer. Hale 
assumes that a moral proposition which forbids a class of actions be­
cause those actions are especially heinous will direct the Will in a ,7/7/ 
moment of extreme crisis. If D chooses to take an evil course of action, 
then D, in effect, is sinning; and sin Is a rational perversity of the 
Will. Were it not a perverse rational activity of the Will— and this 
is the nettle for the theologian— -then there would be a class of actions, 
wrongful in themselves, for which one would not, however, be responsible.
A rational Christian theology found this hard to accept. ; The obvious 
question was: How then would one be able to know when what;appeared to .. 
be a human choice wias truly not a human choice ? - . 7 ' 7y:7:
The historical period in which Hale wrote abouncs in opinions 
by theologians on the matter of the relationship between sinful actions
•■7l
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and the human will. An attempt to discuss the logical assumptions 
inherent in the topic by writers of that period is a topic far out­
side of my study. Of necessity I must be selective, mentioning only 
a few writers who would have been known to Hale on the matter. V .
Hale knew Richard Baxter as a friend, and it is not too 
much to assume that Baxter1s A Holy Commonwealth was known to him.
Therein, Baxter wrote about "forced consent",
V ' - "Man is a free Agent, and his Will cannot
properly be compelled: If you threaten him with death,,/ 
he may suffer it: It is supposed therefore that what­
ever he promiseth, he freely promiseth. We use[d] to 
say, a man is forced, when fear moveth him to consent: / 
But this is not a proper force: It taketh not away the 
Liberty of the Will. He that consenteth, doth it to 
avoid some greater evil, which he,thinks would else 
have befalen (sic) him; and it is his own Good that 
moveth him to it; [He that sweareth to his own hurt, 
and changeth not ] is the person accepted of God, Psalm 
15.4. If every incommodity would warrant men to break 
Covenants, no men would trust each other, and Covenants 
would lose their force." >;' 7  7  ' 7  7  ,7 .7 .7 ../•'■
The assumption here is that the nature of the rightfully spiritual man - 77' ,7>;- 
is to suffer gladly every kind of martyrological torture. But is this 77  
a proper rule for law ? If by the simple means of hypnotism one may ‘ 
surrender himself to the agency of another, why then would not the more-/v;7 
compelling means of torture itself, or the threat of great torture to 
innocent third parties,, not arrest the liberty of the Will ? The modem 7/ 
analyst could see in such urgings towards the promptings of heroic virtue 
the force of the Super ego, and, perhaps, an overly, unreal estimation of 7 
human virtue. -777 • ■'r--77-77' ■77,; ' 7-77 77; *7-77; .• ‘ . : 77
95 . A HOLY COMMONWEALTH, or Political Aphorisms, Opening The True Principles . 
of Government...by Richard Baxter (London, printed for Thomas Underhill and 
Francis Tyton.,7.1659), CHAP7: VII, "Of Forced Consent", page 181. .[Wing 77.77/; 
number: B-1281] 7 / "7‘ 777 ■ .. 7-7" 77-{7 ‘.7. • -v7 7/ ' - ‘ :
■ ■
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From the same period a work of great learning, touching
■ .■ ; . *>• " y” y y . ".■y.- yvy. gfiboth law and morality, was Jeremy Taylor's Duetor Dubitantium. *
He puts the same case for consideration under the heading, "Fear 
that makes our reason uselesse, and suffers us not to consider, leaves 
the actions it produces free from crime, even though it selfe be cul­
pable." The example given is this: * y ; 7 ; 7
.Roberto Mangone a poor Neapolitan travelling upon 
the Mountains to his own house, is seized on by the 
Banditi, a pistol is put to his breast, and he threatned 
to be kill'd unlesse he will be their guide to the house 
of Signior Seguiri his Landlord, whom he knows they intend 
to rob and murder. The poor Mangone did so: his Lord was 
murder'd, his goods rifled and his house burned. The 
question is, whether Mangone be guility of his Lords 
death." 7: '7 • • •>'. y ’ -'.yyy' ;
For his answer, Taylor cites from the Nicomachean Ethics, Ill.i., a 
portion known to us. In part, Taylor says: ■ * y
" To this the answer is easy, that Mangone is not 
innocent; and though he did not consent clearly and 
delightingly to Seguiri's death, yet rather then die 
himself he was willing the other should." ■ '
y ; V-- 7-'y; y’ . ' . ;y ■■•■: . ' ’ appealing' at this
point to Aristotle's notion that some actions are "mixed", ie., have 
to them elements both of the free and the constrained: " These kind 
of actions are mixt, but they have more of spontaneity and election in 
them then of constraint." 9^ • Taylor. however, seems not- to have an­
swered the case. He has cited a standard authority for the case. It ; 
is when Taylor begins to involve religious principles in his answer that 
the case is itself given a "mixt" answer. , • ■ -. ; y
96. DUCTOR DUBITANTIUM, or The Rule of Conscience, In all her generall 
measures; Serving as a great Instrument for the determination of CASES . 
of CONSCIENCE, in four books, BY: Jeremy Talor,D.D. [LONDON, 1660).
97. Op.Cit., The Fourth Book, OF THE NATURE AND CAUSES OF GOOD AND EVIL, 
Rule VII, page 511. Ibid. y qq ; Ibid. V ’*yy'7
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■ •: : ,.v;.. ; w . - ’ -"V--' • • ‘ •: /.• ioo ^  \ ; " f• Taylor resorts to a religious reply for the case: \ ;
" : v "No Christian remaining a Christian is willing .v i:
to offer sacrifice to Daemons, or to abjure Christ, .
v if he be let alone: but he that in time of perse- ■ :
i cution falls away, not changing his heart, but de- v :
- . nying his profession', this man is not excus fd by his :
fear, but betray fd by it.” : 'W
^ ; thereupon citing the dicta of
Aristotle that some actions are so heinous that one must suffer death :
rather than to commit such heinous actions (E.N. Bk.Ill.i).But
even this allusion is circumscribed: . ; ; : ; !
oV/lY?:.? "And because there are some things... [Greek
I. ; \ : ;text, and translation] which are insufferable to humane ?
- ; Nature, and therefore there is in laws assign'd a cer**
’■ tain allowance of fear qui potest cadere; in fortem &
; *• constantem virua, that is, in the case of danger of suf- ^
v : ; fering the extremest evils; and our obedience to humane
• l a w s  is excus'd in such cases, because no man is ordinarily 
bound by the laws to suffer a greater evil in keeping the : ■
law, then is threatned (sic) by the law it self to him 
, . ... that breaks them; therefore the law allows an omission of
* ■ °f obedience in the fear of the;greatest evils,?.But in
Divine 1awes it is otherwise, because no man can threaten 
• J :'.' or inflict on another an evil comparably so great as God ,
does on them that break his laws; and therefore the lesse 
fear cannot be a reasonable excuse against a greater; and 
 ^, y in all cases, the fear of man must yield to the fear of God. 
And therefore in the matter of a Divine Cpmmandement, no 
, fear of temporal evil is an excuse or warranty. Because
; . • . we are taught to despise poverty and pain and death, and
; to doe all this chearfuliy and gloriously. And therefore ’s
V Vthis case of Conscience and it’s whole dimensions are quickly 
: measured." ;vyyy-' •;>; '.A ,'yV;'"' ■ - ■ I/.
^ ° 0 ,  I b i d - 101  • I b i d > PP 511 -512 .
* At this point in the text, Taylor refers the reader to Book III, V ;  
Chapter 1, Rule II (of the instant work): ’’Humane laws doe not oblige
the Conscience to an active obedience,when there is an imminent danger 
of death, or an intolerable, or very grievous evil in obedience.”, the 
body of the Rule, pp 26-31, of Book III. . . - ; . : ;
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Taylor seems to settle upon the general religious maxim 
that there is nothing harmful which man can do to man which could 
match the wrathful vengeance of God. This is the first principle for 
the religious man: Be not afraid of them that can kill the body only, 
But Taylor then offers a more mitigating general principle which seems
v- \ 102 • ■ . V . '• '•.;V vV • -at harmony with civil law: . V. 1-'..;- M:
- . .. ... . ’’But if in these or any other cases the^y?;
; fear be a surprise, sudden, and violent, and im- ;•.>
. ! petuous, that is, such that our reason is invaded . , ; "
; f and made uselesse, such as by a natural effort dis- : ::
. : ;v orders all; our faculties, such as that of Arachne v :
r-" in Ovid [Lib. 3. Met am.] ...[or] such a fright as a "
. hare or lambe are in when they are pursued by dogs '
"•'■v y* - ; ; and.foxes,- • - --v v ' .. J-- •
, . : Occupat obsessor sudor mihi frigidus artus,
 ^ Caerulae aeque cadunt toto de corpore gutta,
: . [Ibid.] when nature is in a lipothymie [ie, fainting
or swooning], and our strengths are made extravagant, ; ^
, ' : when we can doe,anything in flying and nothing at all
to consider; then our understanding cannot deliberate, . 
and then our win does not consent, and then the effect :
" " i s  pityable but not criminal; but the fear it self pos- .
, sibly may be both. For sometimes our fear may be so
: great, that it fills all our faculties, and then there
cannot be any deliberation; for that must be at leisure,
. . . and must look upon two objects. Statius [ Lib. 5. :
‘ . V ; ’ : Thebaid., and I omit the Latin verse ] well describes
this kind of fear in the similitude of a hunted stagge....
' ; she hath no courage, no confidences, no hope of any thing;
• ;t: she dies if she stayes, but she cannot stay to consider
: • ,  so long; and when she runs, she dies too, and she hears
. v .  ^the wolf at her ear, and sees"him with her eye, and,feels j:
the teeth in her heart, and dies with fear. In such cases 
> V-v' :;. ’J-.as: these we are as men without reason, and therefore to be -
. • ■ ' ■ • , '. ■ judg'd accordingly. : . . ;v. ' -• /•.: ‘ . • \y , ' ' :  •’ i-r-
Taylor, as I understand his Severth Rule, appears to be unclear on how. 
cases of fear might be resolved. He .presses for the highest rule: that
102 . Ibid., pp 512-13.
■>%
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a man should not cause harm to another in order to prevent his own 
death. But he also admits, in his considerations of examples from;\77:77:/,-
Ovid and Statius, that one may be so overwhelmed by fear that one 7 ; ;.;
‘ '*7 “ . 7  ' ' - ' 103.(properly) cannot be said to will. The consequences are heinous: 7
\ V "Concerning degrees of fear which are lesse, such .
7 which leave us in a power to consider and deliberate, , " 7 7
: 7 they may lessen the malice of the crime to which they 77 7 7 / 7 Y
V Y drive; but cannot make the fact innocent.11 , »
, as if to admit that, as a principle in theory, if the Will be not yyy
totally extinguished in its natural exercise; then a degree of guilt
attaches to the wrong done according to the measure and degree of the / Z
fear which impelled D to act contrary to his best Will. Thus we have \ .
two principles at work. The first is the noble religious principle, 7 / 7 7 7
/following on from the philosophical tradition of the Nicomachean Ethics
that some actions are without excuse, that supererogation is expected 7.yy77
of the Christian in face of extreme hardship or terror: The second 7  ./ 7;,
principle, more in accord with the facts of human nature, states that 77
it is possible for the faculties of man to be so overcome by a state of y
: fear and terror so as not to function naturally or properly. The latter 7.
principle Taylor does not wish to universalise, and he still hopes that 7 7
one may use one’s liberty to refuse the courses forced by fear: y ^ 7
y y * 7 "He that is taken by a Tyrant and an unjust power and put 7 7" 7-7;
y 7 7 7 ■ ampngst the troups (sic), is not innocent though in that//. 7 :/7 7
, /;;;. fear and against his will he fight against his Prince. 7 77.7/; 7
/ : / [Greek text, then]...said Dio Cocceius, They went w il l in g ly :  7
7 to  w arre, i f  a t le a s t they may be sa id  to be w i l l in g  who are 7/7
7 ; constra ined  by fear. It is/an unwilling willingnesse, and 7/7 .
■ // therefore it is a sin almost against their will." 7 7 ' 7 /7 .//
103 . Ibid., page 513. “ 7 ' 7  7/ 7/ 7 ;t 7y;;; 7vYy/y/7' '7 y/ Z/7 y7y 7 y'7/77/y''
104 . Ibid: 7 ”7 ^
• 7'7 I77
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: : ; Taylor, then, rests upon two statements of principle, y One y i^ y^ , yy
is an expression of belief, his principles emanating from his belief. ^
The second principle appears to be, though it is not unambiguously ex-; ; :
pressed or developed, an acceptance that fear can overpower a person, .f’.
and in such a state a person can commit heinous acts. The tension, , *
however, which Taylor expresses is to suggest that there is something ;;
cfontradictory in the concept of a free act to say, at once, an act can . :
be free because one’s will is at liberty to choose as it may, yet one;
may be commanded or compelled against one’s will. Taylor-appears to
argue that the concept of ’free will' is: a concept which admits either
of no contrary ( ie., one is either free or not free, and both states : ; y, .
cannot, potentially, co-exist in principle in one person ), or, if it
admits of 'degrees of freedom’, the act done is always, in some way, ah ;y ;
expression of a degree of freedom, and it is not, as an act, an expression
of non-free agency . * ■ • V1. •' v  'yy. V.-y j  : ' Vv. *$! y V'.. v \..y
To cite what appear to be rigourous texts Concerning action .
done through: fear does not mean that the period ( circa 1640-80 ) was y ?;;-y ’
devoid of any examination of the passion. Edward Reynoldes, v a Preacher
at Lincoln's Inn at the time Hale practised law in the Inn, wrote at some -
105.length upon the human passions and faculties, and one can assume that • :.■
his large work was known to Hale. The value of Reynoldes’s. work is :'that'yyi^ ;->>;
105 . yA TREATISE OF TOE PASSIONS AND FACVLTIES of the Soule of Man. By;,
Edward Reynoldes, (LONDON, printed by R.H. for Robert Bo stock. . ’ ,
-.yyy: 1640). [S.T.C. number: 20938.] It is a voluminous work spianning .
• y 553 pages, richer in detail and examination of authors than De Homine, y
;{: ? yy which comprised the first part of Hale’s Primitive Origination. ;.sy :
[.'*■ It may;be noted that Edward Reynoldes senses the same puzzle about the: :
Will, but, in this instance, it in regard to God’s prescience: ".. .but v-:;.$}.
yet hee [God] doth not so worke his Will out of mens, as thereby to con- • \
' straine and take away theirs (for indeed the constraint of a liberall and v> 
y ?ree Facultyi is (as it were) . the extinction thereof) "A Treatise, page 545
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it does demonstrate to us that there did exist serious discussion .! :
during Hale's lifetime of the nature and operations of the soul, and 
that chief in those discussions was to present some coherent theory / 
of Will and Intellect in relation to human actions (amongst other.:,, 
human operations). Reynoldes stressed the liberty of the Will,;which 
he thought to be absolute,and the action ( or motion ) of-the Will": 
was to assent to rational propositions and evidence provided it by 
the understanding. However, during his development of his argument 
concerning human passions and faculties, Reynoldes did discuss fear / • 
in itself as a passion, and the body of his discussion was to advance; 
the understanding that fear simply could overpower man. It. could yy y  
be an object which infested human action so that all action done was 
done out of and because of fear. Of the case where death may cause 
one to fear inordinately, Reynoldes uses the language of 'error' to yy
T : ' V.: • ■  ; y y y y ib6idiscuss such an example, and it does have bearing here: -
» : . "For as Errour hath a property to produce an nourish y y:
/ • any Passion, according to the nature of the subject :y A
: y. ■ ; , matter which it is conversant about: so principally yyf
y -' y ■ this present Passion: because Errour it selfe is a , V ' 
,.y*y y y . kinde of Formido Intellectus, a Feare of the Vnder- 'yy yy 
y K :. y. Standing: and it is no great wonder for one Feare to
y , : y V beget another'. And therefore when Christ would takbyyyy
away the Feare of his Disciples, he first removes their
: y\* y  'prejudice: Feare not those that can kill the Body onely,
yy Vy and can doe no more. Where the overflowing of their
y : yFeares seemes to have been grounded on the Overriding y.
; " . y of an adverse power. Thus much for the Root and Es- , • y
yy y ,..y - -y'~: sentiai cause of Feare..." : :y" yy y ..y \ y,; y.yyV'yy y V  :*
106. A Treatise, op.cit., page 278, being CHAP. XXI, "Of the Passion. 
of Feare: the Causes of it; Impotency, Obnoxiousnesse, Suddennesse, 
NeerenesSe, Newnesse,. Conscience, Ignorance of an Evil 1".*; •;: yy :y y  '
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J It may be suggested that Reynoldes transfers the emphasis from  •' 77:7'7
speaking of the Will being compelled to speaking about the under- ; /
standing being misinformed. To act from compulsion would therefore/ 7 / 7 7  
mean to act from an improper estimation of the circumstances, or out . //'// 
, of an improper estimation for ends. It would be natural, by use of 7y y 
this language, to suggest that one would excuse what was done out /, 7;.
of fear because one was incapable of making a proper estimation of Z
how to proceed. Reynoldes, therefore, preserves the liberty of the Z//Z//y 
Will. The Will has not been compelled; it has acted because one could 7  
: / not form a proper judgement or estimate as to what ought to be done *i -7
;• under , the circumstances . His broad depiction of 'fear' permits such 7  77-'
a reading which precludes the somewhat curious objection, But how / 7  /
7 , is liberty obviated in a faculty which, by necessity, directs itself -77/Z7 
The passage may show that Reynoldes saw ’fear1 to be a complicated 
passion, not given over to simple "object of the will" or ^object of
■v;■ Z 7 '7 ' /7  7 7 7 / - / Z / /  ■ "•/ ’'■ 107. 7 7 , ■ ' Z'  / / ;7 ; / ’/7-' 7 ';Z7Z%y;77Z/7-;7 /^?77
7/ ' the intellect" depictions: 7 77-'. 7  '/-, •/ 7 7  ■ - 7.7Z/7 7 7 7 7  /•/•
■ / ■ ■ .- L / V ' '7 C  7  .."The opposite Passion to thiis of’ Hope is 7 7 7  77/Z7Z 
•/ 7 / 7 ’ Feare: which being an Equivocall Passion, and admit- 7/ZZ777
ting of many different kinds, can scarse have any .- 7 77/ 7/;/7~
7 whole and simple definition to explaine it/’ . y
In the following chapter Reynoldes asks the question as to what are the 7 7
; effects of fear, having granted that it is a passion, and, as a passion,
7 / 7 .7 , 7  ' Z -. . ‘ 7. ‘ 7 7. v - v ■  ^ ;*’••. 1; . /•, '■> 7 * *' 7 7* sj*h g * >can dominate one. It clouds our understanding by magnifying an evil .7?r : *
/ 107. Qp. cit.; A Treatise, page 274. 7
79®:* Op. cit.. A Treatise, page 291, which is from Chapter XXVI11, "Of
the Effects of Feare, suspition, Circumspection, Superstition, ’Betraying 7
the succours of Reason’, Feare Generative, Reflecting, Inward, Weakening 
the faculties of the Minde, Base Supition, Wise Caution." pp 290-299. ///'•
426 y -7 ;
Once a man is gripped by fear, "...the minde of man is drawne to
a heerer sense of its weaknesse, and to a more prejudicate'appro- 77; : ’ '7777 " 7-r
■: -.7. .77 " >"%'J . v 109 . \7. '*77.7' • ‘r-l'l fl"• 7?*“-7*v'hens ion of the adverse power." Reynoldes continues, ; ^7v7;y77:7 7'77.7777y;
77; 'X •' '-777 ... Tacitus.: .speaks [of] Ineiinatis ad credendum. .yiy
; So I may say, ineiinatis ad timendum animis loco .
. ; omnium, etiam Fortuna, When the minde is once droop- . 7 7;:'7'7’y'‘/7'-v 77
. ing, things which before passed away as matters of . 7 77 y
7 ' y course arid casualty, are now drawne within the com-" • 7'7/7;’7 v7 7777
I '■'\ v.passe of presages and Emphaticall evils. 7 ; ■ -  y-v- £' ■ y 7* 'y
This leads Reynoldes to make a coherent observation near the end of
his work on the operations of the Will: * * * *
, •”' ;>;yih- some Cases it [ie, the Will] worketh Naturally
77 and Necessarily, as in its Inclination unto Good Vv7yy7'\:7y7/</777':
in the whole latitude, and general 1 apprehension 7; 7 7 7 7  
; ; thereof. For it cannot will any thing under the r y y
>: general! and formall. notion of Evill. In others . <>. '• >:yyy \/y. yy yy
: / Voluntarily, from it selfe, and with a distinct ^
; y r view and knowledge of an End wherunto (sic) it . V 7.ri7
worketh. [Ethics;-1.3. c. 1.] In other freely, with - ,7: 7 :7.y7!/7 •
. . y a Liberty to one thing or another, with a power to ~v-'77 yyy 77;'7
* ' ' 7  elicite, or to suspend;and' suppresse its Owrie Opera- : y 77 :
tion. In all Spontaneously, without violence or com- .
7 7; pplsion. For tnough in some respects the Will be not 7. *:;•
.. • 7 7,7v 7 free from Necessity, yet it is in' ;aii ’'-free-.from-77 y777;•77^777x7
7 Coaction. And therfore though Ignorance § Feare may- 77 7^7.7;; 7v7y .
take away the complete Voluntarinesse of an Action pro-
7 ceeding from the Will (because without such Feare or *7
7, 7; 7 Ignorance it would not have been done; As when a man7 7”
y ' casteth his goods into the Sea to escape a shipwracke...)
yet they can never force the Will to doe that out of
violence, which is not represented under some notion of y 7
7 Good thereunto.” , 7,7- 7 S..7- '. 7 •' • •' \ ' •:'7'"77y’7-
\c- V :v4 '7..
109. • Op. cit., A Treatise, page 292.7 • y 110 . Ibid. v ..‘7. -7,7 :77..
111. Op. cit., A Treatise, pp 548-9, which is Chapter XLII, "Of the 
7 Will: it’s Appetite: with the proper and chiefe Objects thereof;
7. God. Of Superstition and Idolatry. Of its Liberty in the Elect­
. ing of Means to an End. Of its Dominion Coactive and Persuasive
Of Fate, Astrology, Satanicall Suggestions. Of the manner of 
7. the Wils (sic) Operation. Motives to it.: Acts of it . The Con-77 
•■•7 y" y;:’ elusion.” pp 537-553. y . /-'7';'>"'7’7-; ^ 7 : , : *•; -'-V ;/ ;7','7'7' -
■' V . . • • ‘V  yV - I i '  *\ ^  i \  ]
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y We have, then, ..sufficient evidence from the period that . /•
the nature of the Will was subject to serious discussion by EnglishV 
writers. A broad faculty psychology committed Christian writers to : y;; ;
a division that in matters intellective, one spoke of reason or of :V 
understanding, but with regard to actions, means, and ends, one spoke 
of the will. A difficulty which looms at large in such a distinction • y
as was given between the sphere of the intellect and the sphere of 
the will was how to account for coactive actions, when, it will be ;.y yyy
appreciated, both faculties were described as possessing certain y
necessary properties, ie., the mind necessarily knew, whilst the will 
necessarily elected to direct itself. Was it not to propound a; con­
tradiction in terms to speak of the will being moved by other than 
itself :;;y' J h  '-VSy- 'V ,
Hale borrowed from the third book of the Nicomachean Ethics, 
to the effect that the fear of death, either to oneself or to some other, 
ought not to justify a man's commission of a heinous act, and the law, 
therefore, he held, would never admit the defence of compulsion. But V . 
there were models at law, ie., compulsion under contract, which served to :• 
vitiate consent, which could serve as examples to justify the defence
of compulsion. Hale, along with such other Christian writers as Reynoldes,
Baxter, and Taylor, were aware of the contract examples; why then, not ad- . 
vance the principle to cover compulsion ? , - -.' • y V
:It-: would appear that the Aristotelian and Christian assumptions 
about the Will, and about the moral content of certain actions, made the
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extension of the principle difficult, if not impossible. The Aristotelian; 
tradition from the Nicomachean Ethics, Book III, part 1, made choice a 
choice of some good, and the 'good' itself had to be circumscribed by 7 
the limits of propriety. Therefore, some actions in and of themselves 
were evil, and would admit of no justification; one would seek death 7 
rather than to do them. The Christian tradition, drawing upon,the Ethics, 
grafted the Aristotelian Will on to the concept of Christian creation to77 
produce a hybrid of this kind, If God is good, and if God holds man reh 
sponsible for the moral content of his actions owing to the nature of : : 
the human will, its essential and necessary freedom, how then could a 7 
class of actions be permitted to exist in the universe, Caused by man, 
.which were both materially heinous but formally neutral, ie., wrongful 
actions produced as a result of compulsion ? What then, the question 
might be framed, was the object which directed the Will to seek other ; -: 
than the good which was God ? The Christian then would have the dif­
ficult task of justifying that God was the highest good to which all 
men, whatever their troubles and sufferings, ought to turn. There would 
come to exist that class of actions which produced harm, as do natural 
events and disruptions in Nature, but which were produced by man, who 
himself was*to be above Nature, and, therefore, culpable, of which Nature 
was not. There was the further paradox which both traditions could not 7 
relieve if appeal was made to their presuppositions about the Will;: How 77 
can an essentially free faculty, at times, become a determined faculty ? :
If free will admits of no contrary, then lack of freedom had to be one ; 
of degree, and not of kind, or not admit of a transmutation from a free 
faculty into a determined faculty. Hale solved it by denying compulsion.
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v;>y.y y_ '• • as a grounds for a defence to the charge of murder done under compulsion. : j
In this way he was consistent according to his religious tradition, and -;y
: ; > to the tradition of the Ethics. That he was correct is another problem. /
. Prescientific apriorism, of the kind which Hale evidenced, y y: | y
seemed unwilling to admit that,even within the language of faculty 
: psychology,one would be able to speak of the Will being immobilised. ; y V
Reynoldes came close when he depicted the various effects of fear, and y
Taylor was willing to admit that fear could paralyse ( as the passages 
/ supra showed ) . But the vision— -if that is not too extravagant a word-r— ... 
yy y of an ordered universe, made by God, total and perfect to its smallest . % >
;Jy i: : ; parts, with man made in the image of God, seemed not to permit or to ; yi
. countenance that man could apparently fall again after the grand Fall.
An action done under compulsion held the implication that man could fall 
. . from himself, and that such a fall could be greater in nature than the ^yy:
■ original fail from Paradise. The first fall left man with moral faculties; ;yyy
but a second fall, as caused by an action done through compulsion, would y y 
leave man bereft of moral responsibility because, it would be argued as y, y..-y,y
/ a defence, those moral faculties were, or had become, immobilised. y ..yy^ y
" ;.* ’ ; ; Such reasoning, or such a vision, was the ;4o$jfc:'o$
y. centuries. Ail understanding of man began with an a priori conception of what
a man should be, and when the facts did not fit the a priori vision, then; 
the facts had to be wrong, it was the prescientific innocence, if you will^y y 
' ; of an age which explained some forms of insanity by appeal to Satanism and : y y
witchcraft, and which could not have had knowledge of brain dysfunction •.-'..h :-;V :
y . ; . • caused by an absence of tracer elements in the human system. I say this ; y
r without any sense of cultural arrogance given by a life at this time. - y* 1
!'3
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; : 7  There were the seeds, within Hale’s own time, to have. :  : :7  7/
understood action done through compulsion, but the Christian rational­
ism of the period could not have seen it, We know this from history, / 7  
and not from any disassociated consideration of logical truth. Hale 
saw 'by means of his assumptions, and if one sees the universe as a 
rational organism which reveals the rational workings of a God, then 
it is unreasonable to assume that any set of deistic assumptions will 7 7/7. 
permit vast areas of moral neutrality to be permitted, especially if - 
those areas produce harmful consequences. Put into the terms of a , 5 -.. 
rationalist theology, how could a God permit man, or any man, to be . 
so immoblised ? .Would that not mean that evil had triumphed, and that y 
God had failed— the proof being this poor Jack, looking like a man, :/ / 7 
moving like a man, but deprived of that quality which made him to be 7 7 /  
a man, his ability to author voluntary actions ? An argument which . y 7V 
might serve :to j ustify compulsion, and thus.to arrest responsbi1ity for : 
the heinous consequences of an action done under compulsion, must have 
sounded like the arguments of Satan himself: moral harm but no motal 7
responsibility . Hale could not, and did not . accept the defence.' If .
the Devil himself could not control the Will of man, save by permission
of a man, how then could an external threat, or, even the more removed, 7 7
a moral force, control the Will of many and, to such an extent, cause 7/‘ Z y 
one to perform wicked actions, consciously, but inculpably? It must have 
been seen by him to have been a complete contradition in terms, or a 7. ; / 
wrongful assumption at the very least. : 7 7  7
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In concluding this chapter, I wish now to sample his analysis 
of legal texts, showing his mediaeval mind at work in the law. 77
,4 . Hale had reiterated the dictum of Plowden: Ignorantia eorum,
':7'7 . 7? 777 v: 7 7- 112. 7.7:-7 7:7 77‘y7 ;yyy'7'^#7quae quis scire tenetur, non excusat. When one looks to the case -7 •
in which the proposition occurs, Brett v. Rigden (1568) 1 PI. 343, one 
.. discovers that it was a truism advanced by Sergeant Roger Manwood, at7 
: ’ the time a newly called Serjeant at Law of Inner Temple, in his argu­
ment of the case:’ A?'*' .7-77 •;,'7 77: 77 7-7 ;;7. ? '7:777 , “7. -7 7777;/.
7 . - "For, he said, it is to be presumed that no Subject. 7
. 7 7 ;  v7'-°f this Realm is misconusant of the Law whereby he 7
, 7 . is governed. For Ignorance of the Law excuses none, [italics 
And forasmuch as in indifferent Matters every one mine]
7 . shall be presumed to know the Law according to his.
; 7  > 7  Duty, from thence it follows that in a last Will it 7 7 7 7
7; 7 7 7  shall be presumed that every Man is conusant of that 7777;
‘ 7 7 7.7 7 which the Law has ordained touch the same..." 7 7 ;7 7v y
Hale extracted the sentence which I have placed into italics. What is
of interest is that Hale does .concede that ignorantia facti may excuse: 7 ^
7 ." •. • for such an ignorance many times, makes the act it- 7
7 . 7 ; ' . v V  : 7  self morally i n v o l u n t a r y ; 7 7  7 7 7  7 ■: V-. ■ 7- y ■ 7 7 7 -■
7 The example which he gives to illustrate this propos ition•is an examp1e 7
taken from an incident of war, and one would assume that it is an extreme
example used to justify a questionable position at law. He States:7? ^  •
7 . / 7 "Itis known in war, that it is the greatest offense for 7
7 . a soldies to kill, or so much as to assault his general: 7 7 .
77 7 suppose then the inferior officer sets his watch, or sen-
V teneis, and the general to try the vigilance or courage 
7 7 7  of his sentinels comes upon them in the night in the pos- :
7 7 7. ture of an enemy, ( as some commanders have too rashly
7 77 ; done) the sentinel strikes, or shoots him, taking him to -.7 7
7; 7 be an enemy; his ignorance of the person excuseth his of- . 7
.- 7 77x7 7  ' fence." > : - • , ■ ■ • . . . ■' . ■ 7. y).:- ■
112. Cf., 1 Hale P.C. 42, CHAP. VI, "Concerning ignorance, and how far it 777
prevails, to excuse in capital crimes." - '
113 Cf., Brett v . Rigden (1568) 1 PI. 340 at 343, 7 ,-.7 7 7 7
114. Cf. ,71 Hale P .C. page 42. , 7 .
u s . iMi- 7*■; 77" ;i77 '-:,7 ;,777 -7 ;7 '77:^ 7777^7;7 7 7 y 7 7
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The example which Hale gives is compressed, but it does,
I believe, adequately convey what may be the necessary elements to 
show what it means for an action to be done in ignorance, and how the
7-Z/Z‘7.7V-V7 yv:Z'Y'V,ZZ 'Z7 7 Z7 7 .7- .-..77; n 6 . z.77;
consequences which arise from such an action may be excused. One should 
note that Hale speaks of an act, "...itself morally involuntary..."
He appears to assume that an action out of ignorance is a moral cate­
gory which may, possibly, excuse for legal purposes. The word, ’act’, 
is, I suggest, used by Hale both to describe the action D brought about
(ie., intending to kill an intruder, and setting into action causes
which may kill the intruder) and to describe the consequences of D ’s
act ( ie., the intruder actually having been killed ). Hale works from
within an accepted framework regarding ignorance which had a strong medi­
aeval background . V ;
Y Z What, then, does the example suggest ? Assumed it is that an 
human act, to be voluntary, and to which culpability may be attributed, 
must possess certain logically distinct features if it is to be seen as 
a moral act. It is assumed that D knew what he wanted to do, and that 
when he consented to elect the means to achieve what he wanted to do, 
that his object would be achieved, barring the introduction of some novel 
or intervening cause not of his own devising. An act could be rendered 
morally involuntary when there was an ignorance of the nature of the 
object, because it could be claimed that had D known what the object in 
fact truly was, he would have elected to have refrained from his under- 
'taking, - 7-/■ . . A • y . 7y ■ 4 - ' " ' 7 * ' . -'7; ’ : -7-y : '7,7-':
116 . Also; cf., 1 Hale P.C. 431, re * ignorance1 : ’’ If A. gives poison to B .
. in te n d in g  to  poison him, and B. ign o ra n t o f i t  g ive  i t  to  C. a c h ild ,  o r V 
o the r near re la t io n  o f A. aga ins t whom he never meant harm, and C. takes i t  
and d ie s , th is  is  murder in  A. and a po ison ing by him, (Plowd. Com. 474 a. 
D a lt . cap. 93 ), bu t B. because ig n o ra n t, is not g u i l t y . ”
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In this case D, under military command, repelled an intruder.
It was npt D’s intention ( for the sake of argument ) to kill an inno- 
'; . c e n t  person ; and, as a subset of that notion, it was certainly not t i 's 'y iy  
intention to kill his own commanding officer. It was the intention of -;
D to thwart an intruder. What this analysis yields is that a moral, act 
r was seen to possess two broad elements. It possessed a formal element, \ 
and the formal element could be described as that which an agent intended 
' . ; to do, bring about, cause, etc., and it possessed a material element;
that object of an intention which was a contingent fact. In this case -vy.'.-- 
the example Hale constructs shows one that there was not a relationship , 
between the formal and material elements of the moral act. D had intended 
to repulse an intruder ( the formal aspect of his action ), but the in­
truder he repulsed was, unbesought by him, his own commanding officer ;/■ 
( the material aspect of his action ). It had been a truism of the scho­
lastic period that the definition of ’x* was a combination of the material 
cause and formal cause; or, strictly put, a definition presented the mat-.; 
y- ter arid form of an object. For D’s act to have been wrongful, these comr 
ponents would have to be present in any description of D’s act: 1) that D 
bad intended to kill his commanding officer, 21 and that at the time of.- 
his firing he knew that the alleged intruder was actually hisycommanding 
officer. There, one has a clear offence. y t: y ,.V ; > :
. But the case could be altered. D could intend to shopt an in­
truder, and this we would state was D's intention. When the intruder ap­
; y : peared D might have thought it was his coimnanding officerr— -for whatever
reason— -but then have acted without caring, shooting, and, at the same y< 
time, hoping that it was not his commanding officer whom he had killed.
77. 7-'-A7
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But if the facts of this example obtained, then one could not des- 7 -77 
cribe D ?s act as a morally involuntary act.' It would have been an 7.77' 
act at fault in two ways. Intentionally, because D could foresee that 7 / 
he might reasonably produce a harm or wrong; and materially, because if 7  
it were his commanding officer, then an innocent man would die. Hale 
wishes to convey by the force of his example that what D intended was; ;7. 
free of moral culpability; and if realised through action, no moral 
harm would, follow. If that were the case, the act of D would then be 7 7 7  
a moral act. But harm arose at the material level, ie., the intruder 7 7 
(unknown to all) is actually the general, then that harm or that wrong 
could not be attributed to D ’s intending and willing it to be the case. 
Rightfully, then, Hale says of his example that the act of Dis itself 
morally involuntary. D did not intend to bring about a moral wrong, and, 
given the material facts surrounding the episode, D did not act careless­
ly, recklessly* or negligently.
: :. ; . Older 1 anguage— whi ch would have been acceptable to Hale, even
though awkward to our ears now-— would have said that D, when he formed, 
an intention, was not wrongfully ignorant of the material facts of the ,7
moment prior to his willing, concurrent with his willing, or posterior 7  'i
to his willing. We may simplify the description now to state, that D, 
when he had made up his mind and acted, took a reasonable stance with .77:
regard to the facts of the case, and that he proceeded reasonably. It ;.
was reasonable for D to thwart an intruder; the command to thwart in­
truders wasr* a reasonable command; to expect intruders was a reasonable 7 
expectation; and to fire at one who acted like an intruder was reasonable
.’ military conduct by D under the circumstances . . - , - . -/;. •, . 77/ r7
; »V* V-*- * 0' 7 S.- 7' ^ ^
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y T-, y •; ; There is not a need to prolong the analysis of excuses • ; y •. ^y
y by means of ignorance. Hale is correct to cite it as a moral, cate-' 7 7X7'’ y.
gory. It is questionable, as;i stated C ubi supra, note 7 ), if the • • ' V-;;- ;77jy 
" proposition can be generalised to be made into a legal proposition. < y fryZ]
Some actions, at law, done through ignorance may excuse; others may y y y
not. When they do not, it is generally the Case that an offence has: 
been made one of strict observance through statute, ie., one may not \ 
assault an arresting officer, even though one did not, in fact, know 
that P was an arresting officer [ie., did not wear his uniform, and 
the like]. Some actions,f though devoid pf criminal mens rea, may ;C ■ y 
nevertheless produce harm, and it may be thought that D should be ,
; V held; responsible, or answerable, for the harm which he produces or > > y y, yy 
v causes, ie., tort law, and the law of defamation and slander, and in ' . ■
; • ;: trespass, one does not advert to the mind or will pf the• ^ accused- • 7 y;,'', •••••; '.■'/V
- Strict liability statutes to which a Criminal penal ty may attach do yy '’7-"7'y-77
ry • permit their strict interpretation to be challenged; did they not, then 
y, guilt would rest in the simple accusing of D of having committed,the yy
7 proscribed act when an arresting officer filed a criminal information. 7
Such a process would circumvent the function; of the Courts ; y y.y ; 7 , y^777y
• However, may the excuse of ignorance, which is a moral cate- :
gory, be. an acceptable legal category as a defence ? As a rule one would y;7 y 7 
have to consider the facts of the case . As a category whereby toy excuse' ,/yy y;;. 
for harms D caused,ignorance is open to abuse; every accused; would plead y 7777 
yy it. It may diminish responsibility; and it may absolve one of criminal
guilt. It could be argued that if certain conditions were found to obtain, y :
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ie., that D did not entertain an intention in conjunction with an un­
lawful act [constructive malice, felony-murder rule, constructive man- .: 7 y 7
slaughter]; D did not voluntarily seek to bring about a wrong or''a .pro-:;' 7 7 7  
scribed state of affairs; and that the material conditions surrounding .v:'.'7'7V 
the act were such that a reasonable man could not have perceived them 7. 77 , 
to be ether than what D thought them to be, then it would be reasonable 
to argue on behalf of the accused before the court that the elements 
necessary for a criminal wrong to be found of D are not present, and that 
therefore 1). either there is not a case to answer, or 2) a verdict of ; 
not guilty should be returned. One doubts if the court would accept, 
let alone understand, a mediaeval analysis of ignorance in terms of a 
relationship to the intellect, to the will, arid to the material conditions 
surrounding an act. A conditional analysis might obtain if one were to 
say that no fault could be predicated of D’s knowledge of ’y ’; that what 7 
was willed, or deliberately brought about, was not tainted by any sense 77777? 
of wrong, nor maliciousness of will; and that the consequences of.D’s act 
bore no material relationship to what D willed and intended. One can see 7 
that the analysis comes close to presenting the consequences as an accident 7 
D, lawfully, was intending to phi, and phi is permissible at law. In no 
way related to or caused by D, psi results. D neither willed nor intended '- 
psi to be the case, and he had no knowledge that psi would be the case. ,; .
To exclude the odd Case, ie.,tha mad doctor who wants the heart of P, but 
hopes P will not die sans his heart, one has to state that what D intended ' 
and willed was either reasonable or lawful, or both. The mad doctor case; 7 
is neither. ' 77'- ;!7 ', ;'777 -V‘7 * 7 , -  '7; 7 77S77
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.. Of the crimes of murder and manslaughter, Hale dealt with them7; 7
at length, but much of the material is known to us by now for sake of
the legal principles affirmed or developed. Some of it, however,- 17 7
shall consider to show certain linguistic usages, and their logical
im p l ic a t io n s . 7 7 - 7 \ y 7 .  - ; . Y' 7 7 117 Z ; / y 7 7  '7 : 7 ; y^Y /V ;;
' ; When speaking about the killing of oneself Hale uses the
term voluntary in this way:’. y 7 ;  V i 7  7  .■ ’ -.•••:• 7 7  • ; ' ' * / ? •  f  ] .  :
... Y ."*. 7 7' V . ;_7 ; ; "What- a voluntary killing • y  7  7\7Y.'y:y V •//> ./ 
7 , 7  ,; / 7  r If a man voluntarily give himself a mortal 7V7y
. 7  y ; 7 y y/-^:; <y7y .7 7 . .7 wound.. .he is felo de se7 7v-7./•/
• 7 7 V  y 7 If must be simply voluntary, and with an intent 5
■■y7' 7 V 7 7 7  . . r ; 7 v . V ; "'.Y'-’ to kill himself." y YyVY ,'Yy \'/Z .Y7 7 '-Y' .
The language suggests that the object of the intention must also be the 
object of the will, and this leads to the conclusion that an intentional
act— in one sense is predicated both,of the will and of the intellect. ;
• [I]nteption’, may be used in other connotative senses, as: What does JD^ in­
tend? but I wish to suggest that ’intention’ is not restricted to a mentalis/ 
tic usage-only, ie., to speak only about purpose, or end, or aim, or plan. / ) 
An ’intention’ may be that voluntary act.D brings about intentionally,(even 
if a depiction of this kind is linguistically awkward), and the double sense 
of ’intention’ is conveyed: that of mind and that of will. :
Hale advances a standard definition of murder which is familiar:
7  7; Y 7 / "Murder is  >a k i l l in g  of a man ex malitia Y V /. } \ y 
'■ ;f praecogitata; homicide is k i l l in g  a man . ,Y ,; ,7
Y 7 1 : 7,’ without forethought malice." .‘-7'; y. -7.y .7.y-7y; Vy
118/
1 1 7 .  1 ;Hale P. C. , page 412, CHAP. XXXI, "Concerning homicide and f ir s t  
7 . : of s e l f - k i l l in g  or felo de se. "  Y 7V V 7 y, y.  ^ Y Y .7 Y;
1 1  $.  1 Hale -P.O.-, page 425, CHAP. XXXIII, "Of homicide, and i t ’ s several 
7 kinds, and f i r s t  of those considerations that are applicable, as 
v 7 7  well to murder as manslaughter . " ‘ . .7 y 7 .....7 / , 7  Y ; : 7 7-
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Hale overcomes the problem of time of death by concluding that if 
D gives P a serious blow, and the blow produces an injury, and then 
during a year and a day ( the length of time in which legal : murder can 
be charged ) P dies from that wound, then D may be charged with murder : 
or manslaughter. The principle extracted is a doctrine of conse- •; 
quences: if D creates a serious risk; and, as a consequence of that 
risk, P dies, then D is criminally responsible for the death of. P. There; 
is a causative relationship between, the proscribed, act of D and the sub­
sequent death of P.7/ < . • * \ 7 7 7777 v./
•, . , But Hale does make a careful distinction which, by some 7 ,' 7 7y
' ■■ 7 - ; 7- • ' - 7 . ' ' 77: ; 7yv -writers to-day, has failed to have been observed, v -: ivhat if P dies .y 77 
because D has cast a spell upon P ? Is this murder or manslaughter in 
D ? The distinction Hale makes is sound: 120 . .  ^ - 77 T> .v , 
' .V 7
, y >';• 7, "If a man either by working upon the, fancy of another, 
j . “7; 7 y. 7 7 -or.- possibly by harsh or unkind usage put another into .
7 , 7  , such p a s s io n  o f  g r i e f  o r  fe a r ,  th a t  th e  p a r ty  e i t h e r  ! 77V*; 7 77
. d ie  su d d e n ly , o r  c o n t r a c t  some d is e a s e , w h e re o f he d i e s ,7 7 7 / 7 7
7  - 7 ;y  ..' '-7 th o  as th e  c irc u m s ta n c e s  o f  th e  case may b e , t h i s  may be 7
y 7  m urder o r  m a n s la u g h te r in  th e  s ig h t  o f  God, y e t  i n  f o r o  7  7 ,’ 7  7y7.,77777:*7 humano i t  ca nn o t come u n d e r th e  judgm ent o f  fe lo n y ,  b e - ;7 , 7 
7 7 cause no e x te rn a l a c t  o f  v io le n c e  was o f f e r d  ( s i c ) , w h e re o f . . 77 7 I 7 th e  common law  can ta k e  n o t ic e ,  and s e c re t  th in g s  b e lo n g  r 777. f7
7 ' y,-.77- . •:' t q  God. . ' - 7 7 ';7 ‘7  7 7 7  7 7 ; * 7 ; , - " 7 7 V  777 v
It is certainly acceptable to state that actus reus incorporates the 7-777
. external elements which the concept of mens rea precludes, and that, there5-
^29 ; Cf., Freewill and Responsibi1ity, by Anthony Kenny (Routledge §
: * Kegan Paul; London, 1978, Chapter One: "The mind and the deed", 7r
pp 1-21, where the author puzzles over a witchcraft case, Nyuzi .
and Kudemera v Republic [1967] African L.R. 249, thinking that > 77;  that the death of V may constitutes a criminal offence . I have > > 7-;/. 7 
: stated that the analysis given by Kenny is. .In error, as (here) .
the citation from Hale would support.
120 1 Hale P.C. 429, of CHAP. XXXIII.
:C* 7?*J7-* 7--s
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fore, no external act of violence having been offered, no actus reus 
was evident to support the mens rea ibr the crime of murder or manslaughtef• 
Such a rejection of witchcraft, or voodoo, or conjuration deaths, unless : 
forbidden, by statute, may* stem from the other side of Hale 's refusal y 
to permit compulsion.to be a defence to murder . Is it .not theoretically 
consistent to maintain that if the Will of man cannot, in the end, be .7 7
coerced against itself, then should it not be a corollary of such an ' 77777 
assumption that the mind of man cannot be invaded by suggestion or 
conjuration or curse so that one might die simply as a result of a .7
curse, or the like, having been uttered;? But if a resolution to the; . 
question is to be had for the criminal law, the matter becomes then a 
question of determining what be, if at all, the relationship between a7 7 
supposed criminal intention and the event, ie., the death of P ? The 77: 
law will permit theft by menaces, just as the law admits of an assault " 7 
without a battery; but the actus reus of murder of manslaughter,perhaps > y 
out of consideration of the sheer difficulty of disproving counter­
examples or of definitely proving examples, may not be Words in them­
selves, just as a defence to provocatibii is not that the words provoked y 
D to strike P. the force of these considerations must have been known 
to Hale when he rejected conjuration, etc., as a cause of murder because esj.. 
"...no external act of violence was offerTd...". He, admitted that a. statute 
could forbid and could punish acts Of conjuration, but that was an example-;? 
of the power and logic of a statute, and not because of any latent prin- > 
ciple or logic of the common law in itself . V  i\-s\' 7.77
: ,7 . Hale maintains that commanding, counselling or abetting ' 7 7
o f  a m urder o r  m a n s la u g h te r makes th e  a cce sso ry  as g u i l t y  as th e  th e  : . >
principal, but he does permit exceptions: through appeal to intention. 1 2 1 .
Though modern law might appeal to a criminal conspiracy to analyse this ?
case ( the which Hale did not ) / Hale believed that the dis-exercise of' /;
i. . c r im in a l in t e n t  r e l ie v e d  one o f  c r im in a l  i n t e n t : • 7  . 7 - 7  y 7 :' /  , 7 / 7
. "And th e r e fo r e  I have a lw ays ta k e n  th e  law  to  b e , t h a t  i f  Vy. .7 
/  ' : 7 A . and B. have a d is in g  to  f i g h t  one w ith  a n o th e r upon
7  * ; y  p re m e d ita t io n  o r  m a lic e ,  and A. ta k e  C. f o r  h is  second, ’"7 7
V 7  a iid  B. ta k e  D. f o r  h is  second , A . k i l l s  B . i n  t h i s  case 7
! y. C. i s  p r in c ip a l ,  as p re s e n t ,  a id in g ,  and a b e t t in g ,  b u t  7 77 7/  D. i s  n o t  a p r i n c i p a l , because he was o f  th e  p a r t  o ff h im , y
; / t h a t  was k i l d , . arid y e t  I know, th a t  some have h e ld ,  th a t
D. is principal as well as C. because it is a,compact..y.yV;7VV7 
[T]ho it be, I confess, a great misdemeanour, yet I think 
77/' .7 7 7 7  it is not murder in D .’’. sy7 / y..- yy 7. 7  y7 V/.- y y.':'7 ;-v y7‘ 77
; .The second example a g a in  ta ke s  a k i l l i n g  i n  p u r s u i t  o f  an u n -
V ' / Z i / 7 : 123. 7 / . '7 7  . : . '7/7 7 1 .7". ’ V--77lawful act. Hale excuses, or offers as a principle of an excuse, 7
the action of A. for being outside of the criminal design of the com-
p i ic e s ,  g iv in g  e x p re s s io n  to  a p r o p o s i t io n  fo r .  th e  de fence  t h a t  a c r im in a l
in t e n t  m ust have , o r  may be presumed to  have-— th e  fo r c e  o f  th e  ph rases  i i  :
different— limits. Those limits, as it were, are given by the object Z 7
of the intention: * 24 * ; y7. y .. \ y . 7 Y  . . ■. • y y 7’'.7 y/ 7 - . W/Vy
y . Y "A. meets with D. or some other, with whom he had a . -7 • 7yy7 ;
7 fomrer quarrel, or that by reason of some collateral y-
provocation [ italics mine ] given by D. to A. A. kills 7 him without any abetting by any of the rest of his com- 7 7/
pany, this doth not make all the party of A. tho present, y'/y 
7 7;. 7. to be therefore aiding and abetting, and consequently prin- 7 •
cipal in this murder or manslaughter, which was accidental,* 
and not within the compass of their original intention:’’
121. Cf., the body of: "Concerning commanding, counselling or abetting of 
7  murder or manslaughter.", which is CHAP. XXXIV, pp 435-446, in 1 Hale P.C. 
122. 1 Hale P.C., 443. V- / 123 . Ibid. 124 . Ibid. 7 V
* NOTE :’accidental’ is used to mean: not essential: to, or necessary .part of
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If, however, any of the party joined in by words or actual resistence, then
! their overt acts will be read by the law to express the malice needed for
.. the finding, of murder or. manslaughter; y. ; 7'y7'7' *7*Y  v ’Y - 7 ' »Yv
■ : Hale takes a third ease, but in this instance the design of ail
the parties is a lawful design ( contrary to the second case which was a
poaching in which a murder occurred ). In this case all pursue a lawful 
'• design, 125 * 7 7 . - ■ . ' "7 7 :77
’’. . .and one of the company kill another of an adverse 
7 party without any particular abetment of the rest to 7
. / this act of homicide, they are not all guilty, that 7 7-7-y-7
7 : ' . are of the company, but only those, that gave the stroke, 
y or actually abetted it." .7 77' v{ ;7 7-\7y 7 j■■•77 V-y"
It appears to be a common sense principle, but, to take an example from 
the law of criminal conspiracy, some writers did not realise that to com- 7 7; 
mit an unlawful conspiracy there had to be proved that an agreement had 
taken place, and that a simple conjunction of A and B was not sufficient 
to prove that a conspiracy had taken place . A 26. In reasoning which pre- v 
dates discussions of criminal conspiracy, Hale used the same kind of rea- ,7 
soning to show that association or presence was not a sufficient ground 
to charge ..7Dn as being accomplices in a crime. A criminal in­
- tent must be demonstrated; and to the charge that the associates or com- , 
panions must be guilty because they were present when the crime occurred, 
the presumption of guilt may be rebutted by showing that a common intention 
did not exist between the parties. Reasoning of this kind is especially 
of importance when one attempts to rebut the charge of criminal conspiracy, 
especially when, in a charge of that kind, proof for guilt is not rigourous,
i 2? 1 Hale P.C. 444.y 126. Cf., CRIMINAL LAW, by Glanville Williams,
* y (LONDON, Stevens § Sons Ltd., 1961), wherein y
he states: ”A conspiracy is not merely a concurrence of wills but a concur­
rence resulting from agreement.”, Chapter 15, ’’Conspiracy", pp 663-713, at 
page 667, section 212: Acts constituting conspiracy. > '-i;7 y - :"7-: -..;7-7
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r or admits of broad judicial discretion as to what evidence may be ad- 'V
. missibie. * ?^ 7' ''k '\ 'V- ''“'^777 / 7 ■
When Hale came to treat of the nature of murder, and of man- 0 
slaughter, he used the standard phrase,, and variants, "malice prepense" v ; 
to describe murder, and the latter offence of manslaughter was devoid 
of malice prepense but usually came about because of a sudden provocation 7  
or falling out, as the case law till then generally recorded of manslaughter 7 
cases. When:he came to analyse malice prepense in murder he divided it7  ! 77 
into two kinds, "1. Malice in fact, or 2. Malice in law, or ex praesump- • 
tione legis." ’^ 7V v7-77  ■% 77**7*• > i ■ §
’Malice in fact’ he linked to the notion of corporal harm, as
these extracts will show: •.. 7  , • .• 7  ■ ' * . 7 :; 7 \  7 7 ’ ; > 7 '7 7 ,. V- ,
. "Malice in fact is a deliberate intention of doing some 7 7 7
. . 7;7 7- corporal harm to the; persbn of another." 7 ': ; ‘7 7 7
7 7 777' "Malice in fact is a deliberate intention of doing any ;7 . 7'
7 bodily harm to another, whereunto by law he is not au- > 7:7;7
v ..•••: 7 7 * thorized," 7..; 7-. 7 ,v, 7  • V ,/:7'7 " 7 >’ 7 7 : 7.7 . 7 7 ; 7
; - "The evidences of such a malice must arise from external ?7
circumstances discovering that inward intention, as lying ■■7 v:7' , ; 7
7 •; . in wait, menacings antecedent, former grudges, deliberate / 7 777
t compassing, and the like, which are various according to 7 ; 7 77 y
*. , ' 7;.- ‘ •' ’ variety of ..circumstances, 777’ /’ .17'7  7 7 * 7 7 7.'77 • 7 .. 77 - i .7 '; 7 : ■
: 7  "It must be a compassing or designing to do some bodily harm," 7
One can appreciate that the conjunction of .’intention’ with ’doing bodily 7  ;;-7;7
harm’ paved the way for the easy identification, at law, of the two dis- 7  7 -7
tinct propositions, "to intend to kill P" and "to be reckless towards P” as  ^1
- V / 7i - •*' •• ' '-'7; •••' ;* 7  ■. • . . .7 ,• • 1 7 a 7  .when causing greyi.ous bodily harm may be considered indictable as murder. * 7 7 7
127. cf. State v. Cooper, et alii, 1976(2) S.A. 875 re ’Conspiracy*. In the 777 77;
■ typescript, page ten, the Court said, "It is a significant feature in this
case that the allegation of a conspiracy widened the ambit of initially admissible 
evidence."; 128 » l Hale P.C. 451. ?7 . . 129. Ibid , .
130 . Cf. Hyam v D.P.P. [1974] 2 AllE.R. 41 at 43j-44a, Lord Hailsham:"It is ac- 7
knowledged that intention to achieve the result of death or grievous bodily harm-. 77 
...is enough to Convict."for the crime of murder. > In R v. Hyam, CA [1973].3 AH' 7 
7. ER 842 at 844j we read, , "It was conceded on her [Hyam] behalf that tyer acts.’'had7--/;7-7 been reckless and she pleaded guilty to manslaughter...M .7 : : 7. 7 ' 7 7 7 7
} ■'' >
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Hale is careful to state that.’malice* has to it an element of rational :
. control, putting the concept into the family of , "D knows what he is ;. 
about to do." The know1edge need not extend to the full range of the 7 7 -  
circumstances, ie., D, when making a murderous assault on P does not have
to realise that P, though at time t^ is wounded, will, in fact,: die at timeyy
y v_:" "vi 3 1 7y 7y 77  7 ■ 7 77 V •'■■■' 77; 7y7‘; H7t^ (which might be months later) . * Hale is willing to mitigate an : 7 . 77'  77
offence if, when wounding does occur, the death is a result not of the 7
wounding but is clearly the result of medical treatment, but the principle 77
is advanced .-with; great caution. 7 y -:y .. 7 . ,.:7 ; 7 yy ■" • 7;';yyy7-y-
Coupled to the notion of plan, or.design, or preconsideration, ;..
• is 'the notion of ’voluntary’ or ’wilfullyas in, "When one voluntarily y:y.
7- • -V \ ( • '-7 ' 7 7 ■ ' ' : v ..7- ' 77 133 ' ' ' 7'-7  7-; •kills another without provocation, it is murder." ’ or, "He that wilfully
gives poison to another, that hath provoked him or not, is guilty of wil- 7
ful murder, the reason is, because it is an act of deliberation odious in 7 77
7  7  7  y- 7.  ; y  7 7  7 f 7  ■ 134. 7 7 7 7 7 7  ; '7 , ' -'77 • ,;7 y ; -v' y:. v--,7. 77law, and presumes malice.’? . , • •: ' y.; 7 • 7' :. . ‘7 y;:V7V ;7 y-y -yy 7
\V The object of an intent determined the nature of the malice
at law. Hale said, and it can pass without commentary, that malice is of 7-y
several kinds: ^  * 7- 77; .'.7- ;7 .7 7-:-7,77--7-.7 7 .  -y-'-y-'.'’ 7' .y 7'-7
7 y 7 "1. .In respect of the manner of the homicide, when without 7 :; y y ' 
7 7 ’y,' y' v provocation. 2. In respect of the person kild (sic), viz., ,
■‘7);yyy. v 7 a minister of justice in execution of his office. 3. In 7
7  7 7 respect of the person killing." f;
The manner would encompass the nature of the evidence to demonstrate the "
alleged seriousness of the criminal intention ( ie., long-standing grudge,
or sudden saloon fight ). Hale draws upon the example of a master correcting
H i .  : 1 Hale P .C. 428, CHAP.. XXXIII, "Of homicide..." 132 7 Ibid.
133. 1 Hale P.C.455,CHAP. XXXVII, "Concerning murder by malice implied pre-7
sumptive, or malice in law."
1 3 4 . Ibid. 7 „r 1 Hale P.C. 451, CHAP. XXXVI, "Touching murder,; what y
7y, 7 -7.-.;7y 7 ; * it is, and the kinds thereof." 7 s
4 4 4  v / / Z - r y ' 7 : 7  7  ' 7 / '  ■y - • .■ 7  . .:/
• y * his servant where, .the deliberate purpose thereof is not ex;malitia V / 7 .
777- praecpgitata,” But Hale -continues,'.'stating: **?$•>;; 'y ' vi-77;. 77 ;7yyyZZZy
y y . "But if the master design an immoderate or un- y ■/, 7  -
: 7y ’7 7 7  r Z -7 reasonable correction, either in respect of the y/yy"7yy 7.7" 77/77/7•
y/7- y y:.-7 - y/;' 7 measure, or manner, or instrument thereof, and 7;77;y-77? f/7y-;7;'rvZZ;7 
: : //Vyy.y’y - . .the:,seiv»t.die/thierebf, .^ ..see^ not.-hqw^ -this can . - ,
7 V ' f •. 7.: 7' be excused from murder/: if done with deliberation J / / - ; -
7  and design, nor from manslaughter, if done hastily, ;7 7,;7 7
yZ.:-/..7/• 7-7 7 ? passionately, and without deliberation; and herein . - Z'y v
i > 7 .7 7 '’ : consideration must be had of the manner of the pro- ' i- 7  - y-yy/y'/-''. 7 7
y / -y.7; 7 7 - v.7.7 vocation/'/the danger of the instrument, which the ,
.y/y . yy y master us eth, and the age or condition of the ser- • y ; //’"rZ/yZ/Z
7  vant, that is stricken, and the like of a school/ Z 7
Z'":; ' : J 7 7 . ’': ' master towards'-his scholar." [*] • y . - ’yZZZyZ.//;
y By citing such an example as this ( dating from 1666 per Kelyng*s :'y/7 7 yyZy/y/;
y statement of the case, infra ) Hale has suggested that /’intention-*'7 77 .//'//y/j
; , also involves practical wisdom because it is a matter of practical ;y7;,7y,-- 7 77
. Estimation to fit the proper means to the end. knowing ’how1 to do 7 7 .7 ;
an act is not, in the language of ordinary philosophical discourse, 7 /7 7 7 / yiy///
: ; thought to be within the province of the Will. The observation should
provide little difficulty because, as I have argued> ’intention’ is . /.y ■
; . a cluster concept, and is predicated jointly of the Will and of the f; y 7 7 :
yy , .7 Intellect. If, on the other hand, one argues that volition is blind, y
y : 7 then one creates a logical difficulty as to how to explain a wrongful 7  y7y 7 //
7 act ? Every/act would then be impulsive, qua act, because it could be yZ 7 •;
/Z 136 . 1 Hale P.C. 454, CHAP. XXXVI. : 7.-; 7 - ' / . Zy.y ':'vZZ;y .7/ 7 y y ‘Z'- 7 7
’ [*]NOTE. Reference is made in the 1736 edition of Hale’s P.C. at the end 7  ■
of the extraction (supra) to Kelyng. The case in question occurs in that 
7 7 section of Kelyng' s Reports which concems” Murder and other Offences", and
refers to Grey’s Case, 1 Kel.64-65 (1666). Grey, without provocation, struck
y his apprentice with an iron bar to chastise him. On special verdict it was 7 7
adjudged to be murder, "For if a Father, Master, or Schoolmaster, will correct j 7 7 7 ;  
77 7 his Child, Servant, or Scholar, they must do it with such things as are fit 1/ y / 
:/ for Correction, and not with such Instruments as may probably kill them. 11 p-64. y
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advanced for hypothetical consideration that if ’knowledge’ and ’intention’ 
applies only to the intellect, or reason, or mind, and may not be pre- • *-
dicated of the will or of volition, then the execution of every human 
act would be impulsive, and its merit would depend upon the fortuity of <7 
its outcome, ie., if harm ensued, it would he judged to be a wrongful; act, 
and if benefit was produced, then it would be judged to be a proper actv ' 7 
If the Will ( or whatever language one uses to speak of voluntary action ) 7 
is thought to be non-rational, why then would one be held responsible for 
what, non-rationally, one did ? If the reply were that the intellect 7 
embraced the sphere of rational choices, the objection would be that one 
had either transferred volitional functions to the intellect ( and thus 
made a distinction without a difference, or made a confusing use of names ); 
or that one had confused ’to know’ with 'to select’, ie., one may know that 
a number of alternatives exist, but how does one put into act one of the 
alternatives, or make one choice from amongst many options, if, at the same 
time, this is not precisely what is meant by the voluntary,.or, to wi11;? : : 
If, on the other hand, 'to will’, etc., entails 'to be aware of the 7 
rationality of...’, then the execution of an intention is not, or need not 
solely be, an impulsive act. One gets more mileage from describing Will . 
as a rational appetite than as a necessary appetite devoid of rationality.
* I make this qualification because a person may act knowing what he ,is/ 7 ; 
doing, but his act is an impulsive act. = But one leaves fact arid enters 
theory when one speaks about impulsive acts done knowingly but at the ^ :7: 
same time done impulsively, ie., the psychopath who states that he knows 
he might kill a person, and then, a short while later, does kill that 
person. Is such a deliberate act done voluntarily but out of malice ?;,i7 
Or is it an act knowingly done but indeliberately so ? .: 7\‘. . -.\7; 777 : 777
7  7 ; . /  . ■ 1. 7  :■ 7 /  4 4 6  | 7 y  i y  •; 7  7  7
7: • 7 ' 7 7 The. inconsistency between strict liability and actions done 7 7 7 7
7. through ignorance shows itself for Hale when he holds that to kill an . 7  7
7 7 y officer of the law is murder,; the law therefore imputing malice to D. '1-37,y'.y yy ;y
. I have dyrelt at length on this problem earlier. The logical paradox it
presents is a conflict between legal policy and legal theory . One can . 7 ;77
. construct a case where P lawfully must arrest, but D could not know that / 7yy 7/7;
P was an arresting officer ( and, to complicate the case, D might be an /yy.1
.. innocent third party whom P is seeking to arrest ). Earlier we saw that 
/ • y Hale wanted to excuse the sentinel who shot the intruder, even though ; 77; 7
the intruder was the commanding officer of the sentinel. We also saw 7  : ;
: that Hale quoted from Plowden of the. innocent youth who is et down poison 7.
7-.'/ for C. unknowing that it be poison, and Hale approved of the excuse of ' ; !
-/7 ignorance to prevail. Technically, one attacking a police officer must , 7.7.;
y claim that he, D, acted in self-defence against whom he believed to be , ;
. . *38.7 a criminal third party, 7 or, if an offence under a statute, a defence y.y
;7yy. may be that the statute was ambiguous as to requiring that an officer make 77777;
/yy ; himself known to D (at the time of, or just prior .to the attack). —  9. y y ; ;7 / 7
. 137.1 Hale P.C. 460. D need not know that P be an officer he killed. . 7 -
7 y 138. Cf., Kerilin v. Gardiner fl966] 3 All.E.R. 931, Winn, L.J. stating,
! . *7 . .knowledge that the man attacked is a police officer is unnecessary,7  7 .  7 7 7/'
. but a genuine mistake of fact as to the character of the person concerned,: ; ///
7v e.g., genuine and reasonable belief that he was a thug and not a police *
, 7 7 ; y officer, would be highly material in judging the scope of reasonableness 77 7;7 :; .; 
y ; • • and the degree of force falling within the liberty of jutification of self- 7/
7: 7 defence.", allowing the appeal against the charge of assaulting! a police 7^77 yyy;
K. : . officer in the execution of his duty contrary to s. 51 of the Police Act,
,7) ' 1964. /77/;y/7/7.7Y ’
> 7; 139. Cf.,Sherras y . De Rutzen [1895] 1 O.B. 918, quashing D's conviction 
7 77 of having sold liquor to to a constable on duty contrary to section 16 (2) '77 Zv/7J 
of the Licensing Act, 1872. D argued that he did not know that P/was a '777//7:'7
y y ~ : constable on duty, aiid the Court held that this was a reasonable defence: r ■ - i
Mr .Justice Day stating, "...there must in general be guilty knowledge on the 77 :7y; 
■ 7 7  part of the defendant...in order to constitute an offence." . ;
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Although the courts will generally imply malice to D over the death 
of P ( who was an unrecognised officer of the law ), the implication >y-7yy'v
is rebuttable, if difficult, by D. If it is clearly demonstrated to
the court that D’s intention was not a criminal intention, that D’s y  7
action, in and of itself,was not unlawful, then D has discharged the > v >7 7 y
burden of proof which strict liability statutes tend to cast upon him. ■ 7
Certainly it is general common law theory that an accused need not prove, 7 7 
his innocence, it is a curious feature of strict liability statutes and 7
offences that they require D to disprove the charges of the Crown or 
the prosecution by showing that the elements of the statute or offence 
have not been established., and this often requires that D take the wit­
ness on behalf of himself. Strict liability legislation has .to/it an7'..;,:7 .;,y_
. evidential ease. Much like trespass it need only demonstrate the fact ?
and from the fact impute an intention,( as with strict licensing law j. 7 
; : My suggestion that a burden is thrown upon D to declare his
state of mind is not a novel suggestion. If one adverts, to a book on ■ ; .7y 
evidence close to the period one will read the .following: 14 0 . , 777
. . - ' : "On an indictment for murderself-defence^ought to be S y  7 \77
given in evidence, and not pleaded, because nothing can 
; justify one private man’s kill another. ( citing Co.Lit. 7yy77y77
i'*7' . \ 7y.7'-.7 * ' 283' a. as authority to be consulted ) .” •-,y;' 7 7':y7 y,. yy y777-'yy.• y '”7/7;/ y-7 y y-.yy .7", *** ••y/v7 „;>;V,.7;;./.'7V 1 .• / 7 7:.;7/;.7’'7\7‘///7r:77;
7 -: "Indictment for murder ex malitia praecogitata, and the 777777:
7 evidence is of killing without provocation; the killing ,
7 7 7 77 an officer; or that the party was committing an/unlaw-/ 77yy7.y,7
7 7 ,y - 7 ful' act, and that death ensued to somebody, upon that 7yy yTyy
7 7 . . : action; if the act waa deliberate, and tended to the 77  ^ ,^ 7 / 7
7 7 personal hurt of any one, this is proof of murder. for ; 7 7 77|7
,7.-.7.• 7 7 in these cases, ' the law implies the circumstances of '77.y7 7-
malice; this implication of law, is for the defence of 77
14 0 ESSAYS UPON The law of Evidence...., by John Morgan [in three volumes] ,7
* Printed by: J. Johnson, (London) 1789; Cf., Volume One, ’’ (11) OF THE
7. 7/7 GENERAL ISSUE IN CRIMINAL PROCEEDINGS.”,’’(a) Of the Plea of Not Guilty7 ’;
7/;; \,y at 420, ff., e sp. page 422, and 424-25. 77777/7 y'" Y ' y  y; 77 7-77’77 y7:;,7l’y'7
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"its officers and of mankind; for all malice .7 - •,••••/ 7 - 7 .77V 7 -7 ' 
7  7: is a secrect quality of the mind, and it is the ,7 7 -7 7 777777'77-:
;-7' v7 . v fact only appears / and is able to be brought to 7 ;7* 7 7 7.' 7777.77: 7  
7" 7 ; . -proof, and it is from the circumstances ■ of fact; 777V'V -:7 7 7 - 7  •' -■ VV%;
that a man must collect the offence of the mind; 7 7  7
: now when one man kills another, that is prima "7 - 7 ‘ V
7 7 7 facie so ill-natured and bloody an action, that 7 7  7 ; ■
7' it is presumed to be maliciousr and therefore the
7 v 7 ■ 7: ' offender, to cover himself from the supposition ; 7
7 -; 7 * ( /that -the.law has made in tenderness to mankind, 77- ’• 7 \r--7 .-. 7''7“7Vr must shew some provocation, or some accident in , , ,7
7 excuse of the fact; and if he cannot thus mollify ; ■' ' 7 7'7;.'- .7 7;:.:' }■ IU' 7
or excuse the actions, the supposition of law re- • 77 7 7
mains, and he ought to be punished with deathi" . . 77 " v
A b s tra c t in g  fro m  th e  r u le s  o f  e v id e n ce  w h ich  s u ite d  t h a t  p e r io d  in  ' 7 . 7  77  
h is t o r y ,  one can e x t r a c t  th e  le g a l  p r in c ip le  th a t  in t e n t io n  i s  a de­
fe n ce  to  a charge  o f  s t r i c t  l i a b i l i t y  i f  D can d e m on s tra te  t h a t  h is  ' 7 :
in t e n t io n  was la w fu l ( i © •» to  (defend h im s e lf  ) arid t h a t  i t  was based
upon re a s o n a b le  g rounds ( . i e . , i t  was re a so n a b le  f o r  D n o t  to  have known . 7 • 
t h a t  P [ f o r  in s ta n c e ]  was an o f f i c e r  r a th e r  th a n  an a s s a u lte r  ) .  Im - 7
p l i c i t  i n  th e  de fence  by appea l to  D’ s in t e n t io n  i s  th e  reason a b le n e ss
o f  th e  in t e n t io n ,  and t h a t  w ou ld  have to  be adduced fro m  th e  s u rro u n d in g  : ■
c irc u m s ta n c e s . The danger in h e re n t  i n  th e  re a son a b le n e ss  t e s t  i s  t h i s :  ^.77'.
a lth o u g h  D’ s in t e n t io n  may have been la w fu l ( a t  th e  t im e ) , i t  may a lso ,: 77 77
have been u n rea so na b le  ( i e . , he s h o u ld  have known th e  custom s and mores 7 7  
o f  th e  com m unity , o r  D ’ s was an in n oce n ce  beyond b e l i e f ,  e t c .  ) .  ^ 7 ^ 7
*  NOTE. A s im p le  exam ple can be g iv e n  fro m  T o r t  law  to  show th e  n a tu re  
o f  th e  d is t in c t i o n  between th e  la w fu ln e s s  o f  an a c t io n ,  and th e  u n re a ­
sonab leness y e t  la w fu ln e s s  o f  an a c t io n .  A m o to r is t  i s  p e rm it te d  to
d r iv e  w i t h in  th e  p o s te d  speed l im i t s  down a th o ro u g h fa re ,  s to p p in g  o n ly  : 77-
when a s ig n a l o b l ig e s  h im  to  s to p .  T h a t i s  b o th  la w fu l and re a so n a b le  7 r
d r iv in g .  But th e  same case c o u ld  be made u n re a so n a b le , by  D d r iv in g
a t  a p ro p e r  speed th ro u g h  a t r a f f i c  l i g h t  in  h is  fa v o u r , b u t  c lo s in g  h is  * .
eyes when so d o in g .  I t  w ou ld  r io t  be a de fence  to  h is  h i t t i n g  a p e d e s t r ia n . 7 -77• 
who c ro sse d  a g a in s t  th e  t r a f f i c  s ig n a ls  t h a t  h e , D, d id  n o t see th e  p e d e s tr ia n ,  
7 S t r i c l y ,  th e  p e d e s tr ia n  s h o u ld  n o t  have been w a lk in g  a g a in s t  th e  t r a f f i c  . 7 7 ; 
s ig n a ls ;  s t r i c t l y ,  th e  d r iv e r  l e g a l l y  was p e rm it te d  e n tra n c e  in t o  th e  c r o s s ­
ways; u n re a s o n a b ly , D was in c a u t io u s  how ever. . '7 7  -77  7 7 - ,  - '••7 -' 7  -,77
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The controlling case regarding arrest was Mackalley’s Case 
(1611) 9 Co_. Rep. 66. Simply put, D resisted arrest, and, D having struck 
the Sergeant, who died as a result of the blow. The court did not press y 
how the murder happened; it was contented with a general istatement'of 7 ;- 7  7 7 y y  
facts, • 7 7  v . '  y . y . .  ■/ ' y . ' y . y
. ’’And I moved all the Judges and Barons,7if in7this 7
77; . . case of killing of a Minister of Justice in the ex- - ; V-.
y y  ecution of his office, the Indictment might have been 7 :
y7 7 general, Sc., that the prisoners felonice, voluntarie, 7
y .& ex malitia sua praecogitata, &c. percusser, without 77
7  7  y  v alleging any special matter....[68] So in the case at 7 / 77;
. barr: And in this case of a Sergeant, the Indictment ‘
7 might have been general, That he feloniously and of .7
his forethought malice killed the said Fells...The 
: y..: 2./ cause was, ...That the said John Mackalley, &c. / -7v
7 eundem Richard Fells, &c. felonice, voluntarie, &
; ex militia sua praecogitata, &c. percussit & infor-
:7 avit, &c. so that above the special matter which im- 77; y
: j;; . . plieth malice, it is expresly (sic) contained in the 7 7
- , y 7  7  Indictment, that he feloniously and of his forethought 7  ; 7
>.',.'-777-’ 'malice killed the said Fells . . . [ and also proved ] that
[all] the prisoners killed the said Fells of their fore- 7
’ thought malice; and so well mSintaineth the Indictment.
7 , y  And that in the end was the opinion of all the Judges ' .. 7 7 y \ ;-, 7
, and Barons of the Exchequer." • 7 77v
Discharging any objection that the indictment was tainted ( for form 
or substance ) D and his accomplices were found guilty of having murdered- 7 
Sergeant Fells. The Prisoner, Mackalley, had urged upon the court that 
he could not know truly if Fells were an officer or minister because it 
was night when the arrest occurred (5 to 6pm in November ). But the court 
replied that he could have had recourse to a legal remedy of false impri­
sonment had it been a wrongful arrest. From the facts of the case it appears 
that the arresting officer did identify himself, but either it was not a y
141. Mackalley*s Case: (1611) 9 Co. Rep. at 67-b and 68.
- V  ;
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complete identification, or it lacked in some technical finesse. To;'-77 y7 
this the court said, 142 , y  - y  7 / 7  yy 7;7’'7 y ,y7 ; v/.:;yY.‘ • .v. . % >>;7 \:.y
- ;.v;7 7 7 ”2. It was Resolved, That if any Magistrate or 7Z?/77;7
7- - 7 Minister of Justice, in execution of their office, 7  7 7 7 7/7
or in keeping of the peace according to the duty of /' ' 77y 7 y7 
; «• v : his office be killed, it is murder, for their contempt
7 7 and disobedience to the King, and to the Law,...and ,
7 therefore, if a Sheriff, etc., or any one who commeth in 77
‘ . : their aid be killed in doing of thier office, it is;-Vy77/7;-:-7y7...7
v 7 murder...:for when the Officer or Kings Minister by
: y  process of Law (be it erronious or not) arresteth one.
y in the;Kings name, and they notwithstanding disobey " y.7 ,y7‘ 
7 ; 7 : the arrest or Commandment in the Kings name, and kill ; y
the officer...reason requireth that this killing and . 7 7  
slaying shall be an offence in a higher nature than 
7 7;y any offence of this nature; and the same is Voluntary, ;.7v7 y
: felonious, and murder of forethought malice. Arid a
7 7 Watchman by the Law may arrest a Night-walker, 4 H.7.2,
7 ' 7 ':■/ y  • and if a Watchman arresteth such a one, and he killeth
, ':7'' 77 k’-7:-7;'himj/'the;-same is murder. Vide Heydons case in the 4th 
; . :/ part of my Reports. [*] ' ,
The force of the authority, then, seems to indicate that legal authority 
is absolute, but an arresting officer, etc., ought to take prudent measures, 
and that D, if he does resist, ought not to be resisting to avoid arrest 
(which would then make D*s resistance an unlawful act) but resistance for 
the purpose of self-defence ( which would then raise the question of self­
defence and ignorance of fact). Hale's treatment of resisting ( and/or
142, Mackalley's Case (1611) 9 Co. Rep, at 68. ;
[*] WOTE. Heydon's Case, Trinit. 28 Eliz. in K.B. [1586] 4 Co,. Rep. 41. ; /,' 
Jacobus Heydon killed Edward Savage, watchman, wounding him August, with 
death following in the following December. Since Savage was, it was pre- y 
sumed, in the course of his duty as a watchman, D's killing of him was 7
7 murder. Coke also cites Seymayne's Case (1604) 5 Co. Rep. 91-b, as y
authority that a sheriff may arrest at night, but with a caution: "3. In 7. 
all Cases when the King is party,'the Sheriff (if the doors be not open) 7
may break the parties house, either to arrest him, or to do execution of ;y
the Kings process, if otherwise he cannot enter. But before he break it,
he ought to signifie the cause of his coming, and to make request to open 
the'doors'.at 91-b. *777 //yyy • y." . y' '..7 ;■>; ••y.-- 7. 7;
-.il?
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killing ) one not known to D to be an officer affirmed the position de- .7 VJ
j veloped by Coke and the Bench in Mackalley’s Case. One may extract as I7 7 >77
obiter dictum that ah arresting officer, or the like, must act reasonably ;
in the discharge of his office. When he does not, then he may place him- . 7 ?.‘
self into the category of the lawful but foolish motorist whose car strikes /
the pedestrian wrongly crossing against the traffic signal, but the driver 7 7
was unobservant, having closed his eyes. The duty, then, of D in the charge
of resisting arrest ( and/or killing ) must be to show that his intention , 7
as the defendant was not in the entertaining of an unlawful purpose, that
his action or response was, in the circumstances, reasonable; and also that 7 7
the action of the victim was unreasonable, in addition to showing the court
that the lawful identity of the victime could not, at that moment, be as- ,7 •
certained. Haie accepts the reasonableness test: 143; ' 7  7;
7; ”5 . But whether it be in the day or night, it is
7 7 sufficient notice, if he declare himself to be the 7  7
• 7 ;7 7  : constable, or command the peace in the king’s name, "; ; >7 7 7
and the like for any, that come in his assistance, •§/•':•
7 7 7 . v or for a watchman, §c . , and therefore, if any of 7 7
7  \ ! 7 7 them are kild (sic) after such a notification, it 7  \ - 7 ;
7 \ . 7. ..is' murder in them, that kill him. 9 Co. Reip. 68.b. 777
■' ''7 7,' "7 . Mackally’s case.” -, 77 '77 7 ' - 7  \ 77 .. 7 /-’V. . .7;•...’. .- '7''' :
7 7 Hale continues in his acceptance of the traditional doctrine of - 7
transferred malice, butj from the example, it appears that the object of a ' 7
; - wrongful intent must lie within boundaries the class of object proscribed; , 7 7
by the law: . , 7  7 . .7 . • 77, .77.. ; '• 7 ■ ■■ ' 7-77. ?:*’ 77. ’• 7; 7,' 77. X'M -777,'
7  . 7 ; ; 7 ; -.'.if A. by malice fore-thought strikes, at B. ind ■ 7 7 7
, 7 7 7  missing him strikes C. whereof he die; tho he never 7JV
143. 1 Hale P.C.  461. " V .  V . y , ” 7 . ^7; .7. ■ 7 ' 7 ’7 ; ’^ 7 ’7 7 ' . 77. '
1 Hale P.C. 466. -1447 7- —  7- 7.. 77- - !.= : - v'-'v 7 77'7./7.'' 777'>~7;7 ' 7 ;> '7' :..s 7v./7-,; 'V*
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; . 7 7 • .; 'bore any malice to C. yet: it is murder, and the > 7
.7 . . • ' transfers the malice [italics mine] to the party 77.7 7-7 77'y
- 777v7''y; - •" slain;/ the like of poisoning. . ' 7  /7’ 777/7,-•,7-.:.' ;7 - 7.'7 7'y-.7.y$’*7
/ : 7 When Hale discusses manslaugher the distinction is simply made
as a legal aict which is voluntary but which is devoid of malice, be it
7 expressed or implied. ’ The logical assumption which is preserved
is not that D acts unintentionally (he may, but one must carefully / ;
qualify how the term 'unintentional1 is being used so as to avoid an 7*V7-v’ft;
ambiguity ) , but that the intention D entertains does not fulfil or .7 7
meet the mens rea required for a finding of murder. One may establish 7s
a logical distinction between classes. One class may read, "If ’ X *, 7 / y
. then phi.", and a contrary class may ready "If 1Y f then psi", giving
as a rule of interpretation that if class ’phi1 .« ’a’, and class ’psi’
-  ’b ’, then a class distinction obtains if and only if ’a’r <*£> ’b*; y y  7‘ 7 f
Intentional actions may fall into both classes, but the object of an 7 7
intentional action ( arguendo ) can fall only into one class or the other.*
The confusion which sometimes arises in discussions of manslaugher
is to confuse what function ’intention' has for D, and in the definition/ ;;7;
/of the crime per se as an act devoid of intention. What the law holds is
that nothing which D intends happens to fall within the intentional class
of objects proscribed by the law. Drawing upon the simple equation (supra),
it is as if the law says that in order for murder to be found, what D did ;
intend must have been some intentional object within the class ’phi ’. If ,
' . ■ ■ . 7 ■— ■■ ■ — ..■■■■■ ■ ■l«M lll.l.. ■ —! |- /■ I ■■■■ ■ ■ —  ■.■ .. . Mllll'.y. f'V
* This simple exercise is not helped by arguing about null classes or 
null sets. The assumption entertained here is, If an act, then an 
object, and ’act* may be broadly interpreted to include omission, as . 77 
■ - in, "He may no attempt to dissuade his accomplice from firing the pistol 
7 > at P." D^ here has not acted positively; he has omitted to act,, but
bis omission (for the law) is taken as the positive act of being an' -77
7 accomplice or confederate to a wrongful act.
145 Hale P.C. 466, CHAP. XXXVIII, " Of mans laughter...
V'4"
; 'V-; v * f
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the defendant succeeds in showing to the court that he did not phi, 
but, in fact,was psi-ing, it then follows of course that 'to psi1 
is not to entertain an object which is a member of a forbidden legal,
class; furthermore, it may then follow that D either is not guilty, or 7
may be guilty of a lesser offence (depending upon the nature of the
_ ’charge and the facts surrounding' the case ). ‘ T.ifv* 7 y  ;• 7 -•/./' /’ y  /■;! /y/y;
. . From what J have said one might feel safe to assume that y ./y y.
Hale then used only the vocabulary of intention to describe lesser - /77y ;y
5 forms of killing. In fact, he did not. He moves to the/language of 77:7/7
• 77 V/7,'.- 7...,.; ..y.yy '.y Y‘7 7 . ■ /•• y;7?"7 7yy.v yy;. y 1 45 .• ■ y y  '7y/ 7yyyy.y . the voluntary to speak about some forms of killing. * When he does y
so he establishes this proposition as a general definition of such
killings: - y ^-v.; 7 - //y 7 -7y7r7 y/y 1 :y7-.7"'/■ .,7 ■
, . 7/ 7 y ; "Tnvbluntary homicide is the death or hurt of the -
person of a man against or besides the will of him /y.y ; 7/ ./■
yy/y . / ; that kills him." • • '• ' 7 .y-'-y ■" . .yyy'/; 7 . /y y Z
Given this general statement, Hale proceeds to divide it then into cate­
.. 148. • : >• /  '•• ’7 ; y  j 777 , y 7 7 y y : . ' , y y  y - / / / y y .ygones, • y 7 • y. ■ y.;;y ,-yy .• • ;y - . ; -..yy
" T h i s  involuntary, homicide is of two kinds, viz.; y / y y Z ; y 7 y  
.;://■ -7 /7/•-/■ y ysither 1. When it is purely involuntary and 7 7
7 v 7 / casual, as the killing of a man per infortunium, : ,
/ - pr 2. When it is partly involuntary, and partly Z
./ y voluntary, but occasiond (sic) by a necessity, V : 7 //
that the law allows, which is commonly called 7 7
y ; . : homicide ex necessitate, as killing a man in his 7 / yy/. y j
; ' . 7 ; 7  own defense, or the .likey-7-/ .• . ■; //. ; 7yy ; 7 '•./••• ; y  yf 77
The cases which he instances to depict the categories are common cases, and
need hot concern us. What does deserve some question at a minimum is* 7;
why the language of the will to categorise non-intentional killings ?
146. 1 Hale P.C., CHAP. XXXIX, "Touching involuntary homicide, and first 
of chance-medley or killing per infortunium", pp 471, ff. 7 . 7 ' 7
14 7, Op. Cit., page 471. , F y y  y ;7 .yy7 •. .yy 7y': 7 y v.y/ y/' 7' y,
1 4 8 . M i -  y  . : 7 7  Y r y y y y y y y Y Y Y . ,  7 7 7 7 : 7 7 7
■y y..
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7 7 A consideration one could suggest, with regard to the text, 
could be this. When a person is entertaining a lawful intention, and 
then sets about to execute his intention, the language of Hale’s peribd 
might describe the act in this way. The intellect entertains an object,, 
and the will,when moving the person to execute or reach or achieve that / 
object, is said to act voluntarily when it attains or effects union with 1 
the object presented to it by the intellect. Now this is stick language 
for us, and it seem to be a creaky way to depict acts of intention and 
willing. At the bottom, however, is a sensible enterprise: namely, how 7 
to distinguish what one intended to do from what one did not intend to
This can be shown in a number of ways, •. of course . One can say that 
he did not intend to do ’X’ because he did not know that ’X’ possessed 
the properties or qualities that it did. For instance, one may say that 
he intended to give P a tablet for his headache, whereupon to discover 
that the tablet was a diuretic. The: reply of D might be then to say that 
he did not know the tablet possessed this property, and from that reply 
one can ask, Should D have known this (ie., was D careless or reckless 
or negligent ) ? or was this a blameless inadvertence on the part of 
D not to have known this property of this tablet ? However the case is 
resolved, one is appealing to some form of 'ignorance' on the part of D. 7 
This is not to speak bf the act as voluntary or not. It is only to speak 
of the act in terms of knowledge, or its lack. 7 y  -7 7
455/r'777 7 ; ;7 >7 ■ Y
p/ 7^74 Although a case could be made that Hale could have used
this kind of language to depict lesser forms of killings,/he did not/-' ' 7 ,77;777/ :
He seems aware that some confusion could arise between the distinctions • ;
of mufder/manslaugher and involuntary killing, as this example shows
7 7 • " Regularly he that voluntarily and knowingly intends . ,7
;/•••: 7’-;.. hurt to the person of a man, tho he intend not death) "V.. ;yv7/7Y 77  
7 . yet if death ensues, it excuseth not from the 
/-''//■■• 7/7.77 of murder, or manslaughter at least, hs if A. intends iZ v'7777 /7:77;7'.7
7 7 / to beat B. but not to ki 11 him, yet.if death'ensues:,.7.• '••.• '7. 7 -//• :; 7/:.;
7 = 7 this is not per infortunium,, but murder or manslaugher, 7  v : .7/7
7 7 as the circumstances of the case happen." v • 7/;/77’“•7.;
It may good, at this point, to stop here aid deal with the common example. : 7 .
Why does it not support a claim for death per infortunium ? '77.7777-77’-
7  :; . : It may be what we said earlier, that the example takes as . 7Z/ZYC;/
a Category of the unlawful either 'to intend to kill' or 'to hurt in a { p K i & Z b & Z
grievous way' . Truly, a logical distinction can be maintained between . 7 . 7 • \7 .7
"intending to kill" and "intending to hurt the body of P". But for the *
; ' /  ■ •./7'/7':.7'. 7 --V- Z  I S O  - c­law this has been ( at some times ;*) a difficult distinction to sup- 7 .7 ;/7 ;7
port realistically. What Hale has assumed in his]example (supra) is '.7/77 7/7
that D has entertained an unlawful intention ( ie., to kill P, or to harm V/C;':/-;;//
P grievously ), and if, because D effected that unlawful intention, further
consequence? follow as a result of D's wrongful intention, then,D may be * ,
held not simply, accountable for hurting TV., but/ in event of P's death, r
actually for having caused the death of P. Though D, by one portion of -. ;
the example, did not intend to kill P, the unlawful actions of D were the 7-7y/'/'
sine qua non for the subsequent death of P . Bodily harm, being an occasion 7 ; y  7v.
for a possible death, the law treats as if it were the occasion of actual death.7;
149 . Op. Cit., ‘ 1 5 0. Hyam v. P.P.P. [1974] 2 All E.R. 41, ff.,
will Snow how the House of Lords divided [3-2] on what must be the •• /• ■ • 7//77: 
intentional requirement for the offence of murder. Cf. the dissent of . 7 >.
of Lord Diplock at 63-h, ff., rejecting the grievous bodily harm test •­
in the charge of murder. * 7 • : . . ■ : - 77 • 7 •*; ,  . : . ; ,
; 777 M y a
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7 - Without embarking upon an attempt to solve whether "in­
tending to kill" should be taken to be logically equivalent to "causing . 7; , ; 
grievous bodily harm" in the crime of murder, one may extract from v - -
Hale's example this guide. D both knowingly and voluntarily intended ; fvVfe" 
to hurt P. When the hurt was brought about it was not some state of ’ ;
affairs D did not want to know of, nor some state of affairs which D ,
did not seek to cause.; With regard to the object of his intention 
( "to cause harm to P" ) D was of single purpose both in mind and in . • 7 
will. That the consequences exceeded what D had intended and executed t
can be said to be a risk inherent in D’s intention and act. To seek 
deliberately and voluntarily to harm a person under the protection of ;777;t777; 
the King * s peace is to seek deliberately and voluntarily to violate the 77 ; 7' 7: 
law, and the unlawful risk which D causes will be held to embrace the 777••
consequences within the scope of the unlawful risk. Three ingredients , 77-
are put forth: 1) the initial act was; unlawful, 2) the intention of D 
was unlawful, 3) D voluntarily pursued his wrongful intent in the act 'of-V ’ 7;7:> 
causing grievous bodily harm to P. The classic ingredients of versari 7-. / ;
in re illicita are present, save to argue for a strong form of versarii ■; \7:
which held that the wrongful consequences must stem directly from the y 
wrongful intention. Hale, in one sense, has argued for a diminished form 7 i 
of versarii ( in this example ) by holding that the offence could be either , 
murder or manslaugher, depending upon the surrounding circumstances of the 7 r .
.■ v : ;- *case.
* NOTE.7 Strong form would hold that only if D intended to kill P,7 could 77 
murder then be found* Weak form would argue that though D may not .have -M'yk 
intended to kill P ['murder'], an assault which produced death would, at 
the very-least, constitute an assault which was manslaugher, ie., causing 
a wrongful death at criminal law but lacking of murderous intent. . ; 7
457
, ;\7/y-/y The per infortunium example assumes that D is not intending . / y y y j
an unlawful object. Thus the 'intellectual' requirement for an object/' 7 /
at law, is that what D knows and intends, as a result know1e dge,"’Zy
is to achieve a lawful object or end. The will of D, therefore, sets 
in action— -if I may be permitted recourse to stick language-— -to achieve y;' 
a good end, but, somehow, a hatm results. What answer is given to how 7 
the harm occurred will also be an answer as to whether D's act, and its / y 
consequences, were involuntary, and thus were lawful y /  ;
• ; y The class of 'per infortunium' is that class of actions 7
done, in some respect; through ignorance. The ignorance is established 7 
by putting a question about the consequences to the will of the agent. y 
Did D seek voluntarily to harm P ? If the answer is, No, then the 7 7/- ;
further question is, How then did the harm issue forth ? Having dis- ; y y / /  
charged the 'lawful' requirement, ie., Dwas engaged in, or intending 
7 to bring about a lawful act, one turns to the nature of the voluntary //7 :
: . (in what was done). How is it that D voluntary sought to phi, but, in 
J effect, psi-ed ? • ' • • - /  : • y  y  • v . 7  • \ :  7  7  • / /  ’ / / /  y / y  / ’ 7 / 7  7 y 7 / / / ■
/ . Two replies may be given.; Psi may either be related to what y ‘>7
D voluntarily did, or it may be unrelated to what D voluntarily did. ; 7  /"/ 
y / y  An example of the first leg ef the disjunct is that D is en- /'•/>.'
gaged in a lawful sport, but P is hurt, or even injured grievously ( ie., 
wrestling, sword play [ Hale gives the case of Sir John Ghi(feester ] , etc/ ) .
* NOTE, Of the case, Hale s a y s . t h e  end of the rapier prickt the servant Yy: 
in the groin, whereof he died: Sir John Chidester was for indicted of murder.. // 
and it was ruled, 1. That it was not murder, thos the act itself was not law- / 
ful, because there was no malice ir ill will between them. 2 That it was .y/7.’ 
not barely chance-medley, or per infortunium, because the act, which occasiond / 
(sic) the death, intended no harm, nor could it have done harm/if the: chape//// 
had not been stricken off by the party kiId (sic), and tho the parties were in ■ 
sport, yet the act itself, the thrusting at bis servant, was unlawful." 1PC475.
m & m
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If, contrary to the Chicester case, the sport is lawful, then the harm 7777'.'
which comes about is not a harm which D wills, and properly it is then.: .77 7
said that D’s action was involuntary* He did not try rationally to ex- 77t7 
ecute a harm. ITie harm was caused by, D,. in that to explain the harm 777; 
causally one would have to appeal to the actions D brought about; but ; 7 7 
that harm could not be attributed either to what D knew or intended, .or y  7.7 
to what D willed, or what voluntarily he wished to do. By excluding : .
a class of predicates ( ie., voluntary, intentional, wrongful, deliberate ) 
one excludes attribution of the harm to D, and, as it were, moves the
act from'the sphere of,criminal responsibility to tortious responsibility.77:
No class of criminal predicates apply to describe what D caused or brought 
about 7 The relationship .which obtains between P's death and D's act is 7 7
causative; what does not obtain between D's act and the resultant harm - 7  
was that D intended to harm D, or that D set about to harm P, or that D ; 
was engaged in unlawful conduct during which the death of P happened. 7 . 7 ­
, . 7 From a simple relation of causej there may be a second re- :
lationship which makes D even farther removed from harmful consequences.
D* lawfully, is chopping down his own tree, and, as the tree falls over, 77- y 
it falls upon sleeping P, killing him. In the simplest of language, the 77 7 
lines of causality have intersected, ie.,;but for the tree falling, and 7 7  
but for P sleeping.(unnoticed) nearby at the same moment, no harm would 
resulted. D is in no way involved with P ( as>: to the contrary7 D is in­
volved with P in the first set of examples ). One has here only a hap­
pening. • 7> ,-A' • • , •,^  ^ * 77 ' ' -
. 77 7 In the; first set of examples other than what D sets about to r
do happens; in the second set of cases, D’s doing of something inadvertently
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is the cause of harm because P intersects himself, or is there, when one .• >: / 
course of action begins, harmless in its objective, but harmful if some -y'YY 
other element is introduced. Both are involuntary harms ( or classes " '
of involuntary harms ) because D had not willed to cause a harm. The in­
tention which he sought to realise was a lawful intention; therefore, the / 
object of his will was a lawful good. In;seeking vo 1 untarily to bring iabouty 
he was not seeking to create a risk, or harm, or danger. That a risk, or 7y; y 
harm, or danger resulted or ensued was an involuntary result or consequence. y 
r ; . . We have, then, just the reverse of what I depicted earlier. :
What we have here is: 1 ) the initial act of D is a 1awful act, 2 ) D*s
intention is lawful, 3 ) D is voluntarily intending to bring about a lawful ./
act. The harm or injury*which ensues is neither intended nor willed by D, k 
and the elements surrounding the act are lawful. The harm which results 
is either one of pure accident ( ie., P walks out in frontofD’s oncoming 
vehicle, etc. ) or one in which the consequences are said neither to have y y yy 
been intended or willed by D in the course of lawful conduct ( ie., the 
hunting accident, the sports accident, or forms of relationships where D //Zyy.' 
is lawfully involved with P, but as a consequence of the relationship P . y y 
is harmed unintentionally ). D's act is then, for the purpose of the law, 
described as an involuntary act because the harm to P was not a harm which Y
D would have sought to have brought about had the circumstances been other y y,
than they were. It is as if D had answered, " I would not have willed to do 
this if I had known, beforehand, that harm would have resulted from what I Y/y, 
had done." Because did not seek voluntarily to cause this harm/ his act is y  
said to be involuntary. The object of his willing was not the object willed;y.
. I
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Hale's understanding of criminal intention applied variously 
to the mind and to the wi11 of D. D could be said to entertain an un­
lawful intent; D could also be said to have acted: deliberately against 7 7 
the law. In the first instance, 'Intent' is predicated of the mind, 7^
reason, intellect, understanding; in the second instance; 'intent' is 
predicated of the will, pertains to the voluntary, or is deliberate ,
( as in " a deliberate act . To do an unlawful act from malice pre­
pense implied that one could know that his act was unlawful, could set 
about to do the unlawful act, and that what was done could be described X
as being unlawful, giving rise to three conditions surrounding the act 
of D at law: that the law had defined an action to be lawful or unlawful;
, that D had the capacity to know that his act was unlawful; and that D could\ 
voluntarily brought about the unlawful act. To alter these conditions 
could, in theory, alter D's guilt or innocence, or degree of responsibility 
; for his actions. , / /•' -7:'7/7'7 / 7 ,  .7 V*V: 7 \ /7  '77,
A clear distinction regarding 'malicious,' and 'wilful' is 7 ’7 7 7
1 5 1 . .
given to us by Hale when he treats of the; crime of Arson. . It was. 7.7-/''- 7
crime which consisted in the wilful and malicious burning of a house of 7 ;
another by day or by night. The definition of the crime provides for 7 
its maliciousness, as where D sets out to burn the house of another and
the law has forbidden this kind of conduct by proscribing it; and D, in re­
setting fire to the house7provides the element of the 'wilful' in the of-
7: ' 15 2. ':7 •■■7 -- : y/fence-: . .. ....-y • • ; 7 • t-. •. ,-/.-•, : -
. ; "But if A, have a malicious intent to burn the house of B:. ;77-
151 . 1 Hale P.C. 566, CHAP. XLIX, "Of arson, or wilful burning of houses."
r 5 2 . Op . Cit ., page 569. -■ ,;\..:-V7‘7'7 v-v.y;7';’7 ;7 7-'-.- 7’ ‘ \ /77/7.y7‘:
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"and in setting fire to it burns the house of B., artd :.'7;y' 77/''7Vj'; 
. /: :. C; or the house of B. escapes: by some accident, and / 7777. .7
7 7 . the fire takes in the house of G. yet in law it shal 1 V7 77 7 yV
be said the malicious and wilful burning of the house 7;%,y 7 7-
of C. and he may be indicted for the malicious and wil- .
' ;• • ■ 7 r 7 . ful burning of the house of C ." 7y7 ;7777- '*•7'- 7 ": ; 7 7777777
The three elements for a criminal offence are present: the definition V ;  
of the crime ( as proscribed by law ); the object of the intent, ie., 7, 7 7;
to bum the house of B; and the voluntary execution by D of his intent, 7
ieactually setting fire to the house of B. Since the intentional ; 7 • 74:
action is proscribed by law, tiie consequences of D's act are viewed as 7
criminal consequences, and they are proscribed by law. Hale would re­
ject that the consequences are involuntary because they were foreseeable,
although he does not use the term, 'foreseeable1. He reasons to that •. y  '-7
position by this statement: ^53. 7 ;. 7 . 7;77■ ; • x/’’7-7 '
; "An infant of about fourteen years of age or under may 7
7 . be guilty of malicious burning of houses, if by circum- v
stances it can appear he knew it to be evil." : 7 - 7
One may assume that if the Crown or prosecution could demonstrate that 77 7. <
it was reasonable for D to know of the possible consequences of his .7 ?7
act; or that it was reasonable for it to be known ( by a"reasonable man ) ; 
of the consequences of setting fire to a house ( ie., that it could burn > 
down other houses because of the danger of a fire once started being such 7.77 
as to be outside of control ), this would be much the same as asking if a
- youth if he knew that what he did was wrong. Hale invites a knowledge 7 - 7
test, part of which may mean : if one knew when he was a causing a harm,-;: 7
surely it would be reasonable to assume then the harm could be larger 
or wider in scope than anticipated. The test of 'reasonableness', like the' 
test for wrongfulness with a fourteen year old, would be to advert to the 7: 
circumstances of the case, and make deductions from those circumstances. 7
153'.-. IM iv  :-7:? 7:'- 7.7:''77:7:,;;y  '..-y -7"
y . y I
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7 / Since we are not dealing with abstract categories in and /'I I
of themselves, it should not be overlooked that the court will seek / 7 7/
to ascertain what was the state of the accused’s mind at the time of
the commission of the offence.. I have taken as a corollary of,’’Ought 7 7-
D to have known that 1 y 1 might have happened?’’ that the court could :;7/ 7/  
inquire if it were reasonable to assume that greater harm might have ,7/ 
ensued than what D intended by inquiring after the state of mind of . 
the accused. Hale provides just such an example of a knowledge .test///// 
7 He had tried a boy at Norfolk who was near the age of yy y  vy
fourteen, and who was charged with malicious arson. In the facts we
. 7/77', ,154. y.-'/V'//-' -////ry 7////77.7./.7/y 7are told, / y // y,. 7 y  7 .- Yyy /V.y ry yy;- /.-.•//:
y  , : 7/ 7 . Z  ;when nonewere in the house but a child in the 7
. y  y  ^ cradle, [the boy] carried fire out of the kitchen /.Z.:...y
v Yr 7 / into a room of furzes, and set fire in it and went 7y',yr;.7
7 out, and thus burnt a second house, and the child in 7yy ; y
7 77 / the cradle, for both these he was questioned, ahd at:. /.; / 7/7
7\ length confessed freely the whole circumstances of both
’/.//:7. ■//;.■• facts ....and upon his trial craftily insisted that he • : / //
V/ y y ...’was' under fourteen years of age; but I directed the^ V^ 7
.■ ■’-./"’ • / jury, that it appeared by the circumstances, that his Z 7.--7 7.;.y
malice supplied his age, for it appeared, that he under- • '
stood the evil of the first offense when he did it so sec- 
•7 retly [ ie., the first arson ], arid yet charged another".
•"yy//'y. ; wrongfully.; .  /;:**’ //y" ;///•> ' y ' 7 / 5 / 7
The force of the example is to show that the Court will seek to know 
what is reasonable to expect in the circumstances. yin moderny1anguage 7 / .  
we speak of foreseeability, v , y/* 7 / ■'■'.7-1-y y/yy/r:7/7yy
..v . . : I wish to move now from this period of late mediaeval rea- *
soning in law into our own century. With Hale, the scholastic mind in 7 
. the"common law had come -to- -an end. - ‘ -;/ y .':.. • 7 /: . . / /• / '. - 7 "-7.y/;y ///
154 . Op. Cit., pp 569-570. Hale found some relief of conscience when he/, 
Tie learned that the boy’s true age was near to fifteen years of age.
CHAPTER SEVEN
7 7 '7< With the Twentieth Century nearly concluded, one v  / t  7..7
would have thought that the problems which; the concept of
criminal intention had presented to legal minds would have i.;, - 7 .
been solved and put aside, once and for all, and that like ; 7:7*7 7
the Sea Captain whom Viola addressed in the Twelfth Night, 7 7 .
the character of the concept would have been clear and so 7 / 7 'y ../7
easily within the comprehension of iany man: 7 ; 7 :7 7 7 7 /7 7 *
-•;.7 ;,y .'■/ "There is a fair behavior in thee, captain, , 7 7
. And though that nature with a beauteous wall ;:Z
: Doth oft close in pollution, yet of thee , 7 y 7
I will believe thou hast a mind that suits ; .
7 , 7  With this thy fair and outward c h a r a c t e r; 7 7//^^  f 7
■: >7 •: / 7 7; / 7- . : ■ ,7 ^Act . 1, ii, 47) 7 / 7;V 7 . 7 - 77
Alas, the concept of criminal intention was not as simple as
the smile on a girl's face. To the contrary, it was more akin to; ,
the lines which follow those above, when Viola continues: 7 ' 7 ”  7 •
"I prithee ( and I'll pay thee bounteously ) 77
Conceal me what I am, and be my aid ■ - 77 :;7V 77. 7V.y' 7 ^
7 : 7  For: such disguise as haply shall become 7 7 7 7 7 7
7 7.7/77.■ /  7 ,The ■ form of my intent ... . / • 7 ,7  y ■' 7. 7\y > 7 ‘7, 7 / 7 7 7 7 /7  .77­
7 ‘7  77.7' --/What else may hap, to time; I  will commit; ; : /7 (7 ;  - / 7 :7 77
; ..--7 .: : Only shape thou thy silence to my wiV/*/”V, 7 :7 ” ;7%.7 "7 7/
■; 7/7: 7 ( Act. 1, ii, 52) : 7-V -7 ?
Criminal intention seemed to have to it that magician's quality,
"Now you see it, now you don't", and it served to perplex this century/
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The concept did not bear an easily determined or determinable outward 7/7 777!
character, and, because of its elusive and (possibly) linguistically ;7\ y  77;V:; 
unframeable character, those who were paid bounteously in its cause 7
were defence attorneys. As recently as 1978, two legal worthies in 7 7  V
England did battle over what exactly criminal intent meant. ?.* A little 7 
over a decade earlier two very great minds crossed swords, each to sug- 7
gest that the other did not know what he was talking about ( as if v 7 77
Plato and Aristotle were to accuse each other of deliberately misunder- 7 , .7 ..
standing central philosophical concepts ). y  ’ As if enough had not *
been written about the concept in the Nineteenth Century, With its many 7 77-7
Reports and they in turn spawned other Reports in the common law world—— , y
minds of this century turned again to the task of making clear and of' V y ^ y - y y
defining comprehensive 1 y what criminal;intention meant. To some of y*
those Reports I would now, like! turn. . y " 7 v 7 .7.77:77 ''7‘-77 7"77 r■ ''7'-v7-7;7777777;'
; The belief persisted that if only the concept were defined . ’-v V'y 7V; ;V: 
clearly, and given precise limits, then the problems it ’engenderedbe-77; 
cause of its vagueness or open texture might be solved. , Through de- 77VV 7 v7 7 7 
fini tion might come progress. V Every other science and art had seemingly 7 : V 7 
progressed because of the lucidity of linguistic analysis— -physics, ; 7
philosophy, theology, literary criticism, and, in general, the sciencesr-yy . 
Why then should not an equal amount of conceptual progress be attending ’ \
criminal jurisprudence ? Was the wrong question asked ? Or was it.".:.7 ; 7! 7
1. Cf., "The Criminal Law Review, January, 1978, 1) "Intent",,by Mr. .y.'777:7 7777 
Justice J. H. Buzzard, pp 5-13, and the rejoinder, 2) "Intent: A Reply." ) •
by Professor J. C. Smith, pp 14-21. ' '
2. Cf., RESPONSIBILITY BEFORE THE LAW, by Lord Denning, MR, (1961, Magnes Press 7  
and the reply to it, THE MENTAL ELEMENT IN CRIME, by Glanville Williams/FBA, 7  
(1965, Magnes Press). 7 ;}*/;• ’/• V ' * v* '•7 7 7 :  < ’•■-7 ‘V y V
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purely that the wrong answer had been given ? It was as if the 77'7/ 77
process of the criminal law had been trapped between the two horns; .
of the dilemma which Virginia Woolf vouchsafed on her deathbed/ to,
"What is the answer ? ", came the reply, "But what is the question ?" 77:
7 ; 7 , In Twentieth Century England, scholars of law internecinely
attacked each other through the columns of The Times, law journals 7 ''77:7 
and reviews, and books on law, with the 1960’s and 1970|s ablaze as 7
to the meaning of 1 intention1 in criminal law. But not only aca­
demies engaged in such conceptual warfare. The appellate process it-/7 7 ; 7 
self presented internal disagreements, with verdicts being modified, 
remandedy overturned or quashed on appeal. One needs but to look at 7777
the central cases of the period to appreciate how the judiciary dis- 7 , r
agreed amongst itself. One case, perhaps the most bitterly dis- 7 7  y 7 7 7 
puted in judicial and legal circles this century, when it reached77 7 '7-77-7
the Court of Criminal Appeal, R. v. Smith [1960] 2 All E.R. 450, 7 y y .7?yTfy/
composed of Byrne, Sachs and Winn, J.J., reduced the verdict of the 7 7 yyy77/ 
Central Criminal Court, tried by Donovan, J., from murder to man­
slaughter, arguing that the verdict given in the first court for capi- 7 7
tal murder ought not to be allowed to stand because the jury instrue- 
tions given by Donovan, J., were not, clear as to the meaning of ’in- 
tent1. The trial judge * s instructions,7 iii'.partr-,.'- t 6 ' s d •. if..youyare' 7\ 
satisfied that...he must, as a reasonable man, have contemplated that
3. Cf., Reshaping the Criminal Law: Essays in Honour of Glanvilie
Williams, Edited by Peter Glazebrook (London, Stevens § Sons, 1978),77; 
the index of Professor Williams's published writings which does show 7 
how intense correspondence was with-The Times, and other journals, 7 .
. - regarding di fferences betwixt scholars as to the meaning of ' intent '/*7y7>
pp 449-468.
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grievous bodily harm was likely to result to that officer still y7y 
clinging on...then the accused is guilt of capital murder". The jury 
returned a verdict of capital murder re/s. 5 (1) (d) of the (then) 
Homicide Act, 1957. On appeal the Court of Criminal Appeal found 
the instruction on intent was a misdirection, and therefore it re­
duced the verdict to one of manslaughter.y y  : /  ; y y ;:'-.y . y y  7 . / ;
Leave to appeal to the House of Lords was given by the At- 7; 
tomey General on May 31, 1960, with him granting a certificate under 
s.1(6) of the Criminal Appeal Act, 1907. The Direct of Public Pro­
secutions did appeal the case, and the House of Lords in P.P.P. v. y 
Smith, [19611 A.C. 260; [I960] 3 A1i E.R. 1 6 1 reversed the Court y y  
of Criminal Appeal, and reinstated the verdict of murder, holding 7 
that the direction of the trial judge, Donovan, J., was correct with 
regard to intent. The progression is well known: the Home Secretary 
extended clemency, and the verdict of the House of Lords was put y. 7; 
aside. Some years later the Criminal Justice Act, 1967 was instated, 
purposely enacted by Parliament to override the decision of the House 
of Lords in Smith. ; y y  77y7i yy /yyy// y y" y y / y ; 7 y .
Shortly after the decision by the House of Lords in Smith, y 
the High Court of Australia, in a reserved verdict, refused to be ..-7 
bound in law by P.P.P. v. Smith, [1961] A.C. 260, when it decided y y ' 
Parker v. The Queen, [1962-651 111 C.L.R. 610. Dixon, C.J., stated, 
/’There are propositions laid down; in the/ judgment [Smith] which I be­
lieve to be misconceived and wrong." He held that Smith should not y  
be used as authority in Australia at all’. 7 7 7 , y! 77
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. 7 The echo from the Nineteenth Century and its pro- 7 
posed criminal codes in which the 'meaning' of an act coVild.be ; 
determined if the nature of the act were defined with care proved 
that 'meaning' and 'nature' could be poles apart. The (relatively) 
clear language of the Homicide Act, 1957, divided common law juris­
dictions as to how 'intent' ought to be interpreted: , 1 ,
'^ y. 777-!/ . "Sec. l.-(l) Where a person kills another in 7 / 7 7
. the course or furtherance of some other offence; 7
• V7 the killing shall not amount to murder unless done 7yy7y7.
: 7 7 with the same malice aforethought (express or iin-
plied) as is required for a killing to amount to, 7 y  :
murder when not done in the course or furtherance 
of another offence." ."J7V7’: .7' •'% 7 : .7 -y
All were distinguished courts, both here and in Australia, but each
disagreed strongly as how Smith ought to have been decided. If one 7;
adverted to Section - 1 of the Act (supra), then the position of the , ;  7
Court of Criminal Appeal seems to be consistent with the Act. But if Vy7
one adverted to Section-2 of the same Act, where; 7 7 ;7 7 -
"(2)... a killing done in the course or for the y7 ''7,7v77: 
purpose of resisting an officer of justice, or y  ';'V-777V7 
of resisting or avoiding or preventing a lawful 'v7 y :.yy 
s 7-,;7 . 7 arrest, or of effecting or assisting an escape or ;yv
. rescue from legal custody, shall be treated as-a y  7; V ''77'.
; ; killing in the course or furtherance of an offence." . 777
then the verdict of the trial court, and the decision of the House of.. f7 
Lords in Smith seemed to be consistent with the language of the Act. The 
difficulty, however, was that the Act itself supposedly abolished con­
structive malice. Such the case, then one must advert to the actual 7 
intention of the accused at the time when the offence was committed. V.yV 
Therefore, Section 8-(a); and (b) of the Criminal Justice Act, 1967 7 "77 > 
became the remedy. But, again, a leading Solicitor in the field of .7 7
i y; ",
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criminal law. cautioned, \ '. 7. 7 7 : , 77 7 7 y v -7 7 :/-7;-.\Iy7-'''7':7.7
7 7 . 7 "The section [s-8(a) 8(b)], however, does,;/.'-; 77 - 7
nothing to clarify whether/ and to what extent in
. . . particular crimes, intent or foresight is required
‘777 ’ ’ 7-777;: to be proved." 7 - 77' ’77-7./y777; ;./y .777--^'7‘;77777
Had any real progress been made as to understanding what criminal .77-/7 
intent meant, and whether or not its meaning could be clearly ex- :
pressed so that a court or jury could both understand and then use . 7  
the concept to make a finding of criminal guilt in a criminal trial ?
Would the ad hoc findings of case law have to be abandoned, and in 7:.
their place would the criminal courts have to be guided by proposed 
criminal codes akin to those of the Fourth Report (1839) or the Criminal y 
Code [Proposed] of 1879 ? Further to these questions may be added that 7 
the tension lay in the common law system of law itself . The accused 
is charged with having violated the law, either a statutory offence 
or a common law offence. The accused is pot charged with having vio­
lating the law as Professor So-and-So may have viewed the law.;/, The 
power of making a judicial finding rests ultimately with the Courts them­
selves , and, as a corollary of that position, the accused himself has the 
right to be charged with having violated the law in its existing state.
4. A Guide to Law S Practice under the Criminal Justice Act 1967, by [Sir] 
David Nap ley, (London: Sweet and Maxwell: 1967), Chapter 3, "PROOF", -77 
"1. Proof of Criminal Intent (Section 8).", page 29. Sections 8 (a) (b)
: read i  A court of j ury,
"(a) shall not be bound in law to infer that he intended or foresaw ; \ 
a result of his actions by reason only of its being a natural and 
7 7 probable consequence of those actions; but -7"v 7:7./77.77. : : 7 ;
7  . (b) shall decide whether he did intend or foresee that result by re­
ference to all the evidence, drawing such inferences from the evi7 
, ;• dence as appear proper in the circumstances (s .8) ." .^ .:77; 7 777
\• 7; ■/' No easy solution appeared at -hand.! 7y 7/ ‘ 7; / •: 7/-y, .'y/7-:' '-/;7 7;7 y y 7.
■ : ; ; v One further problem is to be/seen by the proliferation 7 7 7 7 ;
Y of case law in this century in its regard to intention: namely, the •/• ;./y 7 7
7 , 7  concept, apart fTom its apparent lack of resolute definition.and 77:
7 limits, began to bear too much, it wa? predicated both of the
agent and his nature; arid of the agent and his action, and of ;an7v7/. 7/ .7/ 77'777-
-,7/// /•' .."action, with its consequences;, itself. In the last edition of Kenny’s 77 ;
7 7 OUTLINES OF CRIMINAL LAW, its editor suggested five different
meanings for the definition of malice aforethought in murder. The ' y ; ;;;':/;7;';
" general concept of criminal intention expressed a State of mind as /77y7/yy /
.v/r to the fo 1 lowing possibilities: 7 y . /■ 7y;y /\ ': /'y
7 :. / 1. D has an intention to kill a particular person, yy/ • y'y7/7;y Yy
■ /7 . / 7 7..-: ' 7 and that person in fact was killed by D.
/"'yy //.;yy/: -2./D-has an intention E6^kin"a;;particular perspny7''7"7Y;'77;;/7/yy-.7
\7 y  ; 7/>7}.7 . 7 y /"/>'.* V'y/ but kills some other than he 'envisaged.' / // 7/Yy.y-; .//A" Z / y y
7 //•>'";■/ • 7-7:7 v-'/ '/3. D has an .intention to kill, but he has no par-7Y7y^7/"7v.yy";y;
: '77//-•-> y  '7Y.7'y//Y/7yy ticular person in mind. " 7/ y
•". y;7'.7/7"-7'7 ' 4. D intends only to hurt P, and not to kill him, but /y/yyy
//7 7 7 7 7 realises that the hurt could quite possibly kill P..
/ y /• .y • 7 7 7 7- 5. D does an act, and the act possibly could kill P y y / y ,:7/i'7;';
7 : / 7 : y but D has neither the intention to kill or to hurt 7 ; 7
/; ;/•" /y /:7'P.; **y / "7 yy 7..-7..y'yy 7 y . ..7/7; //./;/./.;." •///•'//
/ 7 ; .y This simple set of possibilities hardly exhaiists the range of poseibill-/ yr.y/y 
7:.y 7 ties intention might take for a legal philosopher. Turner’s desire was /-7 
y to show a reader of criminal law what the case law had indicated; a s  an7 /7.7. 7‘7 
7 / 7 /• editor he did not propose to create logical puzzles. But it is difficult 7 /7
77 //" S. KENNY’S OUTLINE OF CRIMINAL LAW , [Nineteenth Edition, 196.6]-/y'y 7 %
;. • .by J. W. Cecil Turner, (Cambridge: At the University Press: 1966),
. Book II, "Definition of Particular Crimes", ChapterTVIIy "HOMICIDE", ,
Section 1. Introductory, paragraph 107, "Suggested definition of ma- 1 /
7 ../-. 7- lice aforethought.”, pp 151-154. // * Termed ’’universal malice” by
.77 7 7 : Blacks tone in 4 B1. Comm. 200. ; // >* R. v. Smith [1960] 2 All. E.R. 450/7
7 7/ 5a. Cf., ” In rb: INTENTION ", Aristotelian Society (Suppl. vol. LI), 1977,
7 y V  y •" y / y y  ,:'/■' *> PP 187-220, esp. , pp 197-199. . . . ' 7 7 ,/Y"7"71: * * / \
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not to consider what puzzles a central concept to the understanding 
and operation of the criminal law may present. When a single 7 
concept begins to bear most of the weight in a legal system, the / 
concept must either be clear, given over to a precise application,
. or general enough to permit expansion to novel situations. Some of 
the hard cases in modem criminal law have blurred the qualities of7 
both worlds? * Rigidity can be mistaken for clarity, and ambiguity 
of meaning can be mistaken for application to novel situations* One 
wants to avoid, as Mr. Justice Cardozo said in Hynes v. New York Central 
R.R., 231 N.Y. 229 at 235, a jurisprudence of a priori conceptions in . 
which one extends a maxim or a definition with a relentless disregard 7 
7 for the consequences. The problem then remained: how to define mens 
rea, showing it then to be a simple concept which would serve the 7
? interest of justice in criminal law to the benefit both of the accused 
br the State through pristine impartiality and logic. 7 7
6. There exists a line of cases in which cherished assumptions about -7
the nature of the relation of one element to the other -mens rea
’ to actus reus   in a criminal offence have been stretched to the
extremeThe cases which, in part, show this tension are: Fagan v . 7v 
Metropolitan Police Commissioner [1969] 1 Q.B. 439; - Lett v. R. 6 ><77'v::V  
West Indian Reports 92; Thabo Meli v. R.fsub nom: Meli v. The Queen] , 7
[1954] 1 W.L.R. 228; [1954] 1 All E.R. 373 (Privy Council);, R. v. - 7; J
Chiswibo, 1961 (2) S.A. 714;/ R. v. Church [1966] 1 Q.B. 59; State V.7 7 7 
Masilela, 1968 (2) S.A. 558. Cf., "Contemporaneity of Act and Intention 
in Crimes." by Geoffrey Marston, 86 L.Q.R. 208-238 [April, 1970]. ;
Dean Marston discusses a wide range of cases in which Vact1; and 'in- 
tention1 are separated, with the resulting question then: what re- y  
lationship must:obtain between 'act' and 'intention' for D to be 
guilty of an offence which requires 'act' and 'intention' ? If 'act'
* time b , and 1 intention! * time b , and (b ) <■ /■> (!) ), what re- 7
lationship in time must (b ) bear to (b ) for D to have had
the requisites present for a criminal act to be attributed to him ?
m
:1
; / • ;. 'But the problem did not end With a simple definition of 7 
7 7 'intention'.The further problem; ( as noted in footnote 6, supra ), 77^
• has been to define what kind of relationship must obtain between a\ vy:*72^-v ;7
>-;7 criminal intention and the other elements of a criminal offence. . We 7 /7 :7, ;
/7 saw/this earlier on when 'ignorance' was discussed in
7 77. anhuman action. For the mediaeval mind, ignorance could be prior ;?77;
7y . .  to an act, it could be contemporaneous with ah act, or it could be 7 7
7 y . subsequent to ari act; furthermore, each discrete element of the ab- 7 >7 !
7 stract relationship could admit either that one was culpable or non- 7 j
.7 . . 7 culpable with respect to the presence or absence of ignorance/ Both:. .7/777/;77
77 7 the kind of ignorance, and its quality, were evident in mediaeval 7:Y 7‘v =
, discussiore of moral theory. It is not unusual then that Dean Marston ;
77.7' in his fine article in the Law Quarterly Review raised similar is- 7 7
sues with respect to what relationship mens rea arid actus reus must bear
7 one to the other. If a harm ensues, for instance, P dies, but the re- : 7 y >
quisite elements of mens rea and actus reus are not connected in time., 7' .'7; y.y-y;
; 777 who is to bear the harm? Does one leave the world of logical considera-y
; tions and then enter into the sphere of policy considerations, the rea^v;7, 7 7
soning being that the logical consistency of a coherent theory of inteh tion ..
; will not permit the court to disposeof complicated criminal cases: if that
logic be adhered to rigourously ? But 'policy' is very close to being 7 ;7;
7. 77 . another way of introducing 'constructive malice'. It is a simple aca- 7 '77;
'7/ 7; !. demic exercise to multiply odd examples wherein one element of a criminal
. offence is separated by time from another element, however a positive
: 7 7 harm does ensue: P dies. ; \ ;__________________
; 7 , 7. Cf., IGNORANCE, FAITH AND CONFORMITY, by Kenneth E. Kirk, (Longmans, 1925),: /
.77 Chapter 1, "Ignorance", pp 1-43. ,
. . 7 8. For instance, .consider the crime of 'constructive manslaughter’ and 7./y 7'’77
7. 7y ;- . the conceptual problems which attend both its definition arid applicatiori>;7 77 ;y
7t” 7 ■■’.• ■■7■* *.>’;' 7 777 ■. ;,y‘7yy.' ~ 7'7'-■ y.s-y7y,\ y 7y7y*‘/ ' . .7: . y (infra) - ' '
7 Cf U.S. v % Jewejl. 532 .F. 2d 6$7 (1976) re: ’knowingly ’7/; ~  :y 7 77:7 :■7 ; : rej meaning ofy knowingly” in relation to deliberate ignorance, con- 77y
trived with conscious purpose so as to avoid learning.the truth. 7j
-V-2
1
: " - >'•. ; As the criminal law progressed two qualities
V to appear. As a system of thought it has sought; to free itself :Mv,f ?;; ;
• ; y from former moral presuppositions, and it has also sought to b e - v  :
come consistent and clear in relation to the core concepts of the : r ;
; - system. Each brings with it problems. To be freed from older V  V jp&y
- ! moral notions then entails that the legal system itself will have TC-v
to offer a rationale for the sanctionative elements within itself; ; :
and, if to be consistent and clear as a set of axioms, then it must •/ .
T purge its ordinary terms of the confusion latent in them. The . ’
y latter requires that key concepts be subjected to logical analysis. Svy•: .yyy; 
4 The criminal sanction has seldom taken with natural affection; to ';;\' yy'<'y;/y-v.,;•• ■
,y* ' /—I' ■ ' the demanding..rigours which' attend• logical; inspection./'-'A • - ;ii£
CCorit.)8. Cf., ’’Manslaughter by Unlawful Act: The ’’Constructive" Crime
Which Serves no Constructuve Purpose.1’, by W. T. Westling ( The 
; v SYDNEY LAW REVIEW, Volume 7, Number 2, September, 1974 ), pp 211­
' . 223. Of the logic of the felony-murder rule, the author observes: : -y
" . y . i "It is submitted that the bulk of the cases which have purportedly.//,y;//
: been decided on the basis of an "unlawful” act can truly be decided on
the basis of intentional infliction of harm or on the basis of criminal ■// :';'.y:y' 
y negligence.*’ ( p 212) . "... [I]f we concentrate our inquiry on the dan^ * ; ' ;
y ; geTOus character of the act in question it become clear that an act which > / /
is unlawful because it is dangerous must either be intended to inflict 
; some harm or negligent. If it is intended to inflict harm it will give >
rise to liability for involuntary manslaugher when death results. If it yjy? 
is negligent the accused’s conduct should be measured in criminal negli­
gence terms to decide whether it is manslaughter when death results. The y 
: y y . y  intentional infliction of harm principle is a subjective one: did the acr : y
; ciised intend some more than trivial harm ? The negligence principle is  , y •
an objective one: would a reasonable man in the accused’s position have re- yy. 
cognized the risk and acted as he did ? Anything which does not fall into,
: one bf these categories ought not be criminal homicide at all. If a third -
category of involuntary manslaughter is created, outside these first two, y ; ;
; y . • it is surely constructive. The unlawful and dangerous act principle must •
/./'■, be either subjective or objective, and once it is thus identified it must
• y be completely redundant when considered alongside the two; basic principles . | •
; > Recognition of this would effectively do away with the "constructive" man- v
slaughter which has been so long deplored." fp 223). ‘ t >) • ~
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. - • Prior to the enactment of the Criminal Justice Act, 1967.
the Law Commission issued a paper on the subj ect of imputed criminal :;v r 
intent. .The Right Honourable The Lord Gardiner was; at the time /
of the report, Lord High Chancellor of Great; Britain. It was ap- ' y7 7.7/7/7'7; 
parent to him; as well as to the greater body of the judiciaty of 7 ./. 7/7 / ;
the Uhited Kingdom, that the final decision of the House of Lords in ;
P.P.P. v. Smith ri961lA.C. 290 had caused much unrest in the legal 7/7 , 7 /
community, both in England and in other common law countries. It was > ; V 
proposed that he appoint a body of distinguished legal worthies to ex- 7. 
amine Smith, and to make proposals for the reform of the law of criminal 
intent in murder. * The specific recommendation the Law Commission • 7
was to make was: "Th§t an examination be made of the effect and im­
plications of the decision in P.P.P . v 7 Smith." ** * The; resoiution of 7:7/ 
the questions which criminal intent posed were seen by the Commission - v/
to fall into two broad categories; and these were they: ought the test 
for criminal intent be an objective test, or ought it to be a subjective :.7 ry
test ? ’ 7 ,7 ; / ^ .7,-v : -'77• '/': /;/7:y Yyv '/f/'y ^ :7:V,7 -777 7\7/7y.7:yr//’/y
> In section-4 of the Introduction to the report, the Commissioners :
set down a tripartite division of the elements of the general question for
them to solve, portions of which are cited herewith: * *
9. THE LAW COMMISSION: Imputed Criminal Intent ( Director of Public 7 777:
. Prosecutions v . Smith ), [Laid before Parliament by the Lord High :/y.y/77 
Chancellor pursuant to section 3(2) of the Law Commissions Act 1965]  ^777 
LONDON: Her Majesty's Stationery Office, 1967 [reprinted: 1968].
10. The distinguished body of Commissioners were, as of 12th December, y: 
1966, these men, whose status of the period is given: The Honourab1e /y 
Mr. Justice Scarman, O.B.E., Chairman; Mr. L.C.G. Gower, M.B.E.; M r . y 7 7 /
.7- -\ '■'Heil,._lAwsoriy;.Q.C.'.;; Mr; N.S. Marsh; Mr 7 Andrew Mart in,7Q.C.; Mr. H. I- . .. 
Boggis-Rolfe, C. B.E., Secretary. . - •
11. 7THE LAW COMMISSION: Imputed Criminal Intent(1967) , page 5 / ' y:7',;vy7777 7'7t
12. Ibid., pp 6-7 . 7 ,.7'' • . 7yi.-y777 y777'y/,7-. -77 ;7' Y / /  77y7 y/7?/7 7/77:
7-’“ Ty
■ v - f ^ y y y - .:A ; , 474: r-;y/.: ;Yy-',/'''y\v 7 * y ;
yy.y ;. • -.; M4. The mainissue raisedby the’ decision in the y/y'yy - . --'k ''-.'yy
■%->Y ' >• - ’ / ;.*•*-/•' ■/', House of Lords appear to be the following-: /; *y .y.';K-/-
i  > V. Where murder is alleged, should the jury .  ^ : '-*££■?%*%;*; %
V-vv  Y Y Y  y *':\-r ' ‘ • be ifound to infer the 'intent .to- kill or : ’* -yJt yy'.yyy 
y/. : yy/ : yy -'/vy .yy y-.y to inflict grievous bodily harm, which is
-;/••' --- y.,,y y .yy under the present 'law necessary: for a kill- : $
■ ' :V*. . V  yV."S-yV.\ to amount to murder, if " an' ordinary man i
-"'y.- > • .y- - ‘ ;/y y :y-;. 'y.-*'v;. ’• * capable of reasoning " (Viscount' Kilmuir i  y/ . y ^£yy
yy Y-"\ y/y 1 L.C. at p.331 of. ..Smith) would in the.:po*v / '
y , - y Y -  ' 'Vyy,'. sition of' the alleged murderer have' fore- ' V Y-
..-y"y ' y y - -. . - yY: ;• - • seen death or grievous bodily harm as the.-; • d. Y-yYy'. ;ylyy
'YY wY-Y :'y/. Y -  y ,-natural and probable'consequence.-of his act ? yY yV :^ 'Yy YvY 
;; : y y : Alternatively, should the requirement of intent; y y ; y y;
Yy'/ . Y Y’y •;>*. \ y}*/.;V necessitate proof of'.'the actual intent. .. . ; .
v"; - ;; ‘ ; v ; [of D], and should • the natural and probable y -/yy
Y ■ . . y V ^ y v . y  consequence of his act only.'provide a basis ■■■ - ...y'.V
• .’yMy’V ' ; '' '* : -V from which' such intent may be '.inferred-'?.-. *<•. fy
'y.: y " '' ' ,Cb); Apart from its application to intent in murder ;
.  ^y y ■ v. 5 should the objective or subjective approach to -y'/yy -• ' yyh
-y *v*>V Cy.:. y -y y y:;> f ' ' : - intent, or, where relevant, to
' y£7> - S*Ty ? . '*: adoptedyin■’the criminal law generally ?.v.. ■ ;;yy./-"y; J: y;vV-:>y^4yy
; ; ^ . y (cj «Should the requirement of intent in murder, . . . .
• ^-y ' Jy5.-.; y. whether ascertained subjectively.or- o b j e c t i v e - -^y^ 'V'y^  r'”y\'y
; 'yy',,.-'.y\ y',r-.; ,■ ; ly, be satisfied by either an intent to kill or v
^;y , .-yyy.; ,!(Wy ‘ y. . -.y/yy' -an intent to inflict grievous bodily harm
; yv ; Upon examination one can appreciate that the Commission had not ^
v r ; strayed far from the standard presentations of the question of / y y; • y^ySy
• ' criminal intent in common law.. With the existence of the great i i A  > ^
y v/, reports frbm the Nineteenth Century, any familiar with the language' : y
from those reports Will appreciate that the Commission of 1^67 had
’ : ” not framed any novel propositions . Any of them can be found well > :
stated in any of the Nineteenth Century reports on criminal law per- - ; y:;':V'
;yy\,- y' taining to indictable Offences.  ^ y .y . : ;
y y* , . y . y y But one problem can be extracted from the statement of-the' , y ' V >y y
general issues, and it is this. What is meant by 'objectiveV and by - y y y y  -
475
’subjective’, when applied to criminal intent ? It must be re-
merabered that the Commission (1967) was studying the question of -
’imputed*, criminal intent. Knowing that full well, the Commission
(1967) chose to take a direction from an earlier Commission: ’
: V "The degrees of likelihood or probability being 1
■ . in truth Infinite, it is clear that no assigned degree ; :
; . of likelihood or probability that an injurious conse- J
 ^ " quence will result from any act can serve as a test of
; y criminal responsibility. Such a degree of likelihood
or probability admits of no legal mode of ascertainment,
/ ; and it wouldj if capable of being ascertained, afford ; ;
y / no proper test of guilt, for it is not the precise de-
^ gree of likelihood or probability in such case, but the y
^now^edge or belief that the thing is likely or probable ;
f , which constitutes the mens rea, although the greater Or
less degree of probability may afford important evidence 
as to the real intention of the party."
The same sentiment was reinforced by a citation from a later Com- ;
: ..' 14 ;*?>/,.•/y .'-A';■■ ■'; y y ymission’s report: ’ -A. r
y ; "Persons ought not to be punished for the conse- :
; qUences of their acts which they did not fores bey" / /
The latter Commission (1949-53) was succinct in its estimation of
constructive malice, whilst the Seventh Report ( 1834 ) framed the
logical problem clearly with regard to predicting consequences from /
an act; namely: that from the concept of ’to predict1 possible consequences,
knowledge of those consequences would then be attributed to D as if they
were really and necessarily the case.. The confusion is old to philo-
13. The Royal Commission on Criminal Law of 1834, Seventh Report, 
(Parliamentary Papers 1843, vol. xix: Command Paper 448), p.23.
14. The Royal Commission on Capital Punishment, 1949-1953, REPORT,
(LONDON: Her Majesty’s Stationery Office, 1953 [reprinted:1973],
Command Paper 8932), paragraph 107, page 40. The language of 
the Report read: ” 107. We have no doubt that, as a matter of general / '
principle, persons ought not to be punished for consequences of their
acts which they did not intend or foresee. The doctrine of constructive 
malice clearly infringes this principle and in our view it ought to be 
abolished." .■ -s ■ y. ' ’ rW---. y. y. \ ‘V ■; -v y-:
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sophers and theologians. It concerned the logical status of the 
claim of the verb, fto know1, when applied to God's knowledge of 
future contingents, a question of impending concern both to mediaeval 
and renaissance thinkers. One thinker, Socinus, .v.-* refuted the 
standard arguments for God's omniscient by making a modal distinc­
tion: namely, to assert that there is an epistemic difference be­
tween a claim which states, " A knows that p" , from a claim of the 
form, " A knows that p may possibly be the case." For Socinus there 
was not the same epistemic import in statements, one which made an 
actual claim to actual knowledge, and the other which made a claim 
to future knowledge. His objection took the form that to know what 
is actually the case, is actually to know; to know what may be the 
case is to know the possible as possible. Actual knowledge and 
possible knowledge, therefore, were distinct and different modal 
states. By parity of reasoning, law courts make a pragmatic
distinction in the degrees of knowledge when the courts frame differ­
ent rules of evidence, ie., holding that 'hearsay' evidence has not 
the same force as 'direct' evidence. The Seventh Report (1834) had
15. It is a long and detailed debate which is far outside the scopev \ 
of this study, but one may refer to these authors who have given de­
tailed analysis to the modal differences imported by the verb, 'to know'. 
Variously, cf., The Divine Relativity, by Charles Hartshome ( Yale, 1948) 
Professor Hartshome speaks at length to the logic of Socinus's arguments 
concerning foreknowledge. Gersonides: The Wars of the Lord. Treatise 
Three: ON GOD'S KNOWLEDGE, A translation and commentary by N.M.Samuelson, 
Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies (TORONTO, ONTARIO, CANADA, 1977) 
The Foundations of the Articles of Faith by Al-Ghazzali, translated by 7/7  
Nabih Amin Faris ( 1974: Sh. Muhammad Ashraf, Kashmiri Bazar, Lahore :7 
/ [Pakistan]) .yy yy. 7" 7 ’ 7' ’' -7 7 y;\ v  y- A* • 77/\y/y 7 y7v • 7 Ay;//
All
clearly appreciated that a difference did exist between actual in- '' .
tent, and the knowledge it embraced, from imputed intent, and the 
possible'knowledge it embracedi /"-X \ v ' 'v.X X ' . . y /./ '/\ ./; • Xv,-YV
/ There is a problem which was not considered, and it may 
serve to illustrate why imputed intent, based upon what a reasonable //;
man ought to expect to be the case, is not compelling of itself. y: X
Any of us have cheques which we list in our book of accounts. Any X/: 
of us have concentrated when adding up the columns to determine the XX 
monthly balance in our account. Any of us have been surprised to be 
advised by the Bank that we were either overdrawn or had a larger x X 
balance than we had calculated. Any of us, therefore, have done our X 
calculations seriously, only to be advised that we were in error. It 
is a universal human experience. But the simple case illustrates one 
problem: although there may be an * ob jective * answer to a mathematical 
problem, one may not have ’subjectively1 been aware of the correct /
(and, henae, objective) answer. To deliberate and cause an error does 
not entail that one has deliberated in bad faith. Hence the flaw in / 
the claim that objective knowledge is knowledge that any reasonable 
man would be expected to possess. There may be an objective state of 
affairs; it is a further, and different claim, to assert: therefore,
one must know that objective state of affairs. And it is a positive .
non sequitur to assert that if one attends deliberately to what could 
be an objective state of affairs, one will necessarily know such an ob­
jective' state of affairs. ' /X ;/ /'
I7 ; . : v y The Commissioned were led to this understanding of intent in 7 7 /'.
7A7A A  ■ \ a criminal finding,. -A-;’/ . \  7 7 7 / 7'y7'-fy y ■ /"•/ y vyy -• 7y777 7 7 /7 -7.'A A / f ‘77;
7/7.*/yy 7 A/7 /7 - . "... [T]he inferences as to a man's intent'- .y'7.;77..7/AAy-/'-': A 7
7 ;.A;-; 7 7 to be drawn from the natural and probable consequences 7 : 7 7y7 //77
7  •. 7 7 7 of his actions should be permissible only; they should 7 ’ A
. y 7.' • /'7: 7.A7. not be mandatory, either in a conclusive 017 qualified 7 7  7 7 //y/y/y/:A
/7y7 -77.7 y 7-/.y" sense," ' • y •. ' ■..." . 7-7 y; . 7 7 A A 7  7 7 /A ‘;':7', . -y/7 y y. • ;y7
It would not.be an extravagant claim to suggest that the force of the 7/
7 citation from the Seventh Report (1834) helped to form the reasoning
7 7 of this Commission (1967). It was also aware that a body of com- 7 /y / y 7f y
’7 y -y 7 mon law reasoning was developing which either rejected Smith out^ 7
7 right, or circumvented its understanding of intent.. ; A  As to the 7 y 7 77.7 7. 7'yy
J / 7 ■ question whether an intent to murder ought also include an intent 7 y y ; 7;
. .7 to inflict grievous bodily harm, the Commission made this distinction.
If one is to be assumed to be guilty of murder, the element to mandate . , . .7;
that assumption is that a finding was made that D had a willingness to 7 ; A
:; kill; however, - A  Ay// \/:7'A.'y7 7 .7 : . ; 7y-,, 77 ' _y7AAA,
7/ />/ A  A  A  7 7;, "y ;wher<5 it was not his [ie., D*s] purpose to,1 7 / ’ ■ 7 .7/7y//y
kill in any event, the essential question on a charge A / A  A  A  A * 7 7
. • '7 y  of murder should be whether, at the time when he took
7 7 \ 7 the action in fact resulting in death, he was willing ; 7
;7 ; 7 7 by that action to kill in accomplishing some purpose 7 77 7 ;7y .
7 other than killing. A man may hope that he; will not ; :
: y y 7 7 kill, or he may be indifferent whether he kills or not,
7 but if he is willing to kill, and does in fact kill, we 7 7  ;• 7
v 7•’ 777.'. .• >7: think he'should be guilty of murder.'* 7'; '7-. v 777 77 :/7777A7
7 y 16. THE LAW COMMISSION: Imputed Criminal Intent (1967), page 9.
,7 17. Contrary to Smith were: Reg, v. Sharmpal Singh (P.C) [1962] A.C. 188;-
y 7 ; y Parker v. The Queen (1963) 111 C.L.R. 610, with approval of Stapleton
7 7 7 v. The Queen (1952) 86 C.L.R. 358 at 365, "The Introduction of the
yy 7 . maxim...that a man is presumed to intend the reasonable consequences
7 7  7 of his act is seldom helpful and always dangerous. "  ; 7
• 7 7 . 18. THE LAW COMMISSION: Imputed Criminal Intent (1967), page 147 7 ’7;A
The Commission used the concept of ’’willingness” in this
way, and I wish to cite it fully because of the peculiar problems
which the usage creates: . * *> -. V ; ;!y\ O  "y*
- ; 11 So long as a distinction between • y xy '
murder and manslaughter is to be maintained, there 
- ' must be a defensible criterion for distinguishing .
V between them. In our view the essential element in . : ;
: ' • ' murder should be willingness to kill, thereby evinc­
ing a total lack of respect'for human life. A man j-
. who drives a car at an excessive speed down a crowded >
• ; - street, thereby killing a pedistrian, may know that by /
, ; his reckless folly he runs the risk of killing that :
• .pedestrian, may know that by his reckless folly he
runs the risk of killing that pedestrian, but, al- . v*: 
though he is aware of the risk,-he may not be will-: '.f:
> •: ing to kill him. He may be guilty of manslaughter
; >  because he has run an extreme risk; he is not guilty ; , 
of murder if he was not willing to kill. On the other 
hand, it is desirable to bring within the definition • 
of a murderer a man who...plants a powerful time-bomb .
in an aeroplane in order to blow it up in flight with ,
the aim of recovering the proceeds of insurance on
the cargo. Although he has a purpose other than kill- i
\ ing (namely, the recovery of the insurance money) it -v--.'.-' 
; is clear from the circumstances that at the time when
• planted the bomb, he was willing to kill those in the
; aeroplane in accomplishing his purpose of recovering
; the 'insurance money.” •;//.'• & &  -;;y \ •••
Other cases might be more difficult to decide,the Commission ad­
mitted, but it maintained that when one was accused of a crime \
as serious as murder, an inquiry into his state of mind must be /• 
attempted however daunting may be the difficulties of such an in­
quiry. *.•*:'/. ,*v: :V .r **.S.v'
' ; When the extract (supra) is unravelled, is there little
more being presented by the Commission than a ’but for’ condition 
as to why D did not kill P ? The object may have been unrealised
19. THE LAW COMMISSION: Imputed Criminal Intent (1967) pp 14-15/
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but for some external happening over which D did not have control. /
Was not the Commission presenting an example based upon a hypoy Yy. / ■ ■ % Y yy- 
thetical in which the objective D wished to obtain could be ob- y.;'Y yy-y /iy ■ 
tained in two ways. First, D could gain his objective directly 
without causing death: D phi-s and 'x1 is the case, but death does Yy yyYjY :Y 
not ensue: therefore,’1 Phi and -(killing) but 'x' = D accomplishes
his aim ( * x *) without the need of Wrongfully killing. Secondly/ y 
the equation, if 'willingness1 is realised/would simply read? ”D H-YYY^tY 
phi-s but kills and accomplishes his aim ( 'x' )". The willingness Y Y Y Y Y  
is present in each example. In the first case had not - x' been --- /Y 
directly achieved, D would have killed; in the second case in OTder 
to adiieve ’x', D had first to kill. The stress in the Commissions/ 
test is not an objective test. The test is to Unravel the conditions Y
present in the will of the offender as to what he would do, or did. ... 
do, to Teach 'x'. It is an appeal not to a cognitive test, ie..,- did 
D know what was the case ? but is an appeal to the pian, and its elements, 
which D entertains. If the plan has to it that D would kill in order . 
to achieve 'x*, then, for the Commission, D is a murderer ( if an un-Y- 
intended death ensues )... The Commission appeared to be speaking of Yy y '-:- .Y 
motive. Yy ’yY y ; 'Yy'v\--yy Y -: vY-Y -" Y -! Y Y/y'' Y yy. :\-.,y
/ The dangerous driver example rather muddies the water. Fromy Yy yyy; 
motive (what D would do, whether or not he actually did do ) one is 
transported to objective conditions: the speeding motorist who knows that Y : y 
he could kill if he drove at dangerously high speeds down the crowded 
thoroughfare. Why would this not be murder if he hit P ? It certainly Y
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fits any of the older examples used by Elizabethan writers of the 
man who throws bricks down from a roof on to a pathway where passers- 
by may be, or the case of the man who rides fast into a crowd not car­
ing whom his horse may injure. What the example shows which the Com- ■ ; 
mission constructed is that the D did was willing to achieve his 
end (high speed ) at any cost ( even killing pedestrians ) but, be­
cause of fortune, no pedestrians ( or others ) were present to be in­
jured. The mere act of D driving at excessive speed means that if / 
an accident or death does not come about it is through power or cir­
cumstances other than D-— save for D braking dramatically in order to 
avoid a collision with a person of. an object. If the case is intended 
to prove that if D did attempt* to stop, then he could not have had an 
intent, or willingness, to kill, that is a post hoc propter hoc example. 
From the fact of high speed in itself either conclusion can be yielded:
D may be willing to cause death, D may not be willing tb cause D; we do 
not know unless D attempts to stop or avoid a collision. The Commission 
assumed that high speed drivers do not intend to kill; they wish only 1 
to drive fast. If a logical form, it appears to take this form. .Given 
that D phi-s, unless the ob j ective is known, phi-in g in and of itself 
will not tel l us whether or not D would kil l. If , however, phi -ing ' 
in and pf itself is dangerous, then we may defer to the objective if 
harm is not produced, ie. , D does plant the bomb aboard the aeroplane; I; 
but the bomb fails to explode. D is presumed to have had the requisite
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willingness, but circumstances or conditions thwarted his willingness 
to kill. - 7 •' 7 ' 7 7 7 >7 ,7y. •••.-; 7- - ' 7 '7- y. 7-7 .’7' : '-;V:-7 7/
i; The trouble with this exercise is that it is reasoning . ^
based upon example, and examples may confuse or be tenuously extended.
What the Commission did do which linked its reasoning to older rea­
soning, certainly mediaeval reasoning, was to stress the element in 
murder to be the 'willingness* to cause death unlawfully. To be 
willing to kill imports with itself that D is not only thinking about 
or considering to do, but actually moves himself fully to kill. The 7 7 
shift in the concept of intent began slowly to move back to the volitive 
and away from the purely cognitive. It was not, Did D know ? but, 7
Would D kill (either as an end in itself, or as an adjunct to some 
further end ) ? To ’intend* was now transformed into a volitive ob- 7 
ject, bringing the concept back into line with older reasoning which !
saw intentional action as action springing from character, disposition, 
and the will. A willingness to kill,in order to achieve an end,truiy 
would be an example of 'malice aforethought'.. 7 7 7
: The Commission, in paragraph 20 of the report, dwelled upon
'willingness' . , It said, • . /;// / • V 7.77 A " : * y A
y 7- 7 7-77 "We have had particularly in mind the objections :7: ^7>
7 • . of the judges of the Queen's Bench Division.. .to an A--"/"
earliesr proposal which we made... . In thait proposal we 
y included in the intent to kill the state of mind; of :;a/yy y 77 y A
7 man who both foresaw that he might and was prepared to
r 7' kill; We recognize that the concept of "preparedness 7 77 ’A  A'
to kill" might be taken to apply only to a previously 
planned killing; we think that "willingness to kill" y y 7 , 777
20. Op. cit., page 15
■ , *»• 483 W, vf- ■ ■' i.}> w  ■" v
V ' *•: ./"Is 'not. so"-limited, in its application, while; •; £ • -,; ^>7 • tQ0£ ' y.
V-. still emphasizing what we have made the;cen- . /•.
. ; ■ ; > tfal point in our proposal , namely, a total . • v £3%
vV- \ - ’ lack of respect for human life. And, in so v \ > jY*\
y -. .//_ ■ % far as a man cannot will in the abstract but y; '.‘V-
*<? ‘ r ;-\ must at- .least"'.envisage..the-, subject matter-;.of*;■; : . y .j- y;
f y ;■*:■■■ y his wi 11, we cons i der that the reference to ,
/•> ‘ " foresight was unnecessary 'and'perhaps mislead- ’
: ; *7 ■ 5 ;in;g, in laying- -tOo‘,much’-, emphasis bn, the'; like* . \
.-.•--.7. ' '• - \ ; - . lihood of, rather than on the willingness to 7 ..<>’ y
£\?*'v‘ •'? !.; ;’ v- cadse, .'death." v
i ■ ; v. Paragraph 22 (a) - (c) set down the final proposals of this new legal v ; ^ :■
. voluntarism. Paragraph 22 (a) indicated that the Commission be- . ,
y .•V* ; iieved that a jury should not be bound to draw the. necessary -in- : ;/:
‘ ference that D would see the natural and probable consequences of
: - his act because, in theory, they might be ..depictable; vA jury ought . , -y; , ; M
>: i . to consider all circumstances surrounding an act. This reference v;
y  ; was incorporated into the Criminal Justice Act, 1967, as section ,
^ : 8; (a) and (b). Paragraph 22 (b) of the Law Commission's report
held that a subjective test should be applied to determing intent t
f or foresight. A court or tribunal or jury ought to strive to ap-
predate what was D's actual intent when he acted j contrary to Smith. * ; V
- • >. The movement of the Report (1967) was away from a mathematical model1
^ ; . Or. statistical model of intention, ie. , natural or probable circum-. r;
- , stances; foreseeability, and a return to the older model of intent as J ’ '
. : , ; . an expression, of a willingness to commit a legal wrong ( in which death ■ X-.
; - might ensue ) . It was a compressed but clear return to a position having . -
V- 21. Op. cit., page 11, paragraph 10, "C. Proof of intent and fore- 
y . y ; sight in the criminal law generally.” . . . .  [I]t is desirable, in
’ . . . the interests of the clarification of the law, to put on a statutory -'V/'--y1 vC
1 basis a rule; that, where intent and foresight is required in the^  crimi­
nal law, such intent or foresight must be subjectively proved; that is 
to say, the matter in issue should be the actual state of mind of the .
.:"': ■; Accused.M . • i
, Y Y Y -x'-Y.Y.-1 YY, ' YY YYy-Y/.Y/jY. YY^Jc YY:,,;yYyYy
: its roots in a mediaeval tradition ( as we had discussed in earlier ^ yy^iyyYY/Y
portions of this study ). The concept of 'intent’ was to be defined ■
Y ; Y i r i  its relations to the 'will ' . If we advert to paragraph 22 (c) of • Y ;Y
the report under discussion we read of this r e l a t i o n s h i p : - . /y Y*'y-Y"
y ; ' "22 (c): An intent to inflict grievous bodily Y ‘ Y** y . ;
• yYyyY-y. y harm should no longer be retained as an alternative ' Y'Y. y.-.Yv Y y  Y/yy
"y Y.Y : Y to an intent to kill in the crime of murder. A kill-' Y: Y yYv-YYyy;.y/
YY v ■ Y ing should not amount to murder unless there is an in- ' Yy^YY:;/:
Y Y , Y r y . tent to kill. But it should be made clear that, where \ :Y'Yy Y;'"YYvy':
,Y: ; Y y  ; a man does not have the purpose to kill in any event, he .
Y Y y may nevertheless have the intent to kill, if, at the time
. when he takes the action in fact resulting in death, he Y y ‘
i y Y ,; is willing by that action to kill in accomplishing some 
; purpose other than killing..."
,Y;. Y' if. actions in themselves concern the class of the particular, and if
y actions are particular productions brought about by an agent through YyYYYyyYY
YY himself, then it would seem to follow logically that a finding of •. Y';/YYy/*’; Yy
murder a particular offence brought about by the agent--should re- Y- Yy:;
Y ; v ; fleet the particular volitional state of the agent who caused such &  yyy' vY'Y
y :Y an action. y* To make a finding of other than what the agent had y ‘ .
y ’ Y  y y y - ,  intended is then to have inade a constructive finding. By stating that Y Y
t  - if an agent was willing to kill in order to achieve either a cpllateral y y  
or direct effect disposes of the possible problem that D might not haveyYyyyy-. 
willed to kill this man rather than an unknown person. By being possessed , j. 
Yy' of a willingness to kill wrongfully satisfies the intentional requirement YY,
Y Y; Y for murder; it need not be further specified as to whom will be the victim. ;
yYYY Y y  Y 22. Op. cit., page 16, ME. Summary of Proposals.. .22 (c)" : YyYy YKTiyiYyiy
" 23. Cf., The Nicomachean Ethics, Bk. Ill, i, 1110^2, "...for actions are, f. >.
y Y : y  ’Yyy In the class of particulars ... [ "ai gar pragzeis hen tow prattonti"]. They y>y
’ / Yy -  y observation of Professor John Burnet, The Ethics of Aristotle [Methuen, 1900], y
may be added: '’This is fundamental. There is no such thing as an act which ;:Y
' y Y  \ y is not this particular act in these particular circumstances .. .An act pery ■ Y-
formed is always this act. /Hence too the difficulty; for there can be no Y Y  Y y
YYyy yy v scientific rules about particulars.” page 116. ~'
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The inclusion of ’willingness’ also disposes of the problem case A
7 :~- v y . ; . /  7 \ \ / * ' ,7 7 < 7 ' ' 7 : 7 v-’' •• • 'v:. ; . V ' ; / ” 7 24-' - ‘ y - ;  -7 7 ' 7 7 7 7 7 . .in which a result, might or might not be harmful, * but the will \;v
of the offender incorporates both Conditions. If the harm does en-. // 7
sue it is different in classification if D willed the harm, or the
means to cause the harm, than if the harm simply happened and was 7
:.;7. • • - ' 7  2 5  ■ ■ 7 , cV. . 7* I/ •. '/ •' • ‘// A .’ : 7 ’7 7 7 ' 7 .  . 7/-’ 7 ’-Anot intended by D. * 7 ■ 7 7 7 7  /.• . • / ::;y 7 ,,y y y
7 The report of the Law Commission (1967) on the subjectof7'7.77y-y
imputed criminal intent was not a philosophical paper, and with its 7 7 ;'
case examples one must read them with a certain degree of leniency. y
However; the report did re-establish the dominance of the will in an 
act, making the cognitive elements of intention into a sub-class of . 7 y  77 .
the voluntary, a position this writer would accept. A willingness to 7/
do what could be harmful seems to have wider logical scope than a fore­
sight of possible harms.
24. Such an example is the case of R. v. Desmond (1868) 11 Cox 146. y ,7 7 - :;7  
The actual report of the case, R. v Desmond and Others, is to be found 
recorded in The Times, London, at various dates: January, 7th, 14th, 21st, 
29th; February 5th, 12th, 19th, 26th; March 4th; with a report of the 
opinion of the court on Tuesday, April 28th, 1868, at page 11. The de­
ceased in the case one Mary Ann Hodgkinson who was killed as a result of
a bomb blast which occurred on the 13th of December, 1867. Desmond, and
others, were attempting to rescue a prisoner, and, in the prosecution of 
a felonious intention (sic) setting off a bonib to bring about his escape/ 
glass was shattered in the victim’s house, which pieces pierced her sub­
clavian artery/causing a gTeat hemorrhage, from which she died./ If we y 
advert to the Law Commission's concept of 'willingness', one can see that 
it applies to Desmond: namely, although the defendants did not wish to kill, 
they were prepared to cause conditions the consequences of which may have 
been an unlawful death * :
25. Cf., THE MENTAL ELEMENT IN CRIME, by Glanville Williams, LL.D., F.B.A., 
(Jerusalem: At the Magnes Press, The Hebrew University, 1965), pp 10-12, in 
which four hypothetical cases are put. The fourth example, of inadvertent 
negligence, shows how a different classification of responsibility arises - 
from the same case. Williams says, (p-12), "The word 'intention' must be 
taken in relation to a particular consequence, and when an act has two or 
more consequences (as an act always has), it may be intentional as to one 
one of those consequences and not as to another." . - ' -7 7;%y7y7y7
c 7
■ . / A leading paper in its set of Working Papers, samples of- 7  7/ 7
scholarship of the members of the Law Commission circulated for
the purpose of receiving scholarly comment upon their proposals
for the various reforms of the common law, was that paper concerned 7 y
; •- • ,;7  ' '- 26 ' - ' r 7 V / '  ; 7  V / 7  7 .with the codification of the criminal law. / I shall refer "7 7 7
to this long-titled report ai: The Mental Element in Crime (31); 7777;
One of the members of the working party for this report was Professor 
Glanville L, Williams, Q.C;, LL;D., F.B.A., (who, at the time, was v 7
also a member of the Criminal Law Revision Committee ), who had 
shortly had published earlier a set of lectures bearing the same 7 77 77 y
title, and whom, it may be assxaiaed, lent considerable scholarly •. :
-• '777 v7 77 y,f ■ '■ j - :* -77;".://V//7./y. •:'; '7*7.7 A y / ; 7/7/7 weight to shaping some of the conceptual outcomes of Working Paper 31..
The membership of the working party, as they then were, constituted y
distinguished judges and practitioners who were richly acquainted with 7
the Criminal Bar. ‘ The Working Paper which was circulated was 77 -y
modest in size, some 65 foolscape pages, but direct in purpose, listing
seven propositions to be considered, and then following such propositions 7.
26. THE LAW CONMISSION, Published Working Paper NO. 31, Second Pro- 7,7
ramme Item XVIII, CODIFICATION OF THE CRIMINAL LAW, GENERAL PRIN- v 7:; 
CIPLES, THE MENTAL ELEMENT IN CRIME, Tissued] 16 June 1970, by: y
J.C.R.Fieldsend, Esq., Secretary, THE LAW COMMISSION, Conquest
House, 37-38 John Street, Theobald’s Road, LONDON, WC IN-2BQ,
7 7  ' [paper number: 17-26-04]. 7 7V-/. 7 7./':. ■ 7 y.:.7;- 777;- 7;
27. . Op. cit., footnote #25, supra. ,
28. Mr Neil Lawson, Q.C.; Mr Norman Marsh, Q.C.; The Hon, Mr. Justice
7 7 Scarman, O.B.E.; Mr T.R. Fitzwalter Butler; The Rt. Hon. Lord Justice
: Edmund Davies; The Common Serjeant, Mr J.M.L. Griffith-JonesM.C. ;7;.7
7 Mr J. H. Buzzard: Mr A.E.Cox; Mr J .N. Martin O.BjE. Mr Michael Walker; 
'77 Professor Williams, with alternate members from the Home Office 777/7 7
; ’ -486'-;. : ' 7 /  . ' y y  y .7 :7 y 7y y7 .7 7 A .
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with separate discussions of these categories: 'intention', 'knowl­
edge ', 'intention and knowledge1, 'recklessness’, 'negligence', and 
'The place of mistake in relation to the mental element.' . ,
Y  The paper set out to explore what was the relationship be- ;
tween mens rea and statutory offences, ”...whether the language used 
in the creation of a statutory offence imports full mens Tea ( in­
tention, knowledge or recklessness ), some fault element short of
mens rea, i.e., negligence, or some form of "absolute" or "strict"
• v\ - 29 ' . • •' Y 'Y'Y ' ■, ~liability." * Their difficulty was framed in paragraph (.3) of the
D "• 30. ’ '\yy ’.yy-- ‘ yy'* v y - T -  y / Y ; ' , ;  YYy ;Paper: >' • • • \ YyYv-X'Yx’ ■ .r Y y y
: Y 3. We take the view that it has become essential
to identify with precision those areas where the legis- 
; • lature has created offences without a requirement of Y Y Y
fault (bffences of strict liability), as well as those Y Y ; ! !
areas where fault is a prerequisite of liability only 
\-V- to the extent that the offender must have unreasonably
failed to attain an objective standard of conduct (of- Y
fences of negligence). By this means we seek to further Y
Y the:attainment of certainty in the criminal law." J Yf Y
But the difficulty which was not expressed, and which a legal phi­
losopher would note, was the broadness in which their aim was cast. 
For instance, were they seeking to set down rules for the inter- Y Y 
pretation of a legal.proposition, as one might set down rules for 
the clear understanding of a proposition in logic or mathematics ? Y
29. Working Paper 31: The Mental Element in Crime ( L.C. 1970), pp -1-2.. Y Y 
In a footnote to their own statement, the Commission added: "Through-Yj
out this Paper, we use the world "fault" to include the traditional terms 
"intention", "knowledge", "recklessness" and "negligence". When we usey Y 
the term, "the mental element" or mens rea, we exclude negligence which/ Y: 
in contrast to recklessness, does not require actual advertence to the Y y Y  
risk of the results or circumstances of conduct. " Y "  y  Y Y  Y Y Y  Y*Y ■•-Yy.YY Y Y
30. Op. cit♦, page 2. . , • ' • Y :
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 ^ Was a problem in linguistic construction to be solved for ? Or - ; ‘ 7
was a broader problem to be explored: namely, the relationship ;yy
~ which an agent may bear to the understanding of a linguistic pro- - 7 /;.7;;'777;:r
,7 : position ? The logical reply would be simple. If a proposition
' is to supply or state the elements of an offence, then that pro- 1
. " i l ' 1 7 position should state those elements clearly and precisely. If , 7 ‘ •,
; T v ; ambiguous; then the ambiguity should favour the innocence of the ; /
; - 7 •  accused at the expense of the power of the State. The State could; ; : -7
V after all,, always re-define a statutory offence so as to: make it 7 “
more precise. The working party admitted that past case law 7 77 7 7 : 7/
; was of little help to determine what degree of fault should obtain 77 7 /; •;
"7.7,7 7 -•7' y.;. in particular statutory offences. 7 -v-y-.j 7 • 7 7.7 '-7,-7‘ • 77 7.'\7'-77' 7- -7 7 ^ /
.7 ; : ; .7 7 . The working party saw their problem in terms of language, but : y:;
;/ 7- • 7; 7 not in the way as might a linguistic philosopher. They were not 7.7-  ^y.y
; composing a logical treatise on how to interpret key concepts. * Yet
: 7 they were concerned that key concepts could be employed ambiguously:
7 / 7 1. ;■ . 7 "Thus 'maliciously*, although in general a mens rea .7y-\~'7c77..j77-777-
> 7 7 ’;y 7^ . 7 word, can, apparently, have a different meaning in ; ,
/.-;7 77 7,': -7 7-- ' > ./7'.7 . two closely related sections of the same Act.. f'ft.'/*'';'77777-'7.
7:.y7''--' -..-.-I' * 7 y : '7 - • 7;' v. Mowatt [1968] 1 Q.B. 421, on ss. 18 and' 20 of the .7-y>y ; :
7v7 7 '■■•7 7-7 ' •. . >77 77 7 ;7 7 :7 Offences against the Person Act 1861 ]• Again, it '''7’- y^ 77'77777y777 
•’v,7/'' ’7 7'7  ^ V 7 appears that the ecpression 'with intent to defraud* j ••77'-777
7 > ' 7 7 .y: 7 -7' y, 7 -7, may include recklessness; although it is generally ac- .7 77;
777 7 7'^ ’, 7 7 - cepted that the expression 'with intent to inflict - '
•;7  ’’ 7/--’ 7  . .7 7 7., 7 grievous bodily harm* does‘not. *’ [ R. v. Sinclair 7-471C ■:7\.:'
[1968] 1 W.L.R. 1246] ,  ^ ^
7/ . 7 ;7 77 31. ".. .the legislature may wish tp provide for a different degree of y/yy/yy
7’ .7 '77 ; .7. fault in different elements of the same offences. The propositions,; ; / 7
therefore, are subject to any specific provision the legislature may 7 1' 
, ; 7 . 7-7 take in relation to the fault element in any particular offence." 7:-yy-- 7 ;
.. 7 . . page .5, Working Paper 31. ‘
7 / 32. Op. cit., page 3. :
i 4*9
• v  ‘ ’ • • • ■ -r • . y y y  . ' y  y  • : y  • -■ 33  ' Y > - Y - ' . yThe Commission wanted to be guided by a general principle: * y  . • . . y . Y y y Y ;
: ". . .that the fundamental assumption underlying > : : Y ;
/*' • the proposition is that fault, whether consisting
: Y Y / of mens rea or of negligence, should be the nor- '/.-YYYY
Y-.Y; mal requirement of the criminal law, and that strict YYYl
Y liability should be exceptional.. .”V Y Y ; Y
no doubt remembering what difficulties had been engendered when . .Y\YYY
' - Y  • • Y  •• . V". * Y  Y  - - 34 Y Y  ' ;Y Y VY  •Sweet v. Parsley had been argued a few years earlier. ’ The Y
problem, then, appeared to be a simple one: that is to say, what Y-Yyyy
relationship did key concepts in the criminal law bear to those Y YY!;
statutory constructions which may either have embodied those con- Y Y
ceptions, or may have assumed that such key concepts were possessed Y
of peliicid clarity, easy both to be understood and applied ?
Y Y Seven legal propositions to apply to general principles of Y,
" : ” " * V ' Y, . : • Y- ’ •' . "’'•• y Y  35 :•. ' . '-y'-Ythe criminal law were set forth; and these were they,: : * y  : ;
. M 1. Subject to proposition 2, in every offence created
• y after [ a date to be prescribed ] the fault required
■ Y . Y Y . ' - -  is a mental element consisting of intention, knowledge y  Y
; or recklessness on the part of the defendant in respect
f ; Y of all the other elements of the offence, unless the re- Y
/  Y ; :y  quirement is expressly excluded. Y .  ... ; Y-Y-;' !• " ' , y Y -  Y . /Y  ''-y; YY
"2. Where an offence is an offence of omission or is de^
fined so as to include an omission, the fault required y ' v Y y
Y . Y T-s negligence in the defendant as! to the omission, un- Y
less a mental element is expressly or impliedly required
Y or the offence is expressly stated to be of strict lia-
Y bility or otherwise to be independent of fault in the de- y\ / Y
fendant. Y •. Y  y - Y  Y y  Y ' y  - ' . i y - Y  ' •■yy YYYY
" 3. Where the requirement of intention, knowledge or reck- .
Y y  lessness is expressly excluded from some or all of the YYY
elements of an offence, the offence requires negligence y
in the defendant as to such elements, unless the offence
35. Op. cit., page 4. Y Y  54. Sweet v. Parsley [1969] 1 All E.R. 347yY
■ ; / (H.L.), quashing D's conviction for the
Y  ; . possession of drugs, section 5(b) of the
35. Working Paper 31, Dangerous Drugs Act 1965. Y  Y Y  Y/• pp 6-7- ’ yy  yyy'yyy ; ,:;,y . yyyy
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” 3. is stated to be of strict liability or other- 
■/' • • "wise to be independent of fault in the defendant A / 7:A/.-.;y7;g// 
A- A  7 in respect of such- elements. 7-7: A  ' --'7 ,..7 . 777.7 . 77A5&aAA.j
7 7 4/ Unless otherwise expressly provided; in all of- 7 7 7  7 7 /
>7 fences where negligence is required by reason of 7 ’7  A 7 V 7 -7
, proposition 2 ot 3 above, negligence may be treated 77A- A 7 7 y A 7 7 A
as established in the absence of any evidence to the . . . A y  7
7y 7-. •' ‘7 contrary. ' 7 '
. 11 5. Where the fault proved by the evidence is of a A/y.A:-y /
’" ■ 3 higher degree ■ than'- that -required'-' for-:the- offence "the ’7 A  7; A y / /  //7- 
fault required shall be taken as
7 ” 6. Subject to any specific exceptions, where the 7 ; A A  ^
existing law does not require a particular degree 7/77
'7 y  yof■ fault in respect of an element of the offence, 7 :7 7 7
that offence nevertheless requires negligence in the v "7 7 7 7;'
, defendant as to that element. 7 .77' 7 ; . 7. > 7  A  A / 7 A / A ' /
In such cases, unless otherwise expressly provided, . y  y-/'-"7 ' 
negligence may be treated as established in the absence 7:  7
7 bf an y evidence to the contrary. *
A. 7 Where the fault proved by the evidence is of a ; '
/ rv7.vA higher degree than negligence, negligence shall be 7 A- 7,,77/7 A A / v  
7,y' ;/7 taken as established.” / A ' A - A  - \7; 77' A' . 7 / A ./ \ A//-/A y  f
The Paper proceeded to discuss each proposition, setting forth A  '
examples and case law which pertained to each proposition. THie 7 y7 A  A
Paper used an older term, 1 fault1, to depict the wrongful element y A A / A A
of an act, ( as ’culpa’ did in church law, when a penitent would y 7 /7 7 :
assert, ”mea culpa, me a culpa, mea maxima culpa.” 7), and it 7 7/” 7 y y 7 ;
spoke of the consequences of wrongful conduct as ’ events ’. The A y  7-,Ay:-7
case law selected to illustrate each proposition we have set down
• • •/ ' A' • . A - . . ■ A ' ; , A-- ■ • y 7 ‘' A;y 7in the footnotes. *7 ■ ' 77- ■ -A7 .... /./'AA
* I do not wish to suggest that the Commission drew upon church law ■ 7A y / 7
when it spoke of ’fault1 in reference to an offence. But the language y  7/7
of ’fault’ does have a long history in Western culture, and the com- ;. 7: y  
parison is not far-fetched or misleading. ; A  77/
36, Proposition One drew upon: R. v. Cunningham [1957] 2 Q.B. 396;, .'-/A/
’malice’ * the foresight of a prohibited consequence, as defined by -.//
statute; Bullock v. Turnbull [1952] 2 Ll.L.R. 303, D boards a quarantined 7
vessel unknowingly; R. v . Cohen [1951] 1 K;B. 505, did D; knowingly evade 77: y
custom’s duty; Cotterill v . Penn [1936] 1 K.B. 53, D kills a house pigeon* 
honestly believing it to be a wood-pigeon;R.,v. Forbes $ Webb (1365) 107/7/7 
Cox C.C.362; R. v. Maxwell (1909) 2 Cf. App. Rep. 26, Unknowingly. D ; . -
obstructs a police officer in performance of his duty. , - 3
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: The first proposition is post hoc propter hoc reasoning
because it does not relate D's actual knowledge of his act to 
D knowing that a law has been Violated. The 'fault' in question 
is attributed to D. The other categories, 'knowledge' and 'reck­
lessness', the Paper defines at the close of the propositions ( as 
will be done here ). The logical fallacy consists in this: to 
know that D intends phi does not entail that D intends to commit 
a wrong. The presupposition of the use of intent in the first 
proposition is that D knows that he is intending a wrong pro­
hibited by law, and also that in knowing that he is commiting a ; ^
legal wrong he actually desires or wants to commit that very wrong.
To know what I am doing does not entail that I want to do what I 
am doing. y ■ • , 7 . “ ■ «\'77.;7 V . ' '7- 7* /• 7 O '  7O /7-- ’-y 777
The second proposition broadly concerns omissions for which 
D may be liable; for instance, a bankrupt obtaining credit, failure 
comply with traffic signs, and the like. ^ * The Paper argues that 
'negligence' ought to be the test for 'fault' in omission cases, unr 
less a statute imports mens rea ( ie., 'implies' ) into the offence.
All that such offences seem to do is to cast the burden upon the ac­
cused to explain why his conduct should not be faulted, and says little, 
if anything, about mental elements. If D phi-s not knowing it to be
37. The second proposition was supported by: R. v. Salter [1968] 2 Q.B. 
793 (bankruptcy); Rees v. Taylor, 14 Oct. 1939 (unrep.) from: 
Stone's Justices Manual [100th ed., p. 2404, note (d) ], traffic 
violation in which D unwittingly proceeds through unseen signals.
7a legal wrong, then D, under strict liability for an omission, is 
7 7.. required to demonstrate that his ignorance was reasonable. If this 7 7:7l
Ov.7.f. v;7 7 7  does'-not absolve D, then one has only an example that statutory
•7/y. offences may be strictly constructed.( which does not address the'.7/7 7.777 7-7:
77'. ■ >77 : ■■ 38- v”- * ' 7 ■ 7 v 7.'.’ 7 ’■ '-7 ■ - . • y,v ,y■•. - .v*777; 7.-. 7:7- mental element in a crime,. ). ..O- The power of .a.statute is dis- \ , 77 7 V 77-77
7/7 - 0  . ; tinct from the logic of a statute. •-?! '
57O' 7;.7;.,' O '7 ; Proposition three simply imposes the fault element, but 7'.7;777777
; 07, ; / chooses two conflicting examples to illustrate it. The first example ;7K
7• 7 7 v7. 17;7 7 is of one ;who;'makes'an untrue declaration: ; 7 .,777/7 ; '7 77: 7.y 7/777/777:
*7;:,"7-:'’• , 77 ,7 -7‘ • •.: 7 ’ ” (a) A law makes; it an offence to make an un^ " 7 '-7;77y7';^ ;Vy.7
■;7 • / / . '77; •. ' 7  y - 7 ' - 7  , ; , 7 7 7 7 v 7 . ‘ . ;• , 7  true decaration irrespective of intention Vv 7 y . ” "'■&
77.77'- v- ' • : y7- .77 7;; 7/7 -'7 7 i 7.7 ' or recklessness In that regard. The de- I ’
;;7 ■;V ;•-7 ;:7.'. ’7,7.7 . 7 fendant made an untrue declaration, but 7
'77 ;. yiy - '7y ; 7-y. 7 ' he did not know, and had no reason to sus- 7 7.7 7 7 7 ^ 7 7 1
; 7 77 77-: 7; y;7y:/’.7 ;7' pect, that itwas untrue. He will;-be not 7 y y  .777-7^7^
7' 7 ■: ■;;; 7;-:7'77 '7 ' ' guilt ( cf. Proposition '4 7 )" 77777“ 7'77 77:;7 "7y 7 ;:/>7y77
777:^77^7 •’ -'.Any- set- of examples can be given. Essential to the example: is -that- /7;;7..y yv7
77 77  ^ D asserts ( or does ) phi, which he believes to be 1 xf, but which / ; r-7 v;:'"y;77
the law knows to be fy* ( with 'x' 'y' ). But is this little , ?
7;7; more than to say that conviction should follow guilt ? or that some ;777I7'y-5
-. 7 7 forms of ignorance are excusable ? If D could not know that phi was 7 - 77;
'• -;-'r :-:;7 ‘7-7 ’ ' ' V  (hence prohibited by law), what ’criminal knowledge1 could D have : 77;
7 7* • " : possessed to be guilty of a crime ? ''•/ ' 7 7-■ 7' 7.-- '7 ;. 7.' " :y  7
: . .. The second example chooses the classic adulterated milk case,
■7. . 7 7 7 .“7'-j7..y 38. The model case for an example of sheer statutory power.was': / '•;f7.. ;/• 7'y7 7/
;-7-7;;/77: 7;7';- . . R. v. Larsonneur (1933)/97 J.P. 206. ; .7 . 7y7vy7'7:7
/•■' ;7- - y.;: " ; 39. Cf . , Lambert v. California (1957) 355 U.S. 225; 78 S.Ct. 240;
7  • '••.•••/ : • • • :7:;2 L.Ed. 2d 228, D inadvertently violates a felon’s registration law.7/:77
: 7 Mr. Justice Douglas reversed the conviction. Also, cf. Morissette /7»7777'
7 y 7-;7/7 ; .7 --777. v. United States, (1952) 34?7U.S. 7246; 72 Gt.:7240; 796 L.Ed. 288.777^:7
7,7 7 /7 7 40. Working Paper 31, p 17. ~ ■ 7 ,
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a rather unsatisfactory example. Tesco Supermarkets Ltd. v. Nattrass, 
[1972] AC 153, the defendant manager was charged with a violation of y ! 
the Trade Descriptions Act 1968, s. 11.(2), for advertising a good for 
sale but not having the good for sale. Ordinarily this would have : Y  
been an offence of strict liability by way of agency. The House of 
Lords accepted as a defence to the charge that D could not have known 
of the offence because his employee had not taken proper care to stock 
the storesheIves with the product, and the product was not in stock, 
which absence was unknown to D, a manager. It would appear that the 
House of Lords have imported ’reasonableness1 into the concept of ?to 
be strictly liable for...’, and that one would have to inspect such Y Y : 
cases one by one. The same defence (in theory) could obtain against 
the seller of adulterated milk. It would be a matter only to credi- Y ' 
bility if the judge or jury accepted D ’s reasons for his actions. ;.
The fourth proposition simply places an evidential burden upon 
D. For example, if D does phi, believing it to be an innocent act,) 
but the Crown claims that the act is a wrong, and then argues that ' Y -Y. 
because a wrong, therefore D must have intended a wrong ( thus linking 
mens rea and actus reus ), it will again be left to D to explain why 
he phied, and to demonstrate why he did not know it to be a legal wrongy 
The tests may be both ’reasonableness’ and !ignorance ’. I have ex- < Y y 1
eluded ’compulsion’ from this category, as when D, because of addiction,
■ y ’ - Y' - -  - Y y  y ; y  v   •-»: -Y-f ; ' Y Y ’ r vV ’ - ; Y Y ! : ' . ' Y ;  ' • •:4 i Y ' - .  ;possesses forbidden drugs, yet cannot control himself. * ;
41.; Cf. the illuminating dissent of Wright, J. (joined by Bazelon,C,j., 
and Tamm and Robinson, JJ ) in United States v. Moore, (1973) 486 
F.2d 1139 [United States Court of Appeals, District of Columbia ;Y 
y ! Circuit] ;' Y.: :-Y\ Y  " v • -y..;/ Y‘Y/, Y Y '
7- ' ■ ':/• ■A ■ /■" V-. * • .- . ( 494 * . ‘ ; A*/-, • ,7.7-.'. . ..•, y :;77'y
;• /A 7 : .7 The fourth proposition, however, when it serves to:become ; /Ay/A'A/
:\f.7 7 7 7 ;  7 7 an arm of State power, as with narcotics enforcement. / ;* The A/AAAyA/A/ 
7^ ; / 7 matter there^ it would seem, is> that legislation embodies the , ■ AK / y  7.77:
7 . , y • . : general knowledge of the community that those who use narcotics >7,77 ; y y y
7 r; generally know that they are using narcotics, and that such actions7y'y/;AA-A7
//•A-'/* . / are by general knowledge forbidden. The logic of the statute is 7 Ay-yy/Ayy
7 :7 : ? to appeal to 'custom’ * and to say very little about legal logic. 7?..
77 7 / 7. 7’ . Furthermore, strict liability is often a policy matter, and addresses 7 7 ; A
7 : ; itself more to government and its police powers. A 1
77/ ; A  . Proposition five assumes a standard of conduct, and that it A .yy*
A 7/ 7; 7 7** known to D. If for instance a statute proscribes the selling of A 7//Ay /
; intoxicating liquor during certain hours, if D sells 'x', knowing 
7 7 7 5 it to be intoxicating liquor, during those forbidden hours, it.'is '7 7 7-7; A.;.//
. / : . assumed he has violated the law. Proposition five holds that any <
A A/y: 7 s ta te  w i l l  s a t i s f y  g u i l t :  i f  D a c te d  n e g l ig e n t ly ,  o r  r e c k le s s ly ,  o r  '
A y A ; 77;/' n e g l ig e n t ly .  '7 >77.; '; J 7  V  A A -’ / ; / y  77 A-■ 77 y 777:* '.7 y / .  y : A . ; ; ; .’ y y A
y  y .  7 ; . 7.7 7 The s ix t h  p r o p o s i t io n  re q u ir e s  th e  d e fe n d a n t to  re b u t  th e  : 7 ; {
7 ; . charge that he, P, acted negligently. In R. v . Sal ter [1968] 2 Q.B. -7’
7 7 " 534, section 157 of the Bankruptcy Act 1914 require a bankrupt to ;
; 7 ' . y; furnish an reasonable explanation as to why his estate was lost 7y ^  '7 . A; A y /  
7 y  7 : 7 D did not fulfil this requirement, was permitted to show that he -- A/A'//7/
- ’ 7 ,42. Cf., United States v. Balint C1922) S8 U.S.: 250, removing common7v 7 7;
77 7 /. A.'-AA law scienter requirement in order to effect narcotics prosecutions. A 77
7 7 7 7 > Also, cf . , United States v. Behrman (1922) 258 U.S. 280; 42 Sup.Ct . :,
7-; . y • . 303. D, a physician, wrongfully prescribes narcotics. ’ [W]rongfully’ yy;
7/A A  r A/7 - : ’/.7; is defined' 'by. statute '9; - and '.hot; b"mfedical practice. • I , >7 7.7--vy'777 7/ AA;
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was non-negligent in that regard. The trial judge ruled that D ; > 
had to be shown by the Grown to have possessed an intent to de- ! 
ceive. The Commission, in its Commentary on proposition six, felt ; : 
that this was too lenient to the defendant. They wished the fault , 
element to be constructive, thus changing the burden of proof from >:
the Crown to the defendant. yV ;./-y'yy'‘ V: 'y y
In its commentary on proposition six at C-(2). (a) ,*the : ,
Commission enunciates what appears- to be a strange understanding 
of mens rea, suggesting that a negative statement of belief is a 
statement made outside of the boundaries of intention, knowledge or .
recklessness.; -.'The statement reads, - v.;  ^r
* Wens rea may, however, not always be expressed . :yvy
in terms of intention, knowledge or recklessness. For
/ v example, under section I of the Perjury Act 1911 a ;.*4?'
, false statement must be made ”.. .which [the defendant] ;  ^ ,
y knows to be false or does not believe to be true. . J  '■ J Ci ";;
With respect, to utter a statement which one may not know to be  ^ ^  ^
true, but which one is willing to utter in spite of possible harm- ’; ;
ful consequences, is not to reck a rule; in short, it is to be ‘
reckless, which may be an intentional act. That there may not : ^
be a material correspondence between "D believes that *p'11 and the
truth or falsity of, "...that 'p1'* in no way affects the liability '. Vyy-
of D under the terms of the Perjury Act 1911, section 1. The in- ;
tentional object of the proposition, "D believes;..!', is taken byyVyy-:\yy
" or does not believe to be true." To satisfy that object is to y •
have intentiondly made a statement, and that statement is the intentional
43. THE LAW COMMISSION, Working Paper 31, pp 25-26.
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object for the belief of D ( in that circumstance ). The Com­
mission appears to have confused material implication with logical 
implication. The contingent truth or falsity of a statement does 
not affect the intentionality of the statement with regard to the/ 
maker of the statement. A statement may be intentionally made, 
and be materially false; a statement may be intentionally made,
and be materially true. In either case ( barring defences ), D
. ' V ; . 7 - 7  7  7 , ' ,  • 4-4 7 ; . -  7  ' 7  " ' 7  • /  ;  •
intentionally has made a statement. * . 7 ; .
Proposition seven in Working Paper 31 concerns definitions.
The statements are short enough to reproduce, and I set them down:
;" v 7 ■ ; --7” INTENTION AND KNOWLEDGE A -A": A A yi -:^ A , "  A 7V
V> 7 7777 / A;7. A. (1) A person intends an event not only
7 ; 7 :y y  7 . ' (a) When his purpose is;'to cause
'-v - 7,7: A-.7- - 7 ‘7 * 7 77- that event but also 7 " . V
45.
[First
[Second
alternative]
AAAA.A; (2)
" (3)
[Second A/;y 
alternative]
(b) When he has no substantial doubt A
that that event will result from 7 7A.
•A A his conduct. yAA 7; -A v-'AZ/yYy
(b) When he foresees that that event A
will probably result from his con­
. • •' :7 duct. .''-''-A- ■' • -; ’ -'77 AA "A/A . 7 -.A
A person is not by reason only of 7 
Proposition 7A (1) (b) to be taken 7..; 7, 7 
to intend the wrongdoing ofothers/'77A.7//y
A person knows of circumstances not only 
when he knows that they exist but also when
He has no substantial doubt that they exist 
He knows that they probably exist.”
44 NOTE: Proposition 7 (B) both (a) arid (b), RECKLESSNESS, [Working:
Paper 31], would appear to negate the:Commission's statement con­
. ceming perjury ( supra, footnote 43), pp 30-31. Cf i, footnote 45,
■ (supra). ; .. A 7 ‘A-.;/,.;..-,. *. .-7 ^  ..7"7 A. / v - A "  A /77' •/7 7 > 7777"7
45. Op . cit A, pp 30-31. 7 , A  yA" 7 v,y-7 777--A 7" 7y7-A77 ’7 S 7 7:-7AaA-
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"RECKLESSNESS
B.
"NEGLIGENCE
C.
A person is reckless if, : ///fyy,'
(a) knowing that there is a risk
7/ ;y that an event may result from .
: ; his conduct or that a circum- .
stance may exist, he takes that 
•V •' risk, and y 7  y % 7 / y y y . y 7
. (b) It is unreasonable for him to ? 
y : take:having regard to the de- 
. ;. gree and nature of the risk which
he knows to be present/ ' .7 7 y
A person is negligent if he fails to 
exercise such care, skill or foresight 
as a ' reasonab 1 e man in his situation •*! 
would, exercise." - 77. v-V .7 '' 7. *': 1
*77 One will observe that ' intend' is defined with regard to 7^ 7*
consequences. Were one to borrow from Aristotelian terminology, for , ...
sake of parallel reasoning, action has been defined in terms of its v > 
'final cause', deleting reference to 'formal cause', 'efficient cause', 7 
or 'material cause'. Proposition 7.A. (1) appears to require a reading 7
with both (a) and (b) (either alternative 'b' reading > because the 7 y7
definition is framed with a conjunctive, 'V/.7but also..." Thusyto;y;-777'7;y. 
intend an event the necessary conditions must be that D purposes that, .7. 
event (only ?) and also that he has no doubt that the: event will occur, 
or also that D foresees that the event will occur because of what he y 
had done. We seem to have been given a schoolmaster's test by the ' 7
Commission. What standard is to apply for measuring 7.A. (1) (b^ ) and:
(b-) ? Will it be an objective test ? or will it be a subjective test: ?7
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Certainly it may be argued that the courts will appeal to a reason­
able man test; but the language of Proposition seven seems not to 
appeal to that test. It frames its definition of intention as an 
event which D purposes and also either which D has no substantial y\y.y 
doubt will occur, or foresees that the event probably will Occur.
These are difficult propositions to test. They import a standard 
Of knowledge which the ’willingness1 test does not import. Both the 
dullard and the genius may have a 'willingness’ to kill; but the dullard 
may be unable to foresee or to determine how to effect the killing, while 
the genius is able to measure and foresee like an Archimedes.
; Take the first example given on page 33 of Working Paper 31:
;y y - . "(a) The defendant shot at A at long range hoping to < ,
• ' y kill him, but knowing that the chances of hitting
him were extremely small at that range. He killed 
; A. He is guilty of intentionally killing A." ;
But assume that is a gunsmith, and is firing a gun for; the
first time ( in this hypothetical ). knows that he can kill P, but
does not; ’hopes1.that he might kill P. The second case is less •
one of intention, and more one of recklessness, whilst the first is one
of intention ( if ’intend' is defined in terras of "to know that ’x' >
will result") . But take the same example anil reverse it. • who has
a specialist's knowledge of rifles, intends only to 'frighten' P, and „
therefore;fires, only to his amazement to see that he has actually killed
P. In terms of the above definition the intention of was other than
what he had expected. If an 'objective' test were appealed to, then it/i;
fu ‘ A" V; r- A
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could be argued that D^, who should have known, did not know that his
shot would kill the victim. But if a ’subjective’ test were taken to , A v,
determine what was D^’s actual intent, it could be argued that he did A . 
not intend the result. What of D^, who has no specialist knowledge • A 
of the effectiveness of a rifle ? He fires only to frighten ? P dies. ; A A A 
Do we want to say that D- is reckless, whilst D., who possessed specialist
A -  ;  :  v. •* ■ ' ,  v  . .  *  • v ,  /*m y  ' r  • a  ' A  / * ’  y / r ,  y . A  .  • . ' . / A  1 * y  A -  y * £ . A "  a /  a  a
knowledge, either, (a) intended to kill P, because any specialist would; y y  
know that the rifle shot would kill a person under those conditions, or y  A
(b), D^ was negligent only, arguing that because of his knowledge and
belief he would not have wanted to kill P, nor would he have wanted to ;yy\ A 
be reckless with regard to possible consequences ? " .A 7 A y  AyA ;;: • 7.AAy A 
7 What is missing in the use of ’know* . ( ie. , ’intends’, ’pur- • • &%}
pose’, ’no substantial doubt’, ’foresees’ ) is a failure to make the A  i
old distinction between knowledge by description and knowledge by ac- \
quaintance; or, to employ a terra used by Jacques Maritain to depict /
. ' = ■ -A 7 ••' : % A- 7 y, v ,7- :'/■ 45 7, A‘7 .yy A. ‘•"■>07..-;-AA-artistic knowledge, ’knowledge by connaturality’ ,* knowledge in which A
the knower is Apoetically’ one with what he knows. The Greek, ’poesis *
means: to make , produce, create; and; in a second sense, to create, to;AyA
begets to bring into existence; thirdly,; to produce; lastly, to_ compose: 7 . 7
or to write.. ^ 7* What the verb, and its cognates, carries over is a
sense of personal attachment to, knowledgeable ability to do or cause. y,-;
46. Cf A , Creative Intuition in Aft and Poetry [ The A.W.Mellon Lectures : 
v in the Fine Arts National Gallery of Art, Washington ], by Jacques A •
Maritain (Bollingen Series XXXV*1), Pantheon Books, (N.Y., 1953),. A y  
y Chapter Four, "Creative Intuition and Poetic Knowledge", pp 106-145,;.
, 7; esp., pp 117-125, "Nature of Poetic Knowledge’.’ Also, cf.-, The A AA;A 
Range of Reason, by Jacques Maritain ( Scribners, 1952::N.Y. ), A
• Chapter 111. y A  V'* - 7.:/ ,• AA- A"' A- A--- 5 ;A A--'"A-yA'.A:''A Av
47. , ’POIEN’, col. 1, page 1291, A GREEK-ENGLISH LEXICON, Liddell; and A/ A 
- ; Scott ( Oxford: 1864 j. A
sao
One knows that not only may something be done, but one knows how pro­
perly to produce that something— — as a chef knows how to produce a de­
licate hollandaise sauce well. Knowledge in these instances indicates 
knpwledge of a personal kind.
The definition of 'intend' in the Working Paper (31) puts 
its full stress upon agent as predictor, whilst ’willingness', in the 
earlier report of the Law Commission on imputed, criminal intent (1967), 
put its stress upon that an agent would move himself to act, whether
death were caused by his actions or not, or even collateral to his V .,
, 7 ;. . - 7...: :7 ' * ■* -7 \ ;V7 ' -• •' : :7 43 •• -777/ : 7  7 ‘- v*' - 7 /7 .actions. D, who may be a criminal sociopath V, may have no doubt 
that his actions will cause certain (criminal) events, may have a sense 
of substantial certainty that the end will be achieved, and may even y 
foresee the consequences of his act, yet may not intend to do what he 
did because he was privately compelled, by an aspect of himself that v7 
he could not control or understand, to act. The earlier report (1967) : 
could deal with such a case because it would deduce that D did not 7. 
have a willingness to act, however clearly the consequences of his 
action ( as contemplated, or mentally beheld in his compulsive state ) 
were to him. If, however, 'intend’ is defined without any reference 
to any other possible cause, or relationships, and is defined only as 
a conceptual entity in and of itself ( without reference to how it,/;, y 
as an intention, was produced ), then, in a curious sense, a sociopath, : ; 
does intend, even though he cannot control what he intends. . 7/ 7 . ?
48. Cf., State v. White, 374 P.2d 942, 965 (Wash. 1962) . .\7:^-/vyy
/* . 7 ;
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• \ ; . .yyy. It '.is trivially tTue if we wish to argue that D, who does .
phi, and knows that he phi-s, may be guilty of a wrong by force of
statute, whether D intended to violate the statute of not. Allthaty
such reasoning reveals is that the State may, by its police powers,
or for sake of policy, proscribe certain acts. Strict liability
will permit defences, but they will be rigourous. Strict liability,
which is mandated by statute, says little to nothing about mens rea. y.;
It is, as I have suggested, an example of legislative power, and they y
use or expression of that inherent power may or may not be fair and
logical and coherent. , 11 has been my contention that strict liability
statutes are outside of the scope of this study, unless those statutes•;
reveal some peculiar or difficult dimension about mens rea and its i
relationship to compliance with the said statute. ... \) !, •
, Proposition seven ^* in an illustration and commentary iii-
eludes the ancient case. Beatty v. Gillbanks. (1882) 9 Q.B.D. 308, and
* For instance, take statutes which forbid one to expose his person.
The purpose of such a statute is to forbid lewdness, as defined by 
law. Such statutes are generally vague, ie. , one does; not know if yyy 
genital display is prohibited, or nakedness is forbidden (in what­
ever degree of disrobing D may be ). ; Case law is ambivalent on the . 
point. But One can construct a case in which D, because of a fire >  
in his heater, is forced to flee unrobed. Has D violated, the statute ? 
Stricly, he has; but the defence of necessity applies. One can multi-: 
ply the examples, ie., the milkman who is forced to deliver milk as 
if nothing had happened, while, in fact, he is being robbed. The milk'. ' 
he delivers is adulterated ( ie, the robber forced D to -turn offytheJ• i 
refrigeration unit ) .“ Has D violated the statute which prohibits the; 
sale of adulterated milk ? yy r.: :--yV;;Vy-.‘V- ; h  . V . v yV--y^
49. THE LAW COMMISSION, Working .Paper 31, (1970) page 35. 'y\ ' " : yy'y:}
y  y  . law/ ft presents the Simple distinction between one intending the con- \ : 7
. ; sequences of his own acts ( active sense ). and one engaging in a situa- k
;■ tion in which one is likely to cause a disturbance but not intend it. . /
In the case the Salvation Army had staged a march through an area (the/"
./ streets of Weston-super-Mare) in which their presence would provoke -/;s7 7 ;.;7 . 7 7
■; 7.. \j. rioters. The march occurred;:the riot occurred, but he Court of Queen's 7 7 :7 :
. '7 7 . /-•7. ; 'Bench,' Field, J., held: 7  .V * 7  * ’7 '; 77 .yy •''' ; ■" 7 7 . , : 7 7 7 :>^ ':'" 7-‘-7 y 7 7 7
77'. 7 7; 7 - . .7;/'/':; 777: "Now I entirely concede that every one must be ■'.f7 -7;>
, - .7 / taken to intend the natural consequences of his own acts,: 7 7 777 0-7
7 :7 /7 .' ; /•■• - 7. 77; and it is clear to,me that if this disturbance of the peace7 .; 7 7 7  7 7  
- . 7 was the natural consequence of acts of the appellants they / 7 7  7 7 7  7//
7 . 7 would be liable, and the justices would have been/right in . 7 7
; 7  V7 7;:;/:binding-7them bVer.7 /Bbtyth'e' Evidence set forth in the case ; X
7 - 7 c 7 y does not support this contention; on the contrary, it shews 7 7 .-7 . 7 7 7
7’' :-7 .:/v777.y. that the disturbances were caused by other peole anta- y
7‘.7',-.._ gonistic to the appellants..." '• '*
7 - 7* : 7 If,however,(as had happened in London in 1979 and 1980) the organisation 7 77
V had been refused a permit to march because the area through which the '
■ 7 . organisation proposed to march was an area in which a riot were likely, 7 7 7 /7 ;'
77 then the same facts would have yielded a different conclusion; /In'';- 7 7 ; 7 ’ . ;7
•; 77 i : 7 Beatty, the marchers were peaceful, and had not violated any law which 7
7 -7 would have forbade their marching. This case will, however, permit ’
7 a further analysis. It is this. One may very well 'intend' to cailise
others to attack one, but such an intentional act is not proscribed by 7/ 77::
:7 ; . 7 ? 7The conditions which existed in England throughout the late 7;
only serve to show that the police may deem it wise to require a permit 7, 
7 to march. The National Front, a politcal organisation accused of ex-
7 .7 ’ treme right wing and racist tendencies , carried but various marches to . 7 711
7 7 7  7 protest against Jews, and against African and Indian immigration into 7:;77
the United Kingdom. In certain areas where the National Front carried 7 7  
y/,. out its demonstrations, riots did occur, and lives were lost. The police, 7
7 ;*" J 7 in order to prevent riots, wbuld, in some.cities, not issde a permit tb7 7 7 7  
•. march; therefore, to march without a police permit would be a legal violation -/
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law; therefore, one's intentional'act does not come within the legal : 
domain. <* y  ., <)/ V; Tiyyd.Vyi: V* y V" '-.y. *
y The section on 1knowledge' ( footnote 45, supra j admits of
differentiations. If evidence is adduced which shows that D knew he 
had committed a criminal wrong, then the conclusion is obvious. The 
examples given in the Working Paper 31 (1970), at page 37, take that 
of explosives. In (a) D possessed a package for a long time which he : 
did not know to be an explosive; not guilty. In (b) he receives a ;V: 
package from a third party. If the first alternative is permitted,
D is guilty of an offence if he knows that he received explosives; if’ -y;
the; second alternative is adopted, ..knows they probably exist...", 
the Commission holds that he would also be guilty. But one would have 
to remark that the difference (if it is to obtain, otherwise there 
is no. need for the alternative propositions given in 7.A. (3) ) is. 
a matter of degree. What 'degree' of certitude must obtain for D to 
claim that 'x' probably exists, as opposed to, D has not substantial 
doubt that 'xf exists ? The latter case seems to be a definition which 
strongly favours the Crown because it incorporates the first alternative 
of! ". ..no substantial doubt...'! The first position excludes an appeal : Ty 
to the balance of probabilities, and makes the mind of the defendant 
needing to be possessed of certitude in order to convict, where the second 
position only requires some diminution of doubt in order to convict, ...y y
* If, however, P decided to sue in Tbrts for injuries he suffered, it
may be a defense available to the tortfeasor that the actions of P y y;
were a contribution in negligence to the harmwhich resulted, ie., y 
P knowingly assumed a risk from which harm most likely would ensue.
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Case (o) concerns suspicion of explosives only, and holds that D would - ; A
not be guilty unless ”... apt words [were] used in the legislation..." A
and either alternative would fit the example . A y .  - A  A ; A  A a  ? A A A y A A " y  
As to intention and knowledge, the Working Party put for­
ward two distinct views. One view favoured that consequences would be A A 
part of ,D' s intention, and thus the word ’purpose' Was wide enought o -A".;vAAA 
embrace that concept; the other view was that intention involved the \ A'
foresight of the probability of consequences, or the knowledge that 
such a probability could exist ( a rather fine distinction )Ay The
latter, perhaps, was to dispose of bomb cases where D only wished to A;- A A
achieve his purpose, at the same hoping that no one would be hurt ( or A A} 
that all would act upon D’s warning, and thus the third parties would A: y  •;
expectedly act to preserve their own self-interests).: It is probable A A. A
to, foresee that some might not act accordingly, and thus; the. pbssibility Ay 
of harmful consequences is not remote. The Working Party favoured the ;
definition of knowledge which was enunciated by the Court of Appeal in A ^ Ay 
R. v. Woods [1969] 1 Q;B. 447, a Theft Act case in Which D was charged /Ay^Ay- 
under section 22 of the Act for handling stolen goods knowing or believing A- 
them to be stolen. y '-A; -A-A . A/. A A y  " ' AvAy" A,“A 'A.-A A
; A The Second formulation, 7.A. (1) (b), involves the foreseeing AAAyA:.. 
of probable results to constitute an intention. The Working Party wanted
to avoid cases of the kind of Warner v. Commissioner of Police for the
Metropolis [1968] 2 All E.R. 356 ( D unknowingly drives onto and remains A A 
on a police officer’s toe ) when D might,deliberately shut his eyes toA .7 ;;
a possible harm. The ’probable test' entailed that D took efforts to ; y
know of the likelihood, of the risk or danger, : A A : At A.
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In its commentary upon the category of recklessness the
Commission developed a degrees of knowledge approach to the con- .A A.
y y y - y  - ;  *;y  * ;  y .. - y  ■ y y ' / : ' y y  * . y y  : y y ~ y  y y  y i m -  y  y  : y - ' y y - y y :cept, but was careful to note, in its extended commentary * , that . V y y - C
should D turn a blind eye to that state of affairs from which he 
would gain knowledge of the seriousness of his risk, recklessly , ;y■:%;
ness could be imputed to D. The Commission added, "We all share 
the view of Devlin J;, [Roper v. Taylor's Central Garage (Exeter)
[1951] 2 T;L.R. 284, 289] that, in principle, constructive knowledge y ‘y 
has no place in the criminal law." ' The four illustrations which 
accompany the text on 'recklessness' are modestly helpful, but not 
conclusively so. The first illustration, (a), Concludes that
D is not reckless when he implants jagged broken glass into hi is fence - y 
to impede trespassers. We cannot see how this differs much from put­
ting spring guns in a garden, also with the intent to stop trespassers.
It will; be recalled that the illustration to accompany Proposition y
i* yy ' y-y;. '• - ■ * : ,f " y-.y; yyy : '.*'y. ■ y. y/ -.y. '53''7.A. (1) (a) and (b^ ) and (b^), forbade the spring gun for this reason:
y  T y  . i "(b) The defendant set a spring gun in his woods,
, - . where he knew that trespassers might pass. Apart yy;
from being guilty of the specific offence relating to y ‘ :
spring guns; [s.31, Offences against the Person Act, ' /  - 
' I  y y  1861], he is guilty of intentionally killing if a y : y •■' trespasser is killed by the gun." \ft ' ,;-'.y v - /. y  • y y y y A
It is difficult to separate out What degree of difference exists for .
that example, used to illustrate * intention ’, from the j agged glass: y.yy'y'-'
example ? ^ The jagged glass adds the palliative that D is not guilty
of recklessness, "...if the step he has taken is reasonable for the : 'y
50. 0£....cit.y page 47, "Further commentary on Proposition 7.A (3)." ; V y•
51. Ibid. ; ; y52. Op. Cit., page 49. 53.. Op. cit., page 55,A - A ,  '■ ; y - v y y !  A y  ■'y y "  . ’y y ..y'y y  y A y V A  y  rT3rrEmON"yy • y :
A protection of his property.” which is rather much a circular A /"AV
A": y  argument. A 1 [Rjeasonable*, under set of circumstances ? If tho /.A/A Ay /Ay/'
Ay, 7 7 spring gun or the jagged glass fence do equal harm, ie., kill a 7 y ■ A/y A/;
7 A victim, was one; weapon less or more harmful than the other ?7 7 7 ?,AA A
7 A y AThe second example, (b), is the standard surgeon example : A-A i
A, A ; There is a risk, but D evaluates it, takes it, but V dies . Surgeon7 A A y ;7/7y
A; - , hot guilty becaue he did not tike an unreasonable risk.7 Again, A':AA'ATvA
a tautologous proposition. Vp' is not harmful if fp ’ is not harm- 7
'-.7' ful. But the example pan be altered. D plains to operate, and Ar A 
. v> A 7 tells the patient there are three possible Consequences, one of 7^ 7^
A-Ay A: ;• - which is slightly risky, but unlikely. D operates, but a fourth A  7/7
/ . consequence ensues; patient dies. Expert knowledge is the category 7 /A A A;A
7 to which one must appeal for (1), D may not have known that a fourth A AJy: 
consequence was possible or (2) , D may have been culpably, ig- 7 / A A y 
. . norant of the fourth category as a probable outcome. What the (b) .7 AAA ,A ;
7 illustration seems to tell us is that a risk, in an -of Itself,'. is‘-:A / A  "  : ' A "
77 7 ; not a sign of D1 s being recklness or not. One could argue that the - A  A* :-7
77 7 7 illustrations are incomplete. - 'y,
■ y  y. A' A-A.y In (cj we are given the Russian roulette example'. -' The A / 7AAA 7V'- A/A
7/ example says of a death caused by a jesting D, " If, however, the
- ' . 1 defendant thought it impossible that the weapon would fire he is not syyAY'AA
7 guilty of recklessness, as he would not have known of the risk.” j T
, ,::‘7 7. v 54. Qp;, cit., page 49. 55. Cf., Roe v. Minister of Health, C.A.y A ’7
;A7'-A.A-.;; A / A t ^ A a A A A / . A  A/1.A AAA y [1954]; 2 Q.B. 66; [1954] 2 All E-R- YSIAA
A:7 7 A 56. But we saw that, The State v. Hardie, Supreme Court of Iowa (1878)/ Vv Av
7A :\77- ' * A 777 -7 , 10 Runnel Is 647, plainly: rejected this test, ie., the sport; itself 7 A. A/’ 
y - 7 : 77 A was a ’^reckless sport, and they should be held liable for the conse^ vVAvA;';
A'"/'A A7A' ' quences of their acts.” ;/ A/' '•< A'-.y/AVy'A. / A  -rAAA^AAAT
y  v ’ 7A' A;':: ’/ A  y -  y > ,;.S06 ■ • A / ' A a  J : y>A r
V  • 7 ?
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The final example, (d), is of the motorist who pulls out on a 7
blind stop and causes an automobile fatality. Sy* D is guilty / ■
if he appreciated the risk. /But the solution to the problem is 
an intuitive solution which appeals to a notion of the probable.
One is unclear if 'probable* signifies 'common knowledge/that 'x* 
might occur ', or if 'probable ' means that any person would know •..7.7
what must be done under the circumstances two distinct and dif-7 7
ferent meanings of 'probable'. In an additional commentary the v/y : 
Commission relies upon Ross v. Moss [1965] 2 Q.B. 396, tb fortify 
their position that if D should take a blind eye to knowledge which ;
he possesses, "..-.it will be for the court on the rei event evidence 1
to draw the inference that the person in fact knew of the circumstances." - 
Nelson's blind eye is as good as his good eye. ' 7 ! 7 7 77.-V/
There is something unsatisfactory about these positions / 7
taken with regard to 'recklessness', either by the majority position . 77y
777'-' ■ '-■■■'■ :v y .7 r- •'.• •'■••- •. •. eg • . y -y -y ■ r.  ^ w y 77 - 77'or the minority position of the Commission. ’ The problem seems to b e y /
57. A recent case on the matter would find D guilty, willy-nilly. Cf., .7/ 
Worsfold v. Howe [1980] 1 All. EiR. 1028. 7
58. It will be remembered that the Commission put forward two distinct
Views regarding 'intention and knowledge'.It said, "The first [defini­
tion] of these equates intention as to consequences or knowledge of cir­
cumstances with states of mind in which the defendant has no substantial 
doubt that the consequences will result or that the circumstances exists.
The second equates them with foresight of the probability of consequences y
or knowledge of the probable existence of circumstances." from, "INTENTION Z ■
AND KNOWLEDGE: Commentary",page 39. I have carried over those distinctions 7
for 'recklessness1, since recklessness involves some appreciation and some y
deficiency of knowledge. ".7.[T]he majority would wish clearly to distin^ 7 
guish intention and knowledge from recklessness and to keep the two former 7/ 
concepts as near to their ordinary meaning as possible." (para. 5, page 43,7/ 
Idem.) The minority view favoured a probability test for foresight of 
consequences, , "...[A]n alleged handler of stolen goods should be convicted 
if his state of mind, having regard to all the circumstances, is found to be . 
that, when he handled the goods, he thought that they were probably stolen. 7/
; 1 appreciate with regard to the risk, and what must be the state of the "A
: T; A ’; v; objective conditions which he must appreciate. The commentary on '/A
y A -- .A A J. A • • 59 • xA . /• v y •:; A y -  y V AyA a- y Ay Ay AA y
■ : ’recklessness* ‘ tells us simply, : . A • .. A A A ’ A c  • A.-A; A A A A
y A ; MThe definition of recklessness regarding both y
■ ■yy . -yAv A A  events and circumstances imposes a double test A The / ' y  yyyyy 
V ’A  A first question is whether the defendant realized that cy- AX-AAA
. ; \ he was running the risk. The second element is whether, . I >/A
1 .y'cA'AXy .■ A-y y having such knowledge, it was unreasonable for him to 'AyAAAyjA 
yy ■ ; : A ’AA ; take the risk. We have thus endeavoured to give effect’ y AA'A-Xy
y y ‘ to the common- sens e view that the defendant who appre- A  A A "  ;
yyy.y-y.y-- y ciates the existence of risks but conducts himself yy A A :y 
yA;y>,yyyAX A  ’regardless' is reckless.” AAXi A/AA:'A''A '/A. -A; yA AAA- ;XA Ayy
A y There seems to an element within this category of 'ought' , a pru-AA ; yy-X
fyiy.y A/dential ought that D, in the circumstances, ought not only to have / A A / A A  
-A : . . done other than what he did ( or omitted to do ) but also that D him-V. A-A
v.y A self should have perceived what was the correct course of action, and :AA;
A  A __ did not act knowledgeably. Unless one is arguing from a simple legal?A ;Ax
model of liability as defined ( the. traffic speeding example ), one ;• A
y 'V A- AXyyy\58y-Cbntv, >y ; • ./-•■/** '• A ;'A;A*'A..: A. ;A A -y - -; y"; * £  A 7A  ;y_ vAA i-J Ay
"This, they argue [as the minority], is not by any means the same • Ay
. ; thing as saying that the accused could be convicted if he thought that A A A
y A v A  t^e goods might be stolen. In these circumstances, he has been no more 'AA*
* than reckless, and the present law does not punish reckless handling of \X
stolen property. The minority also see practical difficulties arising Ay -A 
, A  from the words "no substantial dout" which the majority prefer. What ia
a "substantial doubt ?" How are juries to be directed. ?" ( para. ■ 7, A  AA-A •:' •.;Av page 4 5 , Idem.) ' AA. y A ' X y . A 'xXX A' a A  A. A  X X  A A y  -AA.':y y y :
59. Commentary, Working Paper 31, at page S3.
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then posits a complicated set of conditions to determine what is; 
meant by ’reckless*, especially when one wishes to make ’reckless1 a 7)7 
separate category of legal behaviour. Although the Cbmmission
disavows constructive attribution of a crime to D, it would seem that 
the definition posed of ’recklessness* asks that a jury ( or judge ) 7
disregard the state to intention and to knowledge, and substitute 
for what D appreciated, its own appreciation of a state of affairs, 
and then to attribute that appreciate to D. The definition is further .7  
fraught with practical difficulties. It says that D must ’know' that / 
he is taking a 'risk' when he acts. But if D takes the risk, then 
it means that that he has acted intentionally with;regard to a risk. 7 
Ah intentional object of his behaviour to tb produce behaviour which 
courts danger, is a harmful risk. By compressing the elements of 7 :v 
(a) and (b)-in the definition of 'recklessness', is not what was 
stated little more than that to be reckless means that one intentionally 
produces an unlawful harm ? Section B(b),'recklessness', begs the
60 . " ,..[W]e are conscious of the fact that a concept of recklesis- 77
. ness sometimes figures in the present law in contexts which it -‘7:
has a special meaning distinct from that provided in our defini- 77
tion, which is merely aimed at following the traditional common
law. Recklessness is sometimes given a special meaning in offences 
such as manslaughter [ Andrews v. D.P.P. [19371 A.C. 5761 and reck- 
7 less driving [ss. 1 § 2, Road Traffic Act 1960], where the term
is most nearly equated with "gross negligence" or with what has 77 
T been described as "an attitude of mental indifference to obvious -7/7;
7 risks"...."We think that it is necessary to make clear that rbck- 7  7)
> . lessness does not merely mean negligence, even gross negligence. ;7
Recklessness in deception offences seems, in most existing laws, >; 7
: to require foresight of risk. [...(A)n exception in the Prevention 
of Fraud (Investments) Act 1958, s. 13, by which false statements 7 
made knowingly or recklessly though not necessarily dishonestly are 
7 made punishable in certain circumstances. We do not regard this as 7 
a satisfactory use of the word ’’recklessly" in a wider context. See 
...the Protection of Depositors Act 1963, s.l.]" pp 55-57, Commentary, 
para. (4) , , : y7 ; y. ,' 7  / .7 ■ -V 1
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question when it then concludes that D is unreasonable to act in 
light of the risk he knew; B(a) had already answered the matter, 
unless one wishes to argue that there is an objective element in 
the concept of ’risk' which even D himself did not comprehend. If 
that is the case, D is to be punished for an objective element he 
could not comprehend. Example. D intends to phi. ’Phi' is to 
drive his care very fast doWn the roadway. He considers what he 
wants to do, then sets out to do it, and knows that it is risky.
He drives his car fast; however, unknown to him the road is no longer 
a public roadway; therefore, no dangerous risk.
But it will be observed that to define D's conduct, one 
has defined what D may do by use of intentional predicates. But 
recklessness, as the Commission depicts it, is other than 'intention* 
or 'knowledge*. If it is argued that to be reckless do not mean a 
positive statement, "D intends to cause this harm'1, or that it does 
not mean a negative statement, "an attitude of mental indifference 
to obvious risks." then it must be defined in terms of a sub­
set of intention, namely: "D primarily intends to phi, but in order 
to phi he may also, but not necessarily, have to psy [ and ’psy1 is 
a risk which may result in unlawful harm ]." At this point, however, 
'recklessness1 is transformed into a sub-category of intentional ob­
jects: namely, objects which may or may not be achieved, and which are
61. Working PapeT 31, Commentary, para-(4), page 55.
. , -• *.;
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collateral objectives to a primary objective. But is this little 'A■./■"’A y " /
more, also, than to say thiat D has a ’willingness1 to produce a/ AA/
harm, whether or not the harm is actually produced ? Blit further, ; v y 7/ 7 v
if a willingness to produce a harm, does this not mean that the harm ';y:,AA
must be defined by law, and that in the absence of a defined arid pro- y/AAy.
scribed category, ’reckless* or ’recklessness’ is a vapid 'category;.?; 7 y,-AA;A
Is D reckless with regard to his intent to kill V,’if,; 'during the-A- 7 ;
course of the attempt he steps on V ’s flowers in the garden ? 70iyis7/A-AA//:
D reckless if, with veiy limited legal knowledge, he accepts a case A /"Ay/
destined for the House of Lords ? The difficulty which the term pre- ;
sents is to grasp what it means, and then how to judge if it applies. : ?
When the whole impedimenta of conceptual calculation is brought along
to define the term, it seems that an objective category is being es-7 ..Aa AA
tablished, the which D did not, or could not, perceive. This would
satisfy the non-intentional aspect of the definition of ’recklessness1..
But if D cannot perceive that his conduct courts a risk, then is that
not to say that D perceives hiis conduct to be without risk, or without 7 7
dangerous risk ? For instance, is a child ’reckless* when, in doing A "
’x’, he does so because he does not possess the knowledge to inform A
himself that ’xf ought not to be done ? A A A A A A 7
y A  In the close of the paper the Commission addressed: the issue 7
of ’mistake’ in its relation to mental element in crime. It stated:* A
A,A A .[I]f intention, knowledge or recklessness is . y
lacking in relation to some or all of the external ele- :yA "  A/A7 // 
7 , y  ] ments of any offence which requires al mental element, , 7
62. Working Paper 31, THE PLACE OF MISTAKE IN RELATION TO THE MENTAL ELEMKNT:
.AA para (1), page 63. , "A : *'y ’• A-."' A--•'' • 7’--.* "A ;''■ A ’"A A A AA-/A
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V y "the defendant should, in principle, escape ; v . -
culpability.”-.;. 7 7 ’y 7y . 7 .  7 7 / 7 7y • 777 " • 7-. 7 7 7  7';;‘7.-777
Since the theory of criminal law espoused by the Commission was 7 7
a fault theory, if a defendant be not at fault, then guilt ought : 7 7 y
not to be imposed. 3* Whether to excuse a mistake ought to be ,
’honest1 or ’reasonable ’ , the Commission opted for 'honest', in- 7
corporating the spirit provided by ss 2(1) arid 21(1) of the Theft •'- / 7yV7-: 
Act 1968. No elaboration is given for why Treasonable' as a cate­
gory is rejected, nor is much stated as to what constitutes a mis­
take. A brief sentence, by way of example, states: "...he is mis--’ 7 7 7 7/ V 
taken as to the existence or non-existence of a material circumstance/", y* 
elliptical, at best. .. 7 ' : ’77 ■ • .7 ■ .7. yV, 7-'"- yy/. _ .7y.7-"/ 7;7/7.y
7 • , To the second kind of mistake, a mistake of factj the Com­
mission in part refers to R. v. Levett (1638) Cro. Car. 538, and  ^ ,7;
likens its own example to Levett. The Commission wrote, * y )
. 7  »?. 7  .  [D]efendant would have had a der .• y . 7
fence if the victim had actually been B, as where 7 ; 7 7 7/
7 y B  is seeking to take the defendant's life and he 7 7  y, 7 ) 7 \ 777/7 
7 7: would have been acting in lawful self-defence if he 7 7
had fired at B. Here, the mistake of identity forms ." y7 /’7
* part of the defence. Nor, in fact, need there be a
mistake of identity. If the defendant shoots A, as he .
believes, in self-defence because he thinks that A is v
7 going to kill him, it does not matter that A'has no.y ./•;y"7 77 •' 77/
7 7 such intention and there is no B who has ... . Levett was ) : /:7C
•• - 7^ : -very like' this#*'! 7 •_ y,7;//y /• 7 y y ‘ •-. • . 7/ 7'"'7/y7"7 ■ 7y77yy
63. Cf., "Fault, Threat and The Predicates of Criminal Liability" by / 7 7 7  
Graham Strong (1980) 441 Wisconsin Law Review for a criticism of the ;; 
fault model in its reliance upon knowledge and volition. . 7.- ///"•'
*N0TE: These two sections of the Theft Act 1968 are themselves complex, 7  
arid are not self-explanatory as to What ’mistake’ may mean./ • ;y 7 77
64. Working Paper 31, "The Place of Mistake in relation to the Mental
Element", para (1), page 63. 7  7 /  7. - 7  ;• 7  ' • ) ' w’ : :‘ y7. . :V;?7 7 " ’' ; . / 7 v y y 7 s § 7 ; '
'65. Ibid., page 65. .7 / . ■ .■/.'■ / ■ :7 7 . r  • /./-: y :y
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y A  A  X f The Commission had responded to the consideration that-;.no-'xeationalAycr-XAA:-
A.. legal system could possibly permit the defence that D had shot the 1
A  wrong victim, whereupon it stated that Levett was an exception to : X;
A  .. .. X that broad statement. . , .
: . It may be wise to set down the report of Levett for the ; ... ;X A
: A- reason that it is a case within a case, and the facts are mildlyA ' ; ‘ y.y
XX * y confusing. The report Occurs in Croke’s Reports, the third part ,
V ;>A • Ah « A  A  as reference made within Cooks Case Ayv In Cooks Case, Cook /had: y Ay A  Ay
AXAX ••••.AX shot one Marshall, who was a bailiff Who was serving writs, Capias . ..
ad; satisfaciend. [ie., a Writ for the recovery of debt], on Cook. The A h  1
. bailiff had hidden on Cook’s property, hoping to serve him when Cook .. XyxAA
entered. But the bailiff, in order to serve Cook, actually broke in- A A ;
X /. to Cook's home, breaking a window to enter. Cook told the bailiff and A  A 4
his assistants to leave; they did not; Copk thereupon discharged his •
/ y musket, the bailiff dying shortly thereafter. The Court found, be- ;
X - A. / : cause of the technicality of the breaking and eneteririg of the bailiff, ; A  A
:■ A  x that Cook did not murder the bailiff, but committed manslaughter: X X y ‘'AXv/;y
; X . X/ . "Vet they all held , That is was Manslaugher: for
AX; ; VAX A  he [Cook] might have resisted him [Marshall] without A, AX A  A
XAA AX X. . A killing him; And when he saw him and shot voluntarily
Xa v: Xa *"'.' / X X  ■ ' A X : A .  at him, it was Mans 1 aughter.''
’■ • • , At the close of the report, the Court said of Cooks case: . A_ X A AA
•X, • Ay •' • / ’■ . A . X "But here they held cleerly; That it is homicide,.. ;: •.
A '■ a  A; A : A*. XXyA because he [Cook] seeing and knowing him [Marshall] , / : A A a A A  '
A  A  AAA.-’ •’; "• A shot at him yoluntarily, and slew him; whereupon they >;
A A A  xXxX‘AX Ay-. ; all resolved, It was not murder, but homicide only." . XAA A, A
AV a  . 66. The Third Part of the REPORTS of Sr, George Croke Kt.,...[LONDON,
X 1661] , collected by Sir Harbottle Grimston Baronet, Master of t h e A v  'V.AX
y ; " Ay AA'* -/ ■" '■ A  Rolls. , A
' :y /XX . 67. Cooks Case, Termino Paschae, ar.no decimo quinto Carol! Regis, pp : Av.
yy ,X A ; ’. 3-7“ 239, of Croke'is Reports (supra, note 66.)- XA'A V X . • . ■ ; XXXy-.Ay
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. :. 77 Levett\s case is cited by way of contract to Cook’s case.
The full report/reads: ,: A/':/ 7, .//• v .7 7 7 -. 7/ \>Y :.;\7 ,7 A  / • 7/7 V//A7 7 :///
/7AA77'A 7,7'.;. 7 _ .7'7 "But JONES (J.) said, That it was 7 • ''"7 77V // , A y
•7" resolved by the .chief Justice, and himself, arid the . 7 '. V'' 7 7'/A- ’A y  
. -v Recorder of London, at the last Sessions at New-gate, -'AA, i . 7  ;77.yA. '/
in the case of one William Levet. who was eridicted 7 7/ ;
pf the homicide of a woman called Frances Freeman. /y '•‘M
.. A- 7 where it was found by/ special! Verdict, That' the said .• •' .• //'A.- 77; 7 .'
. 7 Levett and his wife being in the night in bed and a- 7 A A
sleep, one Martha Stapleton, their Servant/ .having pro- A A /
cured the said Frances Freeman to help her about her 7,, 7 /y/Af
house-businesse, about twelve of the clock at night A 7
going to the dores to let out the said Francis Free* 7A 7
man, conceived she heart theeves at the dore offering ; A7- 7,
to break them open; whereupon she, in fear, ran to ;her/•.■.7.1 A 7/;/A/"/ 
. Master and Mistrisse, and informed them she was in doubt, .A - 7\ 7 :'
7 . . that theeves were breaking open the house dore. Upon A - 7 7
that he arose sodalnly, and fetched a drawn Rapier. / 7 : / :
: .. And the said Martha Stapleton, least her Master/and \ 77/
Mistresse should see the said Frances Freeman. hid 7/ ; ;
her in the Buttry. : And the said Levett and Hellen his v'--.;-v7.7
7 wife, comming down, he with his sword searched the entry 7 A
7 for the Theeves; And she, the said Hellen, espying iri the A 77; 7 / ;
Buttry the said Frances Freeman, whom she knew not, con- 7 ; A "  7
yy. ceiving she" had .‘been a thief, crying to her husband .in .A, A777/A'7//v;
. great fear, said unto him, Here they be that would undoe 7 - 7 7
us. Thereupon the said William Levett.not knowing the • .
7 ; said Frances to be there in the Buttry , hastily entred A . A .7 /7y y
therein with his drawn Rapier, and being in the dark and' 'v:A/';' /A-A//-' 
thrusting with his Rapier before him, thrust the said Frances 7 A/A-/
7 xinder the left breast, giving unto her a mortal 1 would, where- 7
/ of she instantly died: Arid whether it were felony, they 7 ' 7
A / :  prayed the discretion of the Court. And it - was resolved,*; -7 A-//; A'/y
A 7 That it was not felony; for he did it ignorantly without y.-AA/AjAy"
A  : intention to hurt the said Frances:...” 7  : v/ A A
The importance of the case/ we would urge, is not that it confirms 7? A 7 7A A
’mistake'; rather, that it arrives at; its verdict by appeal to an 7 7 7/ A  7/ 7
act done through ignorance, buttressing that position by appeal to -7:77A '"/y//
a third party who gave information gained in fear. Because- Levett*s / v7 f /Aj
68. Levett’s case (1638) Cro. Car. 558. ' A/ • : 'A • 7. /)' 7 A/ • 7 ;/1 /SyAyA/A
/ I:,*4 VAy { }./ i
■ M
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judgement was formed in and through ignorance, which ignorance 
was neither a fault on his part, nor deliberately of his own ;7777^77 
making, the court resolved that D could not have formed an in­
tent to kill; and, by reference to Cook Vs Case , Levett's action i, 7" . .
would have been noni»voluntary, ie., a mixed action in which there 
were to be found both voluntary and involuntary elements. it 
might further have been argued that it was an action done out of 7 \
fear, as well because of ignorance, which together would lend to ; ; / )
an Aristotelian interpretation that the action of Levett was mixed: 7; 
(possessed both of the voluntary and involuntary). Given this in- )7 7 7  
terpretation of the case, the Law Commission appears to have left 
unstated major portions of what may have been needed to make a co­
herent theory of what.’mistake' meant. Levett *s case draws upon 7777/7 
the causes of the action by D, as well as to incorporate a traditional 
appeal to the concept of Ignorance as a category which may excuse an 7 
otherwise blameworthy action. The Commission, on the contrary, appeals 
to a conclusion, ie., 'mistake' as a fait accompli, without investigating 
the premises which produce the conclusion. It may be— said only in ' '-7/ 
passing, and not as conclusive evidence— -that had the Commission in­
vestigated the premisses they may have discovered that a statement about 7 
the nature of volition would have been required to explain how a mistake 
can be produced which will justify exculpation. The Commission, how- ' . .
ever, tended more to cognitive statements about intention, and less to 
volitive statements about the causes of intentional action. It was a \ ; 
a difference in emphasis. Levett was less a mistake of fact than more
,  - v r l
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an involuntary act caused by ignorance. 1 - X : A
i The Law Commission for Working Paper .31 had given, one
may say, the skeletal elements ( or a bare logical form ) to the
use of key terms in criminal law: namely, 'intention1, 'knowledge', 
’recklessness', and 'negligence'. It had applied its definitions, 
to how those terms ought to relate to statutory offences, but not 
exclusively so, drawing as it did upon common law examples. The A 
tone of the said Paper was definitional, not philosophical nor ana- , 
lytical. Other papers would follow, from other Commissions.A A 
X The first report of the Law Reform Commissioner -Mel-/..'A 
bourne,;.. 1974, concerned the law of murder . The questions posed in ; 
this first report were of the nature of philosophical questions about 
criminal law, and the report itself, though brief, reads more like a 
series of reflective proposals than as a series of bare definitions
solely. The Commissioner had been asked to consider three questions,
A iA  70. xyV-xA • • • x A A A  A X x x a ~ • J ’a -' -.a X x ! A^-x x  A x x a / that he, yy. A X X  - •-••• y,- A-vX - . , . . A X X : V- ,;X, . - • • • / . ; y y, *
X X’- ”...enquire into and report upon the amendments of X ,xAA 
: . the law of murder which Would be necessary——
A x X (i) To introduce degrees of murder— or ; y :A -
X (ii) To classify murders as capital murders and non- X
: '/xXx- A' • .capital murders-— or AXXX V XXxAX /-"••AX' A ’. A -
X (iii) To reduce the width of the definition of murder."X
69. LAW REFORM COMMISSIONER, Report No. 1, LAW OF MURDER, August, 1974,
prepared by: T. W. Smith ( Law Reform Commissioner ), 155 Queen
Street, Melbourne, Victoria, Australia, 3000. ( Cited as: L.R.C.X
A  Report No. 1, 1974 ) y X -y AX' xA*X \ • "A, A A: X X  ;A ■ ~A• * ■'
70. L.R.C. Report No. 1, .1974, page 1. " AyX A-;XXa '1X
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The Victoria Commissioner saw the crime of murder in the " j
four following classes: *
. *” (a) Where he causes death intentionally. ,
” (b) Where he intentionally causes really serious 7'.
bodily harm (commonly referred to as grievous *
• bodily harm) and death results from that injury.
" (c) Where he causes death by an act of violence done
in the course of, or in furtherance of, a felony 
* involving violence.** . / . . , /V
11 (d) Where he causes death by an act of violence done
to a person whom he knows to be an officer of jus­
tice acting in the execution of his duty or a per­
son assisting him, and done with the object of pre­
venting lawful arrest or detention **, (or done to 
; a person known to be acting to suppress an affray
or apprehend a felon***). ”
The classes of (a) and (b) (supra) were considered to be intentionally
caused. Such the case, 'intentionally/ embraced not only the object
D aimed at, but even an unexpected and/or undesired result. To cause !
a death ’intentionally’, D must have the purpose to bring about the
death ( °r injury ), and D chooses an to act in such a manner in which
he realises or believes 1) that the result is certain, 2) or, ’’...more
likely than not to follow.”  ._____ _____________
71. L.R.C. Report No. 1, 1974, pp 2-3.
The case law referred to in the four situations is: . ; ■
*R. v. Jakac (1961) V.R. 367; Vallance v. The Queen 111 C.L.R.
56; R. v. Hallett (1969) S.A.S.R. 141, 153-5; R. v. Sergi (1974)
V.R. 1, 10; R. v Hyam (1974) 2 W.L.R. 607 (H.L.); R. v. Hyam 
(1973) 3 All E.R. 842 (C.A.) :
**Compare D.P.P. v. Beard, 1920 A.C. 479. :
*R. v. Ryan 6 Walker (1966); Stephen, Digest of Criminal Law, 5th 
edn., p. 183.
*** Archbold, 33rd edn. Sec. 1672; R. v. Scriva, No. 2 (1951) V.L.R.298
[NOTE: I have reproduced the citations as they appear in the Report which 
did not employ italics or underlining for case citations.]
7 As for classifying murder into degrees because of the inherent 7
heinousness of the act, the Commissioner found that such a classification 
was fraught with difficulties. A classification would be either too , 
broad, and include too many murders; or it would be too narrow, and in- ; 
elude too few. So also should the classification of murder into capi- vi­
tal and non-capital murders not be introduced. The Commission did, how­
ever, wish to consider if the ’artificial’ extensions of the law of .. 
murder ought to continue in the law of Victoria. Should murder mean ; : 7:; 
only a homicide in which the death was caused intentionally, or ought s; 
murder to include the concept of constructive malice aforethought , or 
implied malice aforethought ? !>•;>• \ 77>r;/y v " * " 1-' 7 7 '77 n :
The Commissioner cited two strong cases, the import of which -'77 
were to affirm the doctrine of intention in the law of criminal law, 7 
Sir Owen Dixon*, in Thomas v. The King, 59 C.L.R. 279 at 309, had said 
that the element of intention as"the most fundamental element in a 
rational and humane criminal code.” The second case, Morisette v. U.S7, 
250, had stated: s ,
'V'"- ' "7 7 77v ’’The contention that an injury can amount to a 7 : 7 /."/.g
7 crime only when influenced by intention is no provin-. . 7, 7 7. 7
7 ■ ' cial or transient notion. " It is as universal arid per- ^77 
7v sistent in mature systems of law as belief in freedom ... 7 7.
. 7 of the human will and a consequent ability and duty of 7" " ' "
77 ;, the normal individual to choose between good and evil.” . 7 7 7;
The Commissioner noted that Holmes, in The Common Law, made the ob-. /"re­
servation that ”even a dog distinguished between being stumbled over ■„ . 
and being kicked.”. The gist of the Commissioner's argument against 7 777 
the felony-murder rule was expressed by him in paragraph (40) of the
g v " :  ( 518 * : 7^
■Report X -  A* y X y y y ’ -X A X ; A A* -A‘. • : X A •; --A y . 'y ?A A y y X - * •x•"A*
. '; (i) [such a] tf.. .rule transforms into murders accidental .X A
'AxX> . deaths resulting from applications of force which 
XX y A A neither the offender, nor anyone else, would have
X V / supposed to carry the slightest danger to life. XX'
X A (ii) "That a tacit assumption is made that the community / .
X may properly impose the severest of punishments upon
a man for unintended and unforeseeable consequences 
of his acts, in order to deter others from the inten­
tional taking or endangering of life X'
The Commissioner felt that no social statistics re/ felony-murder
rule deaths commended the need for the rule, and also when such deaths
did occur, they occurred in spite of the rule, ie., out of the heat
of passion or distraction of the moment so that the existence of the
rule would not have deterred their happening in any case. Paragraph’
(50) of the said Report recommended that the felony-murder rule be
■.abolished. - A A ; ..X A X; AA’ A' A A/Ax x vr . x ■ ■ ' X:'-A: -A
The Report then turned to R. v. Hyam (1974) 2 W.L.R. 607.
■ X ' . ■ XX X- X . v- ■•■ > 'X i x  \ ' \ -  X ;XX; '’' - ' ' X' -A-  ■ . "IIt stated its view of the case to be: A  , . x ' ‘ •
• X A "(53) ".. .the House of Lords [. in Hyam ] [stated]... X
X : X that in law there are two bases upon which this third xXx
form of constructive murder rests. The intentional in­
fliction of grievous bodily harm (i.e., any really seri- A 
A A ous bodily injury ) is by statute a felony [Crimes Act
1958, Section 17.] . Hence, if death results, the case A 
A X is one of constructive murder under the felony-murder •
XX rule [ R. v. Hyam (1974) 2 W.L.R. 607 per Lord Diplock ; -•AJ:
X."- A ’a ^ pp., 629-630. ].  But secondly, and independently of ; : A;X:A
■A x this statutory basis, it is a rule oiF the common law
that, if death results from an intentional infliction of
72. L.R.C. Report No. I , 1974, pp. 12-13.
73. Op.: Cit., pp 15-16. y'X XXXx-:"VX A;
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7 ’ . v. , - "grievous bodily harm (as above defined) malice afore- . , , ‘ '•/
,7 thought is implied [See the majority decision in R. v. 7y: y A/AAA"/;
7V :■ :y 7 . Hyam.. .and R. v. Vickers (1957)';, 2 Q.B. 664]. The m a l i c e -3';
; 7 7 y. a fore though, in that case, is said to be "implied" rather 7/;/ ;
7 , 7 than "constructive", but the implication is made by the 7
,7/ Ayyyy-:. 7 - law and cannot be negatived by any evidence. Accordingly ;V 7 ; !
' ; 7 this category of murder, upon its second as well as its 7 7 -
: ; 7 first basis, is a form of constructive murder. As in / • A -'AAA./'A
7 ; 7 \ , - the cases of felony-murder and escape-murder no actual
; 7 . intention to kill is required. Death need not to be 7 AAA/A
7 shown to have been either an object aimed at-'-or a- resultAA-vyy/AyyA
A 7 v expected. And there need not even be a realisation' -that:7;' 7.7 y;7
A 7 so much as a mere risk or possibility of death is being
:y A ; - A y 7 created." ’• y y y ' ’y y  • y  AA- ■ " A A A  V ;7 y- AA - ^ y ’A A A y
*./. It was to the legal fictions (b), (c) and (d) [ supra, footnote 71.} 7 7AA
y/\ : ; that the Report was addressed, and it noted that save for category
v (a), the other three categories did not.;require an actual intention 77 yA A
A7 f to kill, nor even a realisation that death might occur. The Commissioner AA.:
“ A/A A- believed that the objection to constructive murder was that it subjected . 77
an offender to the severest of punishments from the criminal sanction A ;
. 7 for consequences of acts which the offender in no way intended.V^ltAy-V'/Ay7'Ay
/ / A can readily be seen that the object of the Report was to connect pun- y  Ay
\ 7/ ishment to an offence, and the 'link* would occur through intention, y y
’A whether or not the Report itself examined the concept of intention in A ’;
A, minute detail. In One sense the Report had returned-to a simpler notion AA/
. 77 .7 known to us from mediaeval writers: namely, that the consequences of -.A 7 7. 7*
7 ■ an act, if they are to be consequences for, which the offendermaybe7;../A'A7;A y
7 y severely punished, ought to be conseuqences which the offender intended, ;• ,
7, : 7 ; y y Coimnissioner,' in paragraph (56), also queried another AyAA^yy-yy
A . 7  category which, until then, seemed to stand as a self-justifying cate- 77 A
crnrv. mtirh a s  i € i t  w p r e  a l e a a l  -Fi r s t - n T i  r i r i n l  _ What rin#»s i t  m^an
to speak of ’’any really serious bodily injury" ? The Report stated:74,
' .V\,?* 7 ’’56.7.I These particular examp les pointto another 7. ggg;g;7g;v7' 
serious objection to this third category of constructive • : .‘7 7g 77 
murder, namely that under it/a person’s liability gto the g r" 7 7  
severest of penalities is made to depend on the meaning . gg g '-v 
attached by the jury to the expression "any really serious'; 7
bodily inury” an expression to which it is not possible 7
to attach a precise meaning.’’
The Report had, in paragraph (55), stated that medical science had re-7/3  
moved the seriousness from chance deaths from infected wounds one might 
have received in an affray, so it was purposeless to imply malice afore­
thought that from any such injury D must have intended to kill V. What 
the Report noted was that the category through and by which malice isg ; 7 
imputed is itself a variable and imprecise standard, and it found that 
other Commissions were unable to draft language precise enough to give > 7/ 
precise legal meaning to the concept so as tp make it workable in lawggg 7-g 
Even Hyam, when decided by the House of Lords, was ambiguous on the point, 
with its strongly divided set of opinions. The conclusion of the Victoria 
Report was that all forms of constructive murder ought to be abolished, 
y For purposes of legal reform, 1 intent ’ was therefore to -be' de.-7g77-
fined in the following ways in the Report : ;77-TVV- J+ 7/y -7' '7 /7:,y, /'7g77yg•
; V -777' ”1. (1) -7 Where a person kills another, the7; 7g 7 7777;
,7 /77.3-7 "'■■. 7 gvg. " 7 killing shall not amount to murder 7/,; 7-". /gy.-/g: v 7.. ,7 ; unless/done with an intent to kill.
y :\-. -'V 77 ;.y gy g " ;v' (2) A person has an "intent to kill", if, .
g 7 7 but only if, his purpose is to kill or ;
,7- . '' 77/7 7g777/--7 /-.ggy7 ' - he realises or believes that his actions ; **:) .
7 , '.7yy7'g:'7" ..7 ' - ate certain, or more than likely than not, 7. .7
; to kill.
74. Op. cit 7, page 16. .g , ' '
75* 0£. cit ., page 18, ;FORM OF AMENDMENT FOR IMPLEMENTING THE RECOMMENDED : 
g; REDUCTIONS IN TOE WIDTH OF THE DEFINITION OF MURDER. *
I _521 0
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' Ay A-A A  " (3) The "intent to kill" may- -re 1 ate .-.-to; A ” • y ’A '" ’• ••
. : v . the person in fact killed or to another, ; >Ay
A:A- A ; A : . and need not relate to any particular person.” A
The definition was simple and direct. Section (3) of the defintion A
disposed of the class a nd  its member ptoblem, ie.,D killing P when
intended to kill V. An "intent to kill" satisfied the requirement A
for criminal intention, and it was not extinguished if D, enter- A A.
taining an unlawful intention, killed the wrong victim. AA AAyxXx
It is interesting to note that the Commissioner did not re­
X". v v’ “. A  'A' x •. .. y ■ x x..- . . X-. X * A \  * ic .move from his more narrow definition of murder that of mercy killing: ‘
y A  "...mercy killing, in the sense of an intentional
killing the motive for which is to spare the victim a
, A continuance of severe suffering. 'In my View;..it would A ’ X
. b e  unwise to make such a change. To do so would be likely 
to increase the number of cases in which persons who, even 
under a system of legalized euthanasia, would not be given A 
authority to kill, would take upon themselves the respon- 
. A sibility for doing so. Moreover the motive for killing a 
A  A sufferer must often be predominantly to relieve the killer A
A . from a burden that he has come to find intolerable. And 
it would be undesirable to place temptation in the way of 
persons who carry such burdens, to kill for their own relief,
A a x  x and then to seek to evade full responsibility by asserting AxAA
X A I that their motive was to relive suffering. The fact that a ••-AA
person yielding to such a temptation would commonly be the^  -A;
X only person able to give an account of what occurred, and A A
of the motives for it, would render it difficult for the 
A ' X truth to emerge;” x.'"/-1 - : "X ■ AXX-XA
Apart from addressing the problem itself, the passage may be taken to
indicate that ’motive1 will not excuse a criminal intention. The
mention of motive may have reference to a passage from the report of; ;
The Royal Commission on Capital Punishment, 1949-1953,  ^ ’ which,
76. Op. cit., page 20. X X
77.ROYAL COMMISSION ON CAPITAL PUNISHMENT 1949-1953 REPORT (London,
H.M.S.O. , 1953 [1973], Cmd. 8932) . ; A
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at Paragraph 179, page 63 of the said Report, made the following. A
distinction between 'motive* and 'intention', an echo of which is
caught in the Victoria Report: A  A'. 7 y  7/; A v y A  y 7. •/; 7- A-.; • 7­
7 A ”179. /They [ ie. witnesses appearing to give A A 
evidence to the Royal Commission] thought it would 
y A  be most dangerous to provide that 7"mercy killings" A 'A-A y A
should not be murder, because it would be impossible A A y 7. 
. . 7 to define a category which could not be seriously y /
abused. Such a definition could only be in terms > A 
: of the motive of the offender , but both English and AA
>. Scottish law have always eschewed definitions in terms
of motive, which is notoriously difficult to establish . A“ 
7 .y\ and cannot, like intent, be inferred from a person's . ' A A Ay y ; 7 overt a c t i o n s [ I t a l i c s  ours] . y A 7A  yAy..A . y7 . . A
; 7 A, A7The view of the Law Reform Commissioner in his first re- A 
port was that intention should be interpreted in a strong sense, A y  
and in that regard he reflected the sentiments of the English A/7 A; 
report of The Law Commission (1967) on Imputed Criminal Intent. A 
The Victoria Report did not dwell at length on what would be ; A A 
complex juristic problems latent in the concept of 'intent' it­
self, but the Report did. affirm that 'intent' should be used in 
its simple and direct sense: namely, that to ascribe 'x' to D, y :: 
it ought to be demonstrated that D intended an:act and its con- - A''A 
sequences. Although no historical mention was made, one could 7 7 = 
demonstrate that versari in re illicita had once again entered 77 A  
the common law, even if it returned uninvited and unrecognised. 77 
The crime of manslaugher remained an offence caused without intention 
to cause death, because of provocation, because of recklessness in 
the discharge of a duty of care, because of excessive physical 
injury, because of a breach of criminal law which risked physical 
harm or appreciable risk of harm. A;. Ay y
AA y - v •
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: Other jurisdictions were interested in the reform of ’ A
their criminal law. Queensland had established a law coimnission :. ;
and one of its earlier projects had been to recommend the abolition
of the distinction between wilful murder and murder.A- A Under
their code of criminal law, wilful murder was: A
V , • " [s. 301 ]... a pers on who unlawfully kills another : X. Ay.
X; A . x intending to cause his death or that of x^ :
X. / some other person, is., guilty of wilful X,AXiXxX
. .• A v •,' Xy: X : ; Mnurder.", H . X \  /.A/Ay- ' XX X- ; 'yXxXAxy A A A  'Ay:;;''
while murder was described to be: . x A X A A: X / A
. ; "[s.302]i..a person who unlawfully kills another. X. ;if A
X : . A  the offender intends to do to the person '>yAyXy: 
XX; yAyyX' killed or to some other person some grievous
X . ••X' X'A/ - . x'; ;; v bodily harm.. .is guilty of murder.". X X , . A A ' ; A;
Wilful murder carried the death penalty, murder did not. The Com-
tX, ■ ; X. X ,* X ' y •: X. .X '■ ' :X ! :• A/ X’ X X- /. y.X • vx -i '■ 79 X'"- • r-;v .. X X. AX mission found this difficulty with the distinction; * :,.-AX;
/: ’ X ; "It happens not infrequently that a jury acquits : XX
of wilful murder and convicts of murder in a case in r X
which the evidence points overwhelmingly to wilful mur- x 
A der....Because the accused has been acquitted of wilful
. X ‘ murder he cannot be tried again for that offence; on the AX
,X X second trial therefore he is tried for murder, that is,X y
X, for an unlawful killing in which intention was not to cause
. death, but to cause grievous bodily harm. But the evidence
x A upon the second trial remains the same as that upon the A
78. Report of the Queensland Law Reform Commission (Q.L.R.C.2. ,on A 
"Abolition of the Distinction between Wilful Murder and Murder",X
. The Hon. Mr. Justice, W.B.Campbell (address - P.O.Box 312,; North 
Quay, Brisbane, Queensland, Australia, 4000). A second report y; ■ 
was also issued, 19 December 1969, by the same Chairman, with the 
short title: Q.L.R.C.W.3, " Queensland, Law Reform Commission, 
Confidential, Working Paper on the proposed abolition of the 
Distinction between Wilful Murder and Murder." Both papers are 
substantially the same, and are listed here for sake of reference.
79. Q.L.R.C.2., page 6. y.;A'• A- AyX y- /., . •: •'y X;y :• xy.. Ay
i.i ;A
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/g ; ; "first; that is, it points unerringly to an intention 
yyyy/g -...to^ killy It is almost impossible in such a case for ' yg g"
a Judge to sum up convincingly to a jury; that is, to 
direct them that they must be satisfied beyond a rea­
. sonable doubt that the accused intended, not to kill, 7 •' :y  
gg\yy y ybut to do grievous bodily harm;. .7" . //;/' r .yyy ' 7 -ggg-
The distinction was appreciated to obtain because, at one time,
the death penalty obtained for wilful murder, which penalty had y.777-77
Since been abolished. If the distinction obtained merely be- 77-
cause of punishment, the Commission thought that it ought to 7 7
be abolished. In recommending the abolition of the distinction y
between wilful murder and murder, they followed Section 70 of the -
Draft. Code for the Australian Territories (1969), which section
.7'. v * g 7‘7 ; -;gQ '77'''. 7''- v-:'> .V. :;-;.7- --77 -7defined murder in this way: :y;.>. 7;yy: y :r •*. y --y ^-7" 77y.• 7; ygyy yg/
7v;7 "(1) Except as hereinafter provided a person who kills y
7 : 7 7 7  another:- • 7 y g y v " : ^ ' " t y / *•g 77 7.7' y,;v-;g7
. _ 7  77 . 7- 77 3 '"(&).7;'y 7 intending to kill any person; or/gggygyg
7 (b) intending to do grievous bodily harm 7;, y . gyy.
y W y . v  -yy "7 gg /* 7 • to ;any person; or gg;/77y g.yg g- ':'7'y 7 y-yg/yy
7 777; 7 (c) whilst committing or attempting to commit
■ 7 7.- •' g yg 7g.. • gy7 • ' ; any of the offences ref errred to in sub -  y  .777 g
;7  7. y 7 y g y - y - y  section (2 )  *  or whilst impeding the de- 1 /  ggy
' / 7 7 v gg g7- tection, apprehension, or prosecution of 7 v y g g
.,7 . 7 7  7 ; : a person who has committed or attempted 7y : ; 7 v
gggsggy.^ 7. ; . 7 7  .to commit any such offence, he being aware /7>-?7
,7 y y -  - 7  ; V-7 - , that there is at least a substantial risk gg 7 'gy
, g Vy7,;'77y 7  . of his killing or doing grievous bodily : -  7
yy gg 7 -yg- ''77 . .gygg y harm: to any person; g7y,/-yyyy/^ygg/ygg" ygg 77" 
- 7  7, is guilty of the indictable offence of murder." .7'y g l y g g :7-:
Subsection (2) embraced: Treason;Niurder;Piracy;Robbery;Kidnapping;
Abduction;Resisting lawful arrest;Escaping from lawful custody;Rape;
Burglary;Arson;Unlawful destruction of property by means Of explosives;
80. Q.L.R.C.2., page 7. g y  y  y 7 /■*■'/7 v7\7A\,Vk:‘ ; 7 g y 7/ ' gg 7y;y.-- ?i
y gg;gtv ' i . ' 7 |
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One will appreciate that the Queensland Law Reform Commission (1970) 
instated constructive murder, the very opposite of which the Victoria 
Law Reform Commission would recommend in its report, some few years 
later. Their positions were exactly reversed. The Victoria Cora- A A 
mission wanted murder to be punishable as murder only if the of- > 
fender did intend ( or will ) to kill , a posi tion abandoned by the AA A 
Queensland Commission. With difficulty Would salvation come through Ay- 
definitions ! If the only forceful purpose for maintaining a dis- /A Ay. 
tinetion between murder and manslaugher ( and their cognates as re^ 
finded by various criminal codes ) was for the sake of the punish­
ment imposed, then one is easily led to the conclusion enunciated by A A
Lord kilbrandon in Hyam V . P.P.P. [ 19741 2 All E.R. 42, 72:
'. , "There does not appear to be any good reason why 1 i
the crimes of murder and manslaughter should not = / A  
' 7 ; both be abolished and the single crime of unlaw- / A 77-/777
: A, ful homicide substituted; one case will differ from AA-Ay/;
-7.- another in gravity, and that can be taken care of by
'.. : : A variation in sentences downwards from life imprison­
' A AA,... ment. "A ' ,7: . 7. y  7 ..; ■ .7.//'; .• ; . 7  A ’A'-AA
When one comes to consider the Report on Culpable Homicide 7.
' .-7 .7 . ■•■'7' 7 .  . A  . 'j ,.;r . 01 , ,issued in 1976 by the Criminal Law Reform Committee of New Zealand, * 
one can sense how. some jurisdictions were deciding.to turn from A
solving conceptual problems about the law, and were turning to sentencing
problems, assuming that one solved a complicated legal problem by, ad­
verting to the penalties which the law ought to impose. Lord Kilbrandon, 
in Hyam, gave expression to that frame of mind* a judicial pragmatism,- 7 
akin to psychological pragmatism of behavioural psychologists. If there
81. REPORT of [the] CRIMINAL LAW REFORM COMNdTTEE on CULPABLE HOMICIDE ,7 A 
July, 1976 (address - Private Bag, Postal Centre, Wellington, .New ■:%
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is thought to exist a difference between categories only because 
consequences are differently weighed, if the consequences are made 
identical, why then worry about distinctions between antecedents if 
each will produce the same consequence, or a consequence of equal 
merit or value ?., Why worry about why one wets a bed if one extin­
guished bed-wetting behaviour by meats of conditioned reflex therapy ?A
A greater portion of Criminal Law Reform Committee of New
Zealand is not of concern here. Its purpose was to recommend what 
modifications or deletions ought to be made with regard to the law 
regarding murder, manslaughter, provocation, suicide pacts, and neg­
ligence which caused death or injury. The Committee had taken four
to five years to deliberate upon such questions in relation to the
criminal code of New Zealand, and the product of its deliberation was 
a Report a little in excess of one hundred pages. The gist of a \ 
portion of the Report was that greater sentencing powers should be 
given both to the Court and to the Minister of Justice, permitting A'Vf 
the Court to give indeterminate sentences, and permitting the Minister 
of Justice to terminate a person’s liability for recall to prison if 
so deemed. The system seems to have been little more than an extended 
system of parole, with an offender ( if guilty of a serious offence ) 
liable to an extended and indefinite sentence for a lifetime,(as is 
the case in many common law jurisdictions when a felon is paroled, but 
the conditions of his parole are that they can be revoked at any time, 
the felon thereupon being required to return to prison to complete the 
duration of his prison sentence). a  ■ A.XX': ■ . : ' . X • - ,’X - ;
A: ' A great deal of discussion in the Report (N.Z.) dealt ■
A . with provocation, the resolution of which was to abolish pro- A A /Ayy-; 
A/ vocation as a plea which would mitigate an offence from murder A ; A A/t
A k A A A  to manslaughter, with the question of provocation itself being A: A  Vy./A;
transformed into a question of what circumstances ought to miti- A7;\ A y
A  A ; gate an offence. The Report (N.Z.) consistently turned from 
 ^ . legal concepts, to legal consequences,:and dealt chiefly with
. ;v consequences in relation to punishment. How consequences A- • A  y
7 were to be dealt with was left always in the realm of -prac; ticaly"vA"-*AY*A"A 
- judicial wisdom and discretion, a realm which appeared to be both vA >7
; A  sacred and beyond the realm of principles, and their requisite *. .
7/ 7 analysis, for the Commission (N.Z.). One objection to. provocation* '/"A/AAA
A was to determine what kind of a concept it was, and its status A ''A/AfA/7. A.AA
Was it an objective standard by which the concept was to be judged ? A y "  //y; 
77A 7 A or was it a flexible standard, measured more by the foot of him 7•>*?-vA--.-7.
; A. who rules; than by rules ? The Report (N.Z.) seemed to express y : 7,= -
yyy; dissatisfaction with various English attempts to address fhemseiyesyAyAyy > A
. * A,-.:/ • v A'" ’ A /■ . A . ' ‘A ” 1 "■ M  . •' • >: , A "  -A.- *  ^ • AVy ’ ( A A - A  - » > ' • ; , + \ a A a  * •' -"AA7 . : A to provocation. * The Committee (N.Z*) thought that the law on
the sub j ect of ' provocation V was complex, confusing, and something Ay: A  A/Ay. 
A 7 A  which the ordinary man might not understand, One case was dls^ A 7  AA- A;
• 7..-, A A 7 A 82. Culpable Homicide (N.Z., 1976), Part 1, "Provocation'1, pp 3-23, 7 7 // 7 /
/ A- A / ; ' 7 esp. paragraphs, '5», '6', *81, »13', '29' , and ’42’; also, cf. ,7y A;/
A A APPENDIX 11, "Working Paper on Homicide under Provocation", Part 1 ,;AAAA
A a A / A  AA. -  A. pp 13-20. (NOTE* this is a separately appended "Paper", with pagi- .
Aa . A A.;’”’ distinct from, the Report.) 7.A-. V A y y A  A -7 A  - A''-
'77'A- * A 83. Culpable Homicide (N.Z./, 1976), para. 34, page 18. >, A;.-AA A --;,A 7 7 7 7 7 7 . y A A A
A ; \  84. R. v. McGregor [1962] NZLR 1069. A  7. ' • y * ;A.A y  • AA y.;?.AAf7 Yi//
A 529
cussed, its purpose to illustrate that, at times, because there A X A y  
existed iib cleat and precise line between what was, and what was 
not, provocation, injustice could and did come about. The case XrAyAXj; X 
which served to illustrate this flaw was the Canadian case: Perrault A AX 
v. The Queen, (1970) 12 D.L.R. (3d) 480< ' .',yy A/ a /. : :;A X a X A ^ - ^
A A A  In Perrault the Court concluded that a defendant could 
not combine the categories of ’provocation’ and ’drunkenness’ to 
yield a defence for non-capital murder. The difficulty with the  ^ AAX: A 
case, as the dissent demonstrated, was:the two concepts, impartially X- 
inexact, were attempted to be mixed, which mixture was to yield an ; 
acceptable defence to the charge.. D, thought the court, was neither 
drunk enough, nor so provocated, that each, in itself, would be an . 
adequate defence to the charge of non-capital murder; but, thought X X  
the trial court, the two concepts taken together would yield an ade^
quate defence. Thisi was found to be a mistake of law by the Supreme a
Court of Canada. The New Zealand Commission (1976) dwelt upon this 
case because, as a difficult case, it showed that if an offence of X X:
unlawful killing were permitted--- as was advocated by the Commission X .•
(N.Z.1976) then the gymnastics of law through which the Canadian,
Court tumbled could all have been avoided; it would under the offence 
of unlawful killing be only a question of what non-capital penalty to 
assess, and not be a question of (also) assessing what legal principles 
were, or were not, involved-— -in the case of Perrault, whether D’sXXX . 
intent had been negatived or not . : y a 'AX . . ' ?a  . y- yyyyA .yyyy./X' y yX.A-‘A;
;> > 
y-\
■A'! :' *•
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• ; : The New Zealand report may illustrate a trend growing • ; . 77/7 .'7
in the criminal law: namely, to dismiss complicated discuss ion of: 7?7 7y'
further complicated mental concepts/ and to stress, instead, all : 
concentration upon consequences and effects. It is easy to ap- 7 7
predate how much Baronness Wootton’s own, Crime and The Criminal y . 7 77»
: 85 •* 7 7 /  • v". • v/7 7i"u'\77-y/7'-y . • , / * .  '7 /Law, ,.;y must have affected this Commission. If criminal law is .7 7yy.y:
thought to be a necessary connexion of /elements of a crime1 and
’punishment’, if the punishment is made both non-capital and variable,
why then bother with the nature of the conceptual elements of the 777"%/'
offence, especially when those conceptual elements can be erased ? 77 yt
A rebuttal would be: certainly an offence can be simply defined,
as was the proposed statutory amendment which would abolish the ,7/7777 ,^
defence of provocation But then how does one differentiate
degree within punishment ? It had been seen, in our earlier chapters,
that Church law, after the dissolution of the Roman Empire, when the
Church' instructed its spiritual ministers on the matter of dispensing/ /‘
holy absolution, distinguished between the nature of transgressions, ////.
and that in all cases when a practical judgement had to be made by a 7/
priest or bishop about what penance to impose, and if absolution should
be given, to the penitent, the priest or bishop had to inquire as to / .
the nature of the sin, how it was committed, and to what degree was 7 7 7
the penitent both intellectually and volitionally responsible for the
commission of the sin. Legal consequentialism does not relieve one of
inquiry into mental concepts and their conceptual elements, as the Report
85. London, Stevens and Sons, 1963. 86. Culpable Homicide (N.2. 1976) 7,
page 42.; para. 42 (1) (d) to revoke I 
ss. 169 § 170 of the Crimes Act 1961
; X a  A y A? A ' X'y f  ^Xyt"^53^Ax^ ~xA:yK A-’A a  ^ ?A .. 'A ' / •  ;•■ aA?"
seemingly assures when it reduces all killings to unlawful killings, :yA;';'— XA
adverting then only to punishment to determine how serious 'was: the ; AA.X Ay yy-
x. : A- offensive act in the eyes of the court. To return to practical judge-Ay.X-aX;
y. . X  A lent as a measure whereby an act and its heinousness is understood X AyX
X does not relieve one from the need to understand the nature, and .
A-A'its dispositions and elements, from which the act sprung. - .j
In a peculiar way, although the Commission (N.Z.) avoided a
A '-AXyy use of mens rea, the Commission (N.Z.) reinstated an older notion X :
, A of intention when it came to discuss manslaughter. The Commission yA;y AXlX
XyAA:X A-XyyX perceived that D can act dangerously, and no harm can ensue; or that ‘. A x ,y
XXX. -X ' D can act dangerously, and harm can ensue. A disjunction was intro- Aa  AyyX
duced between the concept of an act dangerous in itself, and the
A X possible;consequences of an act, but which consequences were seen as, ;X A;
. ' . non-necessary. The Report stated, ■ *? .
XXAX; j  ■ \ • "If there is, however, a significant . .
AxyA-;'XA-A> A \ x A.y'-j'- .’element of 'danger, .in'- -the accused’s acts, it is that• X A  X ; X element of danger that ought to be taken into account X":• AA;;yi X; ;X::
a  ! A in proscribing such conduct and setting a penalty in f X XX
- y: . respect of it. The potential harm rather than the , Xa X
A ' a y:" actual harm provides the proper measure of liability. ;y" - X . XX.. ‘ XX
X y... X y v It is recognised that the actual harm may be cogent : XX^X y A
■A : . X evidence of the degree of risk created. For the rea-  ^ A yx
X A X. sons given we are unanimously of the opinion that the X A;X ; X
y  X ;, X  , X  ; criminal law in this area should be directed against X  A  X A A A J y  X
vXy A : dangerous conduct, and that liability should be neither A AA
!:X^ A’x..*-v*V;v ,. A  x increased nor decreased according to chance results ." /'XXX-yxXx v:' XX
Mediaeval Christian moral theologians would have been extremely A xx A
X : pleased by such a principled statement of theory which held that XXX
y X ; wrong ought to be attributed to him who did, and not what was done.
AXX; a 87.; Culpable Homicide (N;Z. 1976), para. 48, pp 28-29, Part 11, MAN- -
'X X x. x : SLAUGHTER, "The effect of "chance1". . r 1
. 1
■ J..
CHAPTER EIGHT
In his inaugural lecture, Professor Thompson said y 
of the concepts mens rea and actus reus, * 7 ; , - 7
;; ;:7J- . ’’ Actus non facit reum nisi mens sit rea
is one of the great maxims of criminal law. As 
with most of the Latin tags which are the lawyer's 
/staple diet, it does not help us very much even g 
when it is translated.; Mens rea has come to mean . 
that kind or degree of mental blameworthiness that 7 " 
y'y- is necessary in order to make conduct criminal, ' ""gg
; ; : The term actus:reus has come to mean conduct for- gyg-
. bidden by law and the term mens rea the mental as- / y ;
g pect of such conduct. Unfortunately scholars are 7y 7g
. not yet agreed on the meaning of these terms and ' g, g 7 v ’
as a result there is confusion in the cases. One : g 
7 can with some difficulty draw distinctions between g
various cases but one cannot deduce from them a con- g g 
7 g sisterit doctrine of criminal liabiiity." g yg g g
Since these sentiments were expressed as shortly ago as 1965;
law commissions have abounded, and writing which is concerned
with the meaning and clarification of the meaning of intention,
and its elements, has abounded. What one commission affirms, y .
another commission denies. New, however, to the old controversy
as to what is the precise meaning of intention, mens rea and actus
reus, is the legal philosopher, who looks not at the concepts as
1. CRIMINAL LAW REFORM, An Ingugural Lecture, by D. Thompson, LL.B., 
Ph.D., Barrister-at-Law, Professor of Law, in the University of < 
g Keele, 22nd February 1965 ( published by the University of Keele ),• >. pp 4-5. ggy,-;y-: -.7 " ..y y- >7y-:y;->• • ."yg.ygy ;,77 • :gg/;. 777:";/ ,
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if he were a lawyer, but who looks into the concepts with a philosophical 
sense of detachment. He must see not only the law, and what 
it means, but also if its meaning(s) makes sense and is subject, 
at the same time, to justification. The sense of detachment from 
a need to support any legal system at all lets the philosopher ap­
preciate that ’intention1, and its adjunct elements, is not to be 
solved, just as ’existence* is not to be solved. The fact that the 
art of the philosopher may begin with his wondering at existence, may 
also carry over to existence of legal systems and their elements; in 
this case, that a concept so flexible and broad as is intention is not 
subject to a confined and restricted analysis, like morbid anatomy, 
but is more akin to the family of living and adverturesome sciences, 
like recombinative microbiology, which looks both to the fons et origo 
of life itself, and to novel and creative patterns which possibly may 
emerge or be created, given greater insight in genetic recombinations.
As to 'intention' itself, whatever its verbal clothing, it 
appears to be a concept which grows and does not diminish in its com­
plexity and intensity. The literature produced by various law com­
missions throughout the common law world is staggering, and is now
enough in quantity that a legal philosopher could devote himself fully
• 2 - to considering and analysing those productions. ’
2. Cf. for instance, these few examples. [The] FOURTH REPORT: The Sub­
stantive Criminal Law, [published by] Criminal Law and Penal Methods Re­
form Committee of South Australia [July, 1977], Supreme Court, Victoria 
Square, Adelaide, S.A. 5000, pp (xlviii) +460. The American Law In­
stitute has recently issued, in three volumes, its massive: MODEL PENAL 
CODE and COMMENTARIES (Official Draft and Revised Comments), edited by 
Herbert Wechsler, published by: The American Law Institute, 1980, Phila­
delphia, Pennsylvania, U.S.A. One may also consult the various papers
EXPLORATIO INTENTION IS is , therefore, a proper
ft, ;ftft ‘ ' heading for what this writer, as a philosopher, has attempted in .'ft ; ft^ftft'ftftft;
' . f t - f t  the body of this research. f t: In criminal law, intention functions
- as the representative concept, whereby human actions, and therea-ftftftft;ftftftftftft'i
“ft; sons for them, are understood in relation to a criminal system. If V'ft ^
, no law, then no punishment; but what if a law, what then ? How is ft’Pftft;
. .-ft -l :; ft ' D suppose to be understood in his relation to that body of criminal - V ; ftftftftftft 'ft'
ft/ft ft-ft'- 'ft ft ■ ' law?'' One is very much aware that the criminal - law; as . it is .pre-ft ft./--ft
'ftftftftft ft ft sently conducted, generally pits the smallness of an individual a­
: ftft gainst the corporate greatness and might of the state. What ought V ■ ;
to serve to balance, or to redress the balance, between these obvious
; issued by the Criminal Law Revision Committee, and published :  ^;
by Her Majesty's Stationery Office, London. Some of the papers were: ftftft
ftftftft' ft- CLRC: Working Paper, Section 16 of The Theft Act 1968 (August, 1974:
HMSO‘.London); CLRC: Working Paper on Offences against the Person (August, /:
; ft.: ft;. -’ftVft 1976: HMSO: London) . There are, also, the various "Working Papers" ftftftft ftftft
ftftftft- ft issued, from time to time, by The Law Commission, and published by ftftft
ftftftrft/ : HMSO.. Some were: WP No SO: Inchoate Offences, Conspiracy, Attempt and ;ft ,ft T
Incitement,( 5 June 1973: HMSO, 1973, London ); WP No 55...Codification 
of the Criminal Law, General Principles, Defences of General Application, i
( London: HMSO, 1974 ); WP No 56, Criminal Law, Conspiracy to Defraud,
) ( London: HMSO, 1974 ); WP No 57, Codification of the Criminal Law,
Conspiracies relating to Morals and Decency, ( London: HMSO, 1974 ); ft :
WP No 6 3 ...Conspiracies to effect a public mischief and to commit a ftft
•ft ft, civil wrong ( London: HMSO, 1975 ). The work, of both Commissions is ft
v a continuing enterprise. One may also encounter various Home Office
ftftftft :v ft/., ft papers, for example: REPORT OF THE ADVISORY GROUP ON THE LAW OF RAPE, ft ; ft
ft (London: HMSO, December 1975 [Cmnd. 6 3 5 2 ]). Then there exist the pub4ftftftftftftkft
ft ' lished reports of The Law Commission; after deliberation and criticismft'ftftiftft'ft 
of their "Working Papers", and some of these final reports have been , ft
: - ft in the field of criminal law: LAW COM. No. 55 , "Report on Forgery and ft ft ft ;
ft Counterfeit Currency" [London, HMSO, 1973 ( 3 2 0 ) ] ;  LAW COM. No. 89 , "Re- ftft
ft port on the Mental Element in Crime" [London, HMSO, 1978 (4 9 9 ) ]  ; LAW COM. ftft-
- ft, : ft No. 76, "Report on Conspiracy and Criminal Law Refoirm" [London, HMSOj l9^ ftftftft>
(1 7 6 )]; LAW COM. No. 102, "Attempt, and Impossibility in relation to At- ft ft
ft ft tempt, Conspiracy and Incitement" [London* HMSO, 1980 ( 6 4 6 ) ]. All are ft ftftftl
vast reports. ftftftft ft'ftft .ft ■ \
J
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disbalances' ? ' ’’ . ' ■ ' ; h
In any exploration one hopes to return to the sources. In 
this extended legal exploration the sources have been wide and varied 
and, at times, rare and difficult to obtain. There have not been any 
clear and precise links of one moment of legal history to another; one 
has been required to*make educated guesses, thoughtful assumptions, and 
proffer what seemed to be reasonable links from one epoch into the next.
Our own reading of our sources has suggested for us that intention had 
been seen mostly as a volitive concept, arid,for that reason, its roots 
and beginnings as ’malice aforethought’ suggested that D had been moved 
to break the law ( a  law which was believed to have a moral foundation ) 
because of his own disruption of character and moral disquietude. One 
did the deed, not thought the deed. .
But to break a law, which had a moral foundation, led one to
ask further questions about both law and morals. Might it be that there
was a common link between an ability to break a social law, and an ability 
to break a moral law ? One will remember how both Bracton and Fleta ad­
mitted how both dimensions could surround an human act, choosing as their 
example the wicked judge who justly sentenced a man to death, but who 
took delight in the shedding of the defendant's blood. Law and morals 
had distinct spheres. At times they overlapped, and at other times they 
coursed independently one of the other. Common, however, to each sphere
was the ability and capacity of a man to move in those spheres, and this
led into the old and common effort: to inquire as to the nature of man.
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That man possesses a nature is, no doubt, a truism; but 
that his nature can be deciphered, decoded, and put into well de­
fined, non-ambiguous sets of linguistic propositions has been and 
is the rub. Our common law was deeply indebted to our common pre­
vailing modes of thought about human nature whereby the two broad 
differences found in our natures were cast into terms of intellect 
and will, and these broad conceptual differences themselves, for 
centuries, seemed to take on concrete forms of their own. One's 
Will, and one's Intellect, seemed to be reified in moral and theo­
logical writings, as if each were homunculus, possessed of its own 
distinct identity, acting for its own distinct ends. Added to this 
reification of concepts and operations, one further distinction was 
laboured: that something about man's nature put him both into a world
of matter ( mass and extension ) and of spirit ( energy and infinitude ) 
Could any more contradictory sets of postulates have been to a grow­
ing legal system ?
By reading the ancient sources with an imaginative mind one 
can disgard, jettison even, much of the conceptual impedimenta which 
accompanied the early postulates from which common law notions of cri­
minal responsibility evolved, and which they absorbed. If there be any 
wisdom in our own age it may be this: to appreciate that no single sen­
tence or algorithm or formula can be generated which will both be a 
substitute for, and full explanation of, human nature. The problem 
of synonymy presents itself: namely, if 'x' can be redefined by 'y',
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then both ' x' and ' y ' can be redefined by any further term. That ■ ■■^ rS-.-
redescription, or its possibility, is much like the number line: it : 
is unbounded, and can, by itself, generate infinite redescriptions of 
elements of itself. If this applies to natural languages, it maybe 
argued that it applies to objects which those natural languages seek 
to explain. If a relationship is to obtain between this sentence, 
and this object, that relationship will be an analogical relationship: ; :: ;V 
partly described, partly indescriptive. It is not a paradox which, for 
the law, creates skepticism; it is a fairly honest depiction of the 
■ human condition, the endless movement from ignorance into intellectual
light and knowledge. The broad categories which have been seen to J . .
describe human nature have been thought and volition. Since the com­
mon law could not effect a criminal sanction to control thought and . 
volition in se, both had to be expressed in some form of action which i %
was forbidden and which brought the person under the power of the law. 
'Action1 need not be solely interpreted as some form of visible movement 
were it so, then the concept of a criminal omission, or of a duty to 1
act, would be a logical puzzle. -V-* '> ’ . '"yy :.-'v ■
But if thei law, then, is a hierarchy of concepts, each with 
its distinct elements, then the;legal philosopher can ask questions 
about the nature of those concepts, and he can also ask how their ap- v 
plication is justified. The broad concepts of 'volitive1 and 1 intellective’ 
call for explanation and justification. It is a dual task:- asking why .v 
phi obtains, and if phi should obtain, 'Phi * may be any key legal con- t #
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cept. But the art of the legal philosopher is conceptual analysis, V A kX 
of concepts qua concepts, and of concepts qua legal concepts. A > : AX,
A ; Analysing intention then was to analyse a complex relation- XA ;
ship. It was to realise and appreciate that one was discussing some .
view of human anture, and it was to be aware that one was applying :X
concepts, generally conveyed through ordinary language, to aspects of V
human behaviour A  Common law minimised many of the difficulties. XltXAXXy 
would not, as we saw, embrace skepticism or pyrrhonism. It assumed 
that an accused who came before the court would be found either guilty 
or not guilty, or, as in the case of Scottish verdicts, not proven.
There seems to have run the consistent, common sense assumption that , 
legal findings can be set down in simple sentences ; and, as a prin-y ; %
ciple coeval with that assumption, that the requirements of the law * 
can be set forth in declarative sentences with certainty. The assump- ..y 
tiori of the cpmmon law has been that language can make clear what the \ A 
law requires and demands:. Law, therefore, is a set of propositions ; k *$ # ? *■ A 
which are both knowable and coherent.. The parallel assumption for the XX: 
Western philosopher has been that the world is knowable. While common 
law embraced a linguistic realism, it was certainly in harmony with the 
accepted philosophy of the West, that of philosophical realism. , XX 'A'yX.
A legal philosopher, however, need not be persuaded by these,.. • 
mutually supportive propositions . .This sets him not against the as- - xXX
sumptions embodied in the law— here, the criminal law but in a state X
of pre-selection, as it were, much like Adam before the Fall, having X 
neither to avow or disavow treasured postulates and their equally treasured
V* *'V- {A*
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corollaries. Because many conceptual and theoretical borrowings 
were at work in the shaping of the common law and its criminal sane-
tion, one in analysing aspects of that great body of accumulated legal .
wealth proceeds with reserve and caution. The slapdash, lasso state- ftft
ment has no place in such sustained analysis. One is forced by the
natufe of the subject to move through its monumental past slowly. ft
Amidst this vast pantheon can be determined why one element
sustained another . T The common law, common to its Christian and ' ft'ft-ftft 
Graeco-Roman heritage, held an offender responsible for his actions.
If action was simply attributed to D, but not originated by D, then 
D did not come into the control of the criminal law ( save for curious 
statutory anomalies which simply attributed wrongdoing to D, whether 
or not J) did a wrong actually W/ft The roots of the criminal sanction 
rested in transgression; but transgression had to flow from the conduct 
of D. Certainly, and it can be dismissed just as easily, any legal ft 
proposition can be constructed which attributes guilt to D, This is ft;
law strictly in the imperative mode. But our common law took over the
older confessorial notions that guilt had to flow from knowledge, and 
knowledge had to be an expression of the free assent of the penitent , ft ft ft 
If D merely ’knew1, but did not consent to knowing, then any movement 
of his senses would have been described as knowledge fully and completely; 
but it was not. Animal motions or sense impressions were never given the 
status or pedigree of knowledge gained in reflexion. Once again, one 
returned to considering what was human nature, and what was embraced by 
the,; concepts' and;Operations "of. mind and will ? ft- > ".ft;-ftft:J..' ftftftftft
3:. R. v. Larsonneur (1933) 97 J.P. 206.
4. Cf., Jaggard v Dickinson [1980] 3 All E.R. 716, re:'belief’ induced . 
ft : by intoxication. :v ft -ft..- -‘ft;•: . ft ftft-’ftftftftft ft;/;' : ft::-'",. -• ft' ftftftft ; ;ft-ft; ;:ftft'ftft-'ft'.
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7 , Is there an ideal model for what relationship ought to ;
obtain between the person and the criminal law ? From the stand­
point of the criminal law such an ideal relationship might view 7: 7. '*'7/7
the law itself to be a vast body of well-definedpropositions; the 
propositions, in theory, would be potentially knowable by any knower 7 - / 
(excluding from the set of knowers infants, the insane, or any class 
of which it could be said that they were incapable of cognitive life); 7
and, as a potentially knowable body of legal propositions, they could 
be converted by any knower into knowledge, and would thus function as 
reasons for one's legal actions. To know the law would mean to ob- 7V
serve the law. Deducible from this model as a corollary of it would 7 :^  ,
be the further claim that if the law is, in theory, knowable, then . 777:77
not to follow the dictates of the law would mean that one knowingly 7
violated the Canons of his legal knowledge. Not to obey the law would 7 
be viewed as a rational act.; It could almost be converted into a simple 
machine model: if P follows the law, there is a law for him to know in . 
order for him to follow it. But if P violates the law, there is a law; 77 ^7 
for him to follow, but he himself knowingly creates counter propositions 7:. 
to those of the law, and knowingly violates the law. Is our simple ■ 7-7 777/■ 
model of the criminal law a complete model ? /C V v7 ' 7 7' . 7 7  ' 7 7 "''7 7'
If one is assuming that a machine model, or a single cognitive /; 7;
model, states the relationship which ought to obtain in the criminal ;'7  ^
law in a complete way, then the model> seemingly, is complete. A per­
son is? viewed somewhat like a a computer without a programme. Once the 7 7 f
programme is inserted, the computer operates. When it operates, accord- 77.77
541
ing to the language of the programme, it may be said to operating 
"legally”— if the programme is one of legal language. Raised to A;,
a higher, but simpler, level of abstraction, action in accord with
the criminal sanction could be reduced to one simple, beatific vision: 
a comprehensive legal proposition converted into knowledge by a knower, 
and that knowledge converted into action by appropriate conduct. It 
would be as if one, in law, had converted the criminal sanction into X
"E*MC^ ” . One would, at this level of abstraction, be reducing the Ax A
criminal sanction into a simple, but comprehensive, proposition which 
was knowable. Other legal systems have known of such a formulation:'! X 
Christian theologians who1 posited an all-knowing God assumed that such 
a being would have perfect knowledge without the need for propositions. 
Our simple vision of the criminal sanction as a universal proposition A  
potentially knowable by any person is hardly as complicated.
But is this ah adequate model ? If the side of the argument 
advances only from the side of the criminal law, and hence from the 
governing and police powers of the state, it may be thought to be a 
complete model. Theories of intention which stress only its cognitive 
aspect, wh ich dwe11 exclusively upon the "mental elements" of intention, 
which speak of intention as if it were a set of propositions in a pro­
grammer ’s code, may be viewed as theories which advance the state’s 
interest in not only control of the subject, but an easy control of X. 
the subject. Models of constructive attribution fall into such a vein, 
as constructive malice, or constructive manslaughter, or felony-murder. A  
rules. XX XA- -X * x - ;-v a  -■ X X '> X A  -Ai / ' A. •//:*' XX'.; A A x X
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Justification for the acceptance of such cognitive models 
may rest in the belief that the criminal law is a construction of* 
and perogative of, the state, and, as such, the state should make 
laws which it can enforce easily; One fines the increasing feature v '• 
of modem criminal law ■ as well as other areas of the law, especially
Tort law that many decisions are justified on the grounds of "policy",
in a word, the willingness of the state to resort to its police powers 
to effect conduct without appeal to logic. v "  .•
5. One may observe the tension which can exist between the logic of 
the law and the policies of the state in its use of law. An interesting 
class of cases are those dealing with criminal attempts, the object of 
which act is itself not a criminal wrong. One class of cases will hold j
that the object of a Criminal attempt must itself be criminal, reasoning 
that one, normally, cannot steal one*s own watch ( or possession ). Cf.,; ; 
People v. Jaffe, N.Y.C.A., 1906, 185 N.Y. 497, 78 N.E. 169, " B A R T L E T T . 
The crucial distinction between the case before us...lies not 
in the possibility or impossibility of the commission of the 
crime, but in the fact that...the act, which it was doubtless.V
the intent of the defendant' to commit would not have been a
crime if it had been consummated." Contrary reasoning may be cited 
from, The Queen v. Whitchurch, and Others,Cl890) 24 Q.B.D. 420, in which/
D, not herself pregnant, was found guilty of attempting to procure an 
abortion ( contrary to the statute, 24 § 24 Viet. c. 100, s. 58 (1)
Lord Coleridge reasoned that if three persons combine to commit a felony, 
"they are guilty of conspiracy, although the person on whom the offence 
was intended to be committed could not, if she stood alone, be guilty of
the intended offence." p 422. Hawkins, J., found her in the instant case ;
guilty: "What she did was a conspiracy to commit a criminal act." p 422.
The literature on Attempt and Impossibility is rich, and confusing. One 
may confer: "Criminal Attempts at Common Law" by E.R.Keedy, U.Penn. L.R.
[Vol 102, 1954] pp 464-489; "One Further Footnote on Attempting the Im­
possible*’ by Graham Hughes, N.Y.U.L.R. [Vol 42*: December 1967, No. 6], 
pp 1005-1034; also, cf., THE LAW COMMISSION (Law. Com. No. 102), "Crimi­
nal Law: Attempt, and Impossibility in relation to Attempt, Conspiracy, 
and Incitement." [London* H.M.S.0*,25 June 1980 (646)], which took the : 
general position, "2.99 -Our conclusion is that the fact that it is im- : 
possible to commit the crime aimed at should not preclude a conviction for 
attempt." page S3, s.4. A "policy" justification was advanced.
It has about it an appealing simplicity. Clear defini­
tions of the law suggest that the law can be easily enforced, and, 
on occasion, when legal clarity is in dispute, the state may then 
enforce strained interpretations by an appeal to policy. Where 
the model begins to show signs of strain is when one questions both 
the nature of a legal proposition, and to whom, or what, it is to 
be applied. Take a very simple case, obvious child neglect. Under 
section 1 of the Children and Young Persons Act 1933 if one is found 
guilty of wilfully neglected a child in one's custody one is subject 
to a fine, or, alternatively, to two years imprisonment. The rele­
vant portions of the Act I have placed below.
6. M (l) If any person who has attained the age of sixteen years and 
has. the custody, charge, or care of any child or young person under that 
age, wilfully assaults, ill-treats, neglects, abandons, or exposes him, 
or causes or procures him to-be assaulted, ill-treated, neglected, aban­
doned, or exposed, in a manner likely to cause him unnecessary suffering 
or injury to health (including injury to or loss of sight, or hearing, 
or limb, or organ of the body, and any mental derangement), that person 
shall be guilty of a misdemeanour, and shall be liable (a) on convic­
tion on indictment, to a fine, or alternatively, or in addition thereto, 
to imprisonment for any term not exceeding two years...
"(2) For the purposes of this section (a) a parent or other person
legally liable to maintain a child or young person shall be deemed to have 
neglected him in a manner likely to cause injury to his health if he has 
failed to provide adequate food, clothing, medical aid or lodging for him, 
or if, having been unable otherwise to provide such food, clothing, medi­
cal aid or lodging, he has failed to take steps to procure it to be pro­
vided under enactments applicable in that behalf..."
It may be noted, from the case which is to be discussed, that the pro­
visions of s.1(1) has been familiar to the common law since 1889 in the 
Prevention oT Cruelty to, and Protection of, Children Act. Case law 
which was decided from it, as well as its later enactments, is to be 
found in R . Senior [18991 1 QB 283, [1895-9] All ER Rep 511, and in 
R v. Petch (1909) 2 Cr App R 71. A statutory offence of this kind is 
nearly a century old.
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In R. v. Sheppard and another * the House of Lords was called
upon to decide, this: point of law: X. ?./ • ' \X. *• 'X y " XXX..X.Xy.y;;/
A "What is the proper direction to be given to
A • A a jury on a charge of wilful neglect of a child un- y
der s. 1 of the Children and Young Persons Act 1933 —XXA 
as to what constitutes the necessary mens rea of the
. x x! ■..offence,’?11; X • .. . I . .XX- ; X ■•••' - X\/ X ' AX':yXy
The facts were simple and human. The parents had a child who was sick, 
They failed to appreciate the gravity of the child’s sickness, they, ; : 
unfortunately, possessed of low intelligence. Their child, an infant: 
boy of 16 months of age, perished from hypothermia and malnutrition.
The trial judge ruled that the offence under the Act was one of strict;; 
liability. X The test for the defendants' guilt was to be an objective X 
test: namely, an appeal to a reasonable parent test who would have been 
able to form a reasonable estimate of the objective seriousness of the 
infant's plight, and who Would have obtained the requisite medical at­
tention and treatment. The jury having been so directed, they found 
the defendants ( who were the appellants in the present appeal ) guilty. 
The Court of Appeal affirmed the conviction of the trial court, but 
signified that there was matter of genuine legal importance to be set- 
tied upon appeal by the House of Lords. X —  , A Ax
7. R. v. Sheppard and another [1980] 3 All E.R. 899. The House of X
Lords divided 3-to-2, in allowing the appeal of the appellants,
James Martin Sheppard and Jennifer Christine Sheppard, against y
X the decision of the Court of Appeal, Criminal Division (Lord Wid-
gery CJ, Bridge LJ and Woolf J). Allowing the appeal were Law X 
Lords Diplock, Edmund-Davies, and Lord Keith of Kinkel; dismissing 
the appeal were Law Lords Fraser of Tullybelton and Scarman. X
■ i. ■»■ ; $
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Although this was an appeal from a conviction arising be­
cause of an Act, the common law had know the offence for failing to 
to provide food and medical necessities, and the like, for one under 
the care of another and unable to take care of Oneself .: * In most . 7  ;
common law countries the criminal offences are enumerated in a code,
or sets of acts, and few of the older, purely common law offences re­
main. To object that a finding under an act differs from the finding, 
under a common law offence is of no moment. .
The question in Sheppard was taken by the various Law Lords. ,.;;
as to what would be the definitional range of the adverb, ’wilfully'. 
There would be its ordinary meaning; there would also be its meaning 
as it was used in an Act. As dan be gathered from the learned opinion 
of the House of Lords, 'Wilfully* was not a simple adverb, or an simple 
as any might think. When a key word functions as a pivot in a legal 
proposition, upon which balances innocence or liability, one begins to 
see that a simple cognitive model which assumes that key words can be 
( or are ) simply used, and therefore just as simply understood, is to 
mistake hope for reality. A key word, in relation to a key element of 
human nature (or a conception of human nature ), does not yield up its 
treasure simply, as Sheppard may demonstrate. : ,
Lord Diplock stated that the defendants' real defence was that 
they were parents who did not realise the gravity of their infant's ill­
ness. From the very beginning he introduced a division in his opinion 
between 'fact*, which is objectively the case, and an appreciation that
8. Cf., Archbold's Pleading, Evidence and Practice in Criminal Cases 
Edn., 1979, page 2, para. 3, and the cases cited therein).
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such a fact is objectively the case by the defendant. Granting this
division between what D knows to be the case, and what truly is the
9case, he proceeded to frame his theory of the case thusly:
r "My Lords, the language in which the relevant pro­
visions of the 1933 Act are drafted consists of ordinary 
words in common use in the English language. If I were 
to approach the question of their construction untrammelled 
(as this House is) by authority I should have little hesi­
tation in saying that where the cahrge is one of WILFULLY : 
NEGLECTING [caps mine] to provide a child with adequate 
medical aid, which in appropriate cases will include pre­
cautionary medical examination, the prosecution must prove 
1) ; that the child did in fact need medical aid at the time 
at which the parent is charged with having failed to provide 
it and 2) EITHER [caps mine] that the parent was aware 
at that time that the child's health might be at risk if it 
were not provided with medical aid OR [caps mine] ■; that the 
parent's unawareness of this fact was due to his not caring 
whether the child's health were at risk or nOt."
He further stated that the presence of the adverb, 'wilfully', in the
Act indicated that the accused was required to possess mens rea for
10.an offence under the Act, and that mens rea meant
"...a state of mind on the part of the offender 
directed to the particular act or failure to act that 
constitutes the actus reus and warrants the description 
'wilful * 7  > • . .
One will take careful note that Lord Diplock views 'mens rea' as a 
state of mind which bore to a particular. That particular would be 
those elements of the offence to which the description, 'actus reus', :
would rightly apply. If one wished to "re-convert" his language into 
an appropriate philosophical turn of mind, one might suggest, when 
speaking of statutory offences (or, for that matter, crimes in general ), 
the offence with which an accused is charged consists of the adequation
9. Sheppard, [1980] 3 All E.R. 899, at 902-j - 903-a-b.
10. Ibid., 903-c-d. • f,&
,7fLvjVfC,
sequent production of the offence, ie., the proscribed act. How this
i adequation is brought about is moot, leaving room for the evident dis-
; / • * agreements amongst ( any variety of ) cognitivists, voluntarists, ; 7 -S
7 7 behaviourists, or determinists. •.7 7 77; 7 ' ’■ 77My;:77r 77
Lord Dip lock advanced one caveat: that the concept of a ’’rea-­
7 . sonable man" was a standard from the civi 1 law, especially from the- -7;7 :X r■■■.]
. ■ 7 - *  7 ': law of negligence in Tort law: [and that] 7 * 7 • C  -V%
7.77 7;.'--' ;•.„ ■ -X- 77V . .the obtrusion-.into'.criminal'law of conformity ..7•>. yy777y7; 77
with the notional conduct of the reasonable man as re- 
77 . 7 levant to criminal liability, though not unknown ( e.g., 7 7 v -7
: V in relation to provocation sufficient to reduce murder "/• ^ -77,.7-v
to manslaughter), is .exceptional, and should not lightly 7 7 ; v.7 y
. f be extended: see Andrews v. Director of Public Prosecutions
7; • 7 7 • [1937] 2 All E.R< 552 at 556, [1937] AC 576 at 582-83. If 7 7;7 y 7
7 ; ; failure to use the hypothetical powers;of observation, ■ W  7 ;7' 7'y
ratiocination and foresight of consequences possessed by 
; 7 7 : 7 7 this admirable but purely notional exemplar is to consti- -7. .77 -7 •/.y'-.yy: 7 ; tute an ingredient of a;criminal offence it must surely ' yyyy;yy.;
; v 7 ^ 7 form part not of the actus reus but of the mens rea." 777 77 ;
: To direct, as did the trial judge, that an offence under the Act as­
; 7... -' 7 sumed that actions of the reasonable parent were assumed, was error: *5* 7 777.7
'y 7j:7r. ;/,:y7;, "It does not.. .seem to me that the concept of the rea- 7
yyyy*;'7v 7 : 7 ; sonable parent, jd>at he would observe j what he would under-
'j--: 7 - - ; : y 7;./' stand from what he had observed and what he would do about v- ; i ;
7 • 7 7 > 7 77.. it, has any part to play in the mens rea of an offence in 7..7:7-7-v1 7.77--:
77,. ; ;, ; which the description of the mens rea is contained in the; : : ; "y
/7‘\7 / .7.■ . 7 7:. ' single adverb 'wilfully* 7 "-77 7?/7v'.-7 7-' y',.7 . 7.777 777.7
X X -  XX Given then these pre-conditions, what then was it for D 'wilfully' XX:Xx
■ to phi ? X 'X yy y  . • • A ; x X ‘ ^ • y X X y y  A:
X X  Lord Diplock thought that 'wilfully' could bear a "narrow: .Xy; XyXAyy
meaning" or a "natural meaning". These two meanings could bear upon
• the doing of a positive act ’wilfully'. What did this distinction
X'■XV-.y.XyyXmeaii X A *  - x  X ' v; A.-yyy x 'AXXy-'X .-X A X  • ' 'Xy.yAX A ;'y X-X-y:XxXy.y
yy .’A • ,X':'"X.AX;x "In the context of doing to a child a positive act X yA :X:-: <xyyyy
• X. ,  ^ Ay (assault, ill-treat, abandon or expose) that is like- 'XXXX X XyXyy
A  A :  V ly to have specified consequences ( to cause him un- A  y,  y x A - A X / A y
XX yX X X X necessary suffering or injury ), 'wilfully*, which ' Vv'-/^ AXAx;y,XXAA:
; A,XV £ 'y y;y ;' Xy - A  . must' describe the state of mind of the actual' doer of . XXX;y y A y y y y x  
lAr.X: X X  A X ‘Xx; y- ■the-,actr -may ;be capable of bearing the narrow meaning 
yyy ■ AXy X-X ‘ that .the wilfulness required extends ' only to theyA-yyyV-yxyyy y
:A''XyA,;y : , AXyv. V;-. X; doing of the physical act itself which;!inAf act -A XyyyvyA X;yA 
■_ X  y X yy X,.XXyXAX results in the consequences described , -X- Xy X “A-;XyX'
y  Xy ; • y... A though the doer thought that it would not and X-'" y y  \. o X ^ X  
Xi.yy X'Xy Ay- would not have: acted as he did had he foreseen . - A-yA^AX yX'" 
!;x. A , X yyx / yyy,v a risk .'that - those consequences ymight fol low . y .X* X X X y x X  
/A A A^  : y  (italics, mine). Although this is a possible meaning , A; AX >Xy;X
Ay y A;--X,; A * X X of 'wilfully', it is not the natural meaning even in -
; relation to positive acts defined by reference to the X- y X  yXi-l/X 
A y . consequences to which they are likely to give rise; and, X  ; A, X'" • i A
: A in the context of the section, if this is all the adverb y ■' "‘x yXXXyy
'A/A-' A .X'vXy 1 ’wilfully’ meant it would be otiose.X , A y' X x:yX^Xyyy
Lord Diplock.’s prose seems to indicate that one sense of doing some- y; Xy X
; . : thing 'wilfully*, a positive act, is to do that from which circum- A A  -X'y.yyX
; stance do flow, but not, as an agent, to entertain the thought of
X ,  y ., what circumstances may flow. From Tort law one may draw an example, y X X X X
even though tort principles are not involved in Sheppard. In Garratt ! .y f : X y y
X v. Dailey (1955), 46 Wash. 2d 197, 279 P.2d 1091, the Supreme Court y X
y : ’ y; • ' of the State of Washington was call fed upon to determine if, a minor, X •yA.wyA' ;AX
■ A , nearly six years of age, could be held responsible for battery. It
' X , XI3. Ibid., 904-a-c. X ” ..."’/ : • .’y x X y * '  ' AAA.-.,yyyyyvyx,x
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was a problem presented to the Court for the first time.
The facts were relatively simple in Garratt. An infant had
pulled away a chair from where an older person was beginning to sit.
The chair absent, the adult fell backwards to the ground and was in-Cj--;.
jured. The question for the Court to decide was one of responsibility:
Could an infant, nearly six years of age, be held responsible for the
harm he had, if he had, occasioned ? The Court accepted that the act
of pulling away the chair was a volitional act. But whether D fs act
was intentional led the Court to draw upon this early statement about j
an actor's intention from 1 Restatement, Torts, 29, I 13: ■ ,
\ / "It is not enough that the act iself is in- . f - o'
tentionally done and this, even though the actor ' V
realizes or should realize that it contains a very . ,
* grave risk of bringing about the:contact or ap- ^
prehension. Such realization may make the actor's 
conduct negligent or even reckless but unless he 
; . . realizes that to a substantial certainty, the con-; ■
tact or apprehension will result, the actor has 
not that intention which is necessary to make 
; him liable under the rule stated in this section.";
By subtraction, therefore, one may paraphrase the instant quotation 
to read: D, without an intention, nevertheless wilfully phi-ed, r  ; ■ VC;
either not knowing that 'x* would result, or not intending 'x' to ; \ 
occur, of not foreseeing that 'x* would occur, yet, P's act was a 
a wilful act, but not a wrongful act. Lord Diplock, in his character­
isation of one meaning of 'wilfully', appears to have taken 'to will' 
in the sense of meaning, simply, "to bring about", but not "knowingly 
to bring about intended or foreseeable consequences." I have drawn 
attention to Garratt purely to show that if a minor did not have
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knowledge of what it was he was doing, or that he lacked the re- t V 
quisite intention for legal wrongfulness, his act was, therefore, v/ 
a voluntary act simpliciter. By removing the predicates, 'malicious' 
and 'intentional', one removes both a legal object and the legal cate­
gory of wrong, and is left with the residue: to have acted wilfully; ;
/ This may yield the odd sentence form of, D willed, . .", indicating ;
that D did not have an object in mind, and further adding that because
D did not have an object in mind D was not, however, at fault for not v
having an object in mind when he willed. Lord Diplock depicts this J 
sense of willing as a narrow sense, and excludes this sense from his 
understanding of 'wilfulness' under the Children and Young Persons Act>f. 
1933.* j
; What kind of wilfulness then must be predicated of E> for an ; 
offence under the Act ? Lord Diplock held that the actus reus of the 
offence of wilful neglect is the failure to provide the prescribed care. 
But then he goes on to describe 'wilful' in this fashion: * . ’•: >
"Such a failure as it seems to me could not be v- //v*.;’.-' 
/ properly described as 'wilful* unless the parent either ;
, (1) had directed his mind to the question whether there
was some risk (though it might fall far short; of proba- 
; , v bility) that the child's health might suffer unless he . - •>
;; were examined by a doctor and provided with such curative, ; • :
treatment as the examination might reveal as necessary,
. and had made a conscious decision, for whatever reason,
* . to refrain from arranging for such medical examination, ’
• or (2) had so refrained because he did not care whether f v
,/  ^ ; the child might be i n  need of medical treatment or not." s :
* It is quite beside the point that the case was remanded for a further 
hearing, affirmed on a second appeal that the minor was liable for in­
juries he caused: Garratt y . Dailey (1956) 49 Wash.2d 499,304 P.2d 681.
14. Sheppard, 904-d-e. ■ v•,’*■ '*v: v,;V v; , i
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The second disjunct invited a finding of recklessness. But what of 
the first ? Can one wilfully intend what one does not know ? If • ' y; -’./7 
one does,not know of the existence of a risk, and the lack of knowledge 7 
is through or because of no fault pf one's, own ( thus excluding that D 
may be 'reckless' ), what state of mind must D possess to be found 
to have 'wilfully' phi-ed at criminal law ? .• It had been stated [at 7> 7 
904-f] that negligence was a civil concept, and that the conditions . 
which governed the use of that concept were not to be imported into the 
criminal law. At this point, Lord Diplock introduced a further dis­
tinction between 'neglect' and 'negligence': ’ : 7 ;
"The danger of the statement is that it invites r. : y 
confusion between...neglect and...negligence, which calls 
for consideration not of what steps should have been taken •
for that purpose in the light of the facts as they actually
y were but of what steps would have been appropriate in the 7 7/yy
light of those facts only which the accused parent either 
, ,y knew at the time of his omission to take them or would have
ascertained if he had been as mindful of the welfare of his :
child as a reasonable parent would have been. "7 ; 7 7 7
The complicated distinction is made in reference to R. v. Senior C which 7 :
excerpt is below ). The criticism Lord Diplock makes of Lord Russel1,CJ,7
is that 'wilfully' as described by the Victorian Chief Justice seemed ,• >
to explain 'wilfully' in terms of positive acts only, acts which, thought
Lord Diplock, would now be described as 'voluntary*. But he then proceeds
l5v Sheppard, 905-e-f. , , ' •
* R. v. Senior,[1899] 1 QB 283 at 290-91; [1895-99] All ER Rep 511, 514: 
.7 '"Wilfully" means that the act is done deliberately and in- 7
tentionally, not by accident or inadvertence, but so that the 
mind of the person who does the act goes with it. Negledt is 
7  . / the want of reasonable care— that is, the omission of such
. y steps as a reasonable parent would take, such as are usually
y :7 taken in the ordinary experience of mankind..." -
V; : ; to make this observation as a criticism of Lord Russell CJ's de- ^
finition of 'wilfully ': *•/>* V, / /7:7„;-/. 7-7.77,7 V-.' • /• 7
v v t  .j .7 'V Lord Russell CJ's brief explanation of the 777' 7;';
. , v  7.7 ;  ^meaning of 'wilfully ' is confined to positive , 7 ■
v'V V:f ■v" physical-acts. In relation to these he equiparates 
77 V; ; ; 7 .. ;7. 7 •. wilful acts with acts that would now be described ,
t . a voluntary. I do not myself think that this was I1
: / : . right even in relation to positive physical acts ; \
v. > : 7 V ; of which the statutory definition included the
v. 7-;-7. ■ characteristic that they were;likely ' t o .have cer- 7 • '■ '
y '■:■■■ ■' 77 tain consequences; but itsmeaning in relation to ; " v X
‘I P V j ;• ' V-po'sitive acts is clear. I find its meaning ob­
' v ’■ '■ scure, however, in r e l a t i o h t o  ; a f ai lure ■ . : .77.7 7 T
. : ; to do a physical act There -the ..failure is,'7. ■; J 7. ,7 :7 'V'v
y\! 7 •. 7.7 /, v' ' not deliberate or intentional in -the- sense ; . ;T. 77.7 7777
7-;; : that consideration has been given whether ; ;. " 7V ;77
t '7 ’7; (V 7' 7 ■' . Tor not to d o ' I t . and .a.;',conscious ; choice made — 7
; ,:V  -77 7':7‘7V not to do it, To 'speak of the mind going -.7 . V t ;7-:777
:;7. with the act is inappropriate to ..omissions i>. 7 .
. . .. but the contrast drawn between 'deliberately and in- ••••’.• / r  ^ j
’7 777--'’.... \,t ,...7 - tentional ly.' and 'by inadvertence' is at/least 7 7  .7-.
' 7 susceptible of the meaning that if the accused has ; v 7
not addressed his mind to the question whether or ;7 ; t 7 777777/: 
not to do the physical act he is accused of omitting V 7- 7 77;. ,7-:' '.7^c 7 
7 to do his failure to do the act is not to be treated 7 : / t
7 777 7 7 " '7 7 as; 'wilful*. [italics, mine] 7 • 7 '• '..;V 7 / - v .7 ••'•7 •77777/ 7 VvV.
7; 7 ; ■ 7 7. Neglectful conduct is not a novel category, nor is it a novel 7777*77­
7 ; ’ category that harmful consequences may flow from neglectful- conduct 7 ^
; v That conduct, as Lord Diplock appreciated, may be subject to civil .77 7 7V
• 7 and/or criminal classifications, but, he stated, the categories must:7>T 7777/777
7 7-7.7/. not be confused. The measure of responsibility in civil law is not
. : • 7' 7 that of criminal law [904-e] .7 But it will be apparent to one on re- 7,.7;777 ^  7,7:
7 flexion that 'neglect' and 'harmful conduct* can admit of a number of \
• 77 • 7. 7 logical and epistemic qualifications, -and in Sheppard the mind of the - V7"7--v7'77
; ; majority was to explore those qualifications. \
16. Sheppard, 905-f-h. . :
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In the preceding passage, Lord Diplock appears to be arguing
that the contrast between 'deliberately and intentionally' and 'by y
inadvertence' does not exhaust the ways in which fault or harm may yyyXx
come about. For example, assume that D is under an obligation to P ; ;;
(which obligation is defined by statute, just as an Act defines tfie J;
obligation in Sheppard), and if the obligation is not correctly dis- ; A
charged, harm may come to P. Do the polarities, 'deliberately and X
intentionally' and 'by inadvertence1 exhaust the logical ways in which 
P may be harmed by D ? What of the logical possibility that P is harmed* 
but D, to the best of ability, either did not know that such harm could 
come about, or would come about ? In the first edition of his Criminal
Law, Glanville Williams stated: "Wilfulness in criminal law implies ■
knowledge of the circumstances that are relevant to the offence." *
17. CRIMINAL LAW, The General Part, by Glanville Williams ( London: 
Stevens § Sons Limited: 1953 ), Chapter 5, MENS REA AS AFFECTED 
BY IGNORANCE OF FACT, at s-(39), "Application of the rule to star 
tutory crimes requiring wilfulness", page 115. In a footnote upon 
this sentence, Professor Williams added:"In civil proceedings for 
maintenance it has been assumed that there may be a wilful refusal 
to maintain if the refusal is based upon reasonable mistake: see 
Chilton v. Chilton [1952] P. 196. But this point has not been ex­
pressly decided, and whatever may be the civil law it is submitted 
that the reasonableness of the mistake is hot in issue in criminal .
. proceedings. Cp. Dept, of Agriculture v, BurkeT191512 I.R. at 140: 
" 'Wilfully' means ’intentionally,’ 'not by inadvertence or mis­
take.' " The observation remained substantially the same in the 2nd, 
enlarged edition of his work (1961), as Chapter 5, §-(53), page 142!
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77 The possible confusion in the passage [905-f-h] is that :
'by inadvertence1 could admit of two distinct meanings. On the one '
hand it may simply mean, "not knowingly"; on the other hand it may
mean, "not knowingly" but the omission was a culpable omission. In r
each case there is no appeal either to intention or to deliberation, y
Both are omissions, one of which is a wrongful omission. In one sense
fault may be predicated of. D for his inadvertence because the condition
of his having omitted to do ( or observe, know, anticipate, realise,
etc. ) is a wrongful omission. An early example in the texts was the
18.Elizabethan statute compelling church attendance, 
partj 7 7 ; V7‘ ; -7"; rt'W 7 .77’ 7 7,7^ 7 -.. 77, v •
It read, in
. "And that from and after/the said Feast of . , / 7  ’ .
• '• • ; ^the Nativity' of Saint John Baptist next com- -7 7 >;7 i'777;/;;^ 7'777;
. 7 ing,7 all and every person and person inhabi-
, ting Within this Realm or any other the Queens • *7 7; 7; 7
7 7 7 Majesties Dominions, shall diligently and faith- V " 7 7  7
  fully, having no lawful or reasonable excuse to ■- 77.77,7. -y- 7 .;
7'7- . 7 7 . be absent, endeavour themselves to resort W 7 7 7  ' 7; 7 777 V;* 7-77:77
■7;7.7 their Parish Church or Chappel accustomed•.. 7 7  7 7; 7
> upon every Sunday and other day ordained and • - 7 777:7y
7 used to be kept as holy-days; and then and 7.7777'' -7
there to abide orderly and soberly during the 7 /,y 7 .7 7>7 7 7 7 7 ' ; 7 7  
7 \ time of the Common Prayer... there to be used 7.7 ■'-'7;7V;;7777'-- 7 V
7" 7-7 ' ■ : and ministered upon pain of punishment. .7"- 7 .7 7' - 77— 7 7 7  7’
D Certainly could, by inadvertence, not know that one day of the week .
were a Holy Day of obligation; and were the inadvertence supported by
a lawful excuse, no penalty would lie upon him under the statute; but 777
if the inadvertence were not supported by a lawful excuse, he would be 777
subject to penalty. An unwilful and indeliberate omission may either 7 7
be excused because of non-culpable ignorance, or be punished because of
culpable ignorance. This simply reinstates an old position from moral
18. Stat. 1, Eliz, cap. 2., Sect. 8, in: THE LAWS...EXPLAINED, by William
* Cawley (LONDON, for John Wright, MDCLXXX). p-26. [Wing No.:C-1651c]
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theology on the nature of ignorance in relation to an act ( and 'act* 
may be that which D does, or that which D refrains from doing-— remi- 
niscent of the position adopted by Thomas Aquinas that to refrain from 
doing could be viewed as a positive of act of the Will, or, in modern 
language, the positive act which one enunciates when one says, *'No. *' ).
If, then, the language of the Act required a ’wilful neglect*, 
and not simply a 'neglect' of the well-being of a child, to explain 
'wilfully' has involved an agreed upon understanding of a relation­
ship which obtains between acts of willing and acts of understanding.
If 'to will’ ±s a concept distinct in features from 'to know* (or 
’to deliberate', etc. ), then it is possible to consider that if XyX- 
knowledge is absent when one wills, and if the absence of the knowledge 
is riot a fault, then one cannot at once be innocently wilful and wrong - 
ly knowledgeable. To be able to wilfully neglect, if one has nbt the 
conditions to satisfy 'neglect1 , 'wilfully' then functions solely as 
an adverb modifying nothing— It modifies no state of knowledge of the 
agent. : • ;A yX;Xy AA ' •: Ayy-Xx X:y -'Ay y ':Ay ;;\v A yy. .X.;y ;,--y yXy
* NOTE: The difficulty may be one of grammatical form by which to
characterise a negative act. When one utters or states, "No, I 
will not go, or do this...etc.", it is not a statement about ability; 
it is a statement about what one will not do, even though orie is capa­
ble of doirig. A pianist, after giving a recital, may refuse to play 
further for ail encore. He is not imable to play; the recital demon- * 
stratedthat fact; he now no longer wishes to play further. It may 
be that negative statements, in some fashion, must be understood. X X 
They are not simply statements which report perceptive states. But y 
some, of course, may report a perceptive state, as when a mule will 
not move, and one can actively perceive that the animal will not move 
; by noting its resistance* X* VA; v-y . y X XX- • ' X'X ' -
-556
Placing these conditions in logical order then led Lord
Diplock to conclude that the pToper instruction concerning the Act 
18 awould be: *
" ’The proper direction to be given to a jury 
on a charge of wilful neglect of a child under s 1 
of the Children and Young Persons Act 1933 by fail­
ing to provide adequate medical aid is that the jury 
must be satisfied (1) that the child did in fact 
need medical aid at the time at which the parent is 
charged with failing to provide it ( the actus reus ) 
and (2) either that the parent was aware at that 
time that the child's health might be at risk if it 
was not provided with medical aid or that the parent's 
unawareness of this fact was due to his not caring 
whether his child's health was at risk or not (the 
mens rea )•"
By answering the general point of law in this way, Lord Diplock felt
confident that parents would not be encouraged to neglect their chil-
"...it would involve the acquittal of those 
parents only who through ignorance or lack of in­
telligence are genuinely unaware that their child's 
health may be at risk if it is not examined by a 
doctor to see if it needs medical attention;", v.
Lord Edmund-Davies, of the majority, believed that the long
series of ceases from R. v. Senior [1899] 1 QB 283; [1895-9] All E.R.
Rep. 511 down to R. v. Lowe [1973] 1 All E.R. 805; [1973] QB 702, had
all made one central mistake when elaborating upon crimes of wilful
neglect: to wit: "By attaching no importance to the mental ingredient
of wilfulness, R. v . Lowe and all similar decisions must, in my'respect-
20 •ful judgment, be regarded as wrongly decided." * And, if it is not 
appreciated that the adverb, 'wilfully', qualifies 'neglect', then
18.a Sheppard, 906-j-907-a. 19. Ibid., 906-g-h.
20. Ibid., 908-g.
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the offence would be read as one of strictest liability wherein one 
would be guilty of the offence if the harm occurred by inadvertence,
without regard for those qualifications which would excuse the in- .XX X
■ • X. • . 21 t-‘- • ’’ : - S'--*' ■ V, • --V 'X‘. - Cv/'advertence. * And, as Lord Diplock had seen, this would be to have.
imported the standards of the civil law for negligence into the criminal
law. : h . ; XX X X xX V . : : " X ;.‘X • ’X'X XXX'--'
Lord Keith put the matter in simpler language on behalf of
the majority. He agreed that the Act in question deemed an offence , .
of wilful neglect to require the adequate mens rea on the part of D.
Here is what he said of 'wilful': ‘ ■ *XXX>X vx. ..XX'- XX':.
, "The primary meaning of 'wilful ' is del iberate.
So a parent who knows that his child needs medical X , 
care and deliberately, that is by conscious decision, vX . xX^XXi 
, refrains from calling a doctor, is guilty under the 'XXx
: subsection [of the Act]., As a matter of general prin- . ;XX
; f ciple, recklessness is to be equiparated with deliberation.
A parent who fails to provide medical care which his ,;X X Xv 
’ child needs because he does not care whether it is needed r /
or not is reckless of his child's welfare. He too is X 
X'xX'X;X guilty of an offence. But a parent who has genuinely ;;;-XXX
• failed to appreciate that his child needs medical care, :
’ through personal inadequacy or stupidity or both, is : '-XXXXXX
. ' ; . not guilty." X'.' •_ -X X X X X / X ' X  X;-Xx X." X' XX XXxXXXX- XxX.
This is further reinforced when, at 914-e-f, of the same opinion he ,vX X;
stated in criticism of R .. Downes (1875) 1 QBD 25 : .-/X.,X '‘X x • X 'X' ' X.XX
; X ; ‘ ; "Lord Coleridge CJ said (at page 30) : 'By wilfully . :
neglecting, I understand an intentional and deliberate ab­
staining from providing the medical aid, knowing it to be 
^ obtainable.' I have difficulty in understanding how the
X abstention could be intentional and deliberate if the ac-
• X . cused did not appreciate that medical aid was heeded. It X
21. Sheppard, 908-b. X ' .'X-/ '■>.- ■.
22. Ib id ., 914-a-b. . . /X X . 'X X 'X' . . X ' V - v . X>; X: X V X  x X X - v
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"It seems clear that, the court proceeded wholly 
on the irrelevance of the accused’s motive for not pro­
viding medical aid. None of these cases show any trace 
of an attempt to face up to the proper application of 
the law to the situation, where no question of motive is 
• in issue, but where the accused's failure to provide medical
care is due to inability, through stupidity or ignorance,
. to appreciate the need for it. So in my opinion it is an
error to treat anything decided or said in these cases 
as authoritative in that situation. I consider that the 
Court of Appeal fell into that error in R. v. Lowe..."
It does not require damaging paraphrasing to suggest that the House of ; 
Lords, in this opinion of its majority, had returned to older concepts 
of an act done or omitted to be done owing to ignorance, which state 
of ignorance is without fault, and also of a concept of the Will in 
which it was assumed that unless the Will was qualified, or related 
•to, knowledge, one could not predicate of D that he had wilfully phi-ed. 
The movement of the opinion of the majority was carefully to rule out 
intentional states, recklessness, and maliciousness, and to concentrate 
solely upon this problem and an answer to it: Can D be said tc have com­
mitted an unlawful act of wilful neglect if D could not, at the same 
time, have 'wilfully* 'neglected' to phi ? The reasoning of the majority 
had gone beyond the concept of, 'to have a lawful excuse.' The reasoning 
of the majority was to affirm that unless the logical conditions were
present in D, the offence could not then be attributed to D. One can
23with some ease apply the older theological notion * that some forms of 
ignorance excuse:
"1. The first sort of ignorance, which is in­
voluntary, invincible and antecedent, that is, is the 
cause of an action, so that the thing would not be done
23, DUCTOR DUBITANTIUM, or The Rule of Conscience ... by Jeremy
Taylor, D.D.(LONDON: Printed by James Flesher for Richard Royston... 
1660), "Of The Nature and Causes of Good and Evil...The Fourth Book, 
Chap.l., Rule VI, Ignorance does always excuse the fact, or diminish 
the malignity of it, or change the kind and nature of the sinne." p-500.
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v ; \ •' . V. .;/V V "but by that ignorance, does certainly make the , c  ^‘ 
• -’.V’ action also it self involuntary, and consequently '; !
. ; -. not criminal. In this sense is that of the; law,
•* 'yy •; \’rVv, Errantis n u lla  voluntas,- n u llu a  consensus. They j * \
•: that know nothing'-of it, consent not; This is-.
f ’ meant of ignorance that it is involuntary: in all
a**. regards, that is, such as is neither chosen di-:y ;
- ,2 : V • . rectly nor indirectly, but is involuntary both : '.-aX--vX
y '• ;v ;• v* ; ' ;; in the effect and in the cause, Thus-what .fools ¥■ \ Y
 V . and mad-men and infants doe is not at all imputed ' : >
vr ,, ^ - to them, because they have no understanding to
’ . ; discern good from evil, and therefore their ap- 7 ,"
. -.. petite is not deprav'd or malicious which part
: soever they take." •vV :■
:; , : With some qualifications, Taylor's statement admirably fits Sheppard.
yy - Since the defendants seemed ignorant of the arts of the medical needs ; ; ^
'ik . required, they suffered the fate of a d e a t h h e  who in arts erres
. . ;  willingly, can mend it when he please; but so cannot he that erres ig-
r . ; norantly. Ignorance is the onely disparagement of his art, and malice
y is the onely disparagement of our manners." 24 V : :
■ : The minority in Sheppard, Lord Scarman and Lord Fraser, dis- : iy& k&Q
v :• sented. Lord Scarman held that the neglect by the parents in Sheppard: 7
J to provide needed medical care was a fact in the case: 2 * - a I
:■ . "The parents knew that a doctor was available
I" ' ; and would come, if called. They also knew! that their YJ 7 Yk'YYk'Y.
: .y; ; .  J  child was ill, off his food, and that he was totally
;• - y ; rejecting food for the two days before his death.  ^ y-v' . ;
•; : Failure In s-uch circumstances to obtain Y\i<r:
' v£ • ' _ ’:-'y' ' . X \  . medical aid - was .-.clearly?-a' neglect of the chi I d . ' -v:'
y : V k The live issue in the appeal is whether the neglect was v y
• 7 ; - : X 'wilful' i " . . . r : : . v •
' 24. DUCTOR DUBITANTIUM (1660), Bk. IV, Chap. 1. , "What is probable J
'}:•* • ignorance para 16, page 499. . . ■ '■■• . .
25. Sheppard, ‘ 915Ta . -. . ' •: ; •: \ I ■; 'k ' ■ ; . ' I
' •**.*>
560
Lord Scarman thought that the instruction of the trial judge was cor?
rect in law with reference to s 1 of the Children and Young Persons
26.Act 1933. He laid this foundation in support of his dissent:
"In my judgment, the conduct must be intention. 
But the word does not impart into the statutory of­
fence the requirement of foresight or recklessness 
as to the consequences of what was done or not done 
(as the case may b e ) " -7 • ,7-- • -A
In his survey of the history which led to the first enactment of a 
statute to protect children from neglect [the Poor Law Amendment , 
Act 1868 (royal assent, 31st July)*], Lord Scarman believed that the 
purpose of the nineteenth century statute was to defeat the finding 
in R. V. Wagstaffe (1868) 10 Cox CC 530* in which the jury acquitted 
the accused.7 7: •• A - . 7 . • * ; ' > ' y i g 7 .**• 7;‘ Y: 7 7 V /7 7
The facts of the case are simple, but bear mention, a re­
ligious believer# whose child was ill, did not call a physician to 
examine the child. It would be against the faith to have done so. 
Elders of the religious sect were called in to pray for the child. 
The child died. At the trial, Willes J., submitted instructions to
the j ury for the crime of manslaughter because of neglect. Lord
27. 7 7 T-'7;r 7 7/-'Scarman offered this paraphrase, which I cite:
7 v 7 . 7 "In directing the jury Willes <3
said that to make out the offence 'gross and 
culpable negligence1 had;to be proved; and he 
left to the jury the defence that these affec­
tionate parents had done what they honestly be­
lieved Was best for the child." 7 7
One will recall that the majority in Sheppard would have taken this
26. Sheppard, 915-a. • 27. Ibid., 9.16-f.
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kind of instruction to be an appeal to 'motive'.
X ;; The history, then, was that the 1868 statute had b^en passedX/ 
Then came the case of R. v. Downes (1875) 1 QBD is. X I have turned to X 
the report of the case itself for fuller details. It was a reserved X, 
case, alternatively reported in 13 Cox C.C. Ill for 1875. The prisoner 
had been indicted in Central Criminal Court for the manslaugher of ;" . 
Charles Downs, his son. Once again the prisoner was a member of a re­
ligious sect. , In paragraph *7' of the reported decision it was stated
; '•' X:" 28 • ’ ■ '.«*• * '>• • ’ • . ' ■>.XX iX X'-Xthat the prisoner, - * .. .. X ‘ X • xXx'X X - X  X/X '; // X'..:X * XX-;X.- X.
Xm'X-X;*'- x ;:; X" //. X * .consulted the witness Hurry as/ towhatX/X/'X/./Xx/ 
i . was the matter with the child, and as to what should X . : ;
be given to it. They thought it was suffering from / XX ■ X-X 
. 'teething; and he advised the parents to give it port X
wine, eggs, arrowroot, and other articles of diet which X
; . he thought suitable for a child suffering from such aX’X X'XxX'Z
:: X x complaint, all of which were supplied accordingly. X XX/X/x
X ‘"10/ It was admitted on the part of the prosecution ; X/ X 
. : . that the child was kindly treated, kept clean, furnished X X
. with sufficient food, and nursed kindly by the mother and X/ XX
and the women of the sect. *,: .... X,'  ^ ' -'X V:X '■.X / ’■ " X ' XX'X/X'''
" 1 5 . 1  told the jury [ie, Blackburn J,] that the law casts
: on the father who has the custody of a helpless infant a X'xX/X'Z
X duty to provide according to his ability all that is rea- X
sonably necessary for the child, including, if the child 
is so ill as to require it, the advice of persons reason­
ably believed to havb competent medical skill, and that if XX > 
death ensues from the neglect of this duty it is manslaughter n 
••XX 'X in the father neglecting the duty." / X: ^
Written instructions and questions were submitted to the jury by Black­
burn J., for the sake of making clear their verdict, and for protecting 
the status of the prisoner who had appeared without the benefit of coun­
sel. XX. : 'X-x ••‘.X/ X, XZ'XX. ! ■ ;: X  XX'X/;X/;//..: vX;X:;XX
28. Downes, 13 Cox. C.C. Ill; (1875) 1 QBD 25. X X Z XX -
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The jury convicted. Paragraph ?16' is of interest: y
' :• V. 7 O  7' "16. Did the prisoner neglect to procure medical
; • aid for the helpless infant when it was in fact .. 7
v'-V.v 7; reasonable so to do, and he had the ability ,? 777v A77777
■: 7;" ■; 7 -7 v . v V  A-7
. • 7 7 "Was the death caused by that neglect ?\ 7 7. \ ’ : .j.1--;.
— YES
If one looks at this case carefully, adverting to its language, one '"V/AvA
will find that it does not precisely sustain the minority reasoning in ;; ; ;7
Sheppard. First of all,; after the judgment of Blackburn, J., one ?
reads the other opinions appended. Mellor, J, stated, " The words
of the section "wilfully neglect" mean intentionally or purposely t
omit to call in medical aid." and then he adverted both to Wagstaffe
and R. v. Hines Cn.d.j, 13 Cox C.C. 114, as a note. .
29. Hines is a long note, but its reasoning bears upon Sheppard, and I .
wish to cite a great portion of Hines. * j
"Reg. VwHines was an indictment against Hines for unlawfully endangering 
the life of his child, aged two years, by omitting to provide proper and V  C 7
sufficient medicine." Pigott, B., after hearing argument, and the cita- / 777=77- 
tions to cases [ Reg. y. Smith, 8 C§P; Reg. v . Hurry, Central Criminal 7
Court Reports, vol 76, p. 63 ] said; " I am of opinion that there is no :f:; ;
case to go to the juj^ r ®f *•$'* crime; I think it is one of those cases A ;7;A y A  
in which a parent, instead of being guilty of anything like culpable neg- , .
ligence, has done everything that he believed to be necessary for the yy/ /yA?. 
good of his child. That he may be one of those who have very perverted ; ; >77 
views and very superstititiOus views. ..may be perfectly true; but- that V/VA 
there is anything in the nature of a duty neglected, that is, a duty' : -y '
which he believed or knew to be such...does not show. On the contrary, V  
he believed his duty to be in the direction in which he acted, and he .7 ’/A/A; 
carried out that duty to the utmost of his ability.. He may altogether 
have mistaken what his duty was; still I believe it was an honest mistake. 7 .7 
It may be an ignorant mistake, in all probability it is the result of ig- 7 i 
norance and superstition, but certainly there is not a trace of anything 7 : > 
Tike an intentional omission of duty or a culpable omission of duty within • 
the meaning of that expression as used in the criminal law....But I am '.-7V 
clearly of opinion that no judge sitting in a Criminal Court, without any 7y 
direction or enactment Of the Legislature, would be justified in saying .
that a parent who exercised his best judgment, though a perverted one, A  7'777=A 
In dealing with his child by nursing and care instead of calling in :a'77;";' /7; 
doctor.. .was guilty of criminal negligence." y 7 > V. 7 7: :  T 77v 7 ,777'vT7
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It had been observed by Mellor, J., that Baron Pigott 
had not had called to his attention the statute of 31 § 32 Viet, 
c. 122, s.37. It may advanced that had the statute been called > 
to his attention, Would it have altered his reasoning in the miat- - - 
ter ? . •;V.- v -•
Coleridge, C. J., in Downes said that but for the statute 
(to which reference was just made) he would have desired further 
argument in the case, and added: "Perhaps it is enough to say that 
the opinions of Willes,J., and Pigott, B., are deserving of grave 
consideration." He said that he understood the statute to require 
conviction if any parent wilfully neglected to provide ( inter alia )
needed medical aid, stating: ' ^
J y y y "That enactment I understand to mean X y /
that if any parent intentionally, i.e., with the 
knowledge that medical aid is to be obtained, and ■
with a deliberate intention abstains from providing 
it, he is guilty of the offence. Under that enactment .f;: 
upon these facts the prisoner would clearly have been 
: y ; guilty: of the ''offence, created by, it. If the death
of a person results from the culpable omission of a .
. breach of duty created by the law, the death so caused ^
? v y is the subject of manslaughter.. In this case there U y
y was a duty imposed by the statute on the prisoner to •:
provide medical aid for his infant child, and there was 
the deliberate intention not to obey the law; whether 
. •"< proceeding from a good or bad motive is not material."
But it takes little appreciation to realise that Sheppard did not ;
involve ’motive’, nor did it involve one who intentionally disobeyed
the law. Lord Diplock’s minute analysis of the case disposed of this
tact. y 7"y ,t; y:- y:/;;\ '.’X7 ; ''yyy '• y: yyy:y
30. Downes, 13 Cox C.C. 114; (1875) 1 QBD at 29. ?
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X ; X * • X Following directly upon Coleridge , CJ1s, opinion was that
v X of Bramwell, B, who. viewed the statute as one which,
XV X X 'X. .has imposed a positive and absolute duty ;• XX:
duty on parents, whatever their conscientious or 
; ; ; superstitious opinions may be, to provide medical X
X aid for their infant children in their custody. The
X facts show that the prisoner thought it was irre- X .
X ligious to call in medical aid, but that is no ex-
• V V V ' \ X *  cuse for not obeying the law.11 ;V •.'X : '  X X X  x -  X X X  '
Once again it may be observed that in Sheppard the accused did not
wish to disobey the law; furthermore, the statute (1933) imposed
criminal liability, but not absolute liability for neglect. Lord
Diplock showed that the standards cf liability from Tort law were
not, or ought to be, applicable in the case. Bramwell, B., it may
be remarked, had not analysed so much as he had affirmed or stated;
The locution, 'to impose an absolute duty upon1, is more reminis-
X  x .  cent of early Tort theories. X X / X X x X X v / X  • Z X ’ X  V" X v X s j * ' v . /  X x X  x / X ,
X V  R. v. Senior/ which the majority in Sheppard disaffirmed,
XX was another religious sect case in which the father did not provide
needed medical aid for a dying child, knowing the child to be in aid
■ XX'v of medical care and attention. The father of the child, who died from
diarrhoea and pneumonia, believed that the New Testament passage in
X James, c.5, verses 14-15> forbade seeking physicians to cure the ill,
believing, instead, that prayer alone was sufficient to cure physical
ills. The parent did not realise that the verse pertained to 'moral'
;V  • illness and not physical illness. X*.X XX ;.XXf X-.X: -X;'X- -XXx XXXXX-.-i
Lord Russell of Killowen, CJ, thought that the prisoner was
rightly convicted, and stated that he dissented entirely from the view
expressed by Pigott, B., in Hines. The meaning of 'wilfully neglects'
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was: 31.
. ”...’wilfully* means done deliberately and not by
■ ]’ inadvertence, and ’neglect ’ the omission to do some!-?
thing for the benefit of the child— -in .other words,
. intentional failure to take those steps which the : ; n
experience of mankind show to be generally necessary.”
He proceeded to sketch two hypothetical cases. What if the child 
had a broken thighbone and needed in operation, or, What if an in- 
farit need a tracheptomy to prevent its suffocating* were a parent V; 
to deny medical aid in either case it would then be a clear case 
of wilful neglect on the part of the parent. ; ' !
; Again, the examples do not address the problem in Sheppard. 
Senior provided an analysis of ’wilful neglect’ which flowed from 
D having been aware that medical aid was needed, and D consciously 
refused to provide such medical aid. The facts in Sheppard did not 
show that the parents were aware that medical aid was needed, they : 
believing that the child's illness was Slight or passing. Lord Dip­
lock ’s objection [905-g] that Lord Russell, CJ's analysis of omission 
was incorrect. Lord Scarman seemed not to appreciate the force of 
this distinction, preferring to state that if a harm ensued ( the 
death of a child ) it must be taken as a neglect, and that neglect 
then must impute that it was a wilful neglect. With respect, the 
logical analysis is faulty, and it seemed not to address itself to 
distinction concerning 'wilful’ which Lord Diplock had advanced. It 
may also be seen that Lord Scarman assumed that a statute could have 
the force of ’policy', and that as a policy it would teach parents •; 
how to obey, drawing upon Johnsonian language that penalities sharpen
31. R. y, Senior, [1895-99] All E.R. Rep., C.C.R. 514; ; ;
V v
.".V: v:!
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one’s wits: 32.
"I do not share the. view expressed by my ; ^ ^  ?
. noble and learned friends Lord Edmund-Davies 
: y and Lord Keith that parents who though not : ; ; v;  ^ :
reckless or indifferent to their child’s wei- ' \  ^ Yfiy:" " 0
7 . fare yet fail through stupidity or immaturity . : i y y
.to appreciate the need for medical aid will not . 
be deterred by a criminal sanction. They under­
rate, with respect, the. deterrent power of the . v’ ' • ;4y;'.yr'
,» law. TTie existence of a penalty can concen- j. \
y y y y trate and sharpen the minds of men and women. , y
It is for this reason that in some exceptional r 7: : ;
: areas the law accepts strict liability.”  ^  ^ y yy
Lord Fraser, in a vigourous dissent, also thought that 
the Act (1933) imposed strict liability based upon objective evi­
dence. He cautioned, 'v;*; y VJkJ £;* v.< H>'*.
; /,' yy y y; y1 . • : ' y ■. "If the offence required proof that" yO/; ;/•’"yyiy^yXy
the particular parents were aware of the probable 
y > consequences of neglect, then the difficulty of proof /..•'••X
y against stupid or feckless parents would certainly be! y y"\ .;y
? increased and so I fear might the danger to their ,
, /; children... .Especially in these; times when parental -y^yy y
. , responsibility for children tends to be taken all. too ' - ’ --y
•. lightly,such a sharp change towards relaxation of the 'XjY J-YkY 
law on the subject seems to me appropriate only for 
\ the legislature and not for the courts.’’
; yy : y What this excursion into linguistic analysis of a -central'- - 'y: y'X^y.yy
concept, that of *wilful neglect*, may reveal is that legal analysis
when it pursues the logic of a concept may show a hitherto unperceived
logical ground in the concept. Lord Diplock, by pursuing a model that
’wilfully’, as an adverb, cannot modify an omission when the omission
is the result of non-culpable ignorance, revealed a new dimension to y?
the term, ’wilfully’. He drew upon a much older notion that some forms
32. Sheppard, 918-c. 33. Sheppard, 913-a-c.
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of ignorance can negative both intent and wilfulness. He also X 
demonstrated how, if properly understood ^  *, the language of mens 
rea, is still a proper language in which to cast discussions about 
omissions, and the logic peculiar to omissions. The obviousness 
of statements about 'wilful', and their cognates, is not, after all,X X  
so obvious at all. And, in another sense, he demonstrated that the - 
reasoning in R. v. Hines, though not mentioned in the body of his 
.speech,; was'sound* XX.X . -XX' .* V  X •; XXX:, X..X' XX•'•'X- .
” . One may advert to a recent case to show that from inadvertence
one may not necessarily deduce recklessness: R. v. Stone, and R. v . Do-
/ X X - 35.. • • ; X x X: x  ;X :-XX; :• X X  ,x. XX'X' X  -v . -
binson. Neither were cited in Sheppard. .Both show that sound law is 
based upon a sound and logical analysis of concepts, not upon the mere/ 
foisting upon the members of a polity a policy ( because the logic of 
the law would so prevent the policy ) to achieve social ends. Reason,
I would wish to argue, creates equals; policy creates ranks and sub­
ordinates. . ;r - •. - ’xX-'X-X ' ''XX\XXX;y-
The facts in Stone and Dobson were these. A and B lived to­
gether. A was a man aged 67, of low but average intelligence; B was; X 
his mistress, aged 43, who was. an inadequate and ineffectual person I 
To this household comes F,: sister of A, to. live with them. X F was aX/XX 
a woman in her fifties who was morbidly afraid of gaining weight; thus,
34. In his searching article, Professor Graham Hughes argued that 
the language of the law in which the logic of omissions was understood 
was not compelling, and was often confusing. He felt that mens rea 
was a notion inappropriate to the logic of omissions. With his state­
ment I would disagree, however helpful I found his research to be. The 
opinion of Lord Diplock in Sheppard is strong proof for my position.
Cf., CRIMINAL OMISSIONS, by Graham Hughes, The Yale Law Review [Vol.
67: 1958, pp 590-637.] 'v\  : V / X
35. [1977] 2 All E».R. ,(C.A.) 341 > heard as one case/X X/: y v X X V X X
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F was not wont to eat food or to caTe for herself. The village in 
which these parties resided knew that F resided with A and B , and all 
of the locals worried that F might become ill through self-neglect, and 
thus urged A and B to care for her (F). A and B, however much aware  ^
of the deteriorating condition of F, failed nevertheless to attend to 
and for her in any materially significant way. F died in squalid con-; 
ditions in the house of A and B to whence originally she had come to ; 
lodge. , ' :,V; ‘V
r , ^ In dismissing the appeal of the joint appellants, the Court
of Appeals let stand the convictibns for manslaughter. In their ap- ,
peal the had, jointly, contended that they had not undertaken a duty - 
to care for F, or, if a duty were found by the court, they contended V  
that they had npt been reckless in their discharge of the duty. As 
to the first footing of the defence, the Court that the circumstances X
of the case demonstrated that F had come to them as a helplessly in-L :
firm person,, and that A and B could have discharged themselves of that 
duty either by summoning outside social agencies, or by themselves 
caring for F . * The Court found that they had assumed the duty of care, 
and that the model from standard Tort law, ie., of not having to rescue 
a drowning swimmer, did not apply. A and B had undertaken some duties- 
with regard to F; furthermore, F was a blood relation of A. V,
To prove recklessness, the Court turned to the words of Lord 
Atkin in Andrews v. P.P.P.[19571 2 All E.R. 552 at 556; [1937] AC 576 
at 583: V - V ’ ; v ’ ‘ • •; > ’ " : '■ : , '■
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" Simple lack of care such as will constitute civil 
liability is not enough. For purposes of the crimi­
nal law there are degrees of negligence, and a very 
high degree of negligence is required to be proved 
before the felony is established. Probably of all 
the epithets that can be applied feckless'’ most 
nearly covers the case. It is difficult to visualize 
a case of death caused by "reckless" driving, in 
the connotation of that term in ordinary speech, 
which would not justify a conviction for manslaugher, 
but it is probably not all-embracing, for "reckless" 
suggests an indifference to risk whereas the accused 
may have appreciated the risk and intended to avoid 
it, and yet have shown in the means adopted to avoid 
the risk such a high degree of negligence as would 
justify a conviction."
Drawing upon this statement of legal principles, the Court of Ap­
peal in Stone and Dobinson then described why such reasoning ought
, ■ ■ 36to apply jointly to A and B in the instant case: *
"It is clear from that passage that in­
difference to an obvious risk and appreciation of such 
risk, coupled with a determination nevertheless to run 
it, are both examples of recklessness.i» The duty which a defendant has undertaken is a duty 
of caring for the health and welfare of the infirm per­
son. What the Crown has to prove is a breach of that 
duty in such circumstances that the jury feel convinced 
that the defendants conduct can properly be described 
as reckless. That is to say a reckless disregard of 
danger to the health and welfare of the infirm person. 
Mere inadvertence is not enough. The defendant mus t be 
proved to have been indifferent to an obvious risk of 
injury to health, or actually to have foreseen the risk 
but to have determined nevertheless to run it."
Leave was given to appeal to the House of Lords on the question:
36. Stone and Dobinson, 347-f-h.
" !*V ;•***•: "Whether in acase of manslaughter it is necessary; ' '
:’x‘ r ; .'-,,7 to prove that the defendant was. reckless as to %7 • X  X X X
1 whether the,victim .Would ;suffer death or serious vx'vX VX 7 7.7 
x . -  ,’ : X X  bodily harm'." O ' * X - X  •' ’ X . - .  ' : ' y ; r  X  .• ' O ' x
XX: but the appeal was not argued. ' /V./ >;♦;V v - ' J ^ :fX*V .i-i
.*• 1 ; ; It may be remarked, and in no wise do I wish to be ■ / ; j
t .l paradoxical ., that all of the criminal law concerns omissions: :X>X.^,XXX
: . ; namely, of D omitting to follow the law.y T d  suggest that there
? ^ is something inherently unresol vable about the logic-of legal.' . •: cv :f- .
: discourse Which surrounds criminal omissions is to entertain ax- X ; XX O X X  7
; ; ; misperception of the criminal law itself. One may have some Xj-•"
 ^ v difficulty in relating a duty, as defined; by the criminal law,, . ^ ’ xX>V.X
;X\X-.. . and the failure of D to carry out that duty. Sheppard, in Lord ,•;>
X'X 7 X X  Diplock*s acute analysis, did show that a duty may lie, but that X, \X:.-XOX
X . X  • X  there may also be conditions or capacities which D must possess r
X-'-.-r, • ’ ,•. .■ in .order -fbr'- the duty to obtain of. which, itis charged that D • • f x*;/f- X>i*
; -,X, -' wilfully neglected. It is not that D, somehow mysteriously, per- -:XXX7
forms a ’’negative act". One could rightly wonder what such a lo- yx&lZ'kUi
X. X cution signified, just as much as Bertrand Russell, decades ago,. ; .
/; wondered about negative facts, and was rightly puzzled over them. X..7XXX.
 ^ : • By violating the law D, in the first instance, brings about an omission: X X  X
;XX/X.7V 7 namely, he omits to follow the law. In omitting to follow the law he ; v MX
: ,i ; may, in the act of transgressing the law, do so ,by a further omission.
He may omit (say),were he a doctor, to administer his skills with
X-X;XXx:,-Jr-proper- -cafe; he may omit (say)',, were ..he a parent, to care for his 
. X  - ; family; he may omit (say), were he a stockbroker, to furnish proper/..v*
^ ; ; r information required by the Securities and Exchange Commission '(S.E.C.i-XX-X; 7v ;
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about the nature of his stockbroking activities— —was he inflating  ^
stock, was he gaining by ’'insider” dealing, was he requiring propet 
credit margins of his clients, arid the like ? The instances can be 
multiplied with ease in which D omits, and by omitting, he commits a 
crime. The problem for the legal analyst is to determine if some 
classes of omissions are culpable omissions, and this may take care­
ful and rigourous analysis. But the category is not a new category, 
as moral theologians know so well. The novelty of the category at 
law may be to state the conditions and requirements for a wrongful 
omission in clear and understandable legal language, Sheppard being 
a clear example that the task, at times, may be difficult to achieve;
It is not, however,-'.unachievable.- ' * *■ : -v. > y ^
Throughout this study it may have become apparent to a reader 
that legal discourse is different from* but also borrows from, other - 
forms of discourse, such as theology, moral philosophy, and, broadly* 
philosophy itself. Unless one has in front of one case law to analyse,; 
legal discourse can become vapid, arid, tautologous, and senselessly 
abstract. The common law especially does not lend itself to empty sys­
tematizing. In this way, discourse about the common law is both re-
stTicted the need to draw upon the great wealth of recorded cases---
and protected-— by use of the case law one concentrates the mind upon 
(generally) a particular problem. To extract common principles from 
this vast body of 1 aw requires that one work with that vast body of 
law. Economy of expression is not the mark of common law jurisprudence,
There are broad areas into which I have not ventured, 
and one of which specifically I would like to mention. I have 
not discussed what may be called, "psycho-chemistry” and the re­
lation research in such an area would bear to human action in its 
relation to the criminal law. I have chosen to remain silent on 
the area because it is an area not within my competence. It does 
not seem impossible in theory that much of human action in its re­
lationship to serious matters of concern is action which is not 
intentional. The counter-set of intentional, in this instance, is 
not unintentional. The counter-set is that human action may be 
so controlled by behavioural states, which result from bio-chemical 
activities, that what may be seem to be an intentional action under 
a legal description is, in fact, a bio-chemical action brought about 
because of the bio-chemical nature possessed by the agent in whom 
such a bio-chemical occurs. It becomes especially trying for the 
law when it says to D, Listen here, you knew that you had this con­
dition, why then did you not take the proper precautions, or exercise 
proper judgement, to prevent harm being caused to another because of
your unhealth ? It is not only that one is raising a question about
37criminal responsibility and mental illness ', but one is raising 
a far broader and far more ranging question: What of human actions in 
general in their relationship to the criminal law in which it is posited 
that D was not responsible because D could not be responsible, given 
the genetic state of D at time t^ when the offence occurred ?
37. Cf. the thoughtful discussion of the matter by F. A. Whitlock in
^is, Criminal Responsibility and Mental Illness (Butterworths,1963)
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. . It is at this point that how one understands the concept of ;
intention to be will bear upon how one will treat an offender. If, V-X
for instance, one believes that there is no problem between ’intentioii'
and 'free will * , but assumes that one can dismiss the latter as a prob-|
lem worthy of consideration, but stress,: the former, then one can pro- *
duce such obvious oddities as: Yes, D was determined, but he intended
to phi, . never the less; ergo, D is legally guilty because, at law, D'yC-V .
legally intended. The assumption underlying such a position.would be’ y
that if D had the requisite intention, D offended; how the requisite
intention came about would be precluded from inquiry, just as when
one might state that deposit banks are^concerned only with the money .7.
deposited, not with the origins of the money one deposited-— a Swiss v
bank principle. If it means that to have a requisite intention that yiX
one can generate a description of a proscribed act in which an in- ; ‘
tentionai phrase is used, and then that such an intentional phrase can
be attributed to D* then the use of Such an intentional phrase indicates
that D is guilty. The contrary would be assumed equally to be the case:
namely, if an intentional phrase could not be used of D, D would not be
guilty. As one recent moral philosopher wrote: ‘ w. 7 V/.--V
’ : . f^It is hard to see why a man who does something :
y y inexplicably does not really do it. Let us suppose . y ;
that the hardened criminal1s action [ie, of not robbing 
a poor box] really is inexplicable; we can only say, y’He X 
y y : just turned away1, and not why he did so; this does not  ^y ; ;y
38. Cf., "Free Will as Involving Determinism", Chapter iv, pp 62-73, 
in VIRTUES AND VICES, by Philippa Foot, ( published by: Basil 
Blackwell: Oxford: 1978 ), pp 65-6.V y - - : ’ •
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J "mean that he did it by accident, or unintentionally,
H  ' ^ V v pr not of his own free will....In any case, to explain -7/,;
. v  ^ ■ ? 431 action is not necessarily to show that it could have V .
^ \ been predicted from some fact about the agent’s charac-
ter-— that he is weak, greedy, sentimental, and so forth/
' - We may if we like say that an action is never fully ex- ;
; ; plained unless it has been shown to be covered by a law a
 ^ \  ^v which connects. it to such a charactertrait; but then it :
7 / becomes even more implausible to say that an action must
.. \ be explicable if we are to admit it as something genuine­
;; : : / * ly done. In the ordinary sense we explain the criminal’s; 7
; ; ; action if we say, for instance* that a particular thought
0 came into his mind; we do not also have to find a law 7V ;7/7v/a
/ v 7 about the way such thoughts do come into the minds of ••.7 -7, 77777-7
■•rU.77 . >7' ; . such men.” . ;7: / y  7‘ ''•••a'. 7V-7 7. a v7-- /;
;r\ / : . . v It may, indeed, for the sake of theoretical consistency be '
: most important to explain how thoughts do originate. The model which
-;7 the common law has accepted for centuries has been a model, which was .77:7]
derived from Christian theism in which, because of a particular u n d e r - / -7
; ' standing of what was volition and intellection, responsibility could be] \
; predicated of an agent if certain conditions were fulfilled: namely, if - 7
7 : the agent could freely will, and if the agent could be shown to have the / t
capacity to know. It has been a very simple but very persuasive model, 77777
a  : end the common law embraced; it. If, however, only the cognitive aspects
- ' 7 of intention be stressed when expounding criminal liability, it is pos si - j
/; ble in theory that cognition, as a description of human action and as •" 7  .-7;; 7*/
; an element of human nature, could be predicated of non-volitional acts * : ;1
To make necessary formal deductions in a syllogism, of in propositions! . j
7'7, argument, is not impredicable Of an agent unpossessed of free will ( or
■ .., of the voluntary ); it may simply convert to this statement that an agent
i,7-'7 v necessarily made necessary deductions . If the consequences of an act f :
7 7  : are thought to be the measure of an act, there is no contradiction in; 7 7 77
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terms to assert that an agent necessarily reached correct deductions, r
or that an agent freely reached necessary deductions, if, in e a c h v 
case, the necessary deductions were the correct deductions. ; y
T There is a great temptation, if one may personalise the >:
criminal law, for the criminal law to disregard clear statements of 
personal intent and principles, and to fly to policy and to principles 
borrowed (unknowingly, often) from Tort law to justify convictions.
One aim of the criminal sanction is to control behaviour, even, at 
times, when the principles of fairness and justice indicate abatement. i
In the grey areas of the criminal law, what relationship, pertains, or- 
ought to pertain; between it and theories of mind, we have witnessed 
a great hostility on the part of the criminal law to accept less than ?
a cognitive model of human nature and human actions. As Professor 
Whitlock had remarked ’, the English criminal law, and the common law y
in general by implication, assumes that one is responsible for one's 
acts notwithstanding, and evidence or theory to the contrary is treated 
without sympathy; ; >? ' ' : "y*
‘ -* . What I wish to suggest— and I am fully aware that it is a
suggestion only, and not a theory or a postulate or an hypothesis—  , ;
is that it is possible to view human action as, in part, an expression V ‘'4 jf 
of bio-chemical activity. Even if one is fond of philosophical dualism, -
it yet admitted that an area of darkness was the material; substratum.
39. Cf., R. v. Rivett (1950) 34 Court of Criminal Appeal 87; R. v.
Windle, [1952] 2 Q.B. (C.C.A.) 826; R. V. Walden 119591 1 W.L.R.
1008; 3 All E.R. 203; 43 C.A.R. 201 (C.C.A.); Roberts and others 
v. Ramsbottom [1980] 1 All E.R. (QBD) 7; R. v. Spratt [1980] 2 All
- EiR. (C.A.) 269; State v. Crenshaw, 27 Wn.App. 526.
40. Op.cit., Chapter 5, "Mens Rea, Determinism, Free Will and Responsibility, 
\ pp 54-71 X y f-'-Vf.Vv - <v-
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The hylemorphic theories about what relationship obtained, and how, 
between matter and form left the area of ’matter' dark and unexplain­
able. Matter, it will be recalled, was explainable only in its re^; : "
lation to form because 'form' was the natural object of the human in­
tellect. Matter, however, was the condition for dualistic existence. XX 
In language from our own scientific milieu one wquld speak of one’s X  
(possible) genetic predisposition to development. The dative phrase,
"...to development",may be taken to indicate not only a phylogenous: X :
development of a member of a species, it may also be taken to indicate / 7 
what may be the causes which cause a member to act as it does.
X - It must be remembered that the common law grounds its ex - 1 ;
planations of intentional- actions in the agent himself; psycho-chemical 
theory may argue that 'agent* is not a predicative stop; that 'agent' 
is itself a term in need of explanation. Common law discourse uses V*'-X 
the term agent as if it were the ground upon which all predications X 
are to be founded. To have reached agency is to have stopped the ex-. 7
planatory process, ie., the agent acted; full stop, or, the agent in- XXXXXX-
tended; full stop. To suggest that one could have the concept of an ‘ 7
agent, but not at the same time that an agent is responsible because of X 
his status as an agent, is heresy, for the most part, to the common law.41*
>• v 
X X, *
41. Cf., the essay by Lord Devlin. "Mental Abnormality and the Criminal 
;X Law", to be found in: CHANGING LEGAL OBJECTIVES, edited by R. Stl; ;XXX 
J. MacDonald (University of Toronto Press: Toronto, Canada: 1963 ), /: 
pp 71-85. . •
■
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It may also, it is certainly to be remembered, that traditional ; :
theories Of human action divided actions into those which sprang 7 .7'v,vV 
from within the individual himself, and those which were predicated '77 
of the individual as caused from without. In either case,:’individ­
ual1 ( or ’agent’ ) is the substratum upon which responsible action 
or volition is predicated. Psycho-chemical theories do not accept 
that ’agent' or ’individual’ is a first principle from which other ~ 
explanations derive.. : - 77
My suggestions here are only at the level that it is not : 7777 
inconsistent with human behaviour to search for a newer or different 
base for human action and behaviour other than in the language of V  . 
traditional, cognitive models which divided behaviour into mental 
and voluntary. It is not inconsistent to suggest that human behaviour 
is a mode of action far wider than the traditional linguistic cate- 7 
gories which have been used to depict it. To the charge that D 7 . ,}
could have acted other he did, there may rest the reply: But I could' 
not. And that reply may be a genuine report of D’s human state. It 
does not, presently, explain why D acted as he did; it reports only A ; 
that he did act as he did. The disturbing element in such a report 7
is that it reports a form of behaviour counter to accepted mentalistic v
and affective models. It also lets in a notion which has been found 
repelling to the common law: that D may have been determined to do what 
did> 7 7a';77/.:' 7 7 ;7  ■7;-7/'-'^ 7;7'7': 7 7 ^ 7 7 ^ 7. -777:7;7 / 7  7:/
A counter model is not that D may have been determined to 7 ;
do what he did, but was determined in that he did. The concept of 'to'
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suggests the model of the divine playwright who has first written ..
the play, and every scene of it, and all the actor then does is to XX
fill in the role and the steps. Used in this way, 'to' suggests that 
the object has been knowingly forecast; But to argue that bio-chemicalX 
determination may direct an agent in what he does, does not give one 
the divine playwright who has scripted every contingent feature in aXyXX 
finite series. Given a genetic predisposition ( and given our ig- : 
norance of a language at present to unravel the code of a genetic pre­
disposition ) it is not unusual that D would act in this way rather ; XV 
than in that way. Genetic predisposition suggests preferences. There 
may be a wide range of 'choices' that D could make, without in any 
way involving the objects of a genetic predisposition, just as there . 
may be a wide range of colours which may be seep without appealing to X  
a spectrum outside of that wide range which only a specially disposed X 
eye could see. One is speaking about a range and possibilities, and 
that there may be sets of possibilities (or the concept of other 7
possibilities': ) outside of a range.. X S' • 'XXxXxXV'S-V-;X.X XX.SX:X"XXv;XX".'7 
• X : It may also be suggested that conditions are required in X7 ;XX
which to exercise both volition and rationality. Criminal defences, 
in some ways (but cautiously ), admit this. It is not to cause a 
logical disparity to suggest, in theory, that it is possible to 
think that unless conditions are present for the proper exercise of 
rational volition, D may be acting, but neither rationally nor of his 
own volition. How, after all, does one report that he acted rationally, 
and of his own volition, unless he is able believe that he has done so ?
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It is truly a Rylean puzzle to consider that one of the conditions 
of the voluntary is to act at liberty or without restraint, yet not 
know that one’s genetic disposition pre-disposes one to act as one 
did. * A psycho-chemical analysis of human action does not turn 
the agent into a complicated chemical set necessarily; what a psycho­
chemical appreciation of human action may indicate is that many con­
ditions, which have been assumed to the be the case about human action, 
and have been unreflectively assumed, are not the case. Who, for in­
stance, would have thought that lithium salts would ever have been a 
cure for manic depressive disorders ? By use of a common and abundant 
pharmaceutical a patient, who may either have alternating moods of un­
controllable mania unusual energy, grandiose plans alternating with
uncontrollable depression, hopelessness, despair , or, in some cases,
only the manic or only the depressive phases may occur, lithium will 
help such patients to attain stability of mood, avoiding, for the most 
part, the highs and lows of alternating mood swings, and permitting them 
to function successfully in their business pursuits and in their private 
lives. . .  .■ .
One may rejoin that one has left the realm of theory and has 
entered the realm of the experimental. It may be the case that our 
modes of common law criminal trial procedure force a legal system to 
resolve its tensions and conflicts on a rational model. TO suggest
42. In chapter iv, ’’The Will", in, THE CONCEPT OF MIND, by Giblert Ryle, 
(London: 1949), most of the remarks could be accommodated to a psycho-chemi­
cal theory of action: namely, of any action one did it could be said , "He 
did it." Also, cf., THE MIND POSSESSED by William Sargant (Heinemann:1973).
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that rational or mental behaviour can be expressed in terms other ’
: I f: - ; thaii a simple dualism is a phase of intellectual and legal develop- . 'f : i ,
; v . : ment which the criminal law will have to undergo. That the law takes T ; j :
cognizance of diminished behaviour, or that certain common law juris- >
,;K ; dictions are re-thinking the nature of the insanity defence in light v ; T i 
; . of present discoveries about the function and operation of the briain,
■ ^ - nay signal that the traditional procedures of the criminal law pro-  ^;
 ^ cess are attempting to accommodate the findings of behavioural and
. '.y''' s. > • neurological science within the ancient advocacy model. The Court it-,-,'*. .
. self has shown signs of being puzzled by the relationship which the law
J . dictates must obtain between an offender, the crime he committed, and 1
the punishment he must receive if it can be said of D that intended phi, ;?. (
■ • %Y- -* • ‘"V' v;' - 44 - '  ' ••'■ v i'1 -■.'V'-h ’ tr .w yand phi was a prohibited act * when it seems clearly the case from a v.-v • f’
; ; medical and therapeutic point of view that what D did should better be ; ; ; ;
Vj; ^ seen in terms of patient and ailment, than in terms of offender and crime. / < / ;
‘  ^ : On the other hand, the willingness of the criminal sanction to accept an f ;;;
’ extended form of duress whilst under stress has met with a chilling cold­
, . .X 45. ’■; ,• ness -and rejection. ■ . •.. > , ■ ■ ■ ■ xt ■ -Y:
. 'i;43. : Cf., The. INSANITY DEFENCE in New York: A Report to Governor Hugh L.
; Carey [from the] New York State Department of Mental Hygiene ( February, ^
17th, 1978 ) [obtainable from: State of New York Department of Mental Hy- 
; giene, 44 Holland Avenue, Albany, 12229, New York State]. Also, cf.,
/ V  BUTPEN OF PROOF OF INSANITY IN CRIMINAL TRIALS (Chief Justice’s Law Reform
Committee ( 6th April * 1965 ) [obtainable from: University of Melbourne 
; '  (Australia), Law School, Professor H. Luntz, Secretary, C.J.L.R.C.].
J: . 44. Cf.,’’Mens Rea Reconsidered.. by G.V.Dubin [Stanford L.R., Vol. 18,
No. 2, January 1966] pp 326-395, esp., ”2. The conformity principle in the
I Supreme Court.", pp 380-392, re/ crimes because of addiction.
I)-**if 45. In Hearst, both the trial court, and the appellate court, rejected the;/v
I '• -r’ '1, . defence of, Duress. ■/' ' / ' •. . •/ : -'VY / YV.'J.
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If there can be difficulties about what it means "willingly" 
or "wilfully" to do a criminal act, of if there can difficulties 
about the tenability of criminal responsibility itself being predi­
cated of an agent when some suggest that an agent was genetically 
predisposed to do what he did, the difficulties concerning a general 
theory of criminal responsibility do not stop there. There can be 
difficulties just as serious to consider when one comes to reflect 
upon knowledge and a criminal act. The general assumption about
the common law and human responsibility was ably put by Professor
4 6Whitlock, when he stated, *
"In English law it is assumed that all persons 
are of sound mind and responsible for their 
actions unless it can be shown that there is 
sufficient mental abnormality to exonerate them 
from responsibility. Should he commit acts or :
• omissions contrary to the law he is liable to
punishment or to make restitution unless it can 
be shown that certain special circumstances were 
operative at the time of the offence which either 
exonerate him completely or diminish the degree 
of responsibility." 7
I wish to offer an extended example of a case at law which struggled
to free one from a criminal charge. The case involved a curious under
standing of 'know1, and its cognates. The case also demonstrates how
the criminal law grows and gives new turns and meanings to accepted
47 *linguistic usages. ’
46. Criminal Responsibility and Mental Illness, by F.A.Whitlock, pub­
lished by Butterworths, London, 1963. Citation taken from chapter
* 5, "Mens Rea, Determinism, Free Will and Responsibility.", pp 54-55.
47. State of Washington v. Gary W. Rentel (1984), a case argued in Superior 
Court of the State of Washington in and for the County of Pierce, Cause 
number: 83-1-01538-5.
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V :t the defendant was a practising attorney. He ;
had beenVcharged with multiple counts of theft of cllent. 7
funds. The trial was a jury trial for multiple felonies X
of theft. The defendant pleaded not guilty. Through ; . ;X
counsel he argued that the thefts did occur, but he raised 
the defence of diminished mental capacity due to his own 7 
addle tion both to cocaine and to alcohol, The facts 77-7 7 ';-^ } 
of the charges were, admitted; but the defence would be that 
the facts, as stated, and if understood properly in light 
of his defence, would not constitute legal facts needed 77 . 
to bring about a criminal conviction for theftous activity.
• When one turns to the Crimina 1 Code for the State '
of Washington, one reads RCW 9A.56.020, which states: ; C
"THEFT-
CD
-Definition, defense.
Theft" means: To
; - wrongfully obtain, or exert un- 7 .7 7'X''. . y,-  ^ X ■
7 ' 7 - •  authori zed ‘ control over the pro-  »-■.y ■.7 , :7 v 77 ;77;‘ . 7 '• • 
' per ty or services of another or ' 7;7 \.7-.7 ■ X X  XXXXxXJ:
. r the value thereof,(with intent to 7 ’7 .7 . : 7 ; ' ; X
; deprive him of such property 6r ser-r : XX 7 X I
/ 7, 7 7 vicCs; or ((b)-. By color or aid of 7 , • X * 7 ' 77.77
' deception to obtain Control over the 
: . property or services of another or / •
7 X 7 7 the value thereof, with intent to 7 7 7  7
’ X ; 7 .7: 'deprive him or such property or services. "
The defence argued for its client that the crime of theft 
requires the prosecutor or the state to prove that the de­
fendant Intended to deprive an owner of the property perr
manently. An appeal was made to a recent case in which- 
such a general statement of the crime was given: State v. 
Burnham, 19 Wn.App, 442, 444-445 (1978); It was further
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stated that to deprive an owner of property permanently -
was a crime of specific intent. But to have the specific, 
intent to deprive an owner permanently of his property, - ' ; ; 
an accused had to be shown to do such knowingly at the 
time when the accused committed the crime♦ The burden, 
then, upon the prosecutor was to show, ; (1) that ;the-,de-v'"';;:¥-'i:'.:: 
fendant intended permanently to deprive his clients of 
funds, and that this was a.n act of specif ic Intent; (2) , ^
that the accused knew his actions would result in such a 
deprivation Of funds from his clients, and that this second ; •' 
element constituted the criminal knowledge needed to find 
him guilty under the statute , •*
. . The facts of the ‘case showed the defendant to b e " /;/ /
a successful lawyer. His; specialty' at law was to repre­
sent inj ure d p a r t ies b ef o re Wo r km an * s industrial Tribunals. \ •<: 
The 'function of these Tribunals was to assess ‘the injury 
a worker may have, and to make a monetary award to the V  ;. 
worker, as compensation, for the inj ury he had suffered./
The award was in the nature of an insurance award for in- . ; . -
juries, the amount of which was to be determined by the , : ?
evidence, and its f orce, upon the; Tribunal. When-the Tti-. 
bunal made its award, it would send a cheque to the defendant, 
and he in turn would disburse those funds awarded to his : 
clients. However, on a number of occasions, the defendant il-/ 
legally deposited the client funds to his own account for his 
own purposes, thus depriving the client of the monetary award 
the Tribunal had .made..- /!.■/; ■ ' '/ /•' .//:/ ".'V
..v-"
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. When a police investigation was made it had "
discovered this defaulcatlon, The accused was charged / .>
and brought to trial. The trial lasted for one week. ;yyyv'Y
It had been assumed in the legal community where the
trial was held that the accused would be found guilty .
straight away . The state had in evidence the endorsed . ; .
and stolen cheques. At the trial the prosecutor was .
able to have the accused admit that the signature on , 
the back of each and every cashed cheque was, in falct, 
the signature of the accused. The cheques, which were ; 
presented for payment, were not the property of the . >
accused; hence, it would seem, the charge of theft on •
many counts was easily proved. ^ y  v ,
Y But one needed to rettenber that the accused .
was charged under the new Criminal Code of the State of ;
Washington, a Code which had been in effect less than 
ten years at the time of this trial (1984). The new 
Code had introduced degrees of culpability, arid had dis­
placed, so it{thought, older concepts of criminal intention.
The new Code stated in RCW 9A.04.020: . . :
’’Purposes ---  . Principles of construction. ,
: (1) The general purposes of the provisions Y .
Y \ . governing the definition of offenses are,: ’[j / :YYr-;t
. (a) To forbid and prevent cdhduct that inflicts :
•. or threatens substantial harm to individual or ?
Y ‘ public interests; . \ Y ' r.y ■;\ ;'Y'Y'\ '
(b) To safeguard conduct that is without cul- 
. Y pability from condemnation as criminal; ^
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"(c) To give fair warning of the nature of 
the conduct declared to constitute an offense;
(d) To differentiate on reasonable grounds be­
tween serious and minor offenses, and to pre­
scribe proportionate penalties for each,"
To give an accused fair warning of what he is accused 
means, under the Code, spell out the elements of the 
crime with which he is charged. Since the Code repre­
sents the mind of the state, and the prosecutor speaks 
for the mind of the state, the duty upon the prosecutor 
before a Tribunal of the state— ■— i.e., Superior Court
in which a criminal cause is heard is to make clear
whether or not the accused did commit the crime with whic 
he was charged. The crime is expressed in sentences 
of the Code, and the duty of the prosecutor is to* show, 
if it can be shown, that each element of the crime as 
expressed in the sentences which state the crime are 
proven to be the case.
If one will look again at the language of theft 
(RCW 9A.56.020), no where does one find the terms of art 
of ’specific intent V nor of ’knowledge’ nor of ’knowingly 
The Code does in a separate title declare what are the 
principles of liability. In RCW 9A.08,010 one reads the 
following,
"General requirements of culpability, (1) Kinds 
of Culpability Defined.
(a) Intent. A person acts with intent or inten­
tionally when he acts with the objective or pur­
pose to accomplish a result which constitutes a 
crime. • -
(b) Knowledge. A person knows or acts knowingly 
or with knowledge when: .
(i) he is aware of a fact, facts, or cir­
cumstances or result described by a statute 
defining an offense; or
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' • "(1 1 ) he has information which would
: 7 ;X. 7. ; lead a reasonable man in the same sit- ;
; 7 . nation to believe that facts exist which XX 7 :
•7. . ' a ;" . ■-. • .• facts'., axe' -described by the -'statute - de- v 77 7 '
v.X;;. ,'v .7' ' ' fining an offense. 7 •' X. vX •• X ^
7 (c) Recklessness. A person is reckless or acts ; 7  7 7
7 7/7\7 recklessly when he knows of and disregards a sub-
7 stantial risk that a wrongful act may occur arid ; 7 ; X
X 7 bis disregard of such substantial risk is a gross 7
7. 7  deviation from conduct that a reasonable man wou 1 d ,
7* exercise in the same situation. yXj/y X - ;7'7'7 ./'-7;.
; . ( d )  Criminal negligence. A person is criminally .
s negligent or acts with criminal negligence when 7 7
7 he fails to be aware of a substantial risk that
a wrongful act may occur and his failure to be' X;XX7  7/ 
7 aware of such substantial risk constitutes a gross777 7
7 deviation from the standard of care that a reason- ;7
: X able man would.exercise in the same situation.
(2) Substitutes for Criminal Negligence, Recklessness,
and Knowledge, When a statute provides that cri- 
'7 7 minal negligence suffices to establish an element
** 7 of an offense, such element also is established if , yj
a person acts intentionally, knowingly, or recklessly.
When recklessness suffices to establish an element, 7 :7
7 such element also is established if a person acts 7>-
7 7 X intentionally or knowingly. When acting knowingly 7 
suffices to establish an element, such element also 
is established if a person acts intentionally. X X
(4) " Requirements of Wilfulness Satlsfled by Acting
X X  Knowingly. A requirement that an offense be com­
. 7 : mitted wilfully is satisfied if a person acts
7 knowingly with respect vto -the material elements
7 ; of the offense, unless a purpose to impose further /■*
requirements plainly appears," X X .
Counsel for the defendant was to argue that the crime,of 
theft had tp be bound by RCW 9A,08,010 (1) (b) (i) , which 
made theft a crime which required knowledge,; and that a per­
son act knowingly, which, as a reading of that section (supra) 
indicates, indicates that one acts with awareness of the 
facts, etc., described by the statute defining the offense. 7
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A crime of specific intent, as understood by 
counsel for the defendant, indicated that one intended 
to do a particular act: namely, permanent to deprive an 
owner of his property. Two elements were then to be pre­
sented by the state: (1), specific intent,; and (2), know­
ledge. Was this an example of an intricate simplicity ?
Counsel for the defendant drew upon a case of recent
standing to urge the distinction upon the Superior Court.
The case cited was: State v. Edmon, 28 Wn.App. 98, 103-104 
(1981). That Appellate Court said:
"(2) Our analysis to this point has been within
the terms of the traditional rule that only
specific intent can be negated by this type of 
evidence. The rule must be modified because 
RCW Title 9A was designed to replace concepts 
like specific and general intent with the four 
levels of culpability in RCW 9A.08.010, Wherever ;
"intent" as defined in RCW 9A.08.010 (1) (a) is 
an element of a crime, it may be challenged by 
competent evidence of a mental disorder that 
causes an inability to form "intent" at the time 
. of the offense. Premeditation, of course, can
• still be negated by this defense. See State v . (
Carter (sic: which was cited in the body of the 
opinion).
"knowledge" also is subject to this defense.
RCW 9A.08.010 (1) (b) (1) reads: " A person
knows or acts knowingly or with knowledge when:
(i) he is aware of a fact, facts, or circumstances 
or result described by a statute defining an of­
fense..." (Italics ours.) The concept of specific 
intent involves an intent in addition to the intent 
to do the physical act. State v . Nelson, 17 Wn.App.
66, 561 P.2d 1093 (1977). Thus, an intent to pro­
duce a certain result from the act would be specific 
intent. The fine distinction between the intent to 
produce a result (specific intent) and the awareness 
of a result of one’s conduct (knowledge) should not 
determine the admissibility of expert medical evidence
; V 7’V  r / V V * ’* ’• 7 588 • V V;// ^  ; 7 \ ^ ^ 0 1 ? ^ ^ : ^ '?
: J of a mental disorder, We have previously 77777 / '7; \-;.i
■ i recognized the relevance of voluntary in- - ;
toxication to the existence of "knowledge"
: ^  ; 7-/ State v. Norby , 720 Wn.App. 378, 579 P.2d 7 7. • •77
7 7 7 7 7 - "  ; : 1358 11978) . It would be incongruous to 7
7 7; '77: •' 7va 1 low- a; defense to "knowledge" where,', t h e d e - ' 7 7777 7777-7;777:7
: 7 7 fendant was responsible for his mental state 7 :>
• ':;v-7 /(voluntary intoxication) and to reject it 7:
7 7 7 where the defendant was not responsible for 77/:7- ‘7-1 •7.;;.Y,'7:-'-
.77-. 7. '■ ,:.7'77'- '7': his mental state (mental disorder ) ." 7 7 . 77:77 ' 77-7'77}':-7
7> ; ; 7 What was slowly evolving in the defence of this 7 7 7 7 7^-7: 
accused was that certain acts were donO, but, for rea­
sons yet to be specified* such were not full-fledged 
human acts tb which criminal responsibility ought to 7.77 ;7:.77:7:7'-
7  ! : 7 7. attach. Underlying the theory the defence was advancing
7 was that the intentional object required for Criminal v Y.7-77y ;|7; 
7 guilt did not exist. The defence would argue that D had 7 7^ 7^;
7 no specific intent to commit the crime as charged, and 7 - 7
also that the elements of actus reus were lacking > ( even >7 7r 77,777
C % though defence counsel; did not employ such words ) • 7 7 7 777;
7 7 Such an approach was not new at law. One may turn7y>:.:;7.77
7 r: 7;.;.y .to the speech of Thomas Erskine, in his defence of James 7777
7; Hadfield, R. v. Hadfield (1800) 27 St. Tr- 1281. Inhisv 7 7;
7 ; remarkable speech to the court, Erskine argued that to be 7777
insane did not mean that one had to suffer the total depri­
vation of memory and understanding, for if that was what .in- 7-7777 
7 7 y 7 sanity meant, then few had -ever been insane , Erskine arguedv77v7777'7 
7 What was wanted for a finding of insanity in 1800 was that an 7 7 7 
Y 77 accused lacked; the capacity to form right intentions at law7 7 7 7 .  7y:7 7: 
:Y7 7 ancV Hadfield had suffered .from such mal-organisation of mind,/ 7. 7 ;i 
, ; as the facts of 'that case demonstrated^ 7' ”• %v7 7 77"  7:-'7 •: 77/77/777
77 ; 77 ' , 7 , To return to Rente 1, def endant! s counse 1 argued that D 77777
lacked the ability to form a specific intent, and such was caused
7  y  by a mental disorder not amounting to insanity in this case. 7 J
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The accused had become totally dependent upon cocaine.
Case law permitted them to argue this dependency, and such 
inability to form a specific intent; St. v . Ferrick. 81 Wn,
2d 942, 506 P.2d 860, cert, denied sub n o m :Gustav v . 
Washington, 414 U.S. 1094, 38 L.Ed. 2d 552, 94 S.Ct. 726, 
(1973); St. v. Martin, 14 W.App, 74, 538 P.2d 873 (1975). 
Counsel also argued that the cause of the inability to 
form a specific intent must be a mental disorder, and not 
emotions like jealousy, fear, anger, or hatred, citing Sj^ . 
v. Moore, 61 Wn.2d 165, 377 P.2d 456 (1959), and St. v .
Upton, 16 Wn, App. 195, 556 P.2d 239 (1976). The mental 
disorder must be causally connected to the lack of specific 
intent, and it must not be just a reduced perception, or 
an over-reaction, or some other irrelevant mental state.
The inability to form the specific intent must occur at 
the time relevant to the offense, citing St. v. Craig ,
82 Wn.2d 777, 514 P .2d 151 (1973), And if it is found,
from the evidence, that the accused did suffer from mental 
disorder ( even of a temporal nature ), then that mental 
disorder must substantially reduce the probability that 
the defendant formed the alleged criminal intent, citing 
St. v . White, 60 Wn.2d 551, 374 P,2d 942 (1962), cert denied,
375 U,S. 883, 11 L.Ed. 2d 113, 84 S.Ct. 154 (1963), and St_.-
v. Carter, 5 Wn,App. 802, 490 P.2d 1346 (1971).
5 9 0 "■•v
What defence: counsel had skillfully done was ;j: ; Ki-^ 
to argue to the court that the forming of a criminal ■ ;/
inte ntion in the Criminal Code was an example :of an •; 
exercise of a capacity , and one could not be said to \ ;.C 
intend at law under that Code if one could not exercise 
that capacity in a specify way to a specific end. In : 
this case, D. had to have the specific intent to commit  ^
the crime described by the Codei D was intending only 
1 b 1 and npt ' a * or ' c '. The train ticket was;, as It  Y:'<;
were, for Cambridge, and not for Oxford or London• The 
defendant would argue that he had developed a chemical 
dependence upon both cocaine and alcohol, but the nature 
and fu11 extent of his dependence upon these chemicals , 
was a dependency he could not fully appreciate. It is> ; v 
the paradox of addiction: in point of fact the addict 
is addicted to some chemical, but the self-awareness of 
that addiction is not appreciated by him. •The o 1d, apbr ; > 
thegm expressed this of the sin of pride, " Pride goeth »
before a fall.", to mean: the proud man does not know that 
he himself is proud. In like fashion, the addict in this 
case was unaware of the extent of addiction and of his 
debilitating dependence upon cocaine and a l c o h o l . B e c a u s e  
such a dependence could be diagnosed by means of psychi­
atric testimony and evidence, it could then b e :argued 
by the defence that the mental capacity of D was reduced, / 
and such a reduction entailed the finding that D could not, 
and thus did not, form the specific Intent required for the 
crime with which he was charged under the Code. The jury
j i
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then was asked to consider the actions of the defendant y  
in light of his own diminished mental capacity . 7 ' -XX
Two very heavy evidential; burdens were placed . .7- ;:77''Xv 
upon the prosecution in this case. In the first in- 777 j7 
stance, the State had to prove every element of the .yX 7 77 
crime of theft. Then, as a further positive obligation* 
the State had to prove, beyond a reasonable doubt, that X 
the defendant was not suffering from any relevant form XX X 
of diminished capacity. This meant that the State had 
to establish for the jury that the defendant both spe- 
gificaily intended permanently to deprive his legal 
clients of their funds given to him by the Industria1 : y
Tribunei As workers1 compensation for their injuries, 
but also when the accused acted so as to deprive them - X 7 
of these insurance fuhds the accused knew that his actipns7; 
would so permanently deprive those persons of their funds.
( It had the echo to it of the old penitential require­
ment that in order for one to;commit a grave or mortal X
sin, one had to do so with ful1 knowledge of what one was7 X
doing.) At the time of the trial this was a novel ex- XX ">7
tension of the defence of diminished capacity. It had. 
been part and parcel of common law assumptions that one 
who had himself induced himself to take illegal drugs could 
not then plead as a defence to a felonious charge that 
o n e ’s drug^taking had become a pernicious and dependent 
habit, and that the habit had therefore deprived one of 7/>: 7 
lucidity of mind i ergo, o n e ’s crimes are to be excused.77 77
*tfQui peccat ebrius luat sobrius". He who offends when drunk shall 
be punished when sober. 7 . 7 777.' . . 7_ 7 ■- .■ • * X;'7;7XX X7X 7;;
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The prosecution assumed' that it had an easy case to" / 
prove. How could any wrong *-doer benefit from his own ; Ay 
wrong-doing, or seek a plea in mitigation because of his 
own wrong-doing and the unfortunate consequences it brought 
about ? 7 /■ • _ / v. ■■■]
. : The stumbling block for the prosecution came in7"v 7; :
form of Jury Instruction No. 27 . In American courts of > .A
law, when an issue goes to a jury for its deliberation,
counsel in both tort and criminal cases is allowed to , 7 'A ' '7  
submit to the jury sets of in struct ions which the jury ; 
must follow in forming its deliberation as to liability,' 
or as toguilt or innocence. The printed jury instructions 
are submitted to the judge by both counsel, and each has ••••■ 
the chance, out of the presence of the jury, to argue fdr 
or against a putative jury instruction. The judge makes 
the final decision as to what jury instructions he will 
allow to go to the jury.* " . A'-'A'
Jury Instruction N o . i l  re ad as fol lows:;
v ”When a person is charged with a crime, it is 7
- the burden of the State to prove beyond a rea- A  :
, sonable doubt that the defendant did not have;
7/7': ' diminished capacity., V/'7 '• ' A .. A A  'i • 7.A 7'. A A
?f A def endant has a diminished capacity if, at A
* It is grounds for reversal if the judge rejects certain 
jury instructions without good reason, and counsel may 
lodge a motion for appeal if it believes that certain , 
jury instructions were wrongly excluded by the judge.
77 Y ; : 7 7 the time of the. commission ol the crime, : r ;7
'.- ■ • as a result of a. mental disorder, the de-7-7; 77-7 7..;; 7.7' 7'777:
■’7'/ . 7 7 7’\ . f endant was not '.capable o-f acting in ten- ; '7/ '7777-7,.
7 . . tionally as that term is defined in these : 7 7 ^
77'7‘7; y7., 7;7 r/7 ■ ;7 instructions , 7/77-7 7 -.7:-’ x77 7:---7',.'7-• -7 ; • ,-7. 7. 77777'.
7y -7;7 • 7 ” If, after considering all of the evidence 7 ::77
.77Y;-7 ;• in this case, the State has not proven be- •''7; 7777777-vy
‘'77- :' '77' '• , • ; yond a reasonable doubt that the defendant - r 7 7  : 77:777
• 7 . 7 did not have a diminished capacity, you must ... 7-7'7-; 77
; '7'' •• 7\ 7 '  7 V 7 7  7 . . find /the defendant Not Guilty . 11 .• /■. . 7 ' 7  v'7-_ 7  . - 7 - , 7  77777;
>:v'r:7vV; ’ • 7-..' : One is aware, theref ore, that a set of legal 7 7  .7-. 777
sentences in which offences were described were to be
7; 7 7 applied, in some fashion by a jury, to the acts or the ^7 7 ;
omissions of an accused. The sentences were not "value :
7-7 free", ais the jargon pf sociology at times puts the 7 7 7 ; ,77
; matter. But, in a like fashion, the legal sentences 77
were not sets of instructions ( as one might find on .7.- 7:7'; 7' •:
- , 7 > - 77 a road map ) . The function Of the jury, further, was 77,
% : to represent the mind of the community, to present, in . .V-7'7.77*-777/77
7 y; some manner, the/ fashion and feelings of, the community 77 •
7' ; ! : at. large, . But none on the jury were schooled philoso- ( ;
phers, or lawyers,, or semanticists. They were all average / 77 7
7 7 people, akin to the riders ( in the past j of that famed :;7' r^ 77--:7y;
Y 7 7 Clapham omnibus• Yet we recognise that the language of 7777 7 71
. Code was meant,.somehow, to apply to what the accused had
, 7 7 ; -  done; to apply, either to find him Guilty, or; to find him : 77 ;7:’ 7 ;
V 7 Not Guilty. The form of the language was realistic; it- 7 7 7 7  7 7
; ; : could be used. When 'know', in any its cognate forms was ’777 • 7-
594
employed, it was assumed that 'knowing' was something 7 7.7 
over which the accused had control and could in some 7 ; 
way focus. The verb was not used at law here as it
that same verb could be used of "sense khowledge", 7
which has little, if any, indication of the voluntary 
in its use. The eyes "see", the ears "hear,"-, and the 
senses report what is presented to them, independent 7 7
of one's wanting to see or hear or sense. As used in 7 : 
the Criminal Code, 'know',and its cogriate forms,im- 
ported control and selection and the exercise of a 
capacity. But under the Crimina1 Code, an accused, 7
and,by extension,any citizen of ordinary status, is | I
assumed to know the Code, or to know that there is a
Code by which they are bound. It would be an exceedingly 
rare defence for one to plead ignorance of the 1aw arid to 
have the court accept that defence, as if one were to say, 
" I  knew some parts of the Code, but; not all of it, and 
this part under which I was charged I did not, I am sorry 
to say, know." 7s;.« 7-v .y7  jX7..;7 .7 7 ;'y 7 ;'
It may be a separate question of great logical interest 7  
to ask to whom does a Criminal Code. address ? The simplest
* It is not my intention to argue curious exceptions to 7 
the general rule that ignorance of the law does not ex-X.x.;• • 7 
cuse one from the sanctions of the )aw. There is 7^ 7 ; 
case law to show that the courts will excuse one from the 
penalties of the law because one truly did not know of the 
existence of the law, or, when the law was made, it was.£mr; 
possible for one to have known that such a law was actually 
in force. R.v. Bailey (1800) R.&R. 1, 168 E.R. 651. There, 
D was at sea when;a new law was introduced, and there was 7 \ 
no way in which D could have known the law at the time he ;x 
was charged. The court found him guilty, but avoided the 
logical embarrassment, which such guilt entailed, by miti- 7  7 
gating the sentence.  ^ .
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answer may be from the law itself; A criminal code AAA'-A':' 
addresses those who may find themseives within the V  /! 
jurisdiction of the Code; If an accused is determined 
to have standing in a? court of crimina1 law; then he ; 7 ’ : 7/ 
is within the jurisdiction of the criminal code. It 'A 
is a functional answer, as are most answers in criminal 
procedure, if, however, a legal philosopher wishes for A 77, 
an a priori answer as to whom the criminal code addresses, 
then a reply, at law, would fairly much be those whom the ; 
law deems capable of following that Code. The language, 
for instance of RCW.9A.04.Q30, "State Criminal Juris­
diction" ,- gives five classes of addressees : - A A-"A.vA-A
"(1) A person who commits in the state any crime, 7 A; 
in whole or in part. , .
>; (2i A person who commits out of state any act
. . w h i c h ,  if committed within it, would be theft 
/ A  and is afterward found in the state with any of 
7’. the stolen property. 7A ", :A-A 7"; A 7 AA':7A' A-..
7 (3) A person who being out of the state, counsels, 7 ;
causes, procures, aids, or agbets another to commit 
•7 ; -/'a crime in this state. '' 7 : - '. /" A- :
(4) A person who, being out of the state, abducts 
or kidnaps by force or fraud, any person, contrarytb 
the laws of the place where the act is committed, and 
A A  brings, sends, or conveys such persons into this state. 
A ;  ( S i  A  person who commits an act without thp state 7 
which affects persons or property within the state ,;A A 71 
7. which, if committed with the state, would be a crime."
This is a very broad audience, and it would be very hard *
to determine what would be the limits beforehand as to whom
the Code may apply. Further speculation brings one into , 7;
questions more at home in the Conf1ict of Laws.*
7 The commOnsense assumption is that the Code addresses V
itself to a community of common language users . ■77:7777/
* It is a truism of the subject of the Conflict of Laws 
that no a priori answer can be given as to the extent of / A  
a legal rule over some putative subject. What the legal 
study of this subject shows is how difficult it is to arrive 
at satisfactory answers as to the extent of jurisdiction. /
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Further embodied in this assumption is that an agent, 
by knowing himself through the power or capacity of self- . , 
knowledge, is able to control the manner of his actions, and 
it is therefore to the element of knowledgeable control to . . 
which the Code addresses itself. One may argue that it is 
the broad, primitive, unanalysed assumption at work in the 
Code. The Code both assumes a community of common language 
users , and a community composed of those who can exercise 
self-control. But assumptions of this nature C or, if one 
prefers, statements of first principles put in that way ), 
carry other possible problems which are of interest to phi­
losophical analysis, and these problems appear when one triesf * ' * - ' • , - , * ,
to make sense of key terms under a Code, such as 'wilfulness’, 
or of a strained use of 'know1’. To have acted wilfully is, 
it appears, also to have acted knowingly. But we do have 
a strong and long enough tradition in the common law to show 
that these terms are not necessarily interchageable as to 
meaning and scope. What in actuality we are encountering is 
the power of the legislative ( the law-making power ) to make 
terms mean what they wish those terms to mean, probably out 
of the assumption that broad terms will not permit of tricky 
defence exceptions or exemptions. But, as Rentel itself did 
.show, precisely because the rubric governing ’know1 and its 
cognates under the Code was not clear or precise, the defendant 
was permitted to engage in broad and ingenious defense theory.
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V ;■ Wha t may serve to make the concept of intention ‘^
>. ’ , especially difficult to understand is that the
seems to lead a dual life, On the one hand it may have
the non-legal use when it is predicated of human actions
in general, or when it is used to give moral explanations ■
- of human actions. On the other hand the concept has a V; r
definite legal use, and the language which embodies that ;
^ , legal use may itself not be clear as to how the- concept - >
{ is to be used and extended. Or, as with so much of our
language, the usage may seem to embody all levels of language, 
both l egal and non- legal, and for the philosopher these /
various uses combined into one term may produce varying V: 
conclusions, one part of which may be in opposition t o . ’
. i r another part. ,V; ■ iV-. • *  \ ■ .V ; v - • ' ■ ■" *
When one is attempting to account for the distinct . 
acts of the agent qua agent, but also when one is attempting 
to account for those acts under a legal system which embodies 
v intentional language and limits, the intertwi n ing of purposes 
~ may yield other difficulties. The agent may protest that his,
, ; aims are disparate to those of the legal system under which
his aims are to be described. An interweaving of the purposes 
. of the agent with the purposes of the legal system does not / .
safely occuri There, as we know too well, the law resorts to
legal fictions, as with constructive malice. This appeal to 
fiction, however, does force the law ( a s  if did in the Smith 
• case, [1961 ] At 290 ) , when an occasion presents itself> to
■*7 ,57  <7: 7 7 *
■. '' r-
-7. -7 - /:'••;■ 7 • 7:7 r >•' 598 ' ‘ ;
reconsider questions of logical refinement. For instance, • 7777-7- 
are intentional, acts and intentional obj ectives t o b e 7-7”7777777777 
understood from the eyes and mind of the agent , or from 7 yp} 7
the logical structure of the legal language itself which 7 7: 
sets down a standard known as the reasonable man or as a n . 7  
objective standard ? Two sets of powerful' self-interests 
become evident; one, that an agent be understood fairly 
and, as far as possible, correctly; the other, that the law 
be obeyed. One interest is that of the person, the other 7 
interest is that of the state.
Other issues spring forth from newer problems which ;7. 
criminal law needs to address. How much should the habits 
of a culture affect the basic distinctions in the law be­
tween voluntary and knowing acts, with regard to guilt for 
crimes ? As a culture grows more and mote irrational ■ ./
certainly, in my own culture which places heavy emphasis 
upon immediate gratification and change— -^must the criminal 
law faithful ly reflect the habits of a : culture. •?7. American 
industrial culture has spawned a vast world which appeals 
to the will: namely, a world which stresses "personal; satis­
faction" very often devoid of concerns for responsibility, 
or, in much milder language, a world devoid of any concern 
for social manners; and civility* Must a cultivated cultural 
weakness which appeals to instant credit* video images ( as 
with rock-video imagery used to promote rock music, in which 
images are moved across a video-screen without any order or 
plot to them, but do appeal to underlying violence ),; easy-
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bankrupcy, short-term marriages which may end in instant 
no-fault divorce, must a criminal law reflect a culture 
which tends increasingly to aspects of will and character 
and the subjective when that law sentences, or when that 
criminal law moves through the process of determining guilt ?
It will be remembered that 1976 Report ort Culpable Homicide 
from New Zealand suggested that one may have to take national 
character into mind when forming theories of criminal re- .. 
sponsibility, but that was a Report only which did not have 
the force of law or judicial decision. However,it does 
touch a question as to how far a theorist may propose national 
habits and customs as a way to temper the law. The ultimate 
question, however, comes to how such formulations could be 
made to be workable and fair in any judicial finding, and it 
does appear that the problems far outweigh the benefits of 
such a theoretical incorporation. A criminal theorist may 
believe that an indulgent culture may be required to pay dearly 
for its acts of indulgence.
This research, "Exploratio Intentionis", was undertaken 
much like a journey into an unknown and forgotten land of the 
mind. The subject of the research, human action itself under 
the criminal law, is far vaster and far more complicated than 
my writing about that subject. I do not delude myself into 
believing that I have exhausted the possible legal combinations
which human action can devise to escape, or to establish,
■ * . • ' . ‘ ‘ v ■ 1 *’ \ ‘ * . ‘ • ' * a finding of guilt under the criminal law. ,
4a :
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I am aware, too, that I began this work as a ; : ; V  r
philosopher who was interested in the law, and* quite, 
by accident and because of a great passage of time, I ■; , 
also became a practising criminal lawyer. I can feel . ; 
the natural tensions between the roles of philosopher ^
and lawyer, and how each sets about to solve legal problems 
and issues. My concern, when combining both of those :
role s within mysalf, was to c one ent ra t e upon, and to f ' • 
explore and to investigate, a category which I found, to 
be cardinal to the common law: its use and its under- . : ;? ?>
standing of intention in the criminal law. I tried to 
use case law itself which showed the internal tensions : 
nearly always at work in trying to refine this subject •;
concept of intention, and by use of case law I came to 
see for myself that the concept; having strong roots in 
both the camps of the will and of the intellect, was uneasy? ;r
: , O ne m ay r e a d  Hyam  v .  P . P . P v [ 1 9 7 4 ]  2 A l l  ER 4 1 ,  [ 1 9 7 5 ]
A . C .  5 5 ,  a - d i v i d e d  d e c i s i o n  o f  3 - 2  f r o m  t h e  H o u s e  o f  . 
L o r d s . .T h e  s p e e c h e s  f o r  t h e  m a j o r i t y  g i v e  o n e  i m p r e s ­
s i o n  a s  t o  t h e  m e a n in g  o f  m ens r e a , w h i l s t  t h e  s p e e c h e s  ; 
o f  t h e  m i n o r i t y  g i v e  a  c o n t r a r y  m e a n in g  a s  t o  t h e  e l e ­
m e n ts  a n d  e x t e n s i o n  o f  t h e  c o n c e p t  a t  l a w .  O ne may a l s o  
r e a d  t h e  r e c e n t  r e p o r t  i s s u e d  b y  t h e  S c o t t i s h  L a w  C o m - ; ?
m i s s i o n  i n  w h i c h  t h e  C o m m i s s io n  Shows; i t s  d i s a g r e e m e n t s  ?
/  w i t h  t h e  r u l i n g  i n  H y a m ;; a s  w e l l  a s  w i t h  c e r t a i n  d e -  . ' > V
f i n i t i o n a l  p r o p o s a l s  a s  t o  h o w  t h e  c o n c e p t  o u g h t  t o  b e  
e x p r e s s e d  i n  v a r i o u s  d r a f t  B i l l s  a n d  b y  v a r i o u s  l a w  r e -  ; -I 
v i s i o n  c o m m i t t e e s .  C F .  S C O TT ISH  LAW C O M M IS S IO N , " T h e  v-?? 
M e n t a l  E l e m e n t  i n  C r i m e " ,  p u b l i s h e d  b y  H . M . S . O . ,  E d i n -  V 
b u r g h  ( N o v e m b e r ,  1 9 8 3 )  One m ay a l s o  r e a d  som e o f  t h e  . .
m o d e r n  c a s e s  w h i c h  a t t e m p t  t o  c o n n e c t  ' r e c k l e s s n e s s *  
a n d  * i n t e n t i o n * , a n d  t h e n  s o  d e f i n e  ' r e c k l e s s n e s s *  t o  
m ean  a v a c u o u s n e s s  o f  - m i n d . C f . R . v .  C a l d w e l l  [ 1 9 8 2 ]
A . C .  3 41  ( H . L . ) ,  a n d  a 1 s o  R . v . L a w r e n c e  [ 1 9 8 2 ]  A . C . 5 1 0  : , 
( H . L . ) .  I t  may b e  a d v a n c e d  t h a t  t h e  t w o  c a s e s  g o  a l o n g  
w a y  f r o m  a n y  com m on u n d e r s t a n d i n g  o f  i n t e n t i o n ,  b u t  a l s o  
a s  c a s e  l a w ,  t h e y - g i v e  n o  c l e a r  r u l e s  a s  t o  h o w  t h e  c o n c e p t  
s h o u l d  b e  a p p l i e d ,  o r  t o  w h a t  e x t e n t  i t  may b e  a p p l i e d .
C f  * ,  t h e  s t r o n g  c r i t i c i s m  e x p r e s s e d  o f  t h e  t w o  d e c i s i o n s : f
" R e c k l e s s n e s s  R e d e f i n e d " ,  b y  G l a n v i l l e  W i l l i a m s , 1 9 8 1  '• '•???  
C . L . J .  2 5 2 .  . • '• •
v V i ® £SC4<&c^ y
to capture.
: .. In attempting to be or become a 1 ega 1 phi 1 osopher . /•
one does not have at one's disposal a simple handbook of . , -j-jyV'
instruction to ;state in what the art or discipline may con- , 
sist. In like fashion, when speaking about legal terms.. , 
such as -intention or mens rea, and the like, one does 'not'V%;-:Sv 
have a handy "Fowler's Correct Legal Usage" at one's finger- ' 
tips to indicate what is the ordinary usage as distinguished 
from the extraordinary usage of the terms. There have been . 
no clear rules for the use of key terms in the law in Which ; , 
responsibility is ascribed to or predicated of an agent by 
their use. One legal philosopher recently stated that l aw; ^
is a parasitic science, and it borrows its vocabulary (often) 
from the fasion and styles of the timies. There is no easy
rule which cleanly marks off "legal usage" from "ordinary •• 
usage" in law. Common law reasoning is especially elastic.
It use of language tends more to an analogical use of words 
than it does to a strict and restricting uni vocal use of
words. The legal philosopher often finds himself moving in r
two worlds. From one world he brings in the habit of mind of 
the philosopher, who hopes to set conceptual boundaries upon 
the use Of a term ( or, at least, to discover what may be 
those boundaries ) , but he alsp must have the mind and the ' 
feeling of a legalist, who appreciates that law does not use - / 
language in way mathematically precise. ?
49. Readings in the Philosophy of Law, edited by Ronald Dworkin 
(Oxford University Press) , from The Preface. -.-’v'
V- 1.V '
L .  .
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Not to sound especially clinical * but there is another 
feature of legal language in Which one assays the key terms 
of that language: namely, the past, and how those terms came 
to be used in the way they are used, The intuition which ’
sparked our interest in this topic was that key legal terms, 7,/ 
such as the various forms of intention, had to them a rich, 
linguistic past, but like anything rich and detailed, that 7, 
past could easily be forgotten; or, which is a graver fault, 
those key terms could be used without regard for their past.;
One is indebted to the commonplace spirit which Wittgenstein 
gave to twentieth century philosophy when he argued that we r 
are directed, in good part, by the logic of ordinary language 
which is embedded in common linguistic use. The logic directs 7 
one to conclusions, the logic of which eludes us oftentimes as 
to why this conclusion rather than that ? But because one^7ib: i
not attendant to the logical force embodied in, and submerged
within, a language must needs then occasion logical errors
by a user of that language when the user does not appreciate, 
or is not aware of, the logic of the language. 7 - 7
The warning is not new to lawyers. Lord Coke had an 7 
insight much akin to Wittgenstein’s when, in the sixteenth 
century, Coke spoke of the ’’artificial reason" of the law, 
there going to such an extent, even, as to rebuke a monarch,7 . 7 
telling him that the art of making legal decisions took a long 
time to learn because one had to be especially sensitive to ;/ ;•; 
the nuances which legal language contained.
>.r.u -»
"artificial reason1’ can be taken to mean that the set of :
legal sentences which so Compose the law at any moment are 
a set of sentences which also contain that logical usage where­
by the law is made and formed. For one to be ignorant of 
this kind of linguistic and logical history which legal 
terms embody is to fail to appreciate what law fully i s .
; ; A reading through the legal history of the c ommp n; 1 a :k
will show one, we believe, that no doctrine of intention is­
sued forth from the mind of Zeus reflective of god1y pu fity i .^
or clarity. What has come forth through the slow develop- v : 
ment of the law is a concept which is at once flexible;, "rich;.^ > 
intricate, Simple, but whose pedigree and 1ogi c a 1 e1ements ® . 
elusive; contrary, difficult and complex. Following the mind 
arid habit of the law , the chosen method of our research has . 
been, wherever possible, to document a claim by an appeal ;toi ; fi 
a legal citation of some kind: or other. The reason i b r - t h i s " p ^  
style is to protect both the reader and ourself against in­
advertent manufacturing of evidence, against making claims 
beyond the purview of the evidence. It is not to do history 
or to write historiography. As a legal philosopher one is : 
beholden to the legal historian for providing one with docu- ; 
meats so that one’s investigation may be done. The legal 
philosopher is concerned with the logical form of arguments, 
with the logical consistency of a concept, with linguistic 
expression whereby a logical concept is expressed, or a rdle : 
or code embodied, and the like, and he uses someVof the matter 
common to history but as a philosopher and not as an historian.
\ ? :? What is not our* intention in this work; is to \
delve too deeply, or too long, on what ought -'to be .'-a'. . V ?
; ^ proper theory of legal language. For the most part ,
legal sources of the common law did not doubt t h e p o W e r>- . . >?;■.> 
? ; V .of language. Language was used, and by its use it was f
also refined. Criminal law, however, did not have the 
' f i n e n e s s  of use which property law had. . The metaphysics
of the common law was its property law; criminal law, alas, ;
V required Centuries of use and practice bef ore any kind of; v"
conceptual refinement occurred in i t . T h e  subject bor­
? rowed from other disciplines, from commonplace morality
" and social notions of right and wrong. There was a general 
• v ^  acceptance in the law over centuries that men had a common
nature, that there was a common sense of what was right and
what was wrong, and that the ordinary man, Everyman, knew .
in his heart in what right conduct consisted and in what 
wrong conduct consisted. Lord Chesterfield embodied the ~ ,
? . conventional wisdom in his essay on men and manners, at onej ; ;
point clearly and simply writing, V \
/ ; ? "In order to judge the inside of o t h e r s , V ?  ^ v
.?y?'v study your own; for men in general are
very much alike; and though one has one’ <
■ v , v : prevailing passion, and another has another , 
v : ; . ? yet their operations are much the same; and ;
? ? ; i; 4; whatever engages or disgusts, pleases or of­
? - ? fends you, in others, will, mu tat is mutandis
: engage, disgust, please, or offend others, , ?
/ in you * Observe, with the utmost attention, V ;
all the operations of your own mind, the na- ■ . ■ \' 
ture of your passions, and the various motives 
. s ? that determine your will; and you may, in a ; /?. •???; ’
? ' great degree, know all. mankind. " ? ' ’V- ' - . v
5 0 .Lord Chesterfield's ADVICE TO HIS SON.,.LONDON, M,DCC,XCII,
i "Knowledge of the World", pp 56-74, at page 61, '.
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But the reason for this linguistic detour is to 
advise the reader that the aim of this monograph will be 
to support its claims and findings, and possible conclusions, 
by an appeal to the language of the common law tradition.
One should reflect on how legal language operates; and one 
poses a legitimate enterprise when one seeks to investigate 
and to find out what may be the latent assumptions controls 
ling the legal language of the common law. The spirit of 
such a direction has taken philosophers of all ages, and it 
is by no means a new pursuit. The pursuit, however, is now 
moved onwards by the force of the cautions of the linguistic 
philosophers of this century who wisely have advised and 
warned us that language is not a limpid pool of unobstructed 
clarity. To the contrary, language is itself a difficult ' >
form of art, with levels and levels of logic controlling its 
use. Like human nature itself, the possessor is perplexed 
by his possession. . .
There is another reason, too, for dwelling at length
upon the language of the law. Charles Richardson saw it---
/ - • , * . ■ ' ■ but not in relation to law when he wrote his little book*
On The Study of Language, in 1854, Whether one wishes to
call him an early linguistic philosopher is not important here
What is of importance was the warning he spelled out in some
51. LONDON, George Bell, 1854, Vol, 11, Chap, 11, "Of Ab­
straction” , pp 101 ff.
* Richardson did discuss legal and moral terms in Chap. 1,
"Of the Rights of Man", Vol. 11, Chap. 1,, pp 86-101, but 
in a general way, and not as would a law book.
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detail that terms are not terms pure and simple. Terms 
are metaphors oftentimes, and over the course of time : . 
the use of certain terms brings about confusions be- ' 
cause the metaphorical roots and origins of the terms have 
been lost to us. Two simple samples may show his mind.
" W I L D  is willed, will'd ( or self-willed)
; in opposition to animals, etc,, tamed or , . 1
T::K; subdued to the will of others or of Societies. ”
or this set of terms for our second example: : :
; f / ; "WILE, G U I L E . T h e  Anglo-Saxon Wigl-ian,}
 ^ ; ge-wigl-ian* be-wigl-ian, means to conjure,
v to divine, consequently to practise cheat, v
'/V.;v imposture , and enchantment ,, •, : .
* ■ ;• ; "WILE ( from Wigl-ian) , and guile (from ge- ■ ; \
! wigl-ian) , are that by which any one is ;•</;
' ; -. '.v deceived . ■ ■ .--/'V- .
\; y-;v.VMGUILT, is Ge-wigled, gulled, guilfd, guilt; • 
.the past participle of ge-wigl-ian. To find ,
52.
y guilt in any one, is to find that he has been i  ^y
•; gulled . o r , as we now say, beguiled; "that is J"
- : .' says Mr. Trench, "instigante diabolo— - a s  is
•inserted in all indictments for murder, the ; . \
forms of which come down to us from a time ^
when men were not ashamed of tracing evil to 
; : his inspiration.” * (On the Study of Words, Lee, *
' "WICKED means witched, or bewitched; and fco t
: pronounce guilt is to pronounce wicked,11 \ ' i
This does not set one solely on a lexical course, but it
does advise one that a sentence, and in this case a legal
sentence may require greater conceptual analysis than simply
to understand (say) what holding it advances in the law, •
One may be required to analyse, or to attempt an analysis v
o f , the key terms which convey the holding at law,' and this
may involve one in more than legal analysis. ' ' •
5 2. Ibid. , page 120, and pp 168-169, "Of Abs traction, "
607
Not only may a term mask a complex but uripercelved :
metaphor, but the sentence in which the term occurs may 
raise a further issue as to whom the term is addressed ?
One will recall D, P . P . v . ■ Smith 1961 A, C , 290 (H. L , ) V :; ^  :;; k
which troubled itself over the question whether intention v ; " 
was to be measured b y .a subjective or by an objective stan- 
dard. Did the language and tradition of the common law 
address the perception of the agent in his doing of an act.,;--'./ 
or did the language of the common law address a class of ' 5
reasonable actions, their reasonableness something akin 
to the reasonable man standard of tort law ? One need not; ; -v ; 
exhume the legal commentary here upon Smith, but the case ^
demonstrated how difficult it was to ascertain a clear and ; ; 
simple standard by which tb judge criminal intent . -A n e x t ; 
Step may be to ask, not only whom a term addresses, but what.' ’ 
is the proper referent of a term ? One will recall the der
cision from the United States Supreme .Court, Roe v. Wade.!'
410 U.S. 113, rehearing denied, 410 U.S.; 959 (1973)> in 
which the Court itself, during the period of Oral argument,
.asked counsel for the defendant, who had been charged with v ' 'vV’ •; 
procuring an illegal criminal abortion , whether or not the .
term T person *, as used both in the Texas statute f orbidding ^
abortion, and the use of the word ’person’ in the Fifth and; ; ":V;:
Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution, a p . 
plied to an unborn child ? JWas an unborn child a person at law ?
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The transcript ~of the case, as published in the 
series of leading Supreme Court cases by the University 
of Chicago, shows that the Justices of the Court were asking 
both for a philosophical use and understanding of the word 
'person1, and a legal use and understanding of the word 
'person*. The question, however, as the transcript shows, 
was never answered at oral argument; and the lengthy de­
cision of the case left more verbal and conceptual dif­
ficulties about the nature of the word and concept, 'person1 
than it resolved. (The case itself is without the boundaries 
of our research.)
The simple Latin phrase, Actus non facit reum nisi mens 
sit rea, appears late on in common law literature in the 
case of Fowler v. Padget (1798), 7 T,R. 509, per Lord Kenyon, 
C.J. Like so much of English law, it was far from original.
But the maxim— ■— for that is what it was , borrowed from
a latinate literature long forgotten, served less to explain 
than it did to confuse. What did the maxim express ? Did 
it express an empirical truth about human nature and behaviour 
Was it a rule whereby a finding could be made under the rule ? 
How was the maxim to be read ? Was it (say) a preamble to 
a larger code or set of rules ? Was it a maxim to which no 
exception at law should be allowed, unless a lawr-making or 
law-declaration power specifically affirmed. Like a piece
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of metal which, after careful inspection one ascertains 
to be some kind of ancient implement or tool, was this 
maxim some arcane but lost rubric indicating some use 
which had been lost in the past ? Like an ancient tool 
one could surmise that it was used for something, but what 
was its specific use time has erased for us. The maxim, 
however, had not reached that state of desuetude; it was 
used, now and again, at law; and, like a solar battery 
on an outer-space vehicle, it was still sending back to us 
some kind of signal, even if not as clear as one wished. 
Some, however, have taken a very hard attitude and have 
moved for the abandonment of the maxim on the grounds that 
its use has caused such unlimited confusion no further good 
can be gained from continuing its legal use. These, as the 
1960s and the 1970s have shown us, are the modern codifiers 
of the criminal law. ^3. ■ *
53. One example, from amongst many, will suffice. In the 
State of Washington, on the 1st of July, 1976, a revised 
Criminal Code was to come into force. One would be charged 
under that Code: RCW 9A, and then a further number after 
9A which would indicate the named offence under the Code.
RCW 9A.16.030 would indicate:"Homicide —  - When excusable. .
Homicide is excusable when committed bv accident or mis­
fortune in doing any lawful act by lawful means,without cri­
minal negligence, or without any unlawful intent." How­
ever, one would have to keep in mind a direction under the 
Code: RCW 9A.04.060 "Common law to supplement statute. The 
provisions of the common law relating to the commission of 
crime and the punishment thereof, insofar as not inconsistent 
with the Constitution and statutes of this state, shall sup­
plement all penal statutes of this state and all persons 
offending against the same shall be tried in the courts of 
this state having jurisdiction of the offense." As in the 
common law, rules for interpretation, in good part, . /
emerge from the developing case law, and many of the same 
conceptual difficulties would obtain.
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Try as some jurisdictions have to rid themselves 
of legal confusions in the criminal law by making into 
supposedly clear codes what must be the specific elements 
of a crime, the logical primitives of the voluntary and 
the involuntary, the intent and purpose of an act, are 
not to be removed. One is not arguing that a law-making - 
or law-declaration power could not remove difficulties, or 
could not so construct a code of criminal law that only the 
effects of an act were censored and punished; but, in a 
strict sense, this would be to graft on to the criminal 
law the principles which seem to govern tort law ( when 
not concerned with intentional torts'-)* and this kind of 
a hybrid would produce a criminal law heretofore unknown 
to common law jurisdictions. It is not impossible to ima­
gine ( as if one were constructing a game theory ) some 
legal universe in which the law-making powers ruled out any 
appeal to the personal state of an agent, or to his testi­
mony as to why he did what he did. Criminal law could be 
seen as a fixed system of tariffs, like traffic infractions. 
But for the sake of consistency one would have to declare 
the absolute rule that no further testimony by the defendant 
could be given. As with the car improperly parked, the of­
fence would be that act as apprehended: namely, the car im­
properly parked. One would be strictly liable for one’s 
actions, and one would proceed at one Vs peril.
611
; But this has not been the history of the common
law of crimes, save for that period of time when the ac,-’ 
cused could not give evidence on his own behalf because f 
it was assumed that he could not be impartial in his tea-
timony because of his direct self-interest in the outcome . y
of the trial. That period is long behind us. For good ;;
or ill, intention is used' as a concept whereby guilt or 
innocence is determined in the common law system of crimi­
nal law, and: it is with that long system of law that we 
are concerned,. The sum of human experience under liberal 
democracy indicates that when one is accused of a crime, “
ohe wishes to have a chance to affirm one's innocence, to 
explain why one is not guilty.* The system of criminal 
law which appears to have evolved in the common law countries 
is one which affords the right to an accused to explain his 
actions if he so w i s h e s . A s  long as.a legal system has a 
right of reply or of rejoinder» it will not be comprised of 
a strict list of crimes of strict liability, as I had earlier 
instanced. v- ; -V/* 7/ -s.. • r'y -
* One need not cavil about the modern rules of evidence  ^/
in their various jurisdictions. The common law rule 
is followed that the Crown, or the State, must prove; 
the elements of the crime charged, and . 1 f;;.such1'S^not ■ ;yy'"
:\ proven by the State, one; may Aiove f or a directed verdict >? ; * 
to have the case discharged. Common law rules of evidence 
do not require one as the accused to defend oneself af­
firmatively. What may happen, however, is that once the 
State has discharged its: burden of proof, the burden then 
shifts upon the defendant and he may choose to give evidence 
in his own behalf or not. **•: •’ :-7' • v -"V . ■
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The legal process whereby the common law Is ex­
ercised is, at best, a fragile and shifting process. It 
is fragile because its practitioners are humanj and to be 
human is to be capable of error. The consequences of er­
ror in a legal process can be harmful in the extreme. To 
deprive a person of his liberty, or even of his life, is 
to make a serious deprivation, and it should be done with 
all precautions for an accused. The machinery of justice 
which the state can move is a mighty engine, and wrongly 
or unwisely moved and it destroys most about it, including 
itself. Whether one speaks of witchcraft trials over which
ALord Justice Hale presided, or the trials which embodied 
modern political witchcraft when a whole nation found many 
to be Communists in the 1950s with but the slightest pre­
text, how the accused is to be found guilty, and what are 
the legal elements of guilt are questions constantly to be 
reviewe-d, and canons which constantly are to be evaluated.
* The English statutes which governed the witchcraft trials 
were: 5 Eliz., c. 16 (1562), and 1 Jac. 1, c. 12 (1604), 
late repealed by 9 Geo. 2, c. 5 (1736), An argument could 
be made that such statutes were examples of law-making power 
which created for the D a "no win" situation, and that pro­
perly speaking this is not a question of the intentions of 
a defendant, but is a question of what defence a legal sys- 
will, or will not, permit whatever may be the real intentions 
of D. In theory, law-making powers may exclude defences for 
any class of victims ( Roe v Wade ) or any class of accused > 
( Jews in Nazi Germany who were declared to be non-persons, 
and hence did not have rights of defence under the criminal 
system )« .
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The style of philosophical analysis embraced . .
in this monograph has been analytical analysis of texts 
and concepts. The analytical method is a style which is -*•'
helpful because it creates a tension of the text against 
a question. What, for instance, is meant by ’will'
(when one speaks about the human will); or what is meant 
by ’action* (when one speaks of human action); or what is 
meant by ’know* ( when it is stated that one must know the 
quality or the nature of one’s acts ) ? In the past, ju­
dicial thinkers seemed either to gloss over any sustained 
analysis of such questions as these, or blindly assumed that 
such sustained analysis and questioning need not be put against 
a legal text. There was the confident tone that any man 
who rode the Clapham omnibus home in the evening would easily 
know how to answer puzzling legal questions. But one finds 
that such confidence is self-defeating; the hard problems 
do not go away, and St. Augustine, when asked by a child what 
was meant by the Trinity, is the paradigm case for us that 
what may be simple may not simply be answered or avoided. 
Analytical philosophy, as a method of asking and solving 
questions, underwrites the assumption that what may seem 
obvious is not, after all is said and done, obvious,
One may find that a concept, or a notion, admits 
of various degrees, or interpretations, or meanings. How ,
does one choose between this or that ? Here, it may be that
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one transcends simple speculation to enter Into a! realm 
of pref erences . One may list various applications of a 
concept; one may say it should mean this, another that, or, .
a third yet different from both-— but which is absolute ?
Which wins the day ? It may very well be that one must 
look and see. One may have to admit that this is a limit, : :
to analyticity as a me thod of invest igation. One leaves .; : v
a world of logic and one enters in t o a wo rid.o f a e s- £
thetics. If A.can do a proof in ten steps, while B can do
the same proof in twenty steps, which is to be preferred ?
One proof may be concise; the o ther proof may be' charmingly ; 
clear. W^iat is required is that one must step outside of 
the protection of a formal system, and this metaphorical ? 
stepping outside of itself the law does in its judgemental 
capacity. No method can finally protect one against deciding 
and what the problem of choice entails, One hopes that if
one has been clear and lucid, then what One has decided w i l l • T
itself also be clear and lucid.. The shortest distance her ^ 5 
tween two points may be a straight line, but for the. road ;
engineer it may mean that he must permit the destruction o f ;:;iV', 
miles of countryside for the planned extension of a dual 
carriage-way, while for some other engineer such would offend 
the overall aesthetic he has of road building. Each.engineer v 
embraces cer tain values on how the roadway is to be built; 
but who is the better of the two, which is the better choice, 
brings in far more values than the distance between two points;
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One perceived such a state of legal tension 
when the House of Lords struggled to decide Hyam. Three 
of the law lords believed that the verdict of murder should 
stand; two of the law lords believed that manslaughter 
should have been substituted for the verdict of murder.
One set of assumptions or one set of legal facts, if held, 
led to one conclusion; but if differently held, then to 
another conclusion. There comes that moment when one must •
step outside of the protective environment which the for- *Y
mality of an analytic system will give to one, and that 
stepping outside is the moment, or act of judgement. The 
child, after all of his practice and reading, finally must 
sit down at the piano and play the piano, or put on its
ice skates and actually skate on the ice, in both cases
taking the chance that the perilous will occur — a wrong 
note out of sequence, a fall when trying to execute a deli­
cate turn on the ice. At law, judgement seems to be more 
than the sum of its preceding steps. How one chooses a jural, 
fact from amongst the facts of a case is one of the mysteries
of legal reasoning . When James 1 and V I , as both King of • •
England and Scotland, tried his hand at judging law cases 
it was said of him that when he first heard one side of a 
case, he could decide for it; but when he had to hear the , ;\
other side of the case, he could decide for its favour too; 
and was reported to have abandoned being a King who judged 
actual law cases because he found the art too difficult.
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There is no sinrple logical form to a r legal x 
dec is ion. One may move from the very simple repotts of / 
early cases which Brooke or Fitzherbert state from the '
mid-1500s, to extremely complicated statements of great 
length which compose a judicial judgement* as was the 
sdecision in Pacific Acceptance Corporation v. Forsyth and : , 
Others,(1970) of the New South Wales Supreme Court, which 
reported is printed over 359 pages and is concerned with' 
a new area of the law, actions against professional advisers. 
No legal philosopher claims that legal decisions are the 
model of logical conclusions. Some decisions at law are • >
, confused, and one is driven to madness when trying to locate 
ratdo decidendi of the judgement. As with such a state 
of affairs ( as can be found often in administrative law i 
decisions ) one is led to strive to make some connection ^ ; 
between the sentences of this judgement, and the; judgement " 
itself. Reasons may lead to action, but not always so.
One is, at that point, left to theorise, stating that the 
reason why the court did not state its reasons conclusively . 
was to indicate that if did not wish to become further inV 
volved in cases of this kind,* i’ , ; . r
* One assumes that a court acts in good faith and im­
partially . Such the case, there may be • instances;'’ \
when the court has arrived at a decision, but the 
written judgement fails to give a solid justification 
for the holding in the decision. If the court hasracted 
fairly, and has heard the evidence of the parties, then 
as a court of law it has discharged itself. That it may 
decide wrongly, or unclearly, is an inherent risk. , ,
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Not intending Co give hostages to fortune, } 7 ;^^
one should nevertheless appreciate and I state it ;:'r •. V:;''-•
here that a strict positivist theory of language,'if
adopted by the law; does yield serious difficulties, - y S
V  To hold that the terms of the law do not describe states 5
of affairs is to enter upon some kind of Alice in Wonder-
v land theory of language . If one holds tha t legal terms , '• ,
ln strictu senso, are purely.nominative, or purely stipu- v . 
latiVe, then one gets in a naming of the beasts p r o b l e m ; %?•
without considering the nature of the beasts named. a To 
call a rabbit a lion, and a lion a rabbit, without regard 
to the natures of either, is to become dinner for the rabbit? y 
if it . enters your garden I * A legal language which has no*Vy;-:V 
respect for natures is no respecter of persons either . Al- . :
. 1 thought this is an issue of law-declaration power , the d e - }
fence against a faulty law which has been declared by a legis-
. lative power is to hold that the law does not. apply to the } ;
natures it embraces. The quickest disposal of it as u theory 
was done by the late Governor Adlai Stevenson of the United y 
. y S tates, w ho, when the. legislature of- his state, Illinois,
sought to make a law prohibiting cats from prowling about at 
night, said, "Cats being ca ts , I don * t expect they will ; yy 
follow the law." The legislature got the message; the law '■
- . was never enacted . “A
* A serious proponent of a stipulative theory of language for 
the law may be found in, "LANGUAGE AND TEE LAW", by GlahviliW 
Williams, L.Q.R. , 1945-1946, • ' ’vl:. P
* 1 In great part, then, my research attempted to in- -;V
vestigate the origin, development, and changes which  ^ K fv 
intention in the law underwent over many centuries. For ; ;
purposes of readability and volume, I wanted to . end the i 
chief part of my research with what broadly were the [ ,, j
mediaeval roots ,of the common.laW^ and I saw Chief Justice i
Hale as the last great embodiment of those scholastic roots, j j
and, by the same token, a spring-board into the modern 
development>o£; reasoning from case law from within the 
tradition and sources themselves of a developing common ! ,
law. It would be to the later scholars, like Blackstone, -■
Wooddeson, East, Foster, Kelyng, and the various Reports .
on the Criminal Law throughout the Nineteenth Century, /• ;; . . |
along with Stephen, Wright, et alii, to develop ;a coherence j
of presentation of a developing common law without incessant / 
return to its mediaeval roots . As the case law developed ;i -'/-V- 
and progressed, it would beeome the basis, more and more, 
of how the common law of crimes would emerge and grow.
■}j:. By moving from the time of Hale into our own Century . ;
it was possible to demonstrate that theories of criminal• ,• .:y./.w'is'j
liability. had not changed unalterably from their ancient roO'ts-. ; V 
I wanted to show that there persisted a relationship between 
the past and the emerging present, and that there was what 
seemed to be a consistent assumption about the nature of . , ^
criminal liability which was expressed variously over time.
V-, 618 V  / . ' \ / [ ■ ■ ' :1;A
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My wish was to demonstrate in this extended research one
central insight which I believe was inherent in the early
Christian roots to which I traced intention. It was that
action was within the province of the human will. The
whole world of intention at criminal law is a world which
deals with the will of man, and which attempts to depict
how the will acts. I am aware that we no longer speak in
this stilted way, but at the very bottom of my research was
an awareness, which I tried to develop, that the will is the
key faculty, or concept, to intentional analysis. This
sentiment was well put at the time of Chief Justice Hale,
54 .and in closing, I wish to impress it upon my reader: *
”1 III.3. LASTLY, to render sin compleat and perfectly 
criminal, it is neither enough that for the matter 
of it, it be against some law, nor that such Law be 
known, but the act or omission must be voluntary; that 
is, not what a man was overborn into by some fatal ne­
cessity, or compelled to by the force of some violent 
impression, nor what he could neither help nor hinder; 
but what was so far subject to his own free choice, that 
he willingly did what he did, and could have done other­
wise, or omitted doing if he had so pleased. For what­
ever is not of this nature is not properly an humane act, 
and therefore cannot involve him in the guilt of sin, ho 
more then the effects and productions of natural causes 
can be esteemed vicious. And though men have understanding 
which those other causes are destitute of, yet that being 
onely the Criterion or Test of truth and falsehood, not 
of moral good and evil, therefore vertue and vice are not 
imputable to the understanding but to the Will,. which being 
the Helm of the soul determines all its motions, and ac­
cordingly is accountable for them.” ’
54. THE PENITENT PARDONED....by John Goodman, D.D., Rector
of Hadharo, [LONDON], 1679. [First edition], [Wing number: 
W-1115]. I have preserved the original spelling, and this 
passage was taken from Chapter III, ”0f the Nature of Sin, 
and of the divers States of Sinners.”, section III, ”A11 
sin is voluntary....” , page 56. '
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When the Latin phrase entered into English law- . . 
through its occurrence in Fowler v. Padget (1798) 7 .
T . R. 509, or 101 E.R. 1103, ,;”Actus non facit reum :
nisi mens sit rea.”, it brought with it a concern for 
the will in human acts. ; Lord Kenyon*s utterance of  ^ ‘
the dictum as a fundamental principle of the criminal :.VXV‘ X-X/ 
crime,was consistent with the respect paid to an under­
standing of will which could be found in the literature ; • 
pre-existing Fowler. The Rector of Hadham (supra) cer- . '• 
tainly could have appreciated that the. maxim embodied ■ :
an appeal to the voluntary. One could also have turned ; ;
to the law of Scotland, near that time, to eee that its 1 *'%••• .X 
understanding of human action at law reflected common 
understandings about the voluntary which were later mirroured 
in English law. John Erskine wrote: / o 'r " V  X  VXX
"2. It iis of the essence of a crime that : ;•
• there be an intention in the actor to
v ; ■ commit i t : for an action, in which the ;  ^ ;
will of the agent has no part, is not . !' ' : 1
■ \ - 4 a a proper object, either of rewards or ” v;
punishments: Hence arises the rule: crimen , . ■
’ dolo contrahitur. Simple negligence does ?> :
55. Cf., The Principles of the Law of Scotland ( 3rd edition ), 
by John Erskine, and published by John Balfour, J;
Edinburgh, M.DCC.LXIV (1764), Title 4, ”0f Crimes”,
pp 469-70.
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y y ;  not therefore constitute a proper crime. > ; y;
y. 1,7 ad leg. Corn, de ficar. Yet where it y' ,
is extremely gross, it may be.punished ar- v 
y : bit rar ily or extra Ordinem. See 1.11, de  ^ -
incend. ruin n a u f r Far less can we reckon 
> in the number of crimes involuntary actions, y  y  
v / the first cause of which is not in the agent;
6r those committed by an ideot or furious per­
son: But lesser degrees of fatuity, which only yy,
I- darken reason, will not afford a total d e - ,
f e n c e ,  t h o f t h e y  m ay s a v e  f r o m  t h e  p o e n a  ’
} . o r d i n a r i a . A c t i o n s  c o m m i t t e d  i n  d r u n k e n n e s s  } ;
v  a r e  n o t ,  as  t o  t h i s  q u e s t i o n ,  t o  b e  c o n s i d e r e d  77
a s  i n v o l u n t a r y ,  s e e i n g  t h e / d r u n k e n n e s s  i t s e l f , 
w h i c h  w as t h e  f i r s t  c a u s e  o f  t h e  a c t i o n ,  i s  
•; y b o t h  v o l u n t a r y  a n d  c r i m i n a l . "  -7: y '7-.7y7\7 'y ./ v '
One will appreciate that a serious analysis of English
laws did not. emanate until Blackstone issued his Com­
mentaries (1765). A sentiment of the same kind, but 
expressed in more Christian terms, is written by Black- 
stone, 56 v y yv_“' \• ;• 7,'; V ■; »y . yy;::
y • "For as God, when he created matter, and y
, endued (sic) it with a principle of mo- ! 7 :
bility, established certain rules for the 
C- perpetual direction of that motion; so, v y -
when he created man, and endued him with y yyyy-7 
.y freewill to conduct himself in all parts
of life, he laid down certain and immutable 
laws of human nature, whereby that freewill ,
is in some degree regulated and restrained, y
• - and gave him also the faculty of reason toy '
discover the purpose of, those laws ‘v:.y7 .• 7 ’y -• }'-y”:
This passage plainly suggests that a great legalist
saw as the key to human action under the law was the
human will:. : . " /■ '7'*y:. ■•• “ / . y7 , ' :7 ” . . 7 r• -
56. 1 B l , Com. 39 and 40, Sect 11 (Fourth edition,
y y ; Dublin, mdcclxxi ) .  7 ■ : : .  y'> r *  7:yy;7 7 :y
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I believe that the early Christian stress upon 
the will found its way into the common law; and that .
as the early common law developed it incorporated the , ;
models of the voluntary which the Christian environment y  : y/ ;
presented. /How this incorporation came about at each- • v /
stage of legal development is difficult to say. More time, 
finer collections of early legal documents and; sources, ; 
and one may be able to document how the legal and cultural 
osmosis may havfBi occurred. Because there are only one or - 
two endowed chairs of legal history, and then but a ' f e w / •; 
more endowed chairs in jurisprudence, this is a problem 
still in need of research, scholars and a solution. Further, / 
as in the United States, the great law schools are turning 
away from classical jurisprudence ( with its emphasis upon 
the use of sources j end are turning to a jurisprudence ; 
founded mostly upon economic theory, seeing the workings of 
law as predominantly expressions of latent and patent theories 
of economics. Little understanding will be gained into the :
complications of intention from an economic jurisprudence.
Having pfesented what I belieVe to my understanding of 
roots of criminal intention, I do/ think that one can simply v , . .r; ; 
hold that pne has solved a problem, full stop. Intention by 
its very nature is open-textured, because it is a concept :  ^
through which particular human actions are attempted to be $.... >v.'
understood. There is .always that element in any human action / r 
which is particular to the person causing that action. There //; 
is the particularity of an act , and particulars /have the lagic^i: |;:/
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feature of their particularity which does not lend them v X X X X X X X X  
to easy comparison with other particulars. I do not. mean^X:X :X.X^ 
V to resurrect the metaphysics of haecciety [1 thisness *] ,
which John Duns Scotus espoused, and which was later ex- X V 
pressed by the late nineteenth century poet,.G. M.v Hopkins, X X  
but we should be careful to realise that human ■ actionsare XXX X' 
s elfsamely particulars. When we enter into law, and its v : ;
relationship to the particular; we come into an area We XX
cannot simply describe or predict. What the case will be •
. i s ;how the case Will emerge. The Understanding of this 
activity is made even more difficult because one of the par­
ticulars to a legal decision ( namely, this-case-yet-to-be- 
decided ) is itself not yet a particular legal entity. X 
is an example of an assortment ( a l l  of the action and detail X  
. which the legal process of a trial ’incorporates ) yet-to-be- 
: the^case.. It is not even a foetal state, which seems to imply . 
that some kind of determined identity will emerge, even though 
that identity is not yet the case. In the world of the putative 
legal particular, however, one does not know what identity will.
X- emerge . . ; / ; • ;• r " •' •;
: Ih a world populated; simply by ob jects, one may appeal X
to various general categories ( shape, size / quali ty, and 
the whole mode of accidents which surround a particular ) b y •' 
which to come to know the particular, but in human actions, ?
with their human histories, one does not have a simple particular. 
Although human action may be considered a natural; event ( from ;
624
the point of view of some other person or perspective ) 
we know, to the contrary, that a human action taken from 
the viewpoint of the agent ( who deliberates or may de- / . 
liberate ) is not a natural event. In bringing about a y
deliberative act, no particular yet exists. Intention 
was a way which religious thinking,, moral thinking, and -77; 7 
1 eg al think i n g tried t o c o  mp r eh en d the; agent in relation ,
to himself as .one who produced an action. The world o f ; y y y
the law was like a general map about human action, yet 
like all maps it could be unclear, or it could fail to give 
insight into territory which was unknown to i t . How com­
plete a map to human action the law, which embraced in- . 7
tention, might be, only case by case analysis would tell. ;
I believed the relationship between what the criminal law :‘: y?1’y 
was mapping, and what occurred when an agent acted or . y ;
omitted to act, lay in developing some understanding of -yyy7 
what the voluntary meant, and might entail. As case law . ->'77;; 
developed, it embodied assumptions about human nature and -'y^y- 
behaviour, and I had read those sets of assumptions (which; y 
were both consciously and unconsciously incorporated i n t o 7- ••7;; 
a developing body of criminal law ) to be assumptions about 
the nature of the voluntary. The key ( to me ) between the 7 77
world of the legal map of the criminal law, and the particular 
actions of this and that person, lay in understanding the ;■ v7; 
will in its relation to intelligent actiony V '.‘7-!77
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X / The decided case, just as the past action of 
some person, underneath its obviousness, ie;, this case •. X 
printed out; or this action which is now a past act ion, ;
to be of help in deciding forthcoming cases, or to be of 
help in understanding further human actions, must embody 
some level of generality, which in turn can be understood XXXX-//'
• and, somehow; applied to further cases and actions. One 
finds that one must be able to rise to some level’ of generality, 
and to be able to pick and choose similar features (;or to 
see that similar features are present, or obtain ) from a XxX 
case ( or a human action ), and then enter into a world of x 
qualities so that, at law, stare decisis can function. Equally, 
if one chooses to neglect what may be the common elements 
present in cases, or in human actions, then one absolves oner /X 
self from having to use.a past case as a binding precedent. X ■: 
This very loose and ad hoc nature of the common law prevented XX: ;  
it from revealing any simple organising principles. It is : XXx^X x 
painfully commonplace for a lawyer to be frustrated by the;X/XS,X<X'XX 
court' s decision, especially when no simple organising prin- v/J; 
ciple is revealed in the decision whereby this case was de- 
Xcided. Courts, whether they choose to give reasons t o ;support XXXX 
X their decisions, nevertheless have the power to decide, and
that power may be raw judicial power devoid of the insulating Xx :XX 
material which reasons for axdecisioh may provide. . ‘X
, X Too, there came with the parasitic nature of common -iaw'Xx 
• its habit of using a vocabulary, but not freeing that borrowed . 
vocabulary from past meanings, Xqr from the richness of past useX/X X 
’Will1 ; 'nature' , ' s o u l , 'mind’ ,are not simple terms like wrench'
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* screw-driver* or ’hammer * . When one bo rrows terms > ,
from another vocabulary, especially from a well-formed s / ; 
and diffuse vocabulary as existed in the writings of  ^'• ■ •/•/: £.'•
theology and philosophy, one brings into the law a V, v ;
vocabulary which carries with itself meanings, both overt I
and hidden, from that original vocabulary. , Unless a term 
is given a precise legal sense, one has a range of nuances 
to consider when the term is used. Like, a successor 
corporation, a borrower inherits the strengths and weaknesses 
of.what he has borrowed. But not Only does one borrow 
the terms from other vocabularies, one uses the,concepts 
which those terms express, and which may h a v e /taken centuries 
to develop and then to refine. Key terms used to d e s - c r i b f e v * 
human actions and behaviour bring with themselves a vast V. 
philosophical and theological impedimenta to which the legal 
philosopher must attend when he seeks tO understand the opera-- 
tions of a legal concept. The impurity of legal language : ; i
constantly calls for its refinerneht and purification, ;
Intention as a concept in common law reaches way . / ;
back to the Hellenic world of its moral philosophy, and then 
..slowly works its way through Roman law, through early Church v 
law, into mediaeval philosophy and theology, and then slowly , 7 J 
near to the end of the 18th Century, begins to take upon ■it-f  ^
self a legal shape from out of its own legal resources. The : ; ’ 
development of the concept is slow and tedious, and so much'; ?
;}7y7y.;7::_-:';. V; 7 ^ 7  627 y y  - /y^ ;7' •, ^  ‘ . V
of its development is open to .conjecture,. The 1 inks 
along the way of the course of the legal development y
'■ i'T '*:'.-' 7  °f intention are ' less than clear and direct., ; The y o * yy; 7 77;
7 7  cabulary of the criminal law came from far and wide, k7 /7
7 and how that vocabulary functioned in conveying what 7
intention meant, has been the subject of my research.
: As a philosopher I worked with that vocabulary, and as 7:
7 a philosopher I put questions to the criminal law about y
yy,;.,, What I believed to be its key concept :y intention. It 7 7 7 7 yy-7 /yy
/ has been the spirit of the philosopher which impelled 7 y / ’ .7
me to write as I have, girded in the belief that phi- ;
7 v Tosophical analysis is always timely, and is never des-  ^ y 777 /7•
•. y  ' troyed by time, nb matter from what age . :7y-- - 7- -y 77 y ' / y;\y: 7yyyyy
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